Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh

Himalayan Triangle

A historical survey of British India's relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765–1950

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Foreword

For more than three centuries the British were involved with India, at first only as merchants and then increasingly as imperial rulers. By the middle of the 19th century the existence of the Indian Empire was one of the central fixed points in British colonial and foreign policy; and nothing demonstrated more clearly the new diminished British world role following the Second World War than the departure from India in 1947. The importance of India to the understanding of British history over the greater part of the modern era cannot be questioned. By what may justly be called a miracle the central corpus of source material for the study of this great subject has remained intact and undivided in London in the India Office Library and Records. In this book Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh explains for the benefit of all scholars one section (and a relatively small one at that) of this great wealth of documents, that dealing with British contacts with Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet from the 1760s until the end of British rule in 1947.

When I started working on this material in 1953 as part of my research for my doctoral dissertation at Cambridge on the subject of British relations with Tibet from the 18th century until the Younghusband Expedition of 1904, the India Office Library had not moved from its old premises in Whitehall and the papers were still arranged in a manner better suited for the functions of Whitehall bureaucracy than the methods of an academic historian. Indeed, it was often easier to approach the India Office material through the copies that were sent to the Foreign Office and available in the Public Record Office (then still housed in the pseudo-medieval splendour of Chancery Lane). All this is now changed. The India Office Records have been sorted out and listed. Some of the adventure may have been removed from research, but also a great deal of needless labour. Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh's work, plus her guide to source materials published as a companion volume to *Himalayan Triangle,* would have been of enormous value to me had I had them to hand when I was doing research for my PhD.

In the early 1950s, at least so it seemed to me, the subject on which I was working and which is also the subject of Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh's book was one of great interest but little practical importance. The Himalayas and the Tibetan plateau to their north did not appear to constitute one of the pivots of global policy. Indeed, what appealed to me most about the whole region (a tiny corner of which I was able to visit in 1955) was that it represented a world in which the nuclear and mechanised horrors of the 20th century could be forgotton for a while. Unfortunately, this vision was to prove (indeed the process had already so started) to be quite false. The landscape covered in the present book is far from marginal to world history. It represents the interface between the two most populous nations on earth and marks the site of one of the most complicated boundary disputes ever to disturb the peace of nations.

There have been two major, though related, issues involved in the India Office Records covered in this book (as well as a large number of relatively minor matters), namely the international status of Tibet (and the Chinese rights, or lack of rights, there) and the nature of the Sino-Indian boundary as it had evolved during the period of British rule in India. In that both are to a great

extent problems of history, the records of the India Office are of enormous importance in their understanding if not necessarily in their solution. These documents which Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh has listed and commented upon, and which in 1953 I rather naively thought were obscure, are probably amongst the most important of the records of the British Indian Empire for those who have to deal with the practical affairs of the contemporary world. Their significance, however, is not always easy to understand; and it is here, above all, that Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh has made her contribution to the whole subject, based upon a sound sense of history combined with many years of devoted study of the archives in her care.

There is a certain irony in the fact that the India Office Library and Records, an institution which serves as a memorial to a dead empire, in fact is of great interest to empires which are very much alive. British policy towards the Himalayas from the outset was part and parcel of British policy towards both the Chinese Empire and (particularly from the latter part of the 19th century) the Empire of Tsarist Russia. While the British Empire really has disappeared, the Chinese and Russian Empires have marched on under the leadership of Communist regimes. The Chinese remain in Tibet, where the true nature of their present position can only be appreciated in the context of a fairly recent past upon which some of the records examined here by Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh throw a great deal of light; and the Russians have achieved what they never did in the British period, the occupation of Afghanistan, again a situation the historical context of which can be greatly illuminated by research in the India Office Library and Records.

What Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh has to say about Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan ought to be considered very carefully not only by scholars but also by those more practically involved in the disentangling of the more diplomatic misunderstandings which have arisen over this particular region. In that a significant amount of the confusion has derived from past incomprehension or misinterpretation of the British documents, many of them officially examined on the premises of the India Office Library and Records by visiting delegations, it is perhaps appropriate that this work should serve to help put the evidence, correctly quoted, in its true perspective.

ALASTAIR LAMB

Preface

The extension of East India Company control over Bengal and adjacent areas during the 1760s and the 1770s brought the Company into direct contact with the kingdoms of Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet. The Company's early impetus to penetrate the Himalayan region was not, however, simply a matter of territorial contiguity. On a more fundamental economic level, it also reflected the increasing significance of the China trade in the Company's accounts and, in association with this, a growing anxiety about the imbalance of its Bengal trade. Increasingly, the Company came to rely on its monopoly of the China trade to provide its profits. The main impediment to the expansion of this trade lay in the inability of the East India merchants on the China coast to establish direct communications with the Chinese official hierarchy. Contact with Tibet was thought to offer an alternative to Canton, a way round the obstacle of China through the mediation of the theocrats of Tibet with their special relationship and access to the Manchu Emperor.

No one appreciated the significance of the relationship more clearly than did Warren Hastings when he became Governor-General of Bengal in 1771. Before Hastings, fragmentary documentation bears witness to haphazard attempts at trade through offers of unwanted merchandise to the northern principalities. With Hastings's arrival, rapid territorial expansion in India found a natural expression in the government of Bengal developing quasi-diplomatic relations with neighbouring states. The documents of the East India Company reflect this process. Since British India's relations with the Himalayan region begins in earnest in the late 18th century, this study takes up the story at the same time.

Himalayan Triangle consists of an historical survey which examines, in detail, the diplomatic relationship between British India and the states of Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan from the first connections in the 18th century down to the independence of India in 1947. The aim of the historical study is to present, for the first time, an integrated appraisal of the development of these three kingdoms with their closely inter-linked political and religious ties. The emphasis is on the treatment of the region as a whole, the early common denominator of government being Buddhism and Tibetan suzerainty linking the kingdoms. Within this regional approach – and using the primary source materials in the India Office Library and Records and the Public Record Office in some instances for the first time – the study seeks to reassess particular issues and themes affecting the political development of the region. Foremost amongst these issues were the interests of the great imperial powers, Great Britain and Russia; the claim of China to sovereignty in Tibet and through Tibet to shadowy rights over Sikkim and Bhutan; and the consequences of Britain's earlier strategic and frontier policy in relation to the Himalayan region for the period after 1947.

It needs to be stressed that the diplomatic history of the three Himalayan states outlined in this study is based almost entirely on British archives, and it cannot claim therefore to portray anything other than a one-sided picture. Unfortunately, the Tibetan records in Lhasa, and the Chinese records in Beijing were difficult of access. Records of the Sikkim Darbar under Indian

Government control presented a similar measure of inaccessibility. Bhutan, on the other hand, possesses significant archival material relating to the turbulent years of the Bhutan War and the Younghusband Expedition.

Transliteration of the original spelling of Tibetan words and names, as in bKra-shis-lhunpo and Ngag-dbang Blo-bzang rGya-mtsho, has been avoided. They have been rendered phonetically as Tashilhunpo and Ngawang Lobzang Gyatso. Students of Tibetan would find the original spelling unnecessary, while it would only serve to confuse the general reader. Moreover, the phonetic form was most commonly employed by British officials, although extraordinary discrepancies exist for the period with which this study deals. Archaic spelling of Tibetan words has been retained as in the original, i.e. Teshoo Lama or Boutanner, which correctly interpreted should read Tashi Lama and Bhutanese.

Himalayan Triangle could not have been written without the India Office Library and Records, but its final form owes much to people whose expert knowledge of this specialised field has been given so generously. I am beholden to Dr Hugh Richardson, Tibetan scholar and last British representative at Lhasa, for guidance and for giving me the benefit of his vast experience of Tibetan affairs. I am equally indebted to Dr Alastair Lamb for discussions on frontier matters and the complexities of the McMahon Line which have greatly clarified many of my ideas. His scholarly books and unique interpretation of Himalayan frontier problems were of immense value. To nobody am I more grateful than to the late Sir Penderel Moon, authority on Indian affairs, and the most amusing and trenchant of critics. Gravely ill as he was, he remained a court of appeal throughout.

It must be said that none of these experts can be wholly in agreement with what I have written, and nor can they be held responsible for the structure of the work or my conclusions.

I owe a special thanks to Margaret Macdonald, who painstakingly read through the final draft of *Himalayan Triangle*. The book was typed by Barbara Tilbury, without whose expert help this work would have taken much longer. I wish to thank her for making the collaboration so congenial.

I should also like to acknowledge my gratitude to sources which have no concern with libraries or documents, but who epitomise something of the background against which the events reconstructed in this study took place. To His Holiness the Dalai Lama whose unrivalled knowledge of Tibetan affairs provided inspiration. To Her Majesty the Queen Mother of Bhutan for her generosity in making it possible to explore the Bhutanese setting of my narrative, and to the Chogyal of Sikkim, who helped remove many preconceptions. I regret any pain or annoyance which my interpretation of events or the posthumous verdict passed in these pages on their forebears may cause to them.

AMAR KAUR JASBIR SINGH

Tibet

* The use of the term suzerainty when applied to Tibet and China is, however, anomalous. Its application can be justified only in relation to the British who used the term to describe their view of China's status *vis-à-vis* Tibet. The word itself defies any absolute legal definition. Nor can it be properly associated with the Central Asian concept of the Priest – Patron tradition, which categorised relations between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor long before the British made their appearance on the Himalayan scene.

Early contacts: 1772–1846

The expansion of British territorial possessions in India in the eighteenth century brought about the inevitable contact with the Himalayan kingdoms and notably with Tibet. By the time Warren Hastings became Governor General in 1772, Tibet had already become the closed country which was to intrigue and exasperate the British throughout the nineteenth century. This development was partly due to the consolidation of Manchu control in Lhasa, and in part to the natural inclination of the followers of the great religious teacher Tsong Khapa[1] to isolate their country and thereby to keep their religion inviolate. In the seventh century, Tibet had been unified under the Tibetan King Song-tsen Gampo[2] who extended his influence into the politics of the neighbouring states of Mongolia and China. He forced the rulers of T'ang China to enter into an alliance with him, and established the pattern of relations between Lhasa and Peking. The Mongol conquest of China in 1279 established a nebulous form of Chinese 'suzerainty' in Tibet; it was not until the Manchus succeeded in capturing Peking in 1644 that they were able to give practical effect to that 'suzerainty'.*

In Tibet itself, towards the end of the fourteenth century, the religious reformer Tsong Khapa founded the Gelugpa sect and laid the foundations for the system of incarnate Lamas which came to characterise Tibetan government. As the Dalai Lamas established their power and influence, it spread amongst the tribes of Mongolia. The Manchus were not slow to appreciate the importance of the Dalai Lama's influence in their policy to control events in Mongolia. In the eighteenth century, first under the Emperor K'ang Hsi and then under his successor Ch'ien Lung, the Chinese managed to establish a protectorate over Tibet which culminated in the revolution of 1751 and removed the last lay Tibetan ruler. From that date the Dalai Lama became the temporal and religious ruler of Tibet. A Chinese Resident or Amban and an Assistant Amban were stationed in Lhasa to make sure that Chinese interests were not forgotten.

By the time Hastings began his administration of Bengal in April 1772, it was inevitable that the British would come to have some sort of contact with Tibet. At the time the influence of Tibet was to be found all along the Himalaya, in Ladakh, Lahul, Spiti, Garhwal, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam, as well as in Burma and western China from Yunnan to Kansu. Here were found people with close ties of race and religion to Tibet, and their political affiliations were closely bound up with commercial relations. 'Trade across the Himalayas and trade between China and Tibet was an expression of politics as well as of economics . . . Political changes, therefore, on either side of the Tibetan frontier, had commercial consequences; and attempts to alter the traditional patterns of trade had political effects'.[3]

It was Hastings who made the first serious attempt to establish commercial and diplomatic relations with Tibet. The occasion was provided by the Bhutanese invasion of Cooch Behar in the plains of Bengal, and which Warren Hastings saw as an opportunity for not only extending his control over Cooch

Behar but of establishing commercial links with the principalities to the north. At the request of the Raja of Cooch Behar a force was sent to expel the Bhutanese who, in their turn, appealed to the Tashi Lama at Shigatse in Tibet.[4] The company of troops despatched by Hastings inflicted a series of defeats on the Bhutanese which alarmed the Gurkhas in Nepal. They were reluctant to see British influence established in an area of some considerable interest to themselves and sent an embassy to Tibet to warn the Tashi Lama of the danger of British occupation of Bhutan. The Gurkha's appeal provided the occasion for the Tashi Lama to write to Warren Hastings in October 1774 requesting that 'negotiations be opened' and giving instructions about sending a Company servant to 'inform himself about the nature and state of the country'.[5] Hastings' response to the Panchen Lama was immediate and direct by the offer of a treaty of friendship between Bengal and Tibet, and a request for a passport for an officer to negotiate with the Tibetans.

Hastings' eager response was based on his essential interest in opening up the trading facilities of Tibet. Trade between India and Tibet was no new thing. It had been carried on freely through Nepal and is mentioned by the traveller Ralph Fitch as early as 1583.[6] The other important consideration was that Tibet might provide a route to China. No such opportunity had presented itself before, and Hastings decided to send an envoy to establish contact and explore the commercial possibilities of Tibet. He appointed George Bogle of the Bengal Civil Service, who set out on his mission in 1774. Bogle was instructed to study the markets and resources of Tibet without which no plans for the increase of Indo-Tibetan trade could be devised. He was to investigate the relations between Tibet and China with a view to improving trade and diplomacy with both countries. Finally, he was to find out all he could about the politics, manners and customs of Tibet for the satisfaction of the personal curiosity of Warren Hastings.

Bogle arrived in Tashilhunpo in December 1774, the first Englishman, though by no means the first European, to cross into Tibet. His journals and letters to Warren Hastings reveal that, although he established relations of great friendship with the Panchen Lama, his success was limited by that obstacle which, in different forms, ever after overshadowed British intercourse with Tibet, the influence of China.[7] The IIIrd Panchen Lama, Lobsang Palden Yeshe (1738–80) was one of the great figures of the day. His prestige was unquestioned and though at Tashilhunpo[8] he freely entered into negotiations with a foreigner, it was not possible for him to conclude an agreement without reference to Lhasa and Peking. Bogle's impression was that the Tibetans were prepared to acknowledge the supremacy of the Emperor of China but it was, at the time, strictly confined to Lhasa.[9] The Panchen Lama's intervention on behalf of Bhutan was entirely on his own initiative, and the consequent visit by Bogle was therefore not welcomed by the Regent[10] and the Ambans[11] in Lhasa. Bogle's request for the right of trade between India and Tibet was never answered and he had to be content with the Panchen Lama's recommendation to Tibetan traders, all over the country, to resort to the markets Hastings' proposed to establish in India.[12] Bogle's

narrative reveals that both the Panchen Lama and himself believed that suspicion of foreigners and jealousy of Tashilhunpo had caused Lhasa to refuse their request and the only way to move the Regent and the Ambans was to approach the Emperor direct. To this end they planned for Bogle to visit China.[13]

Although Bogle returned with no trade agreement, he did lay the foundations of friendly relations between Tashilhunpo and the Government of Bengal. Hastings marked his approval of Bogle by entrusting him with another mission to Tibet in 1779, this time with specific instructions to open communications with China.[14] But the mission never took place, as first the Panchen Lama died in 1780 in Peking, followed by the death of George Bogle himself in India in the following year. Nevertheless the authorities at Tashilhunpo considered that they had a special association with the British in India, and in 1782 the brother of the late Panchen Lama, acting as Regent in the interim, wrote to inform Hastings that the new incarnation[15] had been found. Hastings despatched Captain Samuel Turner in 1782 to offer congratulations on the reincarnation and to try and reopen the question of trade with Tibet.[16]

Turner, like Bogle, got no farther than Tashilhunpo, and his request to proceed to Lhasa in order to attend the installation of the VIIIth Dalai Lama[17] was refused. In his report he attributed the refusal not so much to Chinese authority, but to the obstruction which stemmed from the Regent at Lhasa who dominated the Ambans, and was not well-disposed towards the regime at Tashilhunpo under whose patronage the Turner mission had taken place. He also noted the power of the Chinese, but at the same time found the Tibetans unwilling to acknowledge their dependence on the Emperor of China. Turner's instructions were to open a channel of communication with China, and in Tashilhunpo he saw the most obvious intermediary. 'Whenever a regular intercourse takes place between the agents of the government of Bengal and the Chiefs of Tibet, I shall consider it to be the sure basis of an intercourse with China: and it will probably be the medium of the former, that we shall be enabled to arrive at Peking'.[18]

Soon after Turner returned from Tashilhunpo Hastings left India, and with him went the forward policy that had marked his relations with Tibet. There were no further British envoys to Tibet although contact was maintained through the Indian agent Purangir Gosain.[19] No account of early British dealings with Tibet is complete without mentioning the part played by Gosain. He accompanied both Bogle and Turner to Tashilhunpo and brought the Panchen Lama's letter to Hastings in 1774.[20] His association with the Panchen Lama, whom he accompanied to China, was just as close as with the British envoys he advised and his reports give clear evidence of his role as trusted agent on both sides.

Towards the end of 1789 when it was found that no European could hope to travel to China via Tibet, it was obvious that Purangir should be entrusted with the task. The scheme was to obtain 'either the seed or plant of the Tea' and to deliver it to the Chiefs of Rangpur with a 'native' practised in its cultivation. The scheme came to nothing, but the hope of establishing

relations between Britain and China, by means of communication through Tibet, was not entirely ruled out for it had obvious advantages for the East India Company. It was recognised that any improvement in the condition of trade with China by sea would open it to all subjects of England. Whereas improvement in trade across the Himalayan tracts carried no threat to the Company's monopoly.

While the Company considered alternative schemes to open trade by sea with China, the Tibetan route remained high on the agenda. But before they could put the scheme into operation, the Gurkhas invaded the Panchen Lama's territory in 1788, and hopes of Tibet becoming a flourishing trade route were abandoned for the time being. The immediate causes of the invasion were by no means clear. It is possible that, checked in their designs on Sikkim and Bhutan by the establishment of British relations with Tashilhunpo, the Gurkhas decided to direct their expansionist designs further north towards Tibet. Once they had decided to attack Tibet, the reason given for doing so was their long-standing disputes over their claim to rights of minting coinage for circulation in Tibet, and over the duties which the Tibetans charged on salt which they exported to Nepal. The Tibetans had no force with which to oppose them, and remembering the offers of friendship which had been made by Hastings' two envoys, Bogle and Turner, they appealed to the British for help against the invader. Lord Cornwallis, the Governor General,[21] did not intend to get involved in a Himalayan dispute or take any action which might be construed as hostile by the Gurkhas. He was less interested in maintaining good relations with Tashilhunpo or in trans-Himalayan trade than he was in establishing a British representative in Peking. His reply, in consequence, merely promised Tashilhunpo that he would give no assistance to the Gurkhas; at the same time neither could he give any active help to the Tibetans.[22] The result of this response was to suggest to the authorities at Tashilhunpo that the Company's friendship towards Tibet was not as disinterested as the two envoys might have suggested. However, by the time Cornwallis' reply reached Tashilhunpo, the Tibetans had come to terms with the Gurkhas by the promise of payment of a substantial indemnity.

In 1791, the Gurkhas invaded Tibet once more. Only part of the indemnity had been paid as Lhasa had refused to provide Tashilhunpo with the balance. It is probable that Lhasa saw the Gurkha arrival merely hastening Chinese intervention and with it the removal of Tashilhunpo's independence, for she had watched with great suspicion the rise in influence of the Panchen Lama. The result was that the Gurkhas renewed their attack and advanced far into Tibet, capturing Shigatse and plundering the great monastery of Tashilhunpo. While the Gurkhas were withdrawing with their loot, the Emperor Ch'ien Lung of China sent an imperial army to drive them out of Tibet. They were decisively beaten and obliged to come to terms with the Chinese. They agreed to remove themselves from Tibet and to send a tribute mission to Peking once every five years.[23] The Chinese, having arrived, took the opportunity to strengthen their control over Tibet. The reorganisation of the Ambans and the limits of their control was the first priority. Following on this a number of

measures were instituted to regulate the monetary and taxation systems. The old economic dispensation was cancelled, and money struck in Kathmandu was banned in Tibet, where a new mint with Chinese experts was set up. Foreign trade with Tibet was subjected to rigorous regulations, and Tibetans were allowed to trade with outsiders only under licence and by approved routes. The Chinese Ambans were made the sole medium of communication with the outside world, and measures were taken to subject foreigners to close official scrutiny. A new method was devised for the selection of the Dalai Lama by means of a lottery, whereby the names of several candidates were placed in a golden urn and the final selection rested with the Amban in Lhasa who drew out one name.[24] This method gave the Chinese a considerable say in the selection of a new Dalai Lama, since it is not to be supposed that the draw was entirely random. The effect of these reforms systematically removed the limited trading facilities granted by Tashilhunpo to Bogle and Turner.

British diplomacy during the Tibet-Nepalese crisis went against Company interests. The policy was to try to play one side against the other and mediation was offered to both parties. Both sides felt that they had been tricked. In Tibet there was the definite impression that the British had secretly sent troops to help the Gurkhas against the Tibetans.[25] The Tibet-Nepalese war of 1792, as a result, brought to an end the Company's hopes of establishing trade relations with Tibet or indeed with China. The crisis had resulted in an increase of Chinese power in Tibet and dealt a decisive blow to the policy which Hastings had tried to pursue. The Company knew full well that a decisive change had taken place in the political alignment of the Himalayan states. As Turner wrote to Hastings, his former chief, the recent events in Tibet 'will give the Chinese a much greater hold of those countries than they ever had, and rivet that authority which had before the respect only of a superior power'.[26] The events of 1792 closed all passes to British merchandise and all doors to foreigners.

Tibet's policy of exclusion for the period 1792–1904 permitted only a few travellers and missionaries to break the embargo. Some of the more notable were Thomas Manning who, in 1811, travelling in disguise, arrived in Lhasa and met the IXth Dalai Lama.[27] During 1844–46 the Lazarist Fathers Huc and Gabet, appointed by their ecclesiastical superiors, also made their way to the city of the Dalai Lama.[28] Whereas William Moorcroft[29] and the Indian and Sikkimese Pandits of the Survey of India travelled only in the regions remote from Lhasa. Thereafter, the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858[30] brought in its wake some penetration by French missionaries in eastern Tibet and renowned travellers such as Nicolai Przhevalsky.[31] In the main, however, there was no opportunity for close and friendly relations with persons of real importance as there had been in the time of Bogle and Turner.

China and Britain: the opening of Tibet, 1847–96

Although the Government of India in 1846 endeavoured to establish a *modus vivendi* on the frontier with western Tibet by involving the Chinese

Government in a joint frontier commission, no serious attempt to improve the position was made until 1873 when the Government of Bengal, believing that the policy of exclusion was imposed by China, renewed their efforts to secure a regulated trade with Tibet. They approached the Chinese Government for an order of admittance to Tibet. The British Legation in Peking believed that an approach via the Chinese Government would be singularly inept since it would not be considered in the interests of China to grant permission for a British visit which might ultimately undermine its own position, and in all probability would not be honoured by the Tibetans. No progress was made until 1876 when final negotiations relating to the Chefoo Convention[32] offered a suitable opportunity for including a Separate Article, whereby the Chinese undertook, what later events proved they could not perform, to protect any mission that might be sent to Tibet. The value of the undertaking given by China was tested in 1885 when, on the insistence of Colman Macaulay of the Bengal Government, permission was secured through the British Legation at Peking for him to lead a mission to Lhasa. At the last moment it was abandoned as the Tibetans flatly refused to accept the proposed mission, and the Chinese were quite unable to compel them to do so. It was by the Convention on Burma, 1886,[33] when the British needing Chinese recognition of Burma's incorporation into the empire and the Chinese wanting to save face, that a means was found which provided for the countermanding of the mission 'in as much as inquiry into the circumstances by the Chinese Government had shown the existence of many obstacles' to its success.

However, as the British Mission assembled near the Tibetan frontier early in 1886, it caused the Tibetans to fear an invasion, and to forestall such an event, a Tibetan force crossed the Jelap La and built a fort at Lingtu, inside the Sikkim border. The Tibetans had never accepted the rights of the British in Sikkim, and it was also a fact that the Raja of Sikkim's personal and historical allegiance lay with Tibet. The British viewed the intrusion of Tibetan troops into Lingtu, with what looked like the Raja's tacit approval, as a clear violation of the Anglo-Sikkim Convention of 1861.[34] Lord Dufferin, the Governor General, had never been enthusiastic about Macaulay's proposed mission, but was nevertheless anxious to avoid any measure which would enable China to assert her suzerainty over Sikkim. He therefore hoped to induce the Maharaja to co-operate by persuading the Tibetans to vacate Lingtu. The Maharaja gave no indication of complying and the Tibetans not only continued to hold Lingtu, but went further, blocked all trade, levied taxes on the local population and showed no sign of leaving. Dufferin then attempted, through Peking, to compel the Tibetans to withdraw, giving them one year to oblige. The Tsungli Yamen[35] showed little inclination in getting the Tibetans to comply with British demands for, like the Tibetans, they regarded Sikkim as a dependency of Tibet. However, under threat of punitive action, the Yamen despatched urgent messages to the commander of the Tibetan garrison at Lingtu, as well as to the Dalai Lama, emphasising the justice of the British case and asking for an early withdrawal. Neither of these communications received a reply, in fact the letter written to the Tibetan commander at Lingtu was

returned unopened. Lord Dufferin saw it as evidence of China's helplessness in making the defiant Tibetans conform to their wishes, and decided to send a final ultimatum to the Tibetan commander and, in February 1888, to the Dalai Lama as well. Neither brought a reply. As a result, on 20 March 1888, 2000 British troops, commanded by Brigadier Graham, drove the Tibetans out of Lingtu and took up position at Gnatong. The Tibetans made two more attempts in the autumn to retake Lingtu, but were repulsed with heavy losses, while the pursuing British troops advanced twelve miles into the Chumbi valley. The occupation was brief, lasting barely a day, but it alerted the Tsungli Yamen to the necessity of cautious restraint in their dealings with the British.

This was the first act of aggression between Tibet and Britain, and the spark that lit the fuse was Tibetan resentment against British encroachment in Sikkim, whose traditional political allegiance lay with Lhasa. The Tibetan defeat sufficiently alarmed Peking who speedily opened negotiations in India to define the status of Sikkim. The British were anxious that Peking should recognise their protectorate over Sikkim, for which the latter had shown no enthusiasm in the past, nor did it do so now. As a consequence, Chinese intervention to affect a settlement led to protracted negotiations, and at one stage the British threatened to close the episode so far as China was concerned, without arriving at any specific agreement.[36] Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India who conducted some of the negotiations, remarked that the Amban believed that 'he was only a guest in Lhasa – not a master – and he could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to speak of, and he knows the Tibetans have turned upon a Chinese resident before now'.[37]

The Anglo-Chinese Convention and arrival of Lord Curzon, 1890–98

The Chinese refusal to face up to harsh reality, to acknowledge that they had little or no control over Tibet although they continued to behave as if they wielded absolute authority and could conclude the most binding agreements on Tibet's behalf, meant that a stalemate persisted which was not resolved until 1890 when the Anglo-Chinese Convention was signed.[38] By it the boundaries of Sikkim were demarcated and provision made for subsequent discussion regarding questions of trade, pasturage and method of official communications. It also recognised Britain's protectorate over the state, ie control over its internal administration and foreign relations, and gave a joint Anglo-Chinese guarantee of the frontier as laid down. The agreement was only in its first stage and three more years were to elapse before a set of Tibetan Trade Regulations were appended to the 1890 Convention in 1893.[39]

The Trade Regulations provided for the establishment of a trade centre and a British Trade Agent at Yatung.[40] Goods with certain specific exceptions were to be exempt from duty for five years; Indian tea might be imported into Tibet at a rate not exceeding that at which Chinese tea was imported into England, but this would not apply during the five years when other goods

were exempt. Trade disputes arising in Tibet between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects were to be settled by the Political Officer in Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Official. No Tibetan official was party to either agreement and active obstruction by the Tibetans to a treaty, which affected their interests but to which they had not given their consent, eventually nullified the arrangement. Claude White, as Political Officer in Sikkim, visiting Yatung in 1894 to supervise the new Trade Mart there which had been offered by the Chinese and reluctantly accepted by the British, found the Tibetans wholly obstructive and the Chinese officials incapable of coercing them into co-operating. Free trade was effectively hampered by the existence of a 10% duty levied by the Tibetans on all goods passing through Phari. Furthermore, the valley beyond Yatung had been barricaded and Tibetan traders were forbidden from coming to the mart. The Government of India, at the time, twice refused the Bengal Government's request to take up the matter with the Chinese, preferring a conciliatory policy towards the Tibetans in the hopes of satisfactorily negotiating the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.[41] Mr Nolan, Commissioner of Darjeeling, when visiting Yatung in 1895, expressed the opinion that the Chinese were anxious to see the 1890 Convention carried out, but were thwarted in the task by lack of consent on the Tibetan side.

Whatever British objectives may have appeared to be, there is little doubt that the settlement of 1890–93 contained within it the seeds of a future conflict. Although the 1890 Agreement gave the British a legal right to the area above Giaogong, incorporating the river Tista with its watershed, yet it also put aside the Tibetan's own ideas as to their historical boundary. Therefore, when it came to implementing the Convention by actual demarcation of the boundary, the Tibetans were unable to accept it. They continued to maintain posts in north Sikkim as defined by the 1890 Convention, and when the British set up boundary markers along this alignment, the Tibetans promptly removed them. When it came to the trade mart at Yatung, they were equally determined to see that it did not prosper. British protests to China against Tibetan failure to comply with the 1893 Trade Regulations brought no satisfaction either. It was fortunate for the Tibetans that the Governor General, Lord Elgin, was not prepared to take precipitate action against them, even though his detractors accused him of 'conciliation' and 'forbearance'; he was able to point out that British trade with Tibet had continued to increase and actually expanded nearly 500% between 1890 and 1898.[42]

Lord Curzon's Tibetan policy, 1899–1901

Five years of stalemate were eventually broken by the appointment of Lord Curzon as Viceroy. 'The remarkable change that took place when Lord Elgin handed over the reins of office . . . was nowhere better illustrated than in the new Viceroy's approach towards Tibet. Herein from a policy of patient waiting there was now as it were an abrupt shift to one of impatient hurry'.[43] Curzon's arrival coincided with the revision of the Trade Regulations of 1893, and in a communication to the Secretary of State he made an assessment of the

Tibetan question.[44] He refused to accept Yatung, which had been fixed under the 1893 Regulations, as a satisfactory post for Indian trade and was only prepared to accept Phari, further up in the Chumbi valley, as a workable alternative. He emphasised that his aim was to protect traders from being hindered while conducting business directly with the Tibetans, and to make sure that the measure was implemented, that there should exist an option to send a British official to visit Phari, and if possible for him to reside there. He was also determined to make one more effort, through the Ambans, offering a concession over the Sikkim boundary settlement in exchange for improved trade conditions. Should this approach prove abortive, Curzon was for making a direct approach to the Tibetans themselves.[45] The Secretary of State, Lord George Hamilton's[46] reaction was favourable to the first suggestion but extremely guarded regarding a British official visiting and residing in Tibet, since he believed that such a step might cause complications with the Chinese and delay any hope of a settlement.

Curzon, for his part, looked around for an agent through whom it would be possible to enter into 'direct relations with the Dalai Lama of Lhasa'.[47] His choice alighted on the Bhutanese *Vakil,* Kazi Ugyen Dorji.[48] Accordingly, in the autumn of 1899, the first attempt was made by the Kazi to approach the Dalai Lama direct to ascertain whether he was prepared to discuss the frontier question with the British Government. The reply, to all intents and purposes was a refusal, although it was hedged around with the wish to oblige if only the Chinese Amban did not stand in the way.[49] Undeterred, the Bengal Government again persuaded the Kazi to write to Lhasa, and this time the language used was more threatening and warned the Dalai Lama to 'make haste and settle' as speedily as possible or to face the consequences. Even so, the reply from Lhasa was none too encouraging and all that was promised was renewed consultations with the new Amban. Between the second letter to the Dalai Lama and the Kazi's visit to Lhasa, Curzon attempted through the Kashmir Assistant Resident, Captain Kennion, to make use of the Garpons[50] of western Tibet at Gartok as messengers to the hierarchy in Lhasa. Curzon's letter, the first addressed directly to the Dalai Lama, was returned unopened, with an indirect reply stating that it would displease the Chinese if the Dalai Lama corresponded openly with the British Government.[51] As if to add fuel to fire, Kazi Ugyen returned bearing the Viceroy's letter with its seals intact, and was roundly accused of being a 'liar and, in all probability, a Tibetan spy'. This was contrary to what the Bengal Government thought and at a later date proof was provided to vindicate the Kazi.[52]

From the time of the Chefoo Convention of 1876, all attempts by the British to inveigle the Tibetans to co-operate, through the Chinese, had proved ineffective. The Dalai Lama's silence merely enraged the impatient Viceroy who railed against him: 'It is really the most grotesque and indefensible thing that at a distance of little more than 200 miles from our frontier, this community of unarmed monks should set us perpetually at defiance'.[53] It appears not to have struck Curzon that the Tibetan ruler, had he replied, was in danger of arousing criticism at home and anger in Peking. It was more than

probable that he also suspected the Viceroy of not altogether friendly designs on Tibet. Hamilton's response to Curzon's wish for a change in policy was to marshal argument on argument against any precipitate move, to warn him that there could be no question of sending an expedition of any size beyond the frontiers of India. Besides, the authorities in London, nurtured in the traditions of diplomacy, were conscious of the interests of other nations in the region.[54] To intentionally upset the balance in Central Asia was not part of the policy the Foreign Office had in mind.

Basic to Curzon's approach was his view that Russian advance in Central Asia was of a compulsory nature, as it took place in the absence of any great obstacle. Added to this was his impatience with Britain who alone possessed the power to stop the Russian advance, yet deliberately declined to exercise it.[55] The Viceroy's official despatches on Tibet during 1901–02 reveal a growing restlessness in regard to the unsatisfactory nature of the relationship with that country. When he discovered that the Dalai Lama had sent an envoy to the Czar of Russia with autographed letters, yet returned his own sealed ones unopened, Curzon was convinced that not only were his fears of Russian intrigue well-founded, but that the Dalai Lama himself was deeply involved in it.[56] He refused to acknowledge that there had been a continuous and unbroken link between Russia and Tibet; for the most part it had come through the Mongol tribes, converts to Tibetan Lamaism, who had come within the Russian territorial orbit, and for whom Lhasa and her monasteries were the natural goal for their spiritual ambition.[57] Since territorial expansion at Tibet's expense had never been a Russian goal, the Buriat and Kalmuk Mongols were not suspect in Tibetan eyes.[58] In sharp contrast did they view British forward policy in the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Added to which Curzon's importunate communications to the Dalai Lama were but further proof, if any were needed, that it was a clever ruse to enter Tibet.[59]

Towards the end of the nineteenth century one of the Buriat monks in Lhasa was a man called Aguan Dorjieff.[60] He had initially come to Lhasa on a religious visit some twenty years previously when he had settled in the great Drepung monastery in Lhasa. After acquiring exceptional learning in Tibetan religion, philosophy and history, Dorjieff became one of the tutors to the young XIIIth Dalai Lama with whom, it was alleged, he had great personal influence. On Dorjieff's first visit in 1900 to Russia, Curzon appears not to have taken the matter too seriously, but when in 1901 he reappeared and was received by the Czar for the second time, the mission attracting a good deal of attention in the press, Curzon was visibly upset. His argument was that a Russian protectorate over Tibet would constitute a distinct menace and a positive source of danger to the Indian Empire.[61] Enquiries from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorf, produced the reassurance that Dorjieff's visit was in no sense a diplomatic mission but an exchange of innocuous courtesies. This assurance cut little ice with the Viceroy, and writing to Hamilton he set forth the policy change he contemplated. 'I need hardly say that I would not dream of referring to China in the matter. Her suzerainty is a farce, and is only employed as an obstacle. Our dealings must be with Tibet,

and with Tibet alone . . . Of course we do not want their country . . . But it is important that no one else should seize it, and that it should be turned into a sort of buffer state between the Russian and Indian Empires'.[62]

Meanwhile, ineffective attempts to secure British rights under the Treaty of 1890 regarding the demarcation of the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet met with little success. Curzon believed that the only way was 'to frighten the Lama and his small coterie at Lhasa' into negotiating, but he found that the India Office and London had other ideas and they managed, for the time being, to pour cold water on his adventurist policy.[63] Hamilton and his advisers had repeatedly expressed the view, and told the Viceroy that any abrupt move in the direction of Lhasa would not only hasten a Russian protectorate but antagonise Nepal, when an understanding with that country was regarded as a necessary prerequisite to any move beyond India's frontiers.[64] They recommended that Claude White, Political Officer in Sikkim, should make a tour of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and report on his findings, in the first instance.

At this point, rumours of a Russo-Chinese deal on Tibet gained currency, and Curzon's anxiety was fuelled by the texts of the alleged agreement. The pivotal provision of the supposed 12-clause deal was a renunciation by China of all her interests in Tibet in return for a Russian guarantee of the country's territorial integrity.[65] Despite China's emphatic denial regarding a deal, Curzon was convinced that unofficially some such proposal had been made to the Tsungli Yamen.[66] Meanwhile, the Amban at Lhasa was moved to demand from the Viceroy an assurance that White's intentions were of a peaceful character. Tibetan officials of the Tashilhunpo monastery, no less anxious regarding the visit, called on the Political Officer and volunteered to show him the boundary.[67] To Curzon, here was proof at last that his policy was bearing fruit. For not only had the 'junta at Lhasa' responded but, before the year was out, Peking had announced that the old Amban was being replaced by a new incumbent more suitable to the task of negotiating with White. Curzon believed that these manoeuvres were tantamount to China, at last, accepting responsibility for the affairs of Tibet.[68]

The Political Officer's tour in 1902 proved somewhat in the nature of an anti-climax. Curzon considered White's report to have provided useful information, even though its chief discovery was that the grazing rights of the Tibetans on the Sikkim side were balanced by similar rights which the Sikkimese enjoyed across the border. It did not materially improve the British position on the border or effect anything more than a timely assertion of British authority on the area. The tour did, however, serve as a prop for Curzon in his determination to make as much of the Russo-Chinese deal on Tibet as possible. He did not waver in his conviction that a secret understanding, if not a secret treaty, existed and that it was quite in the realms of possibility for China to part with its nominal rights of suzerainty over Tibet to Russia. Throughout 1901 and 1902 Curzon talked of putting troops into Lhasa or of moving a garrison there to forestall the Russians.[70]

Events leading up to the Tibet Mission, 1902–03

The picture that emerges at the end of 1902 was far more complicated than the one Curzon painted in his communications to the Secretary of State. He treated the problem as essentially one of negotiation rather than an episode in international politics. Peking was suggesting that the Russians were following a policy which boded ill for the British. Consequently, Russian disclaimers regarding a Russian-Chinese treaty were disregarded. Even though there was little likelihood of Russia actually occupying Tibet in the immediate future, Russian influence so near India's Himalayan border Curzon suspected would do irreperable damage to British interests. Russian influence in Lhasa might well unsettle Nepal and suggest to the Nepalese Darbar the benefits of playing Russia off against Britain to their advantage. There was the added irritant of the Dalai Lama's refusal to communicate or even to acknowledge the Government of India's presence. Of specific importance were the activities of Dorjieff, whose political affiliations and his proximity to the Tibetan Pontiff placed him in a class apart from other bona fide explorers.[71]

In the summer of 1901, the India Office and Curzon were agreed that a new situation was developing in Tibet. They disagreed, however, in the methods to be adopted to counter it. Curzon was convinced that only direct Anglo-Tibetan discussions would provide a solution to the problem of Tibet. By February 1902, he had outlined a plan whereby White would go up to the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, put up boundary pillars and either drive out the Tibetans from Giaogong or exact a tax on them if they persisted in remaining there. If this action did not bring the Tibetans to see reason, then occupation of the Chumbi valley and holding it until they agreed to open negotiations at Lhasa would certainly do so. To Curzon it was 'the most extraordinary anachronism of the twentieth century that there should exist within less than three hundred miles of the borders of British India a State and Government, with whom political relations do not so much as exist, and with whom it is impossible even to exchange a written communication'.[72] The India Office feared that these tactics would provoke the Tibetans into providing Curzon with an excuse for sending a mission to Lhasa, and they demanded certain modifications. No fresh boundary pillars were to be erected, and there was to be no question of occupying the Chumbi valley, for any such move would throw into question the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and Chinese territorial claims to it. They did, however, agree to the expulsion of the Tibetans from Giaogong.[73]

In June 1902 White, with an escort of 100 troops under the command of Major Iggulden, drove the Tibetans from the disputed hill tract. The Tibetan reaction to the expulsion was surprisingly mild. They sent down Dhurkay Sardar, a Special Frontier Commissioner appointed by the Dalai Lama, to discuss the frontier with White. 'Of course, I absolutely refused to have any dealings with the man, and gave orders he was not be allowed to enter the camp'. The Tibetans were told that unless they sent a proper representative, no discussions would take place. What is more, White now insisted that even if

the Tibetans did send a representative, any further discussions would have to take place at Lhasa or some other Tibetan town, but not on the frontier.[73a]

The Chinese were greatly impressed by the British action at Giaogong and by July had appointed Ho Kuang-hsieh and the Chinese Customs Officer at Yatung, Captain Parr to discuss with White the outstanding questions of Tibetan trade and the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. The Chinese, having suggested the discussions, were then slow in beginning them and many excuses were advanced for the delay. One excuse was that the new Amban Yu T'ai, although appointed, had still not arrived in Lhasa. In spite of the innumerable delays the India Office were inclined to believe that the Chinese intended to achieve a settlement since they had implicitly accepted responsibility for the affairs of Tibet.[74] Differences of opinion still existed as to the best method of getting the Chinese and the Tibetans to the bargaining table and how to lessen Russian penetration into Tibet. The Foreign Office were for a diplomatic approach, a warning that Britain would not tolerate an alteration in the status of Tibet. The India Office agreed that a plan for Tibet was needed, but were not prepared to accept Curzon's formula of a British mission to Lhasa. The only certainty was in the Viceroy's mind: an Anglo-Tibetan treaty to be negotiated at Lhasa.

By the end of 1902, Curzon had turned his attention to the despatch of a mission to Lhasa accompanied by an escort sufficient to overcome any Tibetan opposition it might encounter on the way. The mission would compel the Dalai Lama to acknowledge the existence of the Government of India and force him to refrain from allying himself with Russia. It would ensure that in future a channel of communication existed between India and Tibet, preferably by way of a British representative permanently stationed in Lhasa. It would also demonstrate to the Chinese the 'fiction' of their suzerainty over Tibet which they had shown themselves unable to substantiate.

Hamilton took a grim view of the new shift, fearing that Russia, thwarted in the Far East, would turn her attention to Central Asia.[75] He warned Curzon that the whole Cabinet was opposed to any action which might complicate the pattern of British foreign relations and produce a state of war in a part of the empire. The last thing HMG wished for was the extension of imperial responsibilities in the Himalayan region. Hamilton viewed the case of Tibet as 'the smallest of pawns' and he was loath to commit more than was absolutely necessary to it.[76]

It is in the context of British diplomacy in the Far East and the ever-present suspicion of Russian intent, that one has to examine Curzon's well-known despatch of 8 January 1903, analysing the Tibetan situation and outlining such measures as he deemed fit.[77] Curzon began by reviewing past developments from the middle of 1901, the main emphasis lying on the failure of White's mission to improve materially the British position on the border. He recommended that to start with, it would be necessary to intimidate the Tibetans sufficiently so as to make them revise their policy of 'obstinate inaction' and thereafter to ensure that, in future, an open channel of communication existed between Tibet and India.

Rumours of a Russo-Chinese deal had merely emphasised Curzon's personal conviction that some sort of agreement existed between Russia and Tibet and could not be ignored. Nor was the Indian Government totally satisfied with Russian assurances that the Dorjieff missions had no political significance. The policy of dealing directly with the Dalai Lama had been endorsed by the British Government only after the difficulty of getting anything done through China had become apparent. There was, Curzon argued, nothing new in his proposals, merely the same policy which had instigated the Macaulay Mission and which had been abandoned because of political considerations that had not the remotest connection with Tibet. The problem lay in the myth of Chinese suzerainty. 'We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction – a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. China is always ready to break down the barriers . . . but her pious wishes are defeated by the short-sighted stupidity of the Lamas. In the same way, Tibet is only too anxious to meet our advance, but she is prevented from doing so by the despotic veto of the suzerain. This solemn farce has been re-enacted with a frequency that seems never to deprive it of its attractions or its power to impose'.[78] At this point the distinction between Chinese suzerainty, as opposed to sovereignty, in Tibet had not yet crystallised.

Hamilton's response was cautious, and contained an important caveat. If Russia and Tibet had an alliance, then any action against Tibet would bring Russia to her side. For the Home Government to consider the Viceroy's course of action, there would have to be a good international case to rest it on.[79] Hamilton proposed that Curzon should continue the negotiations on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and insist on the presence, at these talks, of a properly accredited Tibetan representative. In the meantime, the Foreign Office in London would continue their diplomatic discussions with the Russians. When first approached, the Russians, alarmed by rumours regarding a British military expedition to Tibet, asked Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, whether there was any truth in the story. In February 1902, Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, went so far as to protest against British involvement in Tibet, and warned that the Imperial Government might find itself obliged to protect its interests in the region.[80] Lansdowne countered by warning Benckendorff that any display of Russian interest in Tibet would result in Britain safeguarding its own interests there. Both Lansdowne and Benckendorff had to admit that either they each recognised the other's interest in Tibet, or accepted that neither Russia nor Britain intended to alter the status of Tibet. As a result, April 1903 saw an exchange of letters denying British and Russian intentions to alter the status of Tibet. Even so, the Foreign Office had managed to obtain from Benckendorff an agreement that, as the possessors of adjoining frontiers with Tibet, they did have the right to ensure that the Tibetans respected their treaty obligations to the British Government, and to do so by force if necessary.[81]

Within the Cabinet itself and at the India Office, most of the influential members rejected the conclusions of Lord Curzon's despatch.[82] They were

not prepared to run the risk of international complications and wanted, if possible, that a *modus vivendi* be arrived at, which would lessen the perpetual friction between the British and the Russians in Central Asia. Hamilton considered that the assurances given by Benckendorff were more general and implicit than those which might have been forthcoming from St Petersburg, and they gave the British an absolutely free hand in Tibet provided they stopped short of annexation. Having secured an assurance, Hamilton could no longer see the necessity for despatching an armed mission to Lhasa.[83] Curzon understood that he had been overruled from London, and his response was strong and angry. He accused the Home Government of 'inveterate flabbiness, this incurable timidity that vitiates the whole of our Asiatic policy'. He knew that the differences which existed between himself and Whitehall required him to move with utmost caution if he was to succeed in his objective, for he had little intention of accepting a policy which would encourage Russian generals 'to dream of the conquest of India . . . His object is not Calcutta, but Constantinople; not the Ganges, but the Golden Horn . . . To keep England quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia; that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian policy'.[83a]

The Younghusband Expedition, 1903–04

Curzon recognised that the Cabinet, on the basis of the arguments then at his disposal, would never sanction a mission to Lhasa. He was in no doubt that such a mission was essential and he chose to develop the reasons for it from the reopened negotiations between the Chinese and the Indian Governments on the frontier. The actual negotiations had first been delayed by the Chinese and then by White's refusal to accept the status of the Tibetan delegates. After a year of procrastination the Amban gave Curzon an opening for which he was looking. The Amban requested that, without further delay, someone should be sent to discuss matters relating to frontier affairs and trade. 'The Deputy . . . can either come to Yatung or the Chinese Deputies will proceed to Sikkim or such other place as may be decided upon by Your Excellency'.[84] Curzon interpreted this ambiguous phrase to mean somewhere in Tibet and proposed the Tibetan town of 'Khamba Jong'.[85] If Khamba Dzong proved to be unsuitable as a location then the scene of the talks was to be advanced to Gyantse or Shigatse. The negotiations were to include not only frontier and grazing rights but general and trade relations between Tibet and India, with special reference to the duty on tea and to the 10% tax levied at Phari on trade in transit. The Tibetan and Chinese authorities were to grant full facilities to the British representative for direct communication with the Tibetan Government in all matters and if they failed to do so, then it was proposed to move him forward to Lhasa.[86]

The India Office and the Cabinet, unanimous in their disapproval of the Viceroy's proposed course of action, toned down the proposals. There was to be no advance beyond Khamba Dzong without a further review in London. It was obvious that if the talks failed then a further advance might prove

inevitable but if successful then a new trade mart at Gyantse would be accepted. There was to be no question of establishing a British Political Agent at Khamba Dzong or at Gyantse.[87] The chief significance of these terms was the acceptance by HMG, for the first time, of a British mission to Tibet. Curzon had got his trade mart removed to Gyantse and also the right of stationing an officer at the mart; the distinction between a trade or political officer was not mutually exclusive after all.[88]

The man chosen to lead the Mission was Major Francis Younghusband.[89] He was Curzon's personal choice and he was to commend him to the Secretary of State for his 'great Asiatic experience, discretion and judgment'. Moreover, he shared Curzon's preoccupation of the irresistable Russian advance towards the frontiers of India. During his early explorations through the Pamirs, Younghusband had encountered the Cossack explorer, Captain Grombtchevsky, and of this meeting he wrote: 'Such passes as there were into Hunza I had explored, I had forestalled the Russian'.[90] Between his Pamir adventures and the Mission to Tibet, Younghusband was to act as Political Agent to the Mehtar of Chitral,[91] where, both in his military and political capacity, he earned himself a reputation of being a most deserving and distinguished officer. He was also well-acquainted with the Viceroy having first encountered Curzon when he had taken over as Under-Secretary of State for India in 1892. Later, when Curzon was on a tour of Hunza, the Pamirs and Chitral, he was Younghusband's personal guest. Just before the Tibet appointment, in what appears to be their third meeting, Younghusband was to acknowledge the extent of his regard for the Viceroy, 'And never once afterwards even in the most official dealings, did he treat me as anything else but a friend'.[92]

Under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, Yatung was the only place open to the British in Tibet. By insisting on Khamba Dzong, they were guilty of violating those very treaty obligations which ostensibly they had set out to enforce. Curzon informed the Amban that a small escort would accompany the British Commissioner as befitted his rank;[93] he would be empowered to discuss not only natural grazing rights but the method in which trade relations could be improved with Tibet and with the Chinese Government. The meeting was arranged to take place on 7 July 1903 – the Viceroy's letter was written on 3 July – giving little time for the Chinese Resident either to gauge the import of the Viceroy's word, or much less to protest.[94]

Younghusband, in the meantime, left Simla on his way to Khamba Dzong. To his Mission was attached Claude White as Joint Commissioner, Captain Frederick O'Connor as Secretary, and Sir Ernest Wilton of the China Consular Service for the purpose of dealing with Chinese officials. Younghusband's original brief was to proceed straight to Khamba Dzong, but he preferred to put a different interpretation on his instructions and despatched White and O'Connor and the entire escort to precede him while he held back in Sikkim.[95] White crossed over into Tibet on 6 July 1903 in the face of repeated protests from the Chinese Commissioners, who insisted that Khamba Dzong was on the Tibetan side of the frontier and therefore an unacceptable place for a

rendezvous.[96] Earlier, on 5 July, two Lhasa officials had met the Joint Commissioner at Giaogong (within the Sikkim boundary) and had attempted to discuss matters there, but since White chose to look upon them merely as delegates and not properly accredited plenipotentiaries in the sense demanded by Curzon, their views were easily discounted. As such, it became abundantly clear that talks at Khamba Dzong would be no more successful than they would have been at Giaogong or Yatung. How determined the Tibetans were in dissuading the British force from crossing into their country may be gauged from Captain O'Connor's diary of that day: 'They . . . pressed forward on foot, and catching hold on Mr White's bridle, importuned him to dismount and to repair to their tents. At the same time their servants pressed round our horses, seizing our reins endeavoured to lead us away . . .'.[97] Thus it was that by the time Khamba Dzong was reached, the Tibetans, enraged by White's attitude, showed even less inclination to co-operate with the Mission. Younghusband, commenting on White's behaviour, was far from pleased: 'Politically things are bad. Old White has made a terrible hash of it. He will treat these Chinese and Tibetans as he would the Sikkimese and will not remember that when he crossed the boundary, he crossed out of his own district . . . I regret I ever let him come on ahead alone . . . I had no idea he was so appallingly unfit as he has proved himself to be'.[98]

The Foreign Office, fearing that the Tibetans would not arrive for the negotiations, urged its Minister in Peking to stress the necessity of attaching properly accredited Tibetan representatives to the Chinese Commissioners.[99] Peking appeared to recognise the importance of the request for Tibetan representation, and was eventually able to persuade the Dalai Lama to appoint two officers, Lobsang Trinley, a monk official, and Tsarong Wangchuk Gyalpo, described as a Commandant in 'Interior' Tibet. Ho Kuang-hsieh and Captain Parr were designated as the Chinese Commissioners.[100]

The talks got off to a bad start. Younghusband considered the Chinese and Tibetan delegates as being inferior in rank to himself and White, and would have preferred the Chinese to be represented by the Assistant Amban, and the Tibetan Government by a member of their Council.[101] Nevertheless, on 22 July, he condescended to meet the 'low rank' delegates and attempted to address them all. But even before he could deliver his speech, the Tibetans raised two preliminary objections. First, they protested against Younghusband's presence at Khamba Dzong and pointed out that Giaogong, under the 1890 Agreement, was the accepted place for negotiations. Second, they criticised the size of the escort and asked why, since the talks were meant to be peaceful, had the Mission come with armed guards? Younghusband's explanation that he needed the men to protect himself against 'bad characters' cut little ice with the Tibetans, nor did the speech which followed.[102] His attempt to present the Tibetan Grand Secretary with a copy of his speech met with a point blank refusal to accept it.

Younghusband maintained that the Tibetan's uncooperative attitude was conclusive evidence that they were unfit to conduct negotiations, and anyhow the representatives were not of sufficient rank or authority to parley with him.

Ho, the Chinese Commissioner, then added his voice to those of Younghusband and White, urging the Tibetans to join in the discussions, but to no avail. Younghusband was to note that Ho certainly had not the slightest influence over the Tibetans, and that his only inclination was to bolt.[103] Finding all avenues of approach closed to him, he then ordered the Tibetan delegates to report the substance of his speech to their Government in Lhasa, but the offer was firmly declined.

The first meeting with the delegates was to prove the last. For the next three months, while the British remained at Khamba Dzong, there were no further talks in the strict sense of the word. The Tibetans stayed with their original demand for the withdrawal of the British Mission from Khamba, and this was further confirmed by the arrival of a Deputy from Tashilhunpo on 29 July 1903 who demanded to know the reason for the armed presence within Tibet and requested an immediate withdrawal. By mid-August the British Minister in Peking was also urging the Foreign Secretary to withdraw the troops from Khamba, without which the Tibetans would not agree to negotiate, and in any case it was 'a small and poor place to nourish so large a force'.[104] It should be noted that, in spite of a united demand from the Lhasa delegates, the Deputy from Tashilhunpo, the Chinese representative and even the Foreign Secretary for the British armed escort to be withdrawn, Younghusband was writing to his master that the 'rank of the party with whom we shall soon commence negotiations are considerably divided'.[105] At the end of the two months the Mission was still entrenched at Khamba Dzong, a further reinforcement of British officers was held in reserve in Sikkim, and the British Commissioner was making no secret of his wish to force himself into contact with the Tibetans. His main aim was to use coercion and, if that failed, then to urge the British Government to accept that the new settlement might have to be signed in Lhasa itself.[106] The Tibetans, for their part, were equally determined not to allow negotiations inside Tibet, if it could be avoided.

The Commissioner's complaints were just the fuel Curzon needed to prove that Tibetan 'passive obstruction' meant that a new venue for the meetings would have to be found. He wrote off to the old Amban suggesting that he or his Associate Amban, along with a Councillor of the Dalai Lama and a senior member of the Tibetan National Assembly should proceed immediately to Khamba Dzong for discussions. There, unless early steps were taken to complete the negotiations, the Commissioner would select some other place in Tibet to pass the winter.[107] While on the one hand Curzon was threatening the Amban, on the other he was busy building up a case against the Tibetans for the Home Government. In a despatch to Hamilton he alleged that war had definitely been decided upon by the Lhasa Government since they were determined not to negotiate. Furthermore, they were amassing troops on the frontier and, anticipating their attack, the British Commissioner had increased his own troops. Curzon then produced the case of two Sikkim subjects, men of Lachung, arrested by the Tibetans at Shigatse[108] and whose release was being refused. There was also the incident of the convoy of yaks to Khamba Dzong, sent to act as reinforcements for the baggage train, which had been

forcibly detained by the Tibetans. Another argument put forward was that no sooner had the British Mission entered Tibet than the Tibetans virtually closed the trade mart at Yatung.[109] Finally, Curzon claimed that although the Dalai Lama had agreed to Khamba Dzong as a meeting place, the Tibetans were now adamant about not negotiating there.[110]

Curzon's recommendations to the Cabinet, in the face of these developments, was the occupation of the Chumbi valley and the advance of the Mission to Gyantse. Hamilton, in private, appeared to concede that the matter of a Mission to Tibet was now a very real possibility yet, in his position as Secretary of State, he was not prepared to relent on any advance beyond the Chumbi valley in the first instance.[111] At his own end, Curzon pressed home the vital point of Chinese inability to hasten the arrival of their new Amban Yu T'ai or to pressure the Tibetans into a more reasonable frame of mind. He noted that the Amban's prestige had fallen so low that though he admonished and instructed the Councillors, the Tibetan Government consistently refused to submit to his authority. Nor did the Viceroy forget to remind HMG that the real danger lay in Russian intrigue in Tibet. The end of 1903 found Curzon and the Commissioner just as much concerned with the possibility of a Russian advance into Tibet as they had ever been.[112]

The combined assault and accusations of timidity levelled at Whitehall brought the required answer, with certain stipulations.[113] On 1 October 1903, Hamilton wrote to Curzon informing him that the Cabinet were prepared to authorise the occupation of the Chumbi valley, together with an advance of the Mission to Gyantse, provided 'complete rupture of negotiations proves inevitable'.[114] Curzon was triumphant and promptly pressed home two more reasons as to why the advance into Tibet had become indispensible. He claimed the importance of coming into contact with the Tibetan people who were prepared to enter into relations with the British, in sharp contrast to the clique of Lamas who were 'a narrow, intolerant and superstitious ecclesiastical hierarchy, whose continued ascendancy depends entirely upon the exclusion of the foreigner'.[115] The other, more practical consideration, was that there should be no delay in pressing for a trade mart at Gyantse.[116] It may be recalled here that only three weeks previously, Whitehall had viewed any such forward move with misgiving and Curzon was convinced that he would not get authorisation for an advance from Khamba Dzong into Tibet that autumn.[117]

HMG, sceptical about the gravity of the situation, authorised only a conditional advance since they had little confidence in Curzon's assessment of the problem existing in Tibet. While the Viceroy was preparing for an advance into Tibet, a new Secretary of State for India was taking over in London. This was Curzon's old school friend Henry St John Brodrick. His appointment, strangely, filled the Viceroy with foreboding: 'I must honestly confess there will have to be some change of clothes before he can be generally recognised as the wholehearted champion of Indian interests', he confided to Arthur Godley at the India Office.[118] Godley confirmed that feeling in the Cabinet was decidedly opposed to an advance and warned that if Curzon adhered to his opinion to 'induce the Government to agree, I am afraid that you will find that

the obstacles to an advance to Lhasa which exist in this country are much more formidable than in Tibet'. Thus, by the time Brodrick took office, relations between the two were decidedly cool. It is in the light of this relationship that one should examine the Viceroy's reaction to Brodrick's telegram informing him that the decision to advance to Lhasa would have to be postponed until the Cabinet had met on 6 November. Curzon took it as a personal insult, a deliberate attempt by Brodrick to reverse the earlier policy.[119] Fortunately for Curzon, when eventually the Cabinet did meet, it was Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary who supported the 'going forward now' policy and the advance to Gyantse was sanctioned accordingly. Certain stipulations went with the sanction, namely, since the advance was being made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, the Mission should withdraw as soon as reparation had been obtained. As to the question of enforcing trade facilities in Tibet, these must be considered only in the light of the decision not to establish a permanent mission in Tibet.[120]

Although Curzon felt that he had won an unexpected victory, the Prime Minister's views were far from sanguine. Writing to the King, immediately after the Cabinet meeting, Balfour gave voice to his fear that the Viceroy entertained schemes of territorial expansion which would inevitably prove detrimental to Indian interests as well as to British diplomacy in the Far East.[121] As the sanction went through, the Amban at Lhasa was pleading with the Viceroy and Younghusband to stay the advance, while the Wai-wu-pu in Peking was promising that the new Amban would soon reach Lhasa, by forced marches, if necessary, where he would 'exact obedience' from the Government of Tibet.[122] Their pleading fell on deaf ears; the Chinese were reminded that since their attempts to get the Tibetans to negotiate had proved ineffectual, it was now too late to 'desist from what had already been sanctioned'.[123]

In Europe, Whitehall was forced to consider Russian reactions to any forward move in Tibet. Lansdowne informed Count Benckendorff that it was the outrageous conduct of the Tibetans that had compelled HMG to take the step forward into Tibet. On the other hand, there was no question of permanently occupying any Tibetan territory.[124] Initially, Benckendorff appeared to accept the explanation but, soon after, made some serious representations regarding the British military presence on the Tibetan frontier. He was reminded of Russia's own encroachments in Manchuria, Turkestan and Persia and asked if they would have shown the same forbearance in the face of Tibetan provocation.[125] Faced with this intractable argument, Benckendorff was persuaded to accept the necessity for the advance, with the reassurance that the limited objective of Britain was to obtain satisfaction.

The road to Guru and beyond, 1904

As the year 1903 drew to a close, Curzon and Younghusband had the satisfaction of seeing all opposition to their plans swept aside. The only obstacle remaining was Tibetan resistance, and there was no way of gauging

its extent. The difficulty attending any advance into Tibet during winter was the terrain and the Tibetan weather, but Younghusband was able to convince Curzon that what he had done on the high passes of Gilgit and Chitral was feasible on the higher passes of Tibet. By December 1903, Younghusband had crossed over the Jelap La 'on a bright, clear, sunny day' and found, to his surprise, no one there to oppose his advance.[126] Captain Parr, the local Chinese official, and a Tibetan General came out to meet him requesting him to return to Giaogong where he would find the Amban and the Tibetan Councillors ready and waiting to discuss matters. Younghusband ridiculed the idea and assured them that he intended to press on. Next morning a force under Brigadier General J R L Macdonald advanced cautiously towards Yatung and found their path blocked by a stout wall.[127] Here again, the same Tibetan General begged them not to go further. As Macdonald, with his staff, rode through and Younghusband prepared to follow, he found that 'exactly as I passed under the gateway the local official seized my bridle and made one last ineffectual protest. Then I rode through and the door to Tibet was at last opened'.[128]

The Commissioner camped at Chumbi for nearly a month while the Escort Commander made plans for a further advance. On 6 January 1904, the entire force reached Phari; encountering no opposition, a day later found it encamped at the foot of the T'ang La Pass (15,200 ft) in preparation for the march to Tuna. Three emissaries arrived from Lhasa and urged Captain O'Connor to withdraw the force to Yatung. When Younghusband finally arrived at Tuna on 8 January, he noticed that approximately 2,000 Tibetans were encamped six miles off from the British position. Within two hours of arrival one of the many quarrels that were to take place between Younghusband and Macdonald erupted. Macdonald demanded that the Mission should withdraw to Chumbi due to lack of fuel, grass and the cold afflicting the men.[129] This Younghusband absolutely refused to do. As the Commissioner held his ground, Macdonald was forced to back down, the Mission remaining at Tuna while Macdonald, with the bulk of the force, withdrew a day later over the T'ang La to his base at Chumbi. Before his departure, Macdonald had insisted that a purely military move towards Gyantse required open lines of communication without which he was not prepared to advance his men.[130] Although he left the Mission adequately supplied and guarded yet it faced a camp of 2,000 Tibetans, a number of unfriendly monk officials and no adequate knowledge of the military strength of the enemy. While Younghusband remained marooned at Tuna, still more than eighty miles from Gyantse, the strain of his dealings with Macdonald, plus the fact that the Government of India, unaware of the difficulties existing between the Commissioner and his Military Commander, was asking what was holding up the advance, forced him to an act of staggering foolhardiness.[131]

As the two military forces 'who shared the plateau over which Chomolhari brooded' faced each other, Younghusband decided to establish direct contact, both official and unofficial, with the Tibetans. From the British camp infantry patrols rode out, and the from the Tibetan side delegates rode into the British

lines demanding the return of the Mission to Yatung before negotiations could begin. The first Tibetan deputation appeared on 12 January 1904 and were insistent on a return to Yatung, yet later let fall that discussions might be held at Tuna.[132] It was at this point that Younghusband made a daring bid to visit the Tibetan camp at Guru. It was to be an unofficial visitation. Early in the morning of 13 January, with two companions, he rode out of Tuna and headed for the enemy's camp about ten miles away. On arrival, the Tibetan General received them with marked cordiality and introduced them to three members of the Tibetan hierarchy and three lesser Generals from Shigatse. Younghusband put his case: he had come without escort in the hopes of discovering a path leading to a peaceful solution. The Lhasa General's reply was that the people of Tibet were bound by covenant to bar Europeans from their country thereby keeping their religion inviolate. If the British wanted an amicable settlement, they would have to go back to Yatung and negotiate there. Here, Younghusband made what was almost certainly a tactical error: he brought into the debate the question of Russia. Why was Tibet hostile to Great Britain when she was in close relation with Russia? Why did the Dalai Lama send letters to the Czar of Russia and yet refuse to acknowledge those from the Viceroy of India? Both the General and the monks rebutted these charges, and when Younghusband tried to press the argument and then to leave, he found his way barred. They accused him of being a brigand and a thief.[133] Tension subsided only when Younghusband asked the Tibetans to report to their government the gist of his argument, as he would in his turn to the Viceroy. When the Commissioner departed, the Tibetan General sent a messenger to Tuna to bring back the Viceroy's reply.[134]

Curzon's reply was admonitory. In a letter of 23 January to Younghusband, he drew a revealing distinction between the ostensible and the ulterior purposes of the expedition. 'Remember that in the eyes of HMG we are advancing not because of Dorjieff or the Mission to Livadia or the Russian spies in Lhasa but because of our Convention shamelessly violated, our frontiers trespassed upon, our subjects arrested, our representatives ignored. In your recent talks with the Tibetan General and the monks you seem to have forgotten this, and to have thought only of the bigger objective'.[135]

Curzon's rebuke was lost on Younghusband, who was far from apologetic. 'If it is a question of how to deal with the Tibetans whether by shilly-shallying about like we did at Khamba Jong or by going straight to Lhasa – then I say that I am in a better position to judge than the whole Cabinet and India Office put together'.[136] The encounter served two useful purposes for Younghusband; it convinced him that no compromise was possible with the 'low-bred, insolent, rude and intensely hostile lamas', and later he was able to appease his critics by using this line of reasoning when they accused him of rash judgment in the subsequent fighting at Guru.

The Tibetan attempt to halt the Mission's advance beyond Tuna resulted in the first armed encounter at Guru on 31 March 1904. It started with Macdonald's men ordering the Tibetan levies to lay down their arms. On their refusing to do so, an attempt was made to disarm them forcibly. In this tense

situation, the Tibetan General, evidently exasperated beyond endurance by such behaviour, fired a shot. The mélée that ensued is described in the Commissioner's own words as 'a wretched affair – a pure massacre – brought on by the crass stupidity and childishness of the Tibetan General', and again, 'I was so absolutely sick at that so-called fight, I was quite out of sorts. It was all the Tibetans own fault . . . it was nothing but pure butchery the poor things were penned up in a hollow within a few yards and even feet of our rifles'.[137]

The blame, as can be seen, was made to rest squarely on the Tibetans, and with ill-concealed satisfaction, Younghusband was to note that the Lama representing the Ganden monastery had been killed but as he was 'the most insolent of the three lamas I saw at Guru in January and a thorough-going obstructionist', he had got what he deserved.[138] Both Curzon and Younghusband believed that the tremendous punishment inflicted on the Tibetans – the Tibetans lost 700 men, the British two wounded – would mean that the Mission would reach Gyantse without further fighting and induce the Tibetans, at last, to negotiate. Lhasa, it was felt, would be brought to its senses. These calculations were to be completely belied. Tibetan resistance, however ineffectual, never ceased and merely two weeks later another blood-bath was enacted at Tsamdong Gorge where 190 Tibetan corpses and many hundred wounded and unaccounted for marked the British advance from Guru to Gyantse.[139] Contrary to expectations, these two encounters only served as a preliminary to Tibetan resistance. 'Henceforth, the Tibetans – ill-equipped, ill-led and with a complete lack of planning, much less any awareness of the arts of warfare – offered resistance at every step, however foolhardy at times it may have seemed'.[140]

Macdonald, who had escorted the Mission to Gyantse, left it there and with a large bulk of the force returned to Chumbi. Younghusband was strongly opposed to the withdrawal since it left him with a bare 500 men, two guns and two Maxims and a squadron of mounted infantry. Nevertheless, he took the decision not only to guard his own position, but to attack a Tibetan concentration at Karo La (16,500 feet above sea-level and 45 miles from Gyantse) on the road to Lhasa. The battle took place on 6 May and, after four hours of fighting, the enemy was completely dislodged. The decision to attack was taken in deliberate defiance of instructions from Macdonald, but Younghusband was not a man to be hide-bound by the letter of his command and when, in the months ahead, the matter was brought up by the Secretary of State, his action was defended by Lord Curzon.[141]

While the fighting was going on at Karo La, the Commissioner's camp itself was besieged in the small hours of the morning of 5 May. With only about 150 men, Younghusband fought back and managed to repulse the attack.[142] The decisive victories that took place at Karo La and at Gyantse Dzong were, for Younghusband, the most significant, since it meant that the Mission was no longer on the defensive. The Commissioner, writing to Curzon, explained the advantage of his position: 'With a loss of less than 40 killed on our side we have killed 2,500 Tibetans. We have repulsed every attack on us. We have turned them out of an almost impregnable fort. And we kept open our

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communications . . .'[143] From the time of the attack on Gyantse Dzong, an outer facade of negotiations began, with Younghusband arguing that the only sensible solution was to go on to Lhasa and stay there.[144] While the Commissioner waited, news came from Lhasa that the new Amban would arrive by the beginning of May, bringing with him four Tibetan delegates, to start fresh negotiations. As usual, Younghusband made the discovery that even the new Tibetan delegates were of unacceptable rank.

However, a change had taken place in the chain of command and Curzon, returning home on leave, had been replaced by Lord Ampthill. Relations between Curzon and St John Brodrick had continued to deteriorate, and inevitably the Secretary of State placed a greater measure of confidence in the new Viceroy. In contrast was his growing distrust of Younghusband's haste to go to Lhasa. The Commissioner was, therefore, pressed into the need for further negotiations and for a time limit to be set for the purpose. Although Ampthill was prepared to play a waiting game, yet his hands were considerably tied by the intense fighting that was taking place in and around Gyantse. Rather reluctantly he urged the Secretary of State to agree to an ultimatum being despatched to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, a move to be further reinforced by direct communication from London to the Chinese Government.[145] On 9 June the Secretary of State gave his formal approval for the Mission to proceed to Lhasa if competent negotiators had not arrived at Gyantse by 25 June. By 23 June, the Chinese and Tibetan delegates were on their way and on the afternoon of 1 July, the Ta Lama,[146] accompanied by six representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries, met the Commissioner at Gyantse.[147] Serious negotiations failed, since Younghusband insisted on laying down an impossible condition as a preliminary to any talks. He demanded that Gyantse Dzong itself should be evacuated as a pre-condition, and when the Tibetans failed to comply, the Dzong was taken. Thereafter, Younghusband's attempts to get in touch with the Ta Lama were totally unsuccessful. The capture of the Dzong on 5 July proved to be decisive for, barring a few encounters on the way to Lhasa, it was synonymous with a virtual stop to the fighting.[148]

On 14 July, the Mission began its final march to Lhasa. Two days later, the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan[149] received a letter from the Dalai Lama and the Ta Lama offering further negotiations.[150] On 19 July, the Tibetan envoys the Ta Lama, the Yutok Shapé[151] and the Grand Secretary met the Commissioner at Camp Nagartse and implored him to return to Gyantse.[152] They did so yet again on 29 July at Camp Tolunng. The only response the Commissioner was prepared to give was that he had orders to go to Lhasa and 'go there I must'. Meanwhile, Younghusband received the very first letter from the National Assembly in Lhasa, which bore the seal of the Dalai Lama's Great Chamberlain and of the three great monasteries of Tibet,[153] and later still a direct communication from the Dalai Lama himself. Both communications required him to leave Tibet and both received the same response, that nowhere short of Lhasa was he prepared to halt.[154]

As Younghusband prepared for the final advance from Gyantse to Lhasa,

the problems which had beset him throughout the year were very far from going away. There was the running battle between himself and his chief military aide, General Macdonald, and the growing distrust between HMG and the chief executive of its policy in Tibet. Added to which was the difficulty of transport, made all the more acute by the intense cold. Macdonald advocated an advance to Nagartse and no farther, with only a threat to march on Lhasa. Younghusband was adamant that nothing short of Lhasa, with a prolonged stop-over, would serve his purpose. In the event, a compromise was reached to proceed from Gyantse, without help from a base camp for supplies or military support. The arrangement was hardly suitable from the military viewpoint, but then Macdonald was in the rather invidious position of having to defer to a man inferior in military rank to himself.[155] Also, in spite of repeated warnings from his superiors and even from his old mentor Curzon, Younghusband refused to be moderated, finding himself increasingly impatient of official control. The new Viceroy was forever defending the Commissioner against the military authorities, having to deflect their fury against his high-handed ways. 'The Commander-in-Chief and Elles are both indignant with Younghusband and want to make him essentially subordinate to Macdonald . . . I have to defend Younghusband against the military authorities'.[156] There can be no doubt that the continuous difficulties between Younghusband and Macdonald had its impact on the expedition, not least upon the staff officers under the latter's command.

In Younghusband's own mind there was little doubt that the Mission was not enough in itself. The essentials in which he believed were those set out by Curzon on the eve of his departure for London.[157] These were, that any satisfactory Tibetan settlement would have to include the permanent occupation of the Chumbi valley, and in that case there would need to be a British agent in Tibet, preferably in Lhasa. Such a representative would have to possess the power of constant access to the Dalai Lama, and that any negotiated treaty between Britain and Tibet would have to be signed by the Dalai Lama himself. Curzon, now in England, was canvassing all the support he could get among the Cabinet for his views to be accepted. To his satisfaction, he found, Lord Ampthill's despatch of 26 June 1904 more or less fell in with his own demands.[158] While these points were being debated, it became quite clear that the divergent views of the Home Government and Curzon were, for all practical purposes, irreconcilable. There was, in fact, still a strong feeling in the mind of HMG against anything like a forward policy in Tibet.[159] Cabinet policy was formulated on 6 July and spelt out in a telegram to India. It contained broad agreement on Britain's exclusive political influence in Tibet. Regulations regarding trade and customs duties were to be on the general line of the Convention of 1890; fortifications between the frontier and the point which the Mission may have reached in its advance, were to be demolished. Where they sharply disagreed with Curzonian forward policy was that neither at Lhasa, nor elsewhere, was a Resident to be asked for; any sum demanded for the indemnity should not exceed an amount which would be within the power of the Tibetans to pay, by instalments if

necessary, and spread over three years; the occupation of the Chumbi valley, which was to be the security for the payment of the indemnity and for the fulfilment of conditions in regard to the opening of the trade marts, was to continue until the payment of the indemnity had been completed. The trade marts were to be limited in number to two, Gyantse and Yatung. At each place the Tibetans were required to maintain an Agent who would receive letters from his British counterpart, and would then be responsible for the delivery of these letters to the Tibetan authorities and for their replies.[160]

On the eve of the Mission's arrival in Lhasa the two men who had been the chief executants of Curzon's Tibet policy found themselves completely out of step with the Home Government. In his letters to Lord Ampthill and the Secretary of State, Curzon made his views plain. He accused the Viceroy of breach of faith and of contemplating 'with equanimity the retirement or failure of the expedition before it has accomplished the objects for which it was sent'; and to the latter, that his instructions could not fulfil the condition that 'British influence should be recognised at Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other Power to exercise a pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with the interests of British India'.[161] As for Younghusband, his views were a faithful echo of Curzon's own. 'We are just starting for Lhasa but under rather depressing circumstances. The Home Government will not hear of our having a Resident there'.[162] With Curzon home on leave, he scarcely thought fit to confide in Ampthill's political judgment. Thus, long before Younghusband reached Lhasa, he must have realised that he would have to carry through his policy by indirect means and on his own, a responsibility he did not intend to shirk.

As the Mission approached the capital, the Tibetans were forced to accept that the emphasis of the proposed talks now rested on opening trade marts, and on ensuring exclusive political influence for the British Government, who were prepared to back up their demands by threat of military operations. Tibetan attempts to modify the terms met with a firm refusal. Younghusband pointed out that the terms did not admit of bargaining, and either the Tibetans accepted or he was fully prepared to act against them.[163] He was also convinced that the best thing that could happen as the Mission arrived in Lhasa was for the Dalai Lama to bolt. 'The Chinese Government said they had no influence with the Dalai Lama and rather hoped he would run away – in which I entirely agree'.[164] However, on the eve of his actual arrival in Lhasa, he had completely changed his mind and was confessing to his father that '. . . what I am chiefly afraid of now is the Dalai Lama bolting, so I am angling delicately for him'.[165] But the die was cast, and when Younghusband did arrive in Lhasa, he found the Tibetan ruler gone and no one there of any influence for him to negotiate with. He told Curzon that although he had met the highest Lamas in Lhasa and found them all 'extraordinarily quaint and interesting', yet they were 'utterly hopeless as negotiators'.[166] All was confusion in Lhasa. Yutok Shapé was ill, Ta Lama in disgrace, the Tsongdu or National Assembly was sitting in permanent session, while the Dalai Lama was three marches off from Lhasa.[167] As he contemplated the situation, the Commissioner gave form to

the course of future negotiations. 'I am in the very familiar position . . . of being the one strong man in a country split up into any number of discordant elements'. Foremost among these elements he regarded the Amban Yu T'ai, followed by the Ganden Tri Rimpoché.[168] Both, he considered, would be 'only too delighted to seize the opportunity of having him [Dalai Lama] deposed by the Chinese Emperor'.[169]

On arrival, Younghusband set about finding a Tibetan to be the principal negotiator in the absence of the Head of State. It was not too difficult a task for the Tri Rimpoché had first visited Younghusband on 14 August and, within a few days, was noted as making marked overtures to the Commissioner who, in return, was showing him special attention.[170] The Amban too endorsed the Rimpoché's claims to be 'the best man among the leading Tibetans'.[171] As negotiations were at a standstill, the Tibetans were given a week's notice to appoint a negotiator or face the consequences of military action. On 4 September the Tibetan National Assembly or Tsongdu duly recognised the Tri Rimpoché as the Regent and permitted him to use the seal of the Dalai Lama.[172]

During the first few weeks of his arrival in Lhasa, Younghusband was for pursuing the Dalai Lama and forcing him to return, but was firmly held back by Ampthill.[173] Later still, when he realised that the Dalai Lama was beyond easy reach, Younghusband set about securing his deposition. In this, he appeared to have the backing of the Secretary of State, the Viceroy and, for very obvious reasons, the Amban as well. 'At first sight, it smiles on me. To depose the Dalai Lama, if it can be done in orthodox fashion, would be a signal stroke'.[174] In fact, long before he had reached Lhasa, Younghusband had made up his mind to secure the deposition of the Dalai Lama. He first set out to persuade the Viceroy that a satisfactory Convention could be concluded without the Dalai Lama, provided that the reins of government passed into the hands of the 'Tashi Lama' in accordance with precedence.[175] He then induced the Amban to send a telegram, through him, to Peking asking for the denunciation of the Dalai Lama. On 24 August, in Peking, the Dalai Lama was denounced to the Throne, and two days later an Imperial Decree went out reducing the Tibetan ruler to the station of a private individual and proposing that his place should be taken by Tashilhunpo. All spiritual functions and authority were transferred to the 'Tashi Lama', and future responsibility for Tibetan affairs was charged to the Amban.[176]

What motive guided Yu T'ai to heed Younghusband's behests? The Amban's office had suffered a considerable eclipse during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and in part it was due to China's own decline. In the meantime, the young Dalai Lama had come into his own and the Imperial Resident, never popular, began to be treated with extreme indifference. By supporting Younghusband, Yu T'ai thought he could regain his lost authority, and in the Commissioner he found a man with the most specific instructions neither to ignore nor yet to bypass Chinese suzerainty. In the administrative and governmental chaos that Lhasa presented the Amban seemed to be the only ray of hope. Years later, Younghusband was to record

that 'It was no part of our policy to supplant the Chinese . . . I always tried to treat the Resident with respect, I expected . . . his hearty co-operation. We each of us could and did help the other to the advantage of both'.[177]

The Lhasa Convention, 1904

The Mission having arrived in Lhasa, its achievements Yonghusband knew would have to be embodied in a treaty between himself and the Tibetans, with Chinese adhesion, if at all possible. A dilemma, however, faced the Commissioner for with the Dalai Lama gone, who could be appointed to act on the ruler's behalf? The Dalai Lama had left behind the Tri Rimpoché to act as Regent but then the Amban, at Younghusband's instigation, had deposed the Dalai Lama and, in consequence, the powers of a representative of a deposed ruler were in some considerable doubt.[178] Younghusband solved the problem by dealing with the Tsongdu who would supersede the authority of the Dalai Lama in temporal matters.[179]

On the afternoon of 7 September 1904, in the audience hall of the Potala, the British Commissioner arrived to sign the Convention. The Tibetan's strong protest against such sacrilege he chose to ignore, believing that the act of establishing British prestige in Tibet at last far outweighed any Tibetan superstition.[180] In the end, the Lhasa Convention was negotiated with the Dalai Lama's Representative, the Tri Rimpoché, adorned with the Dalai Lama's spiritual seal and ratified by the Tsongdu. The Amban did not affix his seal to the document, for Yu T'ai had received specific instruction from the Wai-wu-pu not to do so.[181]

The Lhasa Convention was a document of nine Articles.[182] Its main features were as follows: Article I recognised the Sikkim-Tibet frontier as laid down in 1890; Article II opened two new trade marts, Gyantse and Gartok, under the same conditions established for Yatung in 1893, which meant that a British Trade Agent could reside at the marts; Article III reserved questions of tea and tariff for further discussion; Article IV provided free trade for articles subject to tariffs; Article V obliged the Tibetans to keep open roads to the new marts and to transmit letters from the British Trade Agent to the Tibetan and Chinese authorities; Article VI imposed on the Tibetans an indemnity of Rs 75,000,000 (£500,000) payable in 75 annual instalments; Article VII provided that as security for the payment of the indemnity, the Chumbi valley was to be occupied by the British until the indemnity had been paid; Article VIII required the Tibetans to raze all fortifications between the British frontier and Gyantse; and finally, Article IX bound the Tibetans to agree not to have dealings of any kind with any foreign power without British consent. Appended to the Convention was a separate agreement permitting the British Trade Agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa, if and when he saw fit.[183]

The Secretary of State had laid down a definite policy with regard to the indemnity. The Chumbi valley was to be occupied as security for payment and thereafter evacuated at the end of three years, the implication being that the indemnity would have been paid by that time, albeit in instalments. In

actual fact, Younghusband stretched the period of payment and, with it, the occupation of the Chumbi valley to approximately 75 years. Later, he was to maintain that the suggestion for the longer period actually came to him from the Tibetans and he was doing no more than falling in with their wishes.[184] 'The country could well afford to pay 75 lakhs . . . But in Tibet there is almost no cash . . . To pay even a lakh of rupees a year in cash, would cause some difficulty to the Central Government; if I had insisted on only the 25 lakhs being paid within three years, I should have left behind me a raw in Lhasa'. The records and the sequence of events reveal quite another picture.

The first reply by the Tibetans took exception to each of the British terms of settlement, and on the specific question of the indemnity they declined to pay altogether.[185] On 19 August, the Tibetans handed over their second reply in which they accepted, for the first time, a willingness to pay a small amount on the specific condition that the boundary should be fixed at Giaogong. Younghusband was adamant that while the period in which the indemnity was to be paid could be a subject for discussion, the payment itself was not.[186] The Tibetan's were opposed to any extension of the period over which the payment could be made. Yet, on 30 August, Younghusband telegraphed the Government of India for permission to arrange payment of the indemnity by instalments of one lakh of rupees a year, the total amount running into 75 lakhs. On 4 September, without receiving the approval he asked for, he was able to persuade the Tri Rimpoché to accept the British terms. These terms, Younghusband was pleased to note, would enable the British to occupy the Chumbi valley for a considerably longer period than originally anticipated. 'Lord Curzon will, I know, be delighted but how the Home Government will view it, I don't know. If they like to be idiotic they of course need not exercise the right to occupy the Chumbi for 75 years . . .'.[187] On 12 September, the Viceroy telegraphed the Secretary of State informing him that the Lhasa Convention had been signed, with modifications, particularly in regard to the indemnity. Ampthill, explaining the Commissioner's action, gave out that the indemnity was fixed at the special request of the Tri Rimpoché. 'Younghusband, after considerable demur, was obliged to give way on this point, having regard to the necessity of obtaining early signature of Treaty and to the Tibetan's anxiety to conclude settlement'.[188]

The Secretary of State's reaction was swift and he underlined the fact that Younghusband had exceeded HMG's instructions and, though it was out of the question to withdraw support after the Convention had been signed, yet 'I should think there was hardly any precedent for an official disregard of instructions to such a degree'.[189] He authorised the Viceroy to reduce the amount to 25 lakhs, the sum to be paid within three years at the end of which period the occupation of the Chumbi valley was to cease. His orders were to be carried out by Younghusband and the necessary changes incorporated in the Convention.[190] The Commissioner was further advised to secure the consent of the Tibetans to the change before his departure. Both these instructions Younghusband chose to ignore, maintaining that the arrangement was preferred by the Tibetans, that the instructions had come too late and, in any

case, he would give his opinion on arrival in India. Thereafter, a virtual silence fell upon Lhasa. Telegrams from India went unacknowledged until after the Mission had left Lhasa on 22 September. It was only after the Mission's departure that Brodrick was to learn how Younghusband, against specific instructions to the contrary, had made a formal and separate arrangement with the Tibetan Government whereby the British Trade Agent at Gyantse could visit Lhasa 'when it is necessary to consult with high Chinese and Tibetan officials on commercial matters of importance' and which he might find impossible to settle while at Gyantse.[191]

The Commissioner's defence is outlined in a letter to his father where he contends that he got something of value 'over and above what I was asked' and yet, he warns, 'do not mention a word about this for the Secretary of State absolutely forbade my asking for this'.[192] By the time the Commissioner arrived in Simla, he was well aware of HMG's strict censure of him. He was to maintain 'that it was not particularly fair on me to send me into space tied down to return by a certain time and yet to expect me to get a treaty through letter for letter . . . as had been laid down in London'.[193] The Viceroy, attempting to rationalise his behaviour to Brodrick, had this to say: 'I should not like to say that Colonel Younghusband's action was deliberate but I may remind you between ourselves that he is before everything else Lord Curzon's man. He started on his mission thoroughly imbued with Lord Curzon's ideas and convinced of the ignorance and pusillanimity of the Home Government'.[194]

The explanation did not appease Brodrick who viewed the Commissioner's defiance of express instructions with mounting annoyance. He officially informed Ampthill that Younghusband's actions had landed the Home Government into very deep water and he was not prepared to modify the cardinal principle of their policy by having to accept a situation created by their representative's disobedience to orders.[195] On 3 November, the Cabinet unanimously decided not to accept the supplementary agreement, and formally directed the Viceroy to disallow it. Provisions regarding the indemnity were also to be amended in accordance with earlier directives. On 11 November, Lord Ampthill, while ratifying the Convention, incorporated both these changes.[196]

The Panchen Lama; negotiations at Calcutta; the Anglo-Chinese Convention, 1905–06

The immediate reaction by most of the foreign powers to the Convention was hostile. They took exception to what they considered was Britain's exclusive position in Tibet under Article IX of the Lhasa Convention, which bound the Tibetan Government to secure the previous consent of the British Government without which: (i) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign power; (ii) no such power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs; (iii) no representatives or agents of any foreign power shall be admitted to Tibet; (iv)

no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any foreign power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government; (v) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign power, or the subject of any foreign power.[197]

The Chinese claimed that it ignored their rights to sovereignty in Tibet and refused to adhere to the Lhasa Convention. The Russians protested that the Convention had established a British protectorate over Tibet; to substantiate their argument, they pointed to British occupation of the Chumbi valley and the construction of a telegraph line from the Indian border to Gyantse as proof of their assertion. The Germans took exception on the grounds that it gave the British the most favoured-nation-status in Tibet, a status the British Government had consistently denied they were seeking. These diplomatic considerations obliged HMG to modify the Lhasa Convention and thereby to remove the possibility of a British protectorate over Tibet. Nevertheless, despite assertions to the contrary, the Younghusband Mission had brought about a change in the *de facto* status of Tibet. By the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, to which reference had been made in the 1904 treaty, Britain had accepted China's right to negotiate on Tibet's behalf. The Lhasa Convention therefore, without Chinese adhesion, implied an alteration in the status of Tibet. By repudiating the Separate Article of the Lhasa Convention, the British Government, there is no doubt, surrendered their best means of exerting exclusive political influence in Tibetan affairs. It opened the way for the Chinese to assert themselves in a manner that had not been possible since before 1890. The reaction in Peking was swift, and by November 1904, the British Minister in China was reporting that the Chinese were planning to declare Tibet a province of the Chinese Empire.[198] The limitations imposed on the Indian Government upon its action towards Tibet meant that to implement the Lhasa Convention required formal acceptance of it by China.

British officials on the frontier in charge of conducting Anglo-Tibetan relations shared Lord Curzon's view that a direct link with Lhasa was essential if they were to minimise the increase in Chinese influence, let alone that of Russia. Captain O'Connor, the first British Trade Agent at Gyantse, held the view that the most logical alternative to Lhasa would be the Panchen Lama at Shigatse.[199] The Indian Government's aim should be to bring the Panchen Lama into the British sphere of influence and, towards this end, persuade him to make a ceremonial visit to India. The Panchen's terms for accepting the invitation was a guarantee of British protection against the Dalai Lama's party and the Chinese, on his return to Shigatse.[200] The proposal to bring him to Calcutta was put forward by John Claude White, Political Officer for Sikkim, although he carefully withheld the Panchen Lama's terms from the Indian Government. Curzon readily agreed to a formal invitation and by November 1905, the Panchen Lama was on his way to India. By the time he reached Darjeeling, Curzon's term of office was at an end, and he had been replaced by Lord Minto.[201] There was no reason to suppose that the new Viceroy was

interested in any political involvement with the Shigatse authorities; in fact, he had made up his mind that no embarrassing promises were to be offered to the Panchen Lama.

On 10 January 1906 the Panchen Lama called on the Viceroy and repeated his request for assistance in the event of a hostile reception by Lhasa and the Chinese on his return, and that military aid should be granted to counteract it. Both requests were refused but Minto did agree that instructions would be given to the Trade Agent at Gyantse to maintain friendly relations with Shigatse. Lord Morley, who had just taken over at the India Office, viewed the Lama's visit and the policy behind it with a good deal of dismay. He feared that the whole business, if allowed to continue along the lines advocated by White and O'Connor, would lead to something very like a repetition of the Younghusband Mission, and he was determined not to allow it.[202] White was severely reprimanded for misrepresenting the terms on which the Panchen Lama had been invited. It was obvious to Morley that he would need to keep a close check on the activities of Indian officials in specialised frontier issues like Tibet, if his policy of closer Anglo-Russian relations was not to be jeopardised.[203]

The Panchen Lama's visit was arranged at a time when the Government of India was in the process of discussing with the Chinese, at Calcutta, the question of their adhesion to the Lhasa Convention. In India, it was hoped that the Panchen Lama's presence would provide an alternative method of putting pressure on the Chinese during the negotiations. The need for the pressure arose from the divergent views of the Government of India, the Foreign Office and Peking. The Chinese contended that the Lhasa Convention made no explicit reference to China's status in Tibet, and that without their assent as sovereign power the Convention was invalid. Prince Ch'ing of the Wai-wu-pu offered discussions, provided some phrase was inserted into the Lhasa Convention recognising Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in exchange for Chinese acceptance of the general principles of the Convention. The Indian Government were content to leave the Lhasa Convention as it stood since the question of the indemnity, the occupation of the Chumbi valley and the visits by the Trade Agent at Gyantse to Lhasa had been resolved to their satisfaction. Whereas Lansdowne at the Foreign Office felt that the precedent of Tibet, having a right to conduct her foreign relations without reference to China, might prove to be diplomatically unsound if applied to other areas of the British Empire.[204] The Indian Government were reluctant to renegotiate the Lhasa Convention at all, but accepted the need for further discussions in case China decided to declare Tibet as an integral part of her empire. They offered Calcutta as the venue for discussions, the Wai-wu-pu accepted and instructed T'ang Shao-yi[205] to proceed to India for the negotiations.

T'ang Shao-yi arrived in Calcutta on 2 February 1905, and the discussions opened a month later. T'ang declared that the Lhasa Convention was unacceptable to China as it was signed by the Tibetans without Chinese consent. He proposed to renegotiate another treaty, this time with the Chinese but without Tibetan participation. T'ang put forward certain other demands.

He required that the obligations imposed on the Tibetans by the Convention were to be assumed by the Chinese. The new trade marts would be accepted by China, but any modifications in the 1893 Regulations were to be left to Anglo-Chinese discussion and not to Anglo-Tibetan discussion. British officials in Tibet would be permitted to deal with the Tibetan authorities through Chinese officials; the Tibetan indemnity and the three-year occupation of the Chumbi valley, as security for payment, would be agreed to, but only if the Amban appointed a Tibetan official to come to Chumbi to pay the instalments. The Chinese would oversee that all Tibetan forts between the trade marts and the Indian frontiers were destroyed. Finally, Article IX of the Lhasa Convention would require a British denial of intent to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in Tibet's internal affairs. Any such declaration would apply not only to the British Government but to all other foreign powers, but not to China.[206]

The Government of India put forward alternative proposals. In their turn, they were prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty in Tibet; there would be no question of their establishing a protectorate over Tibet, or to control its internal administration, so long as no foreign power attempted to intervene; in relation to the trade marts, the British presence there would mean that they could build and maintain telegraph lines between Gyantse and the Indian frontier. And finally they wanted the exclusion from Tibet of European customs officers in the employ of the Chinese Government. Ever since the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, British officials of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs had been stationed on the border between Sikkim and Tibet. British officials on the Indian side resented their presence there, particularly since they chose to visit the trade marts and go about their business without seeking the Political Officer's permission. At the time of the Calcutta negotiations, O'Connor attempted to restrict Henderson, the current Chinese Customs Officer at Yatung from visiting Gyantse but was informed coldly that 'he could not recognise the right of the Indian Foreign Office to demand categorical explanations of movements or motives of Chinese officials in territory under Chinese suzerainty'.[207] The Calcutta negotiations, therefore, offered a means of ending the practice once and for all.

The Government of India, having secured direct Anglo-Tibetan negotiations, wished the Chinese to accept that while Tibet was nominally a part of the Chinese Empire, yet there could be no question of China having direct responsibility for Tibet. The Chinese, though prepared to grant some concessions in the matter of the trade marts, circumscribed by many prohibitions, were not prepared to surrender China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. In fact, Chinese acceptance of any of the terms of the Lhasa Convention were dependent on British willingness to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, tacitly if not explicitly. By July 1905, the main argument between the two delegates was centred on one issue, suzerainty or sovereignty.[208] Ever since Younghusband's discussions with the Chinese Amban in Lhasa, the terms suzerainty and sovereignty acquired a precision most specific in its application to the Tibetan problem.[209] In all their earlier

negotiations with China, the British had accepted China's right to some supervisory role in Tibet. The Chefoo Convention of 1876, the Burma-Tibet Convention of 1886, the 1890 Convention over Tibetan claims to Sikkim territory, and again in 1893 over the revision of the Trade Regulations, each one had been negotiated between Britain and China, without Tibetan consultation or participation. But in 1904, China's standing had fallen dramatically low, and British foreign policy could no longer regard her as a steady bulwark against Russian influence; nowhere was active disregard for China more evident than in Tibet. China could now be discarded at will, and Curzon saw his dream of direct negotiation with Tibet as a real possibility. Without much ado, he had grasped the nettle. The Lhasa Convention of 1904 bears all the hall-marks of Curzonian forward policy; for the first time a treaty between British India and Tibet without Chinese participation, a possibility, at last, of the Tibetan Government being able to demonstrate its independence. Curzon's determination not to endorse China's fictional authority in Tibet meant that the battle ground for future negotiations was to centre more on the semantics of suzerain or sovereign status for Tibet, rather than on the reality of the status itself.

The Chinese in the Calcutta discussions were determined to secure a definition of Tibetan status which fell in with their view that China was the sovereign power in Tibet. British interests, on the other hand, were in direct conflict with this assumption. In a Tibet where China was suzerain, the British could establish direct relations with the Tibetan authorities without Chinese participation. Every effort was, therefore, made to get China to admit their Tibetan status to be suzerain, whereas T'ang did his best to avoid any such admission. The Viceroy argued that, in 1891, the Chinese themselves had accepted Tibet's independence: 'It may also be mentioned that a point is made by the Yamen of Thibet's condition, which they say is not the same as that of Mongolia, the Turkestan frontier, or Manchuria, which belong to China, but is to be dealt with by China as having in it still something of the simple tributary'.[210] He urged Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Peking, to remind the Wai-wu-pu that the position assumed by China in 1891 was quite different from that being taken up in the Calcutta negotiations.

Curzon firmly refused to endorse Chinese control over Tibet which he believed they could not make effective, and wanted the Calcutta talks broken off. He was not supported by HMG who were inclined to agree with the Wai-wu-pu that if a settlement could not be reached in Calcutta, then the talks would have to be transferred to London or Peking. The Government of India were totally averse to any such move, and as the talks dragged on into September 1905, T'ang brought matters to a head by feigning, Curzon and his advisers believed, diplomatic illness. 'The guiding principle of diplomacy, catch the chance, wait not', he is reputed to have said, and departed for Peking. Curzon was convinced that India derived nothing but benefit from the termination of these discussions. Had he continued as Viceroy, the Indian Government would have fought hard against reopening negotiations. By ending the talks, Whitehall believed that the Tibetans would be forced into the

position of having no alternative but to accept the obligations of the 1904 Lhasa Convention and the Indian Government could, at last, begin to recoup the £1,000,000 they had spent on the Younghusband Expedition.[211] As a result, there was no absolute endorsement of Tibetan status by China. Nevertheless, the obligations of the Lhasa Convention now tied Tibet to both her imperial neighbours; in time the various loop-holes so provided were to bring China back as sovereign in Tibet.

The end of 1905 saw a change of Viceroy and a change of Government in England. The new Liberal Cabinet were for settling the major problems in Central Asia through negotiation with Russia. In line with this thinking, they sought only the minimum involvement on the Tibetan issue. In December 1905, when the Wai-wu-pu urged the Government of India to reopen negotiations in Calcutta, Lord Minto was able to inform them that no useful purpose would be served by further discussion, nor did he attach great importance to the adherence of China to the actual working of the Convention. A question of greater moment was a settlement regarding the future position of the Dalai Lama. Minto wondered 'if HMG were prepared to renew negotiations with China . . . it might, perhaps, be possible to arrange that the Chinese should intern the present Dalai Lama (as was done in the case of one of his predecessors) and definitely announce his exclusion from Thibet'.[212] However, when in February 1906 Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Peking, actually sounded the Wai-wu-pu on the exclusion of the Dalai Lama, he found them opposed to the idea, particularly since they saw little chance of his returning to Lhasa of his own free will, nor would they press him to do so having got him safely under their control at Kumbum monastery near Sining.[213]

With the problem of the Dalai Lama's return duly shelved, Satow and T'ang found little reason for not agreeing to a draft text. In its essentials it hardly differed from those originally proposed by T'ang in January 1906, by which, in Article I, the Lhasa Convention was confirmed; in Article II the British engaged not to annex Tibetan territory nor to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet. Article III confirmed the prohibitions set out in Article IX of the Lhasa Convention which were to apply to Britain as well as to other foreign powers, but the British, as a special concession, were to be permitted to lay telegraph lines between India and Gyantse. Article IV annexed to it the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and confirmed that they were to remain in force so long as they did not conflict with either the Lhasa Convention or the present draft. On 27 April 1906, the Anglo-Chinese Convention was duly signed.[214]

While the Convention did not declare Tibet to be an integral part of China, yet it was phrased in such a way as to imply that only Chinese confirmation of Younghusband's treaty had made it valid; it went further and permitted China to assume responsibility for Anglo-Tibetan relations which the Lhasa Convention of 1904 had left unresolved. Trade Regulations, which the Convention specified would be discussed by Tibetan and British delegates without Chinese participation if necessary, now became of necessity the

subject of Anglo-Chinese negotiations without Tibetan participation. When it came to the question of the indemnity and its payment, the Chinese, hoping to put aside the terms of the Lhasa Convention, insisted on paying it on behalf of the Tibetans, while the British demanded that the Tibetans should do so themselves. The Chinese proposal to pay was made with the object of re-establishing their theoretical right to supremacy over the Tibetan Government and also to ensure that the non-payment of the instalments at the due date should not arise nor stand in the way of the retirement of the British forces from Chumbi as soon as possible. Lansdowne at the Foreign Office wanted to reject the proposal. 'Irrespectively of these considerations, the refusal of the Chinese Government to adhere to the Thibetan Agreement makes it doubly difficult for us to entertain the offer, and upon this ground alone it should be rejected'.[215] He was overruled by Brodrick at the India Office who thought that 'the moral effect of exacting the indemnity directly from the Tibetans would be less valuable to the Indian Government, than the relief afforded from attempting to enforce a direct tribute annually for twenty-five years'.[216]

If Minto had had his way he would have been content to retain the Lhasa Convention without Chinese adherence. Here, for the first time, was a treaty which allowed the Indian Government direct communication with the Tibetan authorities. All previous treaties and agreements, which had emerged during the course of British relations with Tibet had been without Tibetan participation. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 was no exception. As with past tradition, the Tibetans were neither consulted nor did they give their consent to the terms of the Convention. Years later when the XIIIth Dalai Lama, this time an exile in India, called on Lord Minto in March 1910 he emphasised that he could never accept the 1890 nor the 1906 Anglo-Chinese treaties relating to Tibet, in neither of which the Tibetans had participated.[217]

The Government of India fought hard on the issue of the annual payment being made through a Tibetan official, and indeed the first instalment was accepted in Calcutta. However, a year later when the talks had been transferred from India to Peking, the Chinese were granted terms which systematically eroded vital Indian interests, and in accordance with their wishes, the second instalment was accepted by direct telegraphic transfer from Peking to India, without the intervention of a Tibetan official.[218] It marked a defeat for Indian officials and the bitter reflection that they had not sent a British army to Lhasa in order to re-establish China's supremacy in the region. It taught the Indian Government a lesson and, when the question of future negotiations arose regarding the status of Tibet, 'it struggled valiantly to keep them under its own control so as not again to leave vital Indian interests to the tender mercies of the Foreign Office in London and the British Minister in Peking'.[219]

The Liberal Government of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman took office in December 1905, and had as its Secretary of State for India, John Morley.[220] The policy of the new Government was to bring about a change in Anglo-Russian relations through negotiation in London and St Petersburg rather than through the machinations of, what Morley termed, the 'frontier

men'.[221] In other respects, the main thrust of British policy was, the exclusion of Russian influence in Tibet. Evidence for Russia's continued interest in Tibetan affairs was provided in February 1906 when it was discovered that Dorjieff had repeated his earlier journey and gone on a mission from the Dalai Lama to St Petersburg where he had been granted an audience with the Czar, and the Czar had responded by sending a telegram to the Dalai Lama.[222] It was also rumoured that a Buriat guard was intending to escort the Dalai Lama from his place of exile, on his return to Tibet. For Morley, these events proved beyond doubt that an Anglo-Russian agreement to keep out of entanglements with regard to Tibet was essential, if Tibet was to be kept neutral. He seemed not to have considered the possibility that the removal of British-Russian influence from Tibet would provide an open invitation for China to attempt to re-assert her lost prestige.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement concerning Tibet, 1906–07

The preliminaries to the negotiations reveal the stance of the two powers. British interests lay in maintaining the status of Tibet as secured by the 1904 Convention; any alteration in the *status quo* would inevitably unsettle the boundary of the Himalayan frontier. Article IX of the Lhasa Convention permitted the British to maintain a permanent presence in parts of Tibet. It was towards this end that they had lent support to the Panchen Lama in 1906, and in the hopes of lessening the power of the absent Dalai Lama. Russia, for her part, supported the speedy return of the Dalai Lama to his country. They recognized that it was detrimental to their interests to lessen the authority of the Tibetan ruler, since plans to extend their position in Mongolia depended largely on the Dalai Lama's influence in that area. Moreover, they accused the British of meddling in Tibet's internal affairs by advocating the Panchen Lama and warned that the Emperor could not remain indifferent to the sentiments of the large Buddhist population in the Russian Empire.[223]

In August 1906, Count Benckendorff protested at the stationing of British garrisons at Chumbi, Phari and Gyantse, at the establishment of railway and telegraph lines from Darjeeling into the Chumbi valley, the building of permanent depots and the general encouragement of foreign settlement in Tibet.[224] Lord Lansdowne's response was to justify the measures, which he maintained were in accordance with the 1904 Lhasa Convention, although he had to admit that the existence of the Gyantse telegraph was strictly in contravention of the treaty. He vindicated its existence on the grounds that the Trade Agent could speedily summon help in the eventuality of a Tibetan attack. At the same time, he counter-attacked by objecting to the Buriat guard escorting the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa 'as constituting an interference in the internal affairs of that country on the part of Russia'.[225] The Russian Government backed down and agreed that the Buriat guard would escort the Dalai Lama only as far as the Mongolian border, where a Tibetan escort would take charge of the Tibetan ruler. These Anglo-Russian differences and the Czar's telegram to the Dalai Lama alerted the Chinese Government who

promptly despatched Duke P'u, a member of China's Imperial Family, to warn the Dalai Lama not to take any action likely to provoke complications with other powers and to refrain from intriguing with Russian officials.[226] At the time of the warning, the final stages of the negotiations between Satow and T'ang Shao-yi over China's adhesion to the Lhasa Convention were in progress. It is probable that one result of Russian interest in Tibet was an inducement to both Britain and China to come to terms as quickly as possible.

In June 1906, Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Ambassador at St Petersburg and Alexander Isvolski, the Russian Foreign Minister, opened negotiations in an attempt to solve the causes of Anglo-Russian friction in Central Asia. Tibet was on the agenda, as was Persia and Afghanistan. Nicolson proposed five points for discussion on Tibet.[227] Russia was to recognise, as Great Britain had done, the suzerainty of China over Tibet, to engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from interference in its internal administration. Subject to the above stipulation, Russia was also to recognise that, by reason of its geographical position, Britain had a special interest in seeing that the external relations of Tibet were not disturbed by any other Power. The British and Russian Governments were to severally engage not to send a representative to Lhasa. The British and Russian Governments were to agree not to seek or obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights in Tibet. Finally, the British and Russian Governments were to agree that no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, should be pledged or assigned to them or to any of their subjects.

Isvolski agreed to Nos 1, 3, 4 and 5 but point No 2 presented a number of difficulties. These were: the status of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, and the nature of future British and Russian relations with these two Incarnations; the precise implications of the rights which the British had gained in Tibet from the Lhasa Convention, thereafter confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, including the occupation of Chumbi, British status at the trade marts, the Gyantse telegraph and the nature of British contacts with Tibetan officials; whether British and Russian Governments should permit their subjects to undertake unofficial travel in Tibet for scientific, non-political, reasons; on the question of Tibetan travel, what exactly did the term 'Tibet' mean, and where exactly did Tibet meet China proper; in return for Russian recognition of British special interests in Tibet, the British were to acknowledge Russian special interests in Mongolia.

The Russians maintained that they only wanted access to the Dalai Lama for religious reasons, particularly in relation to the Russian Buriats who occupied a strategic area on the border between the Russian and Chinese Empires. Isvolski accepted that Russia should have no political relations with Tibet, but insisted that Russian Buriats should be permitted to visit Tibet for religious purposes. On the question of the Dalai Lama, Isvolski was in agreement that his future should be left in abeyance until such time as the Chinese were moved to secure the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet. Regarding British rights won by the Lhasa Convention, Isvolski made it clear that a permanent British presence

in the Chumbi valley could not be reconciled with China's position in Tibet. Nor was he prepared to accept the total exclusion of Russian officials from Tibet, especially when the British had the right through their trade marts. On the other hand, Minto's view of Tibet's position, 'Tibet is a feudatory state under suzerainty to China, possessing wide autonomous powers, together with power to make treaties in respect of frontiers, mutual trade and similar matters with coterminous states', fell in line with what Isvolski hoped the British might accept in relation to Mongolia.[228] In London it was an accepted fact that if Russia contemplated entering into secret negotiations with Tibet then it would probably be through agents of the standing of Dorjieff and not just any Russian official. Morley, therefore, saw no reason to encourage Indian officials from attempting to visit Lhasa. He was convinced of the need to keep all foreign travel out of Tibet, and in deference to his wishes and, despite the protests of the Indian Government, it was agreed not to permit the entry into Tibet of a mission of any kind whatsoever for the next three years.[229]

As to the definition of the term 'Tibet', the treaties and agreements of 1876, 1886, 1890, 1904 and 1906, all of which concerned Tibet, had not considered or defined the limits of Tibet itself. Russia and Britain understood that certain territories occupied by Tibetans were under Chinese rule; yet the political limits of Tibetan jurisdiction, whether in the north-east towards Tsaidam and Koko-Nor, or in the eastern provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan or in Kham, had never been clearly stated. Isvolski's suggestion that they should 'take Tibet generally as the country considered by the Chinese Government as under that denomination, without endeavouring to define precisely the exact limits and boundaries'[230] was unacceptable to the Foreign Office. They considered that the Chinese Government could not be relied upon regarding the boundaries of China, and most especially when it came to the frontier between eastern Tibet and western China where they might quite conceivably make further encroachments into Tibet and yet maintain that the geographical limits in these border areas remained unchanged. When in February 1907, T'ang Shao-yi was approached and asked to define the geographical limits of Tibet, he volunteered the information that no map of Tibet, later than the eighteenth century, was in the possession of the Chinese Government.[231] Throughout the summer of 1907 the British and Russian Ministers in Peking tried repeatedly to extract a definition out of the Wai-wu-pu; they got no further than to be told that 'no change had ever been made in them, and the old limits should be regarded as authoritative'. Nicolson persuaded Isvolski that, since China was unwilling or unable to give a precise definition of the Tibetan frontiers, it would 'be difficult for the two Governments of Great Britain and Russia to do so on the incomplete and possibly conflicting data . . . I would venture to suggest that the question remain dormant'.[232]

For Britain the Mongolian question was not to be mixed up with that of Tibet, however much Russia might wish it. Even if Russia were to accept Britain's special status in Tibet, little would be gained, since the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 had deprived the Russians room for manoeuvre;

without corresponding advantages, Morley saw no reason whatsoever to help the Russians in their Mongolian venture. The most the British Foreign Office were prepared to offer was diplomatic assistance to get the Chinese Government to recognise the Russian frontier with Mongolia and agree to abstain from interference with it. When the Anglo-Russian Agreement came to be signed on 31 August 1907, there was no mention of Mongolia in any of the three sections concerning Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.[233]

The Anglo-Russian Agreement concerning Tibet contained five Articles with a preamble. In Article I, both Britain and Russia agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of that country. Article II acknowledged Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, and bound both Britain and Russia to negotiate with Tibet only through Chinese mediation, except where the British had been permitted special rights by the confirmation of the Lhasa Convention in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. The Article also provided for Russian and British Buddhists to maintain their spiritual contacts with the Tibetan Church. Article III denied Britain and Russia the right to send representatives to Lhasa. In Article IV, Britain and Russia both agreed not to seek commercial concessions in Tibet. Article V stated that neither Britain nor Russia would interfere with Tibetan revenues. Appended to the Agreement was a British declaration to the effect that once the third instalment of the Tibetan indemnity had been paid and provided the Tibetans had complied faithfully with the terms of the Lhasa Convention, the British would evacuate Chumbi without further delay. As the Agreement was signed, Nicolson and Isvolski exchanged notes in which they pledged their governments to prevent, in so far as they could, the despatch of British or Russian exploratory ventures into Tibetan territory for a period of three years. The Russian acceptance not to equate Mongolia and Tibet proved, in the end, to work in their favour. When, in 1912, the British went back on their own policy and tried to persuade the Russians 'that Tibet and Mongolia were, in fact, two facets of the same problem, the Russians had strong precedents in support of their argument to the contrary'.[234]

As far as the Tibetans were concerned, as with the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, they had neither knowledge nor access to the terms of the 1907 Agreement. Morley considered the Convention as something of a triumph for British interests and was hurt to find Minto rather disturbed that another Agreement had been signed, throwing away still more of the few remaining gains of the Lhasa Convention.[235] For instance in the case of the Chumbi valley it was originally allowed that British occupation could be prolonged if the Tibetans did not honour their pledge. It now required Anglo-Russian consultations; in fact it allowed the Russians a treaty right to exert pressure in relation to the Indian Government's frontier policy. It was unlikely that Russia would henceforth agree to any forward move without some corresponding advantage to herself either in Tibet or elsewhere.

China's Asian policy, 1906–07

The doors of Tibet were forced open by the Younghusband Expedition with

the express purpose of establishing British influence on the high plateau. Neither Curzon nor the Commissioner could have foreseen that the policies of the Home Government, its repudiation of the specifics of the 1904 Lhasa Convention would, within two years, systematically erode British interests. The Tibetan Government were not slow to realise that the Lhasa Convention had been variously modified by the 1906 and 1907 Agreements, to neither of which they were party, and they started to levy duties once again at Phari on Indo-Tibetan trade, to rebuild the forts at Gyantse and along the main route from Sikkim to Lhasa and to stop traders from travelling to Khamba Dzong. It also opened the way for China to rethink her policy towards Tibet and between 1906–1910 the pattern of this policy became increasingly clear. It began when Chang Yin-t'ang was appointed the new Chinese Imperial Commissioner for Tibet in late 1906.

Chang's task was to gain control over the Tibetan administration, weakened as it was by the 1904 Younghusband Expedition and by the absence of the Dalai Lama, and in the process to destroy what remained of British influence in the area. As a beginning, he intended to create at least two new Chinese provinces in Tibet and place them under indirect Chinese rule. In Lhasa, the traditional machinery of Tibetan Government was to be replaced, the Dalai Lama made to publicly acknowledge his subordinate position in the Manchu hierarchy and thereafter to assist the Chinese in their plans. Along the Indo-Tibetan border, Chang began a campaign to negate British influence; a start was made by asserting Chinese claims to suzerainty over Bhutan and Nepal. He selected the Chumbi valley as the scene of his first demonstration of Chinese superiority. From the moment Chang, accompanied by Henderson of the Chinese Customs, entered Chumbi in September 1906, his main aim was to make it clear to the Tibetans that he was there to assert Chinese authority and to ignore British occupation.[236]

The Tibetans were forbidden to have any contact with the British Trade Agent at Gyantse, except through the Chinese official, Kao. Simultaneously, Chinese officials were appointed at Gartok, Yatung and Gyantse to look after the interests of traders and the diplomatic affairs of the trade marts. One of Chang's first tasks was to demand the credentials of his British opposite number.[237] By February 1907, Chang had arrested and sent off in chains the Amban Yu T'ai for failing to stop the Younghusband Mission; he had purged the anti-Chinese Tibetan officers and forbidden the Panchen Lama to receive any more British officials at Shigatse.[238] Various other measures were instituted with the specific aim of belittling the British Trade Agent's prestige at Gyantse. These measures, calculated to cause Captain O'Connor to lose face, succeeded and he wrote off exasperated notes to the Government of India demanding the transfer of the British Agency to Shigatse and the need to assist, as a counterbalance, Britain's old ally, the Panchen Lama. 'Whilst the Chinese are taking advantage of every opportunity to strengthen their position and prestige in Tibet, we are losing ground daily', he complained.[239] Lord Minto accepted most of O'Connor's suggestions and was for making a strong protest against the actions of Chang and Kao. To neutralise the

influence of the two Chinese representatives, Minto wanted to despatch O'Connor up to Shigatse and while there to inform the Tibetans that the second and third instalments of the indemnity were to be paid by the Tibetans themselves at Gyantse. Chang was to be told firmly that the Indian Government did not accept Chinese officials at the trade marts as replacements for Tibetan officials. It was to be made clear to the Tibetan authorities that, despite the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 and its implications, the Government of India still held the obligations of the 1904 Lhasa Convention as binding on themselves and on the Tibetan Government.[240] Lord Morley was horrified by the implications of Lord Minto's suggestions. He totally rejected the Viceroy's requests and called into question the need for 'interfering with the Lhasa Government's relations with the Tashi Lama, or with Chinese actions in Thibet'. The only point he was prepared to concede was a diplomatic protest to Peking against Chang's various measures in Tibet.[241]

By 1907, British officials on the Tibetan frontier were forced to accept that HMG were quite prepared to abandon, without a fight, the advantages secured by the Lhasa Convention. In making his recommendations Minto had hoped that the policies advocated by his frontier officials, if properly construed by the Foreign Office, would influence them to stand fast over Tibet in the St Petersburg talks. This they singularly failed to do. Its effect was to encourage Chang to harass British frontier officials and by so doing force the Indian Government into new negotiations regarding British privileges at the trade marts. An outcome which Chang, by his actions, had hoped, no doubt, to bring about.

The Tibet Trade Regulations, 1908

The difficulties encountered by O'Connor and others at the trade marts became the subject of formal British representation to the Chinese Government. The British Minister in Peking protested at the friction between the two sides, particularly at Gyantse and suggested that conditions might improve if Britain and China worked out a new set of Trade Regulations. The terms of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 had provided a safeguard, whereby the Government of India was obliged to include in any future discussion the Chinese as well as fully authorised Tibetan delegates. The Indian Government were well aware that the Chinese would exploit any discussion of Trade Regulations so as to substitute themselves for Tibetan officials. Minto's aim was to keep the Chinese involvement to the bare minimum and, accordingly, he wanted Tibetan Trade Agents to be appointed and allowed free communication with their British counterparts.[242] However, the Foreign Office felt that they were treaty bound not to ignore the Chinese and advised discussions with them provided fully authorised Tibetan delegates were also associated with the talks.[243] Chang's proposal that discussions could take place between O'Connor and the Tibetan delegate, but that the final text was to be signed by himself and Minto, was turned down.

On 24 August 1907, the Trade Regulations talks opened in Simla with Sir

Louis Dane, the Indian Foreign Secretary, E C Wilton[244] of the China Consular Service and Captain O'Connor representing the British. The Chinese delegate was Chang Yin-t'ang, accompanied by the Tibetan delegate, Tsarong Shapé.[245] Although the negotiations were ostensibly concerned with Tibetan trade, in fact they involved the diplomatic issue of Tibetan status. The Chinese insisted that they were the authoritative Government in Tibet, while the Indian Government claimed that there was a truly representative Tibetan Government who could and did negotiate, without Chinese participation, as enshrined in the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and at the negotiations in Calcutta in 1905. Sir John Jordan, Minister in Peking, spelt out the difficulty: 'The very term "Tibetan Government" requires to be defined . . . My short experience of the working of the existing Conventions convinces me that there will always be great difficulty in getting China to recognise the existence of Tibet as a separate political entity, and that the tendency will be . . . to construe the Adhesion Agreement of 1906 as restoring to China her full suzerain powers'.[246]

Lord Minto, had he been given a free hand, would never have accepted the final text which was signed at Calcutta on 20 April 1908. His argument all along had been that two of the surviving clauses from the Lhasa Convention could effectively be used to pressurize the Chinese and Tibetans into accepting the British position at the trade marts. These levers were the final instalment of the indemnity, and that British troops still remained in occupation of Chumbi. Since the Chumbi valley occupation could only be terminated after the indemnity had been fully paid up, it could be argued that as the Lhasa Convention had not been complied with, the occupation would have to be prolonged. In the event, the Viceroy's recommendations were denied. Morley maintained that the Tibetans could not be made to provide the money themselves, and that 'the Convention with Russia makes it more desirable than ever that we should have no fuss with China . . . we must be out of Chumbi in January [1908] even though it breaks O'Connor's heart'.[247] When in January 1908 Tsarong Shapé produced a cheque signed by Chang for the final instalment, the Indian Government had no option but to accept it.

The Tibet Trade Regulations which were signed at Calcutta on 20 April 1908[248] show clearly the Indian Government's weakness without support from the Home Government. Though the Regulations settled certain administrative problems regarding the trade marts, defining exactly the physical limits of Gyantse, and the rights of British subjects to trade there, they also cleared the way for the Chinese to be the ultimate authority in Tibet. The Government of India protested, but Lord Morley remained unconvinced regarding the importance of the British presence in the Chumbi valley. He held that 'for my own part I have a suspicion that some of your proposals come perilously near internal administration'.[249] The polarised views of the Viceroy and his Secretary of State effectively permitted Chang to insert clauses into the final text of the Trade Regulations which gave the Chinese policing rights along the routes to the trade marts. A mere two years later, the Chinese were able to use these regulations to justify their military occupation of Central

Tibet. Even the role which the Tibetan delegate Tsarong Shapé was to play in the final signature of the Trade Regulations was settled by the British Minister in Peking and the Wai-wu-pu.[250] Regulation 15 agreed that the text should be ratified in London or Peking and not in Lhasa. It also distinguished between the two *plenipotentiaries*, Wilton and Chang, and the Tibetan *delegate*, Tsarong Shapé. The kind of admission of Chinese suzerain rights in Tibet which the Indian Government had tried to avoid in the 1905 Calcutta negotiations and during Chang's forward policy of 1906, was accepted as part of Morley's dictum of non-involvement in Tibetan affairs. In the years that followed, the Trade Regulations themselves brought about little or no change in the value of the trade itself. Indo-Tibetan trade, as a matter of fact, continued to function through the Yatung mart and other traditional channels and bore little relation to the 1908 Regulations.

The XIIIth Dalai Lama, his relations with China and return to Lhasa, 1904–10

Chang's policies of extending China's domination over Tibet was only one aspect of imperial aspirations in the Himalayan region. The other was his close interest in Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepalese affairs. The Government of India feared that Chang's various overtures would come to unsettle Nepal, and find an effective response in the Sikkim and Bhutan Darbars with their traditionally close historical and religious links with Tibet. By October 1908, Minto had found sufficient evidence to convince him that Chang's interest in the northern states indicated that China had embarked on the second stage of her Tibetan policy. The first stage was Chinese control over Tibet itself; the second would be an attempt to confederate Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, the measure inevitably lessening British prestige, or all that remained of it, in the area.[251]

When Chang Yin-t'ang left Tibet in late 1908, he had managed to make considerable progress in consolidating the foundations of a Chinese-dominated administrative and military structure in Tibet. To do so, he had created lay government boards to supersede the theocratic bureaucracy, and a modern army to replace the traditional Tibetan feudal levy. Proposals had been made for the economic development of Tibet through advanced agricultural methods and a Board of Mines to exploit the country's resources in coal and gold. These measures were ultimately to be accompanied by a policy of sinification which was to be undertaken by the Amban Lien Yu who had replaced Yu T'ai.[252]

By the middle of 1908, China's standing in Tibet was sufficiently secure for them to consider the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet, provided he accepted his subordinate position in relation to the Emperor in Peking. His return, it was hoped, could be used to put the seal of legitimacy upon Chang's reforms in Central Tibet. The Dalai Lama had fled Lhasa in 1904 as the Younghusband Mission advanced towards the capital, and had promptly been denied his temporal powers by the Chinese. During his exile, first in Mongolia and then

at Kumbum monastery near Sining in Kansu Province, he appears to have remained confident that Russia, with her long association with him and his predecessors, would actively help to restore him to his rightful place. However, with the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, the Dalai Lama was forced to accept that he could no longer rely on his old ally; the only option remaining to him was to attempt to come to terms with the Chinese. In early 1908, the Dalai Lama arrived at the Buddhist centre of Wu-tai-shan in Shansi and there sought permission to proceed on to the Chinese capital. Here, he was forced to spend several months before permission was granted in September 1908.[253]

In his dealings with the Russian and British Ministers in Peking, the Dalai Lama found that they now presented a united front. Dorjieff, still in attendance on the Dalai Lama, repeatedly represented the Tibetan case to the Russian Minister. He pointed out the dangers to Tibetan autonomy if the Chinese succeeded in their threatened advance from the Marches in eastern Tibet towards Lhasa. This situation could only be avoided, Dorjieff explained, if the Dalai Lama could persuade the Chinese to acknowledge that Tibetan independence antedated Manchu control in Tibet, and moreover, that the Dalai Lama was not a Chinese nominee. As a final gesture, the Dalai Lama was hoping to be granted permission to memorialise the Throne. Dorjieff was clearly hoping to enlist the British, Russian and American Ministers at Peking to use their influence with the Chinese Government. He soon found that neither the British nor the Russians were disposed to assist the Dalai Lama in his plans. In fact, J J Korostovetz, the Russian Minister, went so far as to advise that the 'wisest course was to fall in with Chinese views and to make the best of the altered situation'.[254]

Having failed to enlist Russian and British help, the Dalai Lama was left with no alternative but to appeal to the Empress Dowager. He had avoided, up to this moment, having an audience with her, but now he was forced to seek it. His request to be granted permission to memorialise the throne was refused. In the light of what was to follow in the years ahead, Jordan's comments on Chinese treatment of the Dalai Lama during his stay in Peking have a prophetic ring. 'That the Chinese should thus assert their claim to control the external relations of Thibet, is, perhaps, reasonable enough, but it is open to doubt whether their methods will, in the long run, further their interests in that Dependency. Chang Yin-t'ang . . . is not a person of ingratiating address or conciliatory manners, and some Chinese are already beginning to doubt whether the Pontiff's experience here is likely to make him an active partisan of Chinese policy on his return to Thibet'.[255] The Imperial Decree, issued in the name of the Empress Dowager, ordered the Dalai Lama to 'obey the laws and Ordinances of the Sovereign State' and in all matters to 'respectfully await our decision'. It must have seemed to the Dalai Lama the point of no return, with the bitter realisation that his stay in Peking had accomplished little or nothing for his country or for himself.[256]

As the Dalai Lama prepared to return home to Lhasa, the struggle which was taking place between Chinese troops and Tibetan tribesmen in eastern

Tibet reached a critical point. The final advance to Lhasa seemed imminent and the Chinese increased their endeavours to get the Dalai Lama quickly back to Lhasa in the hopes of using him to negate Tibetan resistance when they eventually reached the capital. It was clear that for the Chinese to establish command at Lhasa and Shigatse, they would need to secure lines of communication between the Tibetan capital and Tachienlu on the Szechuan border and those which connected Lhasa to the Szechuan capital of Chengtu.[257] Unlike Central Tibet, where the Dalai Lama's Government was in effect unchallenged, eastern Tibet presented a region of virtually independent states, some owing allegiance to the Dalai Lama and others, through him, to China. Chinese control over Tibetan districts in the east was little more than nominal. By the end of the nineteenth century the XIIIth Dalai Lama's plan to seek an independent Tibet gave rise to Chinese attempts to command Central Tibet, and to do so by first consolidating their control over eastern Tibet.

In fact, while Younghusband was on his way to Lhasa, a new post was created, the Assistant Amban of Chamdo. The task was entrusted to Feng Ch'uan in 1904. Feng Ch'uan began by issuing decrees to reduce the number of monks residing in the monasteries of eastern Tibet and by forbidding the recruitment of new monks for a period of twenty years. Various other measures proved equally unpalatable to the Tibetan monasteries. It was, therefore, not surprising that serious disturbances began in the region of Batang in eastern Tibet and Tibetan tribesmen finally managed to kill Feng Ch'uan. The Szechuan Viceroy acted promptly and appointed a replacement for the murdered Amban. The man entrusted to supervise the 'pacification of the Tibetan Marches' was Chao Erh-feng.[258] He set about his task with ruthless efficiency and exacted reprisals of great severity from the Tibetans. Although it served to increase Tibetan hostility and resistance, it did not stop Chao from eventually reducing the Marches to complete subjugation. By December 1909, Chao was preparing to attack Chamdo, the last stronghold before Lhasa.

The rapid Chinese advance into eastern Tibet had been helped by the absence of the Dalai Lama, but as Chao Erh-feng prepared to move towards Lhasa, the Dalai Lama was on his way back via Kumbum monastery. On Christmas Day 1909, after an absence of five years, the Dalai Lama was back in his capital. What he found in Lhasa agitated him considerably. Chao Erh-feng's men, under the command of Chung Ying, were at the doors of the capital requesting permission for another 1,000 men to enter Lhasa for the purpose, they claimed, of providing police protection at the trade marts, and thus enabling the British to withdraw their Gyantse Trade Agent's escort.[259] On this understanding, the Amban Lien Yu secured permission from the Tibetan authorities for the force to enter Lhasa. However, early in February 1910, the Dalai Lama discovered the real size of the Chinese garrison and faced the unpleasant truth that he had been tricked by the Amban. In fact Chung Ying's force consisted of 2,000 troops and more. On 12 February, as more of Chung Ying's flying columns entered Lhasa, the Dalai Lama, realising that it was too late to offer resistance, secretly departed. As soon as they discovered

his absence the Chinese gave chase; they were held off by the Dalai Lama's escort at Chaksam Ferry and he managed to escape, reaching Yatung on 20 February where he took refuge with the British Trade Agent, David Macdonald.[260] On the following day, ignoring the advice of the Chinese officer at Chumbi, he crossed over into Indian territory at Gnatong. China was at the gates of India, and the Government of India, who had repeatedly advocated strong measures regarding the Chumbi valley, had after all not been so far wrong. This time they were determined to let the 'border States see that we are not afraid of China' and with the presence of the Dalai Lama on Indian soil they believed they had found 'a powerful lever wherewith to secure a satisfactory settlement'.[261]

The Dalai Lama in India, 1910–12

The Government of India viewed the Tibetan situation with considerable alarm. From the moment Chao Erh-feng's advance column entered Lhasa and put the Dalai Lama to flight, whatever remained of British gains from the 1904 Lhasa Convention, the 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention and the Trade Regulations of 1908 were further subverted. The Indian Government could not fail to recognise that China stood to challenge British influence in Nepal and Bhutan.[262] The British Minister in Peking was urged to ask the Wai-wu-pu their intentions regarding the future of Tibet, and to remind them that the various Conventions had been negotiated with a Tibetan Government, confirmed by China, and that HMG felt that they 'had a right to expect that an effective Thibetan Government shall be maintained, with whom they can, when necessary, treat in the manner provided by those two Conventions'.[263] The Chinese reply was quite clear. Their troops were in Lhasa for the purpose of policing the trade marts and to guard the Dalai Lama; both duties, they pointed out, had been accepted by the British in the 1908 Trade Regulations as a Chinese responsibility.[264] They went on to accuse the Dalai Lama of treachery and that 'having acted so independently in leaving his post, is not considered a competent head for all the Hutuktu'.[265] In the circumstances, the Emperor of China had had no alternative left to him but to depose the Dalai Lama and order the selection of a successor.

The logical outcome of Morley's non-interference policy in Tibet was a Chinese-dominated Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama in British territory was viewed by the India Office as a threat to the Indian Government's neutrality in the Sino-Tibetan struggle, and which they had little intention of entering. Lord Minto, on the other hand, urged that the Wai-wu-pu should be warned against any Chinese advance which constituted an alteration in the *status quo* of Tibet. The Tibetan Government, he claimed, had been recognised by the 1904 Convention, and confirmed again by Article 1 of the 1906 Convention. Now a large slice of Tibetan territory had been 'lopped off' by China. They had also gone on to forcibly occupy and dispossess the Tibetans in 'Chiamdo, Draya and Tsa Kalho, provinces of Eastern Thibet'. Minto wanted definite assurances by China on the maintenance of a real Tibetan

Government. He asked for the limitation of the Chinese garrison in Tibet to a number adequate for maintaining internal order; the policing of the trade marts by Tibetans under Chinese officers if necessary; the appointment at Lhasa of an Amban less hostile to British interests, with instructions to Chinese local officers to co-operate with British Trade Agents, and not to hinder the Tibetans and British officers from dealing directly with one another. In the circumstances, he wanted the right to retain and increase escorts at Yatung and Gyantse.[266] Charles Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim, wholeheartedly backed the Viceroy; in his view British policy should be to encourage the maintenance of the traditional structure of the Dalai Lama's Government, to bring about a cancellation of the Lama's disposition by the Chinese and to return him to Tibet. The results of six years since 1904, he summed up: 'The *status quo,* and the promises of China, went by the board. The Tibetans were abandoned to Chinese aggression, an aggression for which the British Military Expedition to Lhasa, and subsequent withdrawal, were primarily responsible'.[267]

In London, however, there was no difficulty in disregarding the views of the 'frontier men'. 'Every step taken should tend to disabuse their minds of the idea that we shall pick a quarrel with China to restore their precious Dalai Lama'.[268] In fact, in general, the thinking was that China could not be blamed for making her control effective. 'The Tibetan Government has proved a bad neighbour to us . . . we ought to welcome a better and stronger administration'.[269] All that Morley thought necessary to authorise was some increase in British reserves in Sikkim.

June 1910 saw the Chinese well established astride the Trade Routes, communications between British and Tibetan officials virtually cut off, and the position of the Trade Agent, through lack of support from London, becoming increasingly isolated. However, pressure from Lord Minto finally secured permission from the India Office to put a small force into Gnatong, on the British side of the border, ready to proceed to Gyantse if and when the post was threatened. In eastern Tibet, consolidation by the Chinese of military posts continued and reached as far south as Tsona Dzong, an administrative centre close to the north-eastern frontier of India. To Lord Minto it seemed that little stood between Chinese progression towards the Himalayan boundary of India, a concept which no Indian administration could afford to ignore either politically or militarily. It had become increasingly clear that the Chinese were in Tibet to stay, and in the Viceroy's opinion no permanent settlement of the Indo-Tibet frontier was likely until some solution could be found for the problem of the Dalai Lama. His fear was that the Dalai Lama might take it into his head 'to try to bolt, he might be able to play the mischief' by causing the Tibetans to revolt once he knew that he had nothing to hope for from the British Government.[270] Minto had got it wrong. The Dalai Lama had himself decided to return to Tibet in order to attempt to stay the further erosion of his traditional government by the Chinese. He had heard that Liusher, one of his high officials, and the Regent, the Tri Rimpoché, had been arrested in Lhasa.[271] He was also no longer receiving funds from Lhasa, and he feared that

Chinese attempts to supplant him by the Panchen Lama was a real possibility.

By August, the Chinese also appeared to want the return of the Dalai Lama, but on their own terms. They had failed to appoint a new Dalai Lama during the lifetime of the present one, and regarded his presence so near the border as unsettling to the Tibetans. While he remained on Indian soil, the British might use him as an excuse for another mission to Lhasa.[272] Accordingly, the Amban Lien Yu despatched his Secretary, Lo Ch'ing-ch'i to Darjeeling to persuade the Dalai Lama to return, but under specific conditions. The Dalai Lama, after a probationary period, would be allowed to regain his spiritual offices. He would receive an allowance from the Chinese and be permitted to live in the Potala Palace. His life would be assured, but he would not become again the supreme temporal authority in Tibet.[273] The Panchen Lama and the Tsongdu, to the Tibetan ruler's surprise, advised acceptance of the conditions, even though it involved coming to terms with the Chinese. The Indian Government and the Foreign Office were agreed that if the Chinese met him halfway, the Dalai Lama should accept the terms and return. When Lo Ch'ing-ch'i met the Dalai Lama he put to him the terms for his return. They were rejected outright.[274]

The end of 1910 saw the Dalai Lama still in India and the Indian Government with no new policy towards Tibet. Those who had advocated the appointment of a British Resident in Lhasa in 1904 now made proposals for a joint Anglo-Russian Mission in Lhasa, as the only means of preventing Chinese encroachments towards the Indian Himalayan frontier. Any such move would have been a considerable departure from the declared policy of the Home Government. It was left to Charles Bell to remind the hawks in the Indian Government that 'the main reason for the costly Thibet mission of 1903–4 was to keep Russia out . . . but by the proposed joint mission we should go out of our way to establish Russian influence in the heart of Thibet'.[275] The proposal appeared to him 'dangerously unsound'. He was supported by Lord Morley who did not intend to revise the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 to suit 'the knavish tricks' of the Younghusband party.[276]

Changes, however, were imminent at both the India Office and in India itself. Sir Charles Hardinge[277] of the Foreign Office became Viceroy and the Marquess of Crewe took over the India Office. In the main their policies were not very different to those of their predecessors. In fact, Lord Hardinge's administration, more or less, accepted that Chinese control of Central Tibet was inevitable and he merely intended to come to some sort of agreement regarding the trade marts. The other problem facing the new Viceroy was that the future of the Dalai Lama still remained unresolved. While the Chinese persisted in their attempts to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, he continued, in his efforts, to try and enlist British backing and also that of the Czar to help return him to his country under the right safeguards.[278] Up to this point, the Government of India had managed very successfully to avoid committing itself openly to the Dalai Lama's support, the general attitude being that Chinese control of the Tibetan administration was probably a permanent feature. The most that the Indian Government could hope to

achieve was a working relationship with the Amban regarding the Gyantse and Yatung trade marts.

Challenge in the Assam Himalaya, 1910–13

The proximity of Chinese troops so near the north eastern frontier caused the Indian Government to look at their position in these sensitive areas. They came eventually to recognise that their interests would be best served by a policy which provided for an adequate defence of the tribal areas against any Chinese encroachment. It could only be done by establishing some measure of permanent British influence, and this they knew HMG would certainly consider as an extension of territorial limits towards Tibet. Lord Minto, at the end of his term of office, recommended a northward advance of the Indian border thus creating a buffer by extending the outer line and providing 'no intercourse between tribes within or beyond the line with any Foreign Power other than ourselves'.[279] Such a policy, however, was not immediately practicable since neither the area nor the people who lived in them were well known enough to the Indian Government for them to risk moving the strategic frontier without further knowledge.

Sir Lancelot Hare, Lieutenant Governor of Assam, strongly advocated a forward policy to Minto's successor, Lord Hardinge, in November 1910. Hardinge's immediate reaction was to deprecate any forward move beyond the administrative frontier, believing that Chinese aggression should be met, not in the tribal territory, but by 'attack on the coast of China'.[280] Hare was not satisfied with the reply and put forward the strongest argument he could muster to persuade Hardinge to think again. 'We only now claim suzerainty up to the foot of the hills. We have an inner line and an outer line. Up to the inner line we administer in the ordinary way. Between the inner and the outer lines we only administer politically . . . Now should the Chinese establish themselves in strength or obtain complete control up to our outer line, they could attack us whenever they please and defence would be extremely difficult . . . It seems to me, in view of the possibility of the Chinese pushing forward, that it would be a mistake not to put ourselves in a position to take up suitable strategic points of defence'.[281]

Hare wanted the Viceroy to send out men who would tour the frontier villages, to improve trade routes and establish friendly relations. By doing so 'we should maintain our present standing and should forbid China stepping in . . . After all, if China press forward, we must forbid further progress some day'. The Viceroy was not convinced. He was in favour of exploration beyond the outer line if that were possible, without risk of complications, but he disapproved of any general increase of activity or any promise to the tribes that they could rely on British support in the event of Tibetan or Chinese aggression.

Hardinge's solution to a Chinese invasion of Assam was based on the assumption that an attack on British territory was an attack on Great Britain, and would be dealt with as part and parcel of global British strategy.

He could not initially bring himself to assess the Assam border problem in purely Indian terms. Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Secretary to the Political and Secret Department at the India Office, took great exception to Hardinge's argument. In a letter to Sir Richmond Ritchie, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for India, he summed up his views on the Viceroy's attitude. 'The levity with which Hardinge talks about attacking the coast of China amazes me . . . If anything goes wrong in Assam, there will be very voiceful public opinion against us. There are no European industries along the North West Frontier, and one fat Hindu *banya*[282] more or less doesn't matter – yet! But in Lakhimpur District there are over 70,000 acres of tea gardens turning out 30,000,000 pounds of tea annually, and employing over 200 Europeans and 100,000 Indians . . . These gardens lie at the foot of the hills inhabited by savages; their defence rests with one battalion of native infantry and one battalion of military police (850 men). Think of the howl the planters would let out, and the rise in the price of tea! . . . I think the Secretary of State should call the Government of India down from the high atmosphere of 'attacks on the coast of China' to the more prosaic level of border protection and administration'.[283]

British administration could not afford, even if it so chose, to ignore the enormous economic importance of the Assam tea trade. After all, London had its investment in the industry as it had its voices in Parliament. On the other hand, nor could the Indian administration ignore Chinese movements in the Assam border areas. In fact in 1911 British and Chinese attention began to focus more and more on the Assam Himalaya. Chinese officials were sent to probe the loyalties of the tribal people and British officials went forth to collect as much geographical and strategic intelligence for use against Chinese encroachments. It was not proposed to have a third or intermediate line between the existing Inner Line but to secure a sound strategical boundary between China and Tibet and the tribal territory from Bhutan up to and including the Mishmi country. To regulate the new boundary it might be found necessary to send up frontier officials 'to erect cairns at suitable points such as trade routes leading into Tibet, to indicate the limits of our control, and to explain to the tribesmen the object of such marks'. As to the sites of other cairns, it could only be determined after enquiry on the spot.

The question of controlling and safeguarding the area between the administrative boundary and the new external frontier was yet to be considered. But for the present, the Government of India saw its future policy as being 'one of loose political control', and having as its object the minimum of interference compatible with the necessity of protecting the tribesmen from unprovoked aggression, and of preventing them from violating either Indian or Chinese territory. It was understood that the natural consequence of the settlement of an external boundary, whether by mutual agreement, or on an *ex parte* basis, would require effective steps to prevent the violation of the new boundary by the Chinese. The nature of the measures to be adopted could not be determined until more was known of the country.[284]

Captain F M Bailey was one of the most outstanding among the British explorers who managed to traverse the Assam Himalaya, his first journey in

1910 taking him from Peking to Kahap via Rima and Mishmi country. His official report outlined the points of tension in the border areas.[285] It is true that he exceeded his instructions by travelling further into Chinese territory than the Indian Government would have thought fit to sanction and was mildly censured for it, but it was recognised that the information he brought back was of the greatest value to the Indian administration. His intelligence reports related to the strategically placed Lohit valley, and to Rima, the Tibetan village that commanded it. On passing through Rima on his way back to Sadiya, Bailey had met two Mishmi headmen who informed him that they were on their way to Chikung, a Chinese military post thirty-five miles north-east of Rima. They had been summoned by a Chinese official to make their submission; they had been asked previously to do so but had refused, and now they were threatened with military action. Bailey advised them to consult the Political Officer at Sadiya before going on to Chikung. His suspicion of Chinese activities was further confirmed by two Tibetans who told him that they had been ordered to bring in Mishmi headmen to Chikung, under threat of decapitation should they fail to do so.

Chinese activity on the Mishmi border was considered a sufficiently serious threat by the Political and Secret Department for it to comment on it. 'The Chinese had established a firm control over Rima, and had planted flags near the river Yepak, a tributary of the Upper Lohit, but that they had not attempted to assert sovereignty beyond what might be argued to be the limits of Tibet'.[286] Fearing that the Chinese might decide to assert their control, the Indian Government decided, in 1911, to send W C M Dundas, Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, to lead a mission to the Mishmi country. On his way he met Mazanon, the *gam* or headman of the village of Chipai, who reported that about seven months previously, 'in the moon of Tacheyi, one Ta Loh a Chinaman, with fifty Chinese sepoys carrying guns and one hundred Tibetan coolies transporting their load, came over the Glei Dakhan pass and halted for seven days in the jungle two days march from Chipai'.[287] The messenger summoned Mazanon to the Chinese camp, but as he was ill, he sent his son and some of the villagers in his place. When they got there, they discovered that the Chinese were demanding that the Taroan section of the Mishmi country and other villages should open the road down the Delei river, a tributary of the Lohit, and allow them to use it. The Chinese had produced a flag and ordered the tribesmen to set it up at the confluence of the Delei and Lohit rivers. This, and other blandishments, Mazanon explained, the villagers had refused fearing that they might incur British displeasure.[288] The Chinese, realising that their presence was not welcome, soon left in the direction of Pomed.

Captain Hardcastle, who later toured the Delei valley confirmed Dundas' findings. He found the Chinese had been distributing 'passports'. 'Their purpose was to the effect that (individually or on behalf of a village) having tendered his submission, the said Minister [Chao Erh-feng] after due enquiry feels it incumbent on him to sanction the issue of a Warrant of Protection for his property.' The aim of the 'passports', the Chinese official insisted, was not money but that in future the villagers would 'obey all the orders of the Chinese'.[289]

A further instance of Chinese penetration was reported on the Yepak river. In 1910, the Chinese, having established their control over Rima, planted flags at Menilkrai village, near the Yepak. One was a red flag with a blue four-clawed dragon, the other a board with a roughly printed notification in Chinese and Tibetan: 'The Southern Frontier of Zayul on the borders of the Szechuan Province of the Chinese Empire'.[290] When the Chinese revisited the village in 1912 they found a British camp on the Yepak, and inscribed on a boulder 'The Sappers and Miners'. The Chinese, not to be outdone, promptly had other signs erected alongside the British ones with the addition of a thatch covering so as to give it an air of permanence.

The strategic significance of the Lohit valley was appreciated both in London and Peking as well. They closely followed each other's moves and each accused the other of moving into Tibetan territory. The Mishmi Mission, which set up camp at the Yepak river bounding the Menilkrai flats, was one such forward move. Having explored the area, Dundas recommended Walong to be in every way better suited than Menilkrai for a post. He had found well-watered flat ground all the way between the 'Yepak river and the Cheiyap cliff on the north sufficient to provide parade and polo grounds if necessary, as well as to grow all the rice required by the post without much difficulty and expense'. If this were done, then there would only remain the political aspect. The Chinese would certainly object to any post being established at Walong. Since their arrival at Rima they had asserted their authority over the five houses at Walong, Tinai and Dong, who were now having to pay tribute to them. Dundas believed that Chinese claims could be disputed with success since the three Tibetan hamlets only existed on the sufferance of the Miju tribe who found them useful for looking after and pasturing their cattle. In his view the only suitable northern boundary with Tibet was the line of the Tho Chu.[291] His explorations and mapping activities did not go unnoticed by the Chinese who visited the camp at Yepak and protested at the British presence there.

The problem presented by a post at Walong was of communication and how it could be kept open. The country from Walong to Rima was 'a tangled mass of hills, thickly wooded and precipitous, with the Lohit running in a deep defile'. Major Stansfield, who visited the area, pointed out that '. . . a few men, well armed and well handled, could make it difficult for a force advancing from Sadiya to reach Menilkrai. The Chinese official who placed a boundary board at the south end of the Menilkrai flats in June 1912 evidently realised this, as he put his board at the southern edge of the open port of the valley'.[292] By the time T P M O'Callaghan visited Walong in March 1914, his objective was to secure a base in Walong itself. To justify this action he decided to remove first the boundary pillars erected by the Chinese at Menilkrai, three miles south of Walong.[293]

In 1908, Noel Williamson had toured along the Pasi Minyong country. He followed this exploit in 1909 by travelling up the Lohit, almost as far as Rima. In the early part of 1911, Williamson again penetrated the Mishmi hills as far as Walong, where he saw the Chinese flags at Menilkrai and reported the Chinese

occupation of Rima. At the end of March 1911, Williamson set out from Pasighat on another of his journeys, this time to visit the Diang or Siang river, as the Tsangpo is called where it runs through Abor country. In early January, without seeking any permission, he decided 'to find out as accurately as possible what the Chinese were doing round Rima'.[294] He was aware that he must not go beyond the Outer Line, although he had gone forty miles beyond it on his first trip to the Abor country. On that occasion he had found that there were no traces of Tibetan influence at Walong, the first sign of the Tibetan presence being found much further on at Tatap Ti. On his second visit, Williamson decided to go further on, but as he and his escort of 44 people approached the village of Komsing, they were attacked and all of them were murdered. Williamson had been previously warned that if he attempted to repeat his Kebong trip he would be killed; he chose not to heed the warning. On the eve of the massacre, the last written word came from Williamson's own servant, Katoki, to his wife: 'Have arrived at Pangighat. Here Kebong Abors forbid going further. Saheb insists on going on into village. My impression is we shall never return'.[295]

Until the Abor massacre, the idea of a forward move in Assam had not found favour in London, nor, for that matter, in Simla. In India, the attack on Williamson was laid at the door of the Pasi Meyongs who sought 'the quarrel by asking him into their country with the deliberate intention of killing him, was probably due to sheer bravado and devilment, due to want of appreciation of our power . . . The challenge cannot be refused, and due reparation must be exacted. Otherwise our position on the frontier is impossible, and our villages and tea gardens will not be safe'.[296] A punitive expedition was despatched to the Abors to exact reparation for the murder of Noel Williamson and his party, and to establish 'our military superiority in the estimation of the Abor tribe . . . It is of prime importance that we should take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the expedition to carry out such surveys and exploration as may be possible, in order that we may obtain the knowledge requisite for the determination of a suitable boundary between India and China in this locality'.[297]

The Abor Expedition led to a series of others under the general supervision of Major General Bowers, who was also appointed Chief Political Officer. A H W Bentinck went up to Komsing and then travelled northwards to Singging. Colonel D C F McIntyre visited Damrok. J F Needham was sent to the Minyong villages on the right bank of the Dihang as far as Parong. Needham and Molesworth went up the Shimang valley to Yingku, and Captain Dunbar toured to Kombong.[298] While the Abor country was being explored, F M Bailey as Political Officer was taking an expedition to the Mishmis. It was a two-pronged effort, the Dibang or Nizamghat Column under the command of Bailey and Captain Bally, the other, the Lohit Valley Column commanded by Dundas. Bailey's instructions were 'to enter into friendly relations with the Mishmis; to inform the Mishmis that for the future they will be under British control exclusively and must accept no order except for the present from the Political Officer, Mishmi Mission and thereafter from the Assistant Officer, Sadiya'.[299]

The Aka hills were the least known territory, and it was found that they had not been visited since the expedition of 1883. A 'promenade' into Aka country was sanctioned by the Secretary of State in November 1913 with Captain Nevill, Political Officer, Western Section appointed to the charge. The Aka Promenade, as it came to be known, was to tour up the Subansiri, into the Dafla hills and to pay 'a friendly visit, unaccompanied by an escort, to Tawang'. Apart from establishing friendly relations with the Aka people the opportunity was to be taken to survey the Aka hills and to do some triangulation work towards the Tibetan frontier.[300] In December 1913, the expedition set out from Peinjulie on the Borelli river, making its way by the right bank of the Dirangchu to Dirangdzong, the principal Mönba village south of the Se La range. From Dirangdzong, Nevill travelled by the trade route crossing the Se La to Tawang.

The main object of these expeditions was to explore the trade route in order to experience what was required so as to improve communications and increase trade; to gather information about the inhabitants and local conditions, and to ascertain exactly how far Tibetan rule and influence affected the country. At Tawang, Nevill found a large monastery whose monks formerly administered the territory, but the administration had been taken over and shared between two Dzongpons, one a layman and the other a monk. Nevill was confident that the oppressed Mönbas would welcome British administration, but that the monks with the 'weight of the Drepung monastery, the largest of the three great religious houses in Lhasa, and from which the Tawang monastery has sprung' would undoubtedly take up a policy of obstruction. He saw great difficulty in administering the Tawang country north of the Se La. South of the range, difficulties would undoubtedly exist, but would not be insuperable.[301]

In 1914, it was the strategic rather than the commercial possibilities of the Tawang tract which attracted British interest to it. Being a much used trade route, the Chinese could, if they so wished, exert influence and pressure on Bhutan to close their route to goods from India and thereby leave the British without an approach to the salient. By the time the Aka Promenade had finished its explorations, two thousand miles of previously unexplored country had been surveyed. Nevill had no compunction in suggesting its inclusion within British administration. The Simla Conference and McMahon attached considerable importance to Tawang, which they attempted to include in British territory as a result of an agreement signed at the Simla Conference by Sir Henry McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra in March 1914. Argument over its ownership, let alone its administration, had not ceased when independence came to India in 1947.

Almost universally, the result of these expeditions called for the establishment of military posts and routes which would enable frontier officials to face a Chinese challenge. The imminence of Chinese influence which the Indian Government feared seemed somewhat remote to the Chief Commissioner of Assam: '. . . neither the Abor Expedition nor the Miri Mission found any trace of the Chinese in the country which they explored. Only in the extreme

north of the Abor country was there some signs of Tibetan influence'.[302] But British 'hawks', mostly in India, wanted the posts to observe as well as to impress the Chinese and the Tibetans. The 'doves', mainly in Whitehall, were disinclined to add to the frustrations of diplomatic exchanges with China, whether in London or in Peking. Williamson's murder meant that the 'hawks' won the day. Six months earlier, the Secretary of State, Lord Morley, had said that he 'would prefer even not to keep a permanent post beyond the Inner Line'. In October 1912 he was forced, against his judgment, to order the despatch of exploring and survey parties into the Assam Himalaya, 'with sufficient escorts to overcome any possible opposition, to the Doshung pass and the head-waters of the Siyon and Sigon rivers; surveys to be made of the Dibong valley . . . of the Dri river to its source; of all the inhabited valleys leading into either the Dri or Dibong rivers; and of the Sisseri valley to connect with the Mishmi and Abor surveys of last season'.[303]

The results of the survey meant that various administrative charges were established. The areas covered by the Abor Expedition and the Mishmi Mission were divided into a Central or Abor Section and based on Rotung. The Eastern Section comprising the Mishmi Hills and Bor Hkamti country was based on Sadiya. The Western Section included the country between Tawang and the Subansiri river with its eastern watershed.[304] The Indian Government, galvanised by the increase of Chinese penetration into the tribal territories of Assam, had managed by the end of 1914 to have established their permanent control over the region.

Tibet and the Chinese Revolution, 1911–12

In Tibet itself, Chinese consolidation of power seemed on the point of success in 1911. The Amban Lien Yu, with a puppet regime in Lhasa to do his bidding, showed less and less regard for Tibetan sentiment and more for his final objective of removing from Tibetan hands all forms of administration, with special regard to the Trade Agencies. In Tsarong Shapé and the Panchen Lama,[305] the Amban found collaborators sufficient for his needs, so long as the main line of communication between Central Tibet and Szechuan remained open and he could count on being backed militarily. Nevertheless, the very extension of Lien Yu's authority began to give rise to Anglo-Chinese friction at the trade marts along the border between Central Tibet and India, and also on the frontiers of Nepal, Sikkim and western Bhutan.

Two further events in 1911 caused the Government of India to rethink their attitude to Chinese encroachments on the Indo-Tibetan border. The first was the attempt by Chinese troops to subjugate the Tibetan district of Pomed, a region where the Tsangpo cuts south through to the Assam Himalaya and becomes the Brahmaputra. The second was Chao Erh-feng's intention to add to the Marches the district east of Pomed, Zayul. The object was to open a road through the region in order to provide a short cut between Yunnan Province and Lhasa via Batang and Zayul. However, Chao's attempts to subdue the people of Pomed met with stiff resistance and in late 1911 the

Amban Lien Yu was forced to recall the Chinese garrison, the remaining Chinese being massacred by the Tibetans in Zayul.[306] Although the occupation of Zayul and Pomed was only for a short time, the Chinese were seen to be in contact with the tribal areas of the Assam Himalaya. This move, the Government of India considered, would inevitably breach the natural defence line of the north-eastern Himalaya, an administrative back-water no doubt, yet there could be no question of allowing the Chinese to fill the vacuum.[307] Little was known about the nature of Tibetan relations with the tribes of the Assam Himalaya, but with the Chinese in occupation of Pomed and Zayul, the danger seemed very real. Separate schools of thought, in India and in London, existed regarding Chinese intentions in the border areas of Tibet.

Morley, who had never wavered in his non-intervention policy on the Indian frontier, did not think that asserting British authority in the frontier areas or sending expeditions were questions that India alone could decide. The Home Government had to survey the whole theatre of Chinese operations, whether in Burma or in the Assam Himalaya. In his view 'if China were a decent place, we should settle the boundary by arbitration, joint commissions and other resources of civilisation; only these devices are not well suited to people who speak disdainfully of latitude and longitude, and work their oracle by forged maps'.[308] British officials, though they broadly agreed with Morley's assessment of China, were well aware that the Chinese, sensing British weakness and indecision, had already embarked on a forward policy with regard to Tibet and its confines. Max Müller, British Minister in Peking, interpreted China's forward policy as a 'determination to affirm the shadowy rights she has always possessed in theory over her outlying provinces, Mongolia, Thibet, and even distant Turkestan'. It was highly probable that Chinese Government actions would be influenced by the strength of opposition they might encounter from the officials on the spot. However, there could be no doubt as to 'their general intention which is that Thibet shall become a province of China, in fact if not in name, thus aggravating the responsibilities of the Indian Government and emphasising the necessity for watchfulness on our frontier and in the three neighbouring frontier states'.[309]

The Chinese Revolution which began in China in October 1911 had far-reaching effects in de-stabilising the Chinese position in Tibet. Hostilities between Chinese and Tibetans were but one aspect of the revolution, the other was that Chinese troops rose against their own officers and, in the chaos that prevailed, were in imminent danger of being massacred by the Tibetans. As the mutiny spread to the Chumbi valley, several evicted Chinese officials sought refuge in the Trade Agencies at Yatung and Gyantse.[310] By November 1911 reports were coming in that at Shigatse, Gyantse and Lhasa, Chinese troops were openly rebelling, and that the Amban, with 100 Chinese soldiers, had fled from Lhasa. In Phari, the situation was equally grave where two of the Lhasa Amban's officers were murdered by Chinese troops, as was the Amban Lo Ch'ing-ch'i when he attempted to return from Pomed to Lhasa.[311] By December the Amban Lien Yu had been deposed by Chinese troops in Lhasa and Chung Ying appointed in his place.[312]

Unfortunately, part of Chung Ying's command consisted of soldiers returning from the Pomed disaster, whose indisciplined behaviour further eroded the morale of the Chinese garrison in Lhasa where fighting then broke out between the Tibetans and his troops. Chung Ying expected that an expeditionary force from the Tibetan Marches would relieve his position but his hopes were soon dashed when he discovered that Chinese revolutionaries had put to death his old commander, Chao Erh-feng. He had been replaced by Yin Ch'ang-heng, who possessed none of the qualities, let alone prestige, of his predecessor. It was the signal for a series of uprisings in the Marches, and by April 1912, not only Chung Ying but the Amban Lien Yu were both besieged in their separate Yamens in Lhasa. In the circumstances, Chung Ying's attempts to effect a cease-fire and arrange safe-conduct for his men to eastern Tibet proved unsuccessful; he found himself stranded and waiting for relief from the Chinese garrison in the Marches.

In Lhasa as well, the Chinese were no less under pressure from the Tibetans. The Regent Ganden Tri-pa and the National Assembly had deputed monks from the three great monasteries of Drepung, Sera and Ganden to guard the Potala Palace and its vicinity. Monks and Tibetan troops had been summoned from the provinces of Central Tibet to join in the siege of the capital.[313] The monasteries of Sera and Ganden were leading the attacks against the Chinese, whereas the monastery of Drepung was following a less extreme course. By May 1912, the Tibetans had decided to try and end the fighting and the Chief Minister of the Panchen Lama was deputed to help mediate between the Tibetans and the Chinese.[314] The Dalai Lama, still residing in Kalimpong, was being urged by deputations of monks from Sera and Ganden to return immediately to Tibet, particularly as the authorities were experiencing great difficulty in controlling the monasteries. He appeared, however, reluctant to leave India until the situation in his capital had stabilised. In early May 1912, the Dalai Lama attempted to come to terms, provided the Chinese agreed to surrender their arms and withdraw under supervision. A request was made to the British Trade Agent at Gyantse to authorise someone to negotiate between the Chinese and the Tibetans, but before any satisfactory arrangement could be arrived at, the monks of Sera and Ganden attacked the old Chinese cantonment and fighting broke out once again.[315]

By the end of May, the Government of India had decided that mutual distrust was holding up negotiations and they agreed to act as mediators in the dispute. They entrusted the job to Laden La, Deputy Superintendent of Police in Darjeeling.[316] His brief was to go to Lhasa and persuade the Chinese to surrender and then get them to retreat, under his supervision, to the Indian frontier. Lord Hardinge's justification for Laden La's deputation was the urgency of the Tibetan situation and Nepalese restiveness at the losses their subjects were suffering due to the internal unrest in Tibet.[317] He feared that were the Dalai Lama to return and get involved in the Lhasa hostilities, it might result in active participation by Russia or Nepal.

Early in July, the Dalai Lama arrived at Phari at the head of the Chumbi valley. His departure from India, Lord Hardinge viewed with a sense of relief

as his presence had made the task of the Government of India, in relation to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, highly sensitive. On the other hand, Hardinge also recognised that, once in Tibet, the Dalai Lama would be free to pursue an independent foreign policy. The old suspicions were aroused when news came that Dorjieff was waiting for the Dalai Lama at Phari, having only recently come from St Petersburg. The Trade Agent at Gyantse was duly instructed to warn the Dalai Lama that trouble would result if they found him intriguing with foreign powers. Assurances having been given, the India Office was to conclude that 'the cordial nature of the language held by the Dalai Lama on these occasions appears to Lord Crewe to emphasise the undesirability of putting him in the position of having no friendly Power with whom to correspond except Russia'.[318] As the Dalai Lama made his way by slow marches towards Lhasa, a meeting took place between him and the Panchen Lama at Ralung on 16 July 1912, where apparently a 'settlement was arrived at of all old differences'. At the same time, a warning was given to the Panchen Lama's Ministers not to intrigue against the Central Government of Tibet in future. The Dalai Lama then settled down at Samding monastery on Lake Palti to wait until Lhasa was safe enough for his return. From here he telegraphed the Trade Agent at Gyantse to say that directions had been given to Dorjieff to leave 'for his own country via Chengri and Changtang'. Orders had also gone out to all Dzongpons to send a representative apiece to Samding to represent the new National Assembly.[319]

In August 1912, the Tibetan and Chinese, assisted by the Nepalese Representative in Lhasa, reopened truce discussions. On 13 August 1912, an eight-point Agreement was reached whose basic aim was to secure the transfer of Chinese troops to the Indian frontier, whereas Chinese subjects remaining on in Tibet were to be guaranteed protection so long as they obeyed Tibetan laws.[320] The Chinese were to store their arms and ammunition under joint Tibetan, Chinese and Nepalese protection. The truce worked well enough in relation to the Chinese officers and men but not when it came to General Chung Ying and his bodyguard, who were not so easily despatched. In early September, Chung Ying received orders from Peking appointing him Amban at Lhasa in place of Lien Yu, and he accordingly decided to stay on in the capital with his escort, in breach of the truce. He maintained that there had always been an Amban at Lhasa and his orders were for him to stay put. By November, under pressure from Basil Gould, the Gyantse Trade Agent, Lien Yu was persuaded to move down to Chumbi. Chung Ying had understood by now that no military help was likely from the east and agreed to a truce with the Tibetans. The truce, Chung Ying insisted, was to be negotiated only under British supervision. Hardinge rejected the suggestion on the grounds that a British official visiting Lhasa would involve a breach of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.[321] Between 11 and 25 December, both Lien Yu and Chung Ying had surrendered their arms and crossed over into the Chumbi valley. On arrival, Chung Ying was to receive his first orders from Peking for many months. He was ordered to stay on in Tibet for as long as he possibly could. The order suited him very well, and he decided to remain on in Chumbi,

from where he intrigued with the Nepalese and carried on a clandestine correspondence with the Panchen Lama in the hopes of launching a new offensive for the recapture of Lhasa. By March 1913, Tibetan troops had surrounded him and cut him off from all contact with the north. Lien Yu, who had obeyed orders, was, by this time, established in Peking. He blamed the Tibetan fiasco on Chung Ying and his brutality towards the Tibetans. On 14 April 1913, Chung Ying himself, under pressure from India and orders from China, was forced to leave the Chumbi valley and was on his way back to China. When eventually he reached Peking, he was arrested, put on trial and executed for his Tibetan crimes.[322] With Chung Ying's departure, the Chinese military occupation of the Dalai Lama's dominions, begun three years previously, came to an end. As subsequent history was to prove, the Chinese did not abandon their efforts to return, and forty-nine years later they were established in Tibet once again.[323]

Status of Tibet under the Chinese Republic, 1912–13

President Yuan Shih-K'ai and his advisers recognised that with the collapse of Chinese authority in Tibet, the secular arm was not long enough to extend to Tibet and the question, if it was to succeed, would need to be approached from the spiritual side. He went to some lengths to try and persuade the Dalai Lama that his best interests lay in a continuation of the traditional relationship with China. The Manchu Government had succeeded in its declining years, favoured by a combination of political circumstances, in converting its nominal suzerainty over Tibet into something closely akin to sovereignty. The attainment of this object was part of Yuan Shih-K'ai's Republican programme. It was stimulated by the fear that an autonomous Tibet on the Indian frontier might serve as a suitable offset to an independent Mongolia on the Russian border, thus leaving the frontiers of China vulnerable to both Britain and Russia.[324]

With the disappearance of the Lhasa Ambans from Tibet, Yuan Shih K'ai needed to find some other channel of communication with the authorities in Lhasa. He decided to send a delegation of pro-Chinese Lamas under the leadership of a Chinese official, Yang Feng.[325] Their instructions were to persuade the Dalai Lama to accept his former relationship with China. If he agreed, then all his titles would be restored to him, compensation for the damage done by the Chinese garrisons in Lhasa would be forthcoming, and a senior Chinese official would arrive in Tibet to investigate and redress wrongs. Underlying these generous offers would be the threat that, if the Dalai Lama did not respond to Chinese overtures, then a further military expedition would be despatched from Szechuan to teach him a lesson.

The Indian Government, when approached, refused permission for the delegation to cross the Indian border into Tibet.[326] They thought it would be undesirable for the mission to negotiate within Tibet where they would have no control over their actions and no certain means of ascertaining the results. Of greater importance was that any admission or concessions which the

mission might extract from the Dalai Lama could thereafter be used against British interests. Having failed once, it did not deter Yuan Shih-K'ai from making a further attempt to get another delegation into Tibet. In 1913 he appointed Lu Hsing-chi to repeat the experiment.[327] To Lu's overture, offering negotiations in Tibet, the Dalai Lama offered, in return, a high Tibetan official for discussions in Darjeeling but not in Tibet. By the end of 1913 it had become obvious to Lu Hsing-chi that he had also failed, for the time being, to persuade the Tibetan ruler to acknowledge his country's dependence on China.

Yuan Shih-K'ai was to find that the Chinese position in eastern Tibet was no more promising than in Central Tibet. The revolution had brought with it a number of anti-Chinese uprisings, and throughout the Marches Chinese positions were under attack from armed Tibetan tribesmen. The removal of Chao Erh-feng and his officers had proved a grievous blow to Chinese aspirations in the east. His replacement, Yin Ch'ang-heng, having none of Chao's abilities, had found it impossible to dislodge the Tibetans from control of Hsiang-ch'eng, the vital artery which connected the road from Tachienlu to Chamdo. The Chinese expeditionary force was further hampered by lack of funds, the troops disaffected, in consequence, due to arrears of pay; moreover, the newly-enrolled men, unlike Chao Erh-feng's veterans, were a far less effective fighting force against the powerful monasteries and scattered tribesmen.[328] By March 1913, Yuan Shih-K'ai had come to accept that neither the military leadership nor Chinese troops were in a position to undertake military operations for the reconquest of Tibet, in the face of effective armed resistance by the Tibetans. The time had come, in the President's opinion, for a policy of reconciliation to replace military measures. The Tibetans had, however, learnt their lesson and Yuan Shih-Kai's new approach proved no more effective than the various overtures which had gone before. The Dalai Lama was not going to be persuaded to accept China's sovereignty in Tibet, at any price.

The changed situation in the eastern Marches led the British to reconsider their relations with the Dalai Lama's Government in Central Tibet. Ever since Lord Curzon's day the Indian Government had regarded Tibet mainly as a problem of frontier defence and frontier administration. The emphasis of the frontier officials had been on the establishment of some degree of British influence in the border states which, in its turn, would guarantee the exclusion of rival influences in the area. With the collapse of Chinese influence in Tibet, the Indian Government saw an opportunity of bringing the Dalai Lama within the sphere of British diplomacy and, with British support, to help him keep the Chinese out of Central Tibet.

Hopes of a British presence in Tibet had been effectively removed by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the Indian Government could see no way to circumvent it. The Dalai Lama, however, just before returning to Tibet, gave evidence of the fact that he was not averse to some measure of joint Anglo-Russian intervention in Tibet. 'I beg that the Russian and British Governments will kindly discuss the Anglo-Russian Agreement deeply and

carefully . . . so that all the Chinese officials and soldiers may be withdrawn from Tibet, and that the kingdom of Tibet may be restored to us'.[329] The statement clearly revealed his belief that acting jointly would effectively prevent one or the other from acquiring a dominating influence over his government. While exploring the Anglo-Russian possibility on the one hand, the Dalai Lama's Ministers were requesting that the Indian Government should agree to provide a military escort, or failing that a British official, to accompany the Dalai Lama back home.[330]

The Laden La Mission was Hardinge's way of making a gesture to the Dalai Lama for future cordial relations between India and Tibet. It was also possible that once in Tibet, the Viceroy hoped that the official might evolve into some kind of permanent representative in Lhasa.[331] The Home Government thoroughly disapproved of the Laden La Mission. They felt that it went against Article III of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement and they feared that the Russians might use the move to support their own claims to increased involvement in Mongolia. They promptly demanded his recall, but by the time the order got to India, Laden La had already set out for Lhasa.[332] Once inside Tibet, he was recognised as the 'officer deputed by the British Government to make peace between Chinese and Tibetans' and urged by the Tibetans not to abandon the Mission. Hardinge had his orders to recall Laden La and he did. He refused, however, to be totally circumscribed by the Home Government in his dealings with the Dalai Lama. For instance, on the eve of the Dalai Lama's departure for Lhasa, Hardinge assured him that it was the British wish to see 'internal autonomy preserved in Thibet, subject to suzerainty of China, but without interference on part of Chinese . . . and that friendly letters from the Dalai Lama will always be gladly received and answered by the Viceroy'.[333] It was Hardinge's intention that, once the Dalai Lama was back in Tibet, the Indian Government meant to ensure a diplomatic relationship with him.

Thus, while the Indian Government moved towards direct relations with the Tibetan Government, the India Office and Foreign Office were having to consider the best means of securing a reduction in Chinese diplomatic influence in Tibet, with the possible revision of that part of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which continued to hamper their actions there. The main reasons for change rested on the weakness of the Chinese Republic, and that the revolution had in itself brought about a change in the status of China proper, as it had in Mongolia and Sinkiang. Whitehall was quick to see that the new forward policy of Russia in Mongolia offered a bargaining counter, Russian acceptance of British relations with Tibet, in exchange for British acceptance of Russian interests in Mongolia. The Government of India had all along tended to advocate a strong policy towards the Chinese and, before 1912, the Foreign Office had generally opposed any such move. With the outbreak of the revolution and the existing state of civil war in China, her goodwill was no longer a commodity in particular demand, and the Foreign Office attitude underwent a dramatic change.

The new Republic of China badly needed international recognition and it

seemed to Lord Hardinge that, before British recognition was accorded, the Chinese should be made to declare what precisely the status of regions like Tibet, Mongolia and Sinkiang were. To secure British recognition it would be conditional on a Chinese settlement of the Tibetan question. The aim was to get the Chinese to make peace with the Dalai Lama and, thereafter, to agree, as part of their obligations, that 'the autonomy of Thibet under Chinese suzerainty will be preserved'.[334] The Foreign Office saw no objection, particularly in view of the reservations made by Russia in regard to her special rights in north Manchuria, Mongolia and the west of China, to Britain making a similar reservation in regard to the political status of Tibet. The other lever to be used to persuade the new Chinese Government towards a Tibetan settlement was financial. China was to be informed that funds would not be freed for any of her enterprises in order to enable her to unsettle Central Asia to the detriment of Indian interests.[335] Thus the India Office and the Foreign Office were agreed that there could be no question of Tibet passing out of the Chinese sphere of influence due to existing treaties; at the same time they would not stand by and watch the total incorporation of Tibet within the Chinese provincial structure. What Russia had proposed for Mongolia, complete internal autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, was to afford a useful precedent. The India Office proposals were to contain the following points: recognition of Chinese suzerainty by retention of a Chinese Amban at Lhasa, on condition that he did not interfere in internal Tibetan administration; withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhasa and other parts of Tibet, leaving only the Amban's bodyguard; withdrawal of Chinese officials and trade agents from Tibet and an attempt to be made to reassert special treaty rights in Tibet.[336]

The Foreign Office memorandum, which was to serve as the basis of an approach to China regarding the status of Tibet, was presented on 17 August 1912 by Sir John Jordan, British Minister in Peking to the Chinese Government.[337] In brief, the five points which Jordan set out were as follows: His Majesty's Government, while recognising Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, denied that this status conferred on the Chinese Republic any right to intervene in Tibet's internal administration beyond the specifications of Article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. Chinese actions in Tibet since 1910, when they began to take over the internal administration of the country, and the declared policy of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Presidential Order of 21 April 1912, that Tibet was to be 'regarded as on an equal footing with the Provinces of China Proper', should be repudiated by the Chinese Government. The Chinese could have an Amban at Lhasa, with suitable escort, and with the right to advise the Tibetans on their foreign relations, but they could not have in Tibet an unlimited number of Chinese troops. His Majesty's Government would require a written declaration along the lines of points 1–3 before they would be prepared to recognise the Chinese Republic. Until the Chinese made such a declaration, His Majesty's Government would close the Sino-Indian border absolutely to the Chinese; the only Chinese who would be allowed to cross that border would be troops withdrawing to India from

Lhasa. The first three points of the memorandum did not give the British all that they wanted in relation to Tibet. For instance, there was no mention of the physical limits of Tibet, and it was very unlikely that the Chinese would be content with suzerain status in all the territory claimed as Tibet. Therefore, a boundary between Chinese 'suzerain' Tibet and Chinese 'sovereign' Tibet would have to be drawn. Nor did the memorandum contain any provision for the exercise of British influence in Tibet under Chinese suzerainty.

The British were limited in their relations with Tibet by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, yet by sending the memorandum direct to the Chinese Government, they had intentionally broken diplomatic ground. Any formal change in the status of Tibet or in the nature of British relations with the region, would inevitably involve the removal of some of the prohibitions contained in their agreement with Russia. In fact, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, made it clear to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that HMG were not prepared to allow China to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. They were to remain in the hands of the Tibetan authorities, subject to the rights of Great Britain and China under Article 1 of the 1906 Convention.[338] To establish direct contact with the Dalai Lama implied the possibility of a British Resident at Lhasa. The memorandum itself was despatched with the authorisation of both the India Office and the Foreign Office, and only after they had examined the full implications of the future status of Mongolia and Sinkiang in relation to Russia, and in the light of the Chinese Revolution. It was considered 'something of an anomaly that we are tied by engagements with Russia in respect of our action in Tibet, whereas Russia is under no engagements to us in respect of Mongolia, although geographically and politically, Mongolia is to Russia, very much what Tibet is to us'.[339]

The parallels between Russian interests in Mongolia and British interests in Tibet formed the basis of Anglo-Russian diplomacy throughout 1912. The Foreign Office view was that a Russian advance in Sinkiang could not be thwarted by British resistance, yet it could be used diplomatically, provided suitable compensation was given elsewhere. It was thought that a revision of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 should at least be explored and the matter was put to Mr Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, who was on the point of discussing in London the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Russian relations concerning Persia. Sazonov required some *quid pro quo* for Russia, not a concession relating to Mongolia but to Afghanistan.[340] To the Indian Government, whose policy since Curzon's day had been the total exclusion of Czarist influence in Afghanistan and Tibet, Sazonov's terms were far from welcome. They were unwilling to allow the Tibetan question to be subjected to Anglo-Russian discussions. Indian officials were to note that Russia had influenced and encouraged Mongolian independence from China, and that by late 1912, their mutual dependence had culminated in the Russo-Mongolian Treaty of 21 October 1912.[341] To permit Russia to have a hand in Tibetan affairs would merely extend her influence still further without any corresponding advantage for the British Government.

It was apparent to the Foreign Office that Sazonov was not going to accept a

straight Mongolian-Tibet exchange. London suspected that Russian influence in Mongolia would lead, through the Mongolian's close ties with Tibet, to Russia acquiring an exceptional position in Tibetan affairs. Anxieties were further raised when news came through that negotiations between Tibet and Outer Mongolia had resulted in a Tibet-Mongol Treaty on 11 January 1913.[342] The implications of such an agreement could only accelerate Russian-sponsored Mongolian interference in Tibet. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the negotiator with Isvolski of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, believed that the Mongolian situation and other events had altered the *status quo* in Tibet. 'It would I submit, be unwise to let Russia under cover of the [Urga] Hutukhtu have direct relations with Lhasa and the Dalai Lama'.[343]

The India Office, in the light of these developments, considered the various alternatives which faced them in their relation to Tibet, and in a memorandum of 27 January 1913 they formulated their policy.[344] The discussion centred round the 17 August memorandum which required the exclusion of Chinese and Russian influences in the area, but in such a way as not to invoke Russian protests regarding the 1907 Convention. To secure this the Chinese would get recognition of their suzerainty and the Tibetans would be guaranteed internal autonomy. In return for a guarantee against Chinese encroachment on Tibet's eastern border, the Dalai Lama might be induced to authorise the reinstatement at Lhasa of a Chinese Amban with a suitable escort. For the first time the memorandum implied some form of tripartite agreement between Tibet, China and Great Britain. To settle the status of Tibet would involve the definition of the physical limits of the Dalai Lama's kingdom and the demarcation of Tibet's boundaries with those of China. China would have to accept an autonomous Tibet, whose geographical limits would preclude Chinese territory from touching upon the northern and north-eastern borders of British India.[345]

In a telegram outlining a scheme for the solution of Tibet, Jordan in Peking had this to say: '. . . the elimination of Chinese influence and the connection which Russia has established through Mongolia – seem to me to demand revision of our Thibetan policy and an abandonment of our disinterested attitude unless we are prepared to see Tibet . . . gravitate towards Russia'.[346] The only solution to the problem would be a tripartite agreement between Britain, China and Tibet with negotiations taking place in India as a preliminary to the agreement. Even the failure of such negotiations, Jordan considered, would leave the British in a better position thereafter to negotiate with Tibet independently of China. Any formal change in Tibet's status *vis-a-vis* the Government of India might indeed involve some modification in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, but at the time the Home Government appeared not to have made up its mind as to the exact solution it meant to adopt in relation to Russia.

Preliminaries to the Simla Conference, 1912–13

The Chinese Government made no attempt to respond to Jordan's memorandum of 17 August 1912. On 3 December, the India Office pressed for an

immediate reply, taking as an excuse the reported conversion of Zayul into a Chinese civil district, and which they regarded as an undoubted aggression upon Tibetan territory. Jordan was asked to inform the Chinese that, unless they were prepared to carry the negotiations through within three months, 'HMG will regard the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 as no longer holding good, and will hold themselves free to enter into direct negotiations with Thibet. Moreover, should Chinese troops enter Thibet, they will be prepared to give active assistance to the Thibetans in resisting their advance and in establishing and maintaining Thibetan independence'.[347] On 14 December, the Wai-chiao-pu[348] thought it wise to invite Jordan for a discussion of the 17 August memorandum.[349]

The Wai-chiao-pu's reply was as follows: that Article II of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 reserved the right for China to intervene in the internal administration of Tibet, although China undertook not to permit any other state to do so. It did not follow that China intended to exercise the right, but she was free to do so under the terms of the treaty. Jordan noted that on the one hand the Chinese were protesting that they had no intention of converting Tibet into a province, on the other they were proposing 'to give effect to the unanimous desire of the nation and complete the union of the five races in one family'.[350] China also claimed the treaty right to police Tibet. They protested against the closing of the Indo-Tibetan border to them, and pointed out that British recognition of the Republic would lead to mutual prosperity. For China the most serious difficulty was in accepting the expression 'suzerain rights' which had been inserted in Clause 2, and to which China had voiced her objections in earlier negotiations. On the question of the Amban and his escort, the Chinese were only prepared to limit him to Central Tibet, provided there was no limitation to their policies towards the Marches and the creation of Sikang province. The limits of the Tibetan boundary in the province of Szechuan and the question of Pienma in Burma would need to be defined in any future agreement which might be reached. Finally, the Wai-chiao-pu saw no need for a fresh treaty relating to Tibet since the 1906 and 1908 Agreements met British interests relating to trade in the Himalaya.[351]

Jordan, in his various discussions with the Wai-chiao-pu, recognised that there was no clear definition of what the Chinese regarded as Central Tibet. He suspected that they would try and include areas such as Zayul and Pomed, too near the Indian border to be acceptable to the British Government. Lord Crewe thought that Zayul should be left to Tibet, which would then leave to China the districts of Derge and Chamdo, the conquest of which she had shown herself effectively able to maintain. Crewe also thought that the opportunity of a settlement with Tibet should be used to settle the Sino-Burmese frontier, with the Chinese abandoning all claims to Pienma and Hkamti in the northern Irrawaddy basin.[352]

The Dalai Lama sought recognition of his country's independence, and the establishment of Tibet's frontiers so as to include all people of Tibetan race. The formal statement of Tibetan claims included a refusal to have a Chinese Amban or any other Chinese officials in Tibet. The Tibetans maintained that

the presence of an Amban in Lhasa would provide the Chinese with an excuse to attempt to return in strength and, moreover, claim that his presence in the capital was evidence of China's sovereign position in Tibet. The Tibetans wanted the recognition of the Dalai Lama as head of state and head of the Buddhist monasteries in Mongolia and China, and they asked for the repudiation of the 1906 Convention and the 1908 Trade Regulations between China and Britain.[353]

The Tibet-Mongolian Treaty of 1913 had indicated that the Dalai Lama considered himself free to negotiate as a sovereign head of state, and, since his return to Tibet, had made every effort to establish the fact. As a consequence, the Chinese found themselves unable to get an Amban into Lhasa; they blamed the Dalai Lama's intransigence on British influence and to side-step this factor, they proposed direct Sino-Tibetan talks. Of course, the venue for these talks would be either Lhasa or somewhere in eastern Tibet. Each Chinese approach the Dalai Lama stonewalled. Finally in February 1913 he agreed to discussions, on the proviso, that the Chinese ceased their military operations in eastern Tibet and accepted Darjeeling in India as the meeting place.[354]

The British had attempted, from time to time, as evidenced in 1886, 1906 and 1908, to secure direct Tibetan participation in discussions. The attempts had proved unsuccessful due to Peking's objections and also to Britain's treaty obligations to the Chinese and to the Russians. Moreover, the Tibetans had regarded the premise on which these discussions were offered as essentially detrimental to their interests. However, with the Dalai Lama's acceptance of negotiation with China on Indian soil, an opportunity presented itself which the Indian Government were quick to seize upon. To convince the Home Government that direct negotiations with Tibet did not infringe the terms of the 1907 Agreement with Russia, they were able to point to the precedent of Tsarong Shapé in the 1908 trade negotiations as an independent Tibetan delegate. They decided to omit that his role had been decided upon by the British and Chinese Ministers in Peking, and that the Tibetan Government's acceptance of the terms of the Agreement had not been secured.

On 26 May 1913, Jordan was instructed to inform the Wai-chiao-pu of the proposed tripartite conference. He urged them in favour of immediate acceptance since he believed that the tripartite talks offered the only prospect of a peaceful and permanent solution with regard to Tibet. The Chinese insisted that Tibetan participation was unnecessary, and although they were quite prepared for a discussion of Jordan's 17 August memorandum it would have to take place in London.[355] The Foreign Office reaction to the proposal was that if there was to be a conference, it should be between the Tibetans and the Chinese, otherwise the Russians would accuse them of violating the 1907 Convention. Jordan was of the view that, by their absence, the British Government could not hope to guarantee terms to which they were not party and, for another, they needed to revise the 1908 Trade Regulations and other aspects of their relations with Tibet.[356] Jordan's argument won the day and the Foreign Office agreed to withdraw their objection. The Wai-chiao-pu was informed that their representative would be welcomed in Darjeeling by the Tibetan and British representatives, but not in London.

Yuan Shih-k'ai's response was to issue a Presidential Order claiming sovereignty over large tracts of Tibetan territory along the Assam Himalaya, including Zayul and Pomed. When Jordan protested against the contents of the Presidential Order, it was promptly denied.[357] Yuan Shih-K'ai did, however, insist that the Tibetan representative would only sign as part of the Chinese deal, a suggestion that met with stiff resistance from Sir John Jordan. After much argument, it was finally agreed that China would 'proceed to India to negotiate a provisional treaty jointly with the plenipotentiary appointed by Britain and the Tibetan plenipotentiary'. This was as far as China was prepared to go. Beilby Alston, Acting Chargé d'Affaires during Jordan's absence from Peking on leave, warned the Wai-chiao-pu that any attempt at the conference to question the Tibetan representative's credentials would be met by a categorical refusal to reopen the question.[358] Trouble also arose over China's title for its representative, 'Commissioner for the Pacification of Tibet', which was considered as reflecting China's view of her position in Tibet, but was quite unacceptable to everyone else. It was hoped that a successful outcome of the talks would make the presence of pacificators both superfluous and undesirable.[359]

The Chinese finally agreed to appoint Chen I-fan (Ivan Chen) to represent them at the Tripartite Conference. He had served nine years as Councillor in the Chinese Legation in London and the Foreign Office accepted his appointment as the 'best there could be'. He was accompanied by Archibald Rose, a Consular Officer in China appointed to advise the Indian Government during the Conference, and B D Bruce, a European employee of China's Customs, whom the Indian Government opposed on the grounds of it being a last-minute attempt to increase the Chinese strength. The Viceroy appointed Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, as the British Representative, to be assisted by Charles Bell as Tibetan Adviser and Archibald Rose as Chinese Adviser.[360] The Dalai Lama's representative was to be his Chief Minister, Shatra Paljor Dorje (Lönchen Shatra).[361] The venue of the Conference was changed at the last minute to Simla because Lord Hardinge believed that he could exercise more control over the proceedings and also that the Tibetan delegate would not be so exposed to Chinese intrigues as at Darjeeling. The Tibetans accepted the change with some reluctance since they carried no cipher of their own and all references to Lhasa would take eleven days from Simla, thereby increasing the difficulty of keeping in touch with their own government.[362]

The Simla Conference, 1913–14

The formal opening of the Simla Conference took place on 6 October and on 13 October the first meeting of the Conference was convened with Sir Henry McMahon elected as President.[363] McMahon, after the usual scrutiny of credentials, declared that whereas 'a state of war exists between the Government of China and the Government of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, whereby the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 . . . has been rendered of no effect',

and because 'His Holiness the Dalai Lama has invoked our good offices to remove all causes of differences between his Government and that of China' that the Conference had been convened.[364] He then handed to the Chinese plenipotentiary the Tibetan statement of claims. Tibet's demand was for complete independence: 'Tibet is an independent state and . . . the Precious Protector, the Dalai Lama, is the Ruler of Tibet, in all temporal as well as spiritual affairs'. Attached to the statement was a declaration of Chinese oppression and Tibetan grievances which had led to the Chinese eviction from Tibet. The Tibetans denied the validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, and demanded that any revision of the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 would, in future, be decided between Great Britain and Tibet without China. No Chinese official or Amban would be permitted to return to Tibet, and the Dalai Lama's dominions would stretch from Central Tibet eastwards towards the Marches up to Tachienlu and the KokoNor territory.[365] They also claimed close diplomatic relations with Mongolia which would continue to be maintained. The statement concluded with a demand for recompense from China of all recent forcible exactions of money and property taken from the Tibetan Government.[366]

The Chinese replied with their own statement on 30 October. They rested their claim to sovereignty on the long history of Chinese influence in Tibetan affairs and that Tibet had ever been an integral part of China's territory. They claimed the right to station an Amban in Lhasa with an escort of 2,600 men of whom 1,000 would be posted in Lhasa itself; the right to guide Tibet in her foreign and military affairs and that Tibet was to have no relations with any foreign power, except through China; the Tibetans should grant an amnesty to all those who had sided with the Chinese since 1910; and if it should be found necessary to revise the 1908 Tibet Trade Regulations, this should be done through Anglo-Chinese discussion, without Tibetan participation. And finally, the frontier between China Proper and Tibet should be in the region of Giamda, within 260 miles of Lhasa.[367]

Having studied the statements submitted by the two sides, McMahon, at the second meeting of the Conference, explained to Chen and the Lönchen Shatra that nothing would be achieved until the boundary between the territories of Tibet and those of China had been properly defined.[368] The Lönchen claimed that the historical and traditional frontiers of Tibet was as outlined in the Chinese-Tibetan Treaty of 822 AD. To support his claim he provided original records of each Tibetan State as far east as Tachienlu, including the text of the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of 822 AD. These documents showed a continuing administrative control by various lamaseries and tribal chiefs, who collected their taxes and received subsidies by virtue of their association with the Lhasa Government and not with China. Ivan Chen resisted any discussion of the territory east of Batang, on the ground that the Batang pillar, erected by the Chinese in 1727 AD, furnished incontestible evidence that the March country was beyond the limits of Tibet. Moreover, the effective occupation of the country by Chao Erh-feng in 1910 had, in his opinion, cancelled any earlier Tibetan claim.[369]

As McMahon studied the complexities of the disparate claims of Tibet and China, he urged the two representatives to draw up a detailed statement of their territorial limits which would then be considered by the Conference. McMahon was chiefly concerned about Russia in Mongolia and its effect on Tibet which might come to prove prejudicial to British interests on the frontier. He noted that the Russians, through their Mongolian Treaty and by the Tibet-Mongol Treaty, had overcome the restrictions imposed upon them by Articles III and IV of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.[370] He was also reminded of the way the Russians had recently settled the difficult problem of Mongolia by division into two zones. McMahon applied the example to Tibet. The Outer Zone, which included Lhasa, was to be autonomous; the Inner Zone, though remaining an integral portion of Tibet, was to be subject to some degree of Chinese control. Partition along such lines would ensure that British territory along the Assam-Himalaya borders would be secure from Chinese penetration. For the Chinese, any acceptance of the concept of an Inner Tibet would mean the renunciation of Sikang Province and all that Chao Erh-feng had annexed. To the Tibetans, partition was hardly less welcome. While a division would give Lhasa a secure eastern frontier with China, it would also involve the surrender of large tracts of Tibetan territory. Any solution of the political issue by recognition of autonomy for Outer Tibet, while at the same time reserving for China an absolute measure of control in Inner Tibet, would merely restore and safeguard China's position.[371] Inevitably it would infringe the integrity of Tibet as a sovereign political entity; it would mean that China's claim to sovereignty would still be left in force.

When the Simla Conference reassembled on 12 January 1914, both Chen and the Lönchen presented their detailed statements. The Chinese claimed that Giamda marked the boundary between Lhasa territory and the Marches. The districts of Chamdo, Zayul, Pomed, Pemako and Derge were all within Chinese territory. The whole of KokoNor they claimed as part of China. No documents were produced to back up Chen's claims. The Tibetans maintained that Tibet extended all the way to Tachienlu on the Szechuan border. The Lönchen produced a mass of documents to prove the Tibetan claim. McMahon chose to accept the Tibetan definition and, on this basis, he put forward his proposals on 17 February for the division of Tibet into two zones, Inner and Outer Tibet, together with an outline map. A red line indicated Tibet as a geographical and political unit as put forward by the Tibetan side, and a blue line divided Inner from Outer Tibet based on Chinese evidence.[372] McMahon implied that the territory east of the boundary marker, Inner Tibet, was part of Tibet Proper, but that the Chinese could restore their historic position there provided they did not infringe the integrity of Tibet. What it really meant was that the Chinese were free to do as they pleased in Inner Tibet provided they 'adhered to the fiction that it was part of a mystical Greater Tibet'. Outer Tibet was to be autonomous in fact as well as in theory.

There were ten Articles to the Convention and in brief the main points were as follows.[373] The Conventions of 1890, 1904 and 1906 were to stand, except

in so far as they might be inconsistent with the present Convention; Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was to be recognised; autonomy of Outer Tibet was to be recognised; China was not to interfere in internal administration of Outer Tibet; China was not to convert Tibet into a province; Britain was not to annex any part of Tibet; China was not to send troops or station officials in Outer Tibet, except for an Amban and his escort; Britain was to be similarly bound, except for the British Trade Agents and their escorts. The Amban, with his escort of 300 men, was to be maintained at Lhasa. China and Tibet were not to negotiate about Tibet with any other power, except as provided for in the Convention of 1904 between Britain and Tibet, and the Convention of 1906 between Britain and China. Article III of the 1906 Treaty, which gave China a monopoly of concessions, was to be cancelled; China was not to be a foreign power under Article IX of the 1904 Treaty, for the purposes of commerce. Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were to be cancelled; new Trade Regulations were to be negotiated for Outer Tibet between Tibet and Britain, together with the right of the British Trade Agent, Gyantse, to visit Lhasa with his escort in connection with matters arising out of the Lhasa Convention of 1904. The borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, were to be shown in red and blue respectively on a map; the Tibetan Government were to retain rights in monasteries and religious institutions in Inner Tibet. English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention were to correspond, but in the event of any differences of meaning arising between them, the English text was to be authoritative.

On 20 March, Chen communicated to McMahon a virtual rejection of the entire draft. McMahon responded by pointing out that he was endeavouring to provide an adjustment to the present difficulties, and unless Chen was prepared to discuss the issues in a spirit which gave some promise of settlement in the future, he would withdraw the present draft and put before the Conference proposals of a different nature. Chen, however, continued to prevaricate in the hopes of postponing any sort of conclusive meeting. On 7 April, Chen put forward his government's refusal to withdraw east of the Salween river and his overall objection to the Sino-Tibetan border. On 15 April, Chen returned again to discuss the various objections his government had to McMahon's proposals, which he believed made the Chinese position in relation to Tibet unacceptable.

The obvious solution was for Rose and Chen to work out point by point the differences on McMahon's draft. To begin with Chen objected to the equal status accorded to Tibet in the Preamble. It was pointed out by Rose that the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking had underlined the fact in his 17 August memorandum and the position had been accepted by the Chinese Government. For their part, the British Government intended to treat 'Tibet as an independent nation recognising no allegiance' to China. In Article II Chen objected to the phrase 'suzerainty' and wanted 'sovereignty of China' brought in. He also required a statement to the effect that Tibet was a portion of Chinese territory. It was agreed to insert such a phrase as a Note to the final agreement. To his request that the political limits of suzerainty should be

defined, Rose refused to entertain the idea. He did, however, agree to a textual change from 'including the selection and appointment of the Dalai Lama' to 'including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama'. A Note was also appended to the effect that the Chinese Government would confer on the newly-installed Dalai Lama 'the titles consistent with his dignity'. Chen took exception to Tibet being debarred from representation in the Chinese Parliament. Rose strongly resisted the suggestion that Tibet was part of China. However, it was agreed to take the Clause out of Article II and place it in the Notes to be exchanged. In Article III, which related to Britain's special interests in Tibet, Chen wanted the expression 'in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining states' taken out. Here two concessions were made by Rose; the first that the expression 'Chinese colonies' would be deleted and, second, that the period of withdrawal of Chinese troops and officials from Outer Tibet would be extended from one to three months. In Article IV it was agreed that 'a high official with suitable escort . . . would be maintained at Lhasa by the Chinese Government'. Article V and VI remained virtually unchanged. Article VII was relegated to a Note. Here, the argument centred round Chen's insistence that policing the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier was a political question and not dependent on the recognition of Tibetan autonomy. Rose insisted that since there were no Chinese garrisons left in Tibet, the need for China to accept responsibility on the Sikkim frontier did not arise. Article VIII accepted a Note limiting the size of the Trade Agent's escort to 75 percent of the Amban's escort. Article IX, which related to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet, was strongly disputed by Chen. It was agreed to delete the phrase which accorded Tibet the right 'to issue appointment orders to chiefs and local officers, and to collect all customary rents and taxes', thereby virtually depriving the Tibetans of their rights in Inner Tibet and leaving them with nothing more than a religious concern. Article X, which provided cash compensation to the Nepalese and Ladakhis as a result of Chinese depredations in Lhasa, Chen refused to have at any price. Rose then agreed to remove it. In place of Article X, Chen's offer was accepted; it stated that in case of differences between China and Tibet 'in regard to questions arising out of this Convention' the two Governments would agree to 'refer them to the British Government for equitable adjustment'. Finally, it was agreed that the Amban was free to enter Tibet as soon as Article III of the Convention had been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the three signatories.[374]

Although McMahon had conceded many of Chen's points, yet the Chinese position relating to the boundary between Tibet and China remained a major stumbling block to an agreement. China claimed that the Salween was the border between Szechuan and Tibet, and to the east of the Salween their sovereignty was absolute. To the west of the Salween to Giamda, the former boundary between Lhasa and Sikang, the Tibetans were asked to acknowledge a status different from that of Lhasa itself. The KokoNor region (Chinghai), Chen claimed, was part of China, and as for Gyade, situated in the upper reaches of the Salween, it should enjoy a special status of being under indirect

Chinese rule. When, on 22 April, Chen declared himself unable to initial the draft agreement and the attached map, McMahon, in a last minute attempt to get the Chinese to change their minds, postponed the final meeting until 27 April.

When Chen returned to the Conference table on 27 April he stated that his position was in no way changed and he categorically refused to initial the agreement.[375] McMahon, resolved to secure an agreement if at all possible, then persuaded the Lönchen Shatra to make a last minute concession in the form of a tract of KokoNor territory, which was accordingly excluded from Inner Tibet and included in China Proper. The prohibition against Tibetan representation in the Chinese National Assembly was confined to the inhabitants of Outer Tibet only. In the meanwhile, Chen, closeted with Rose in a neighbouring room, was informed of the Lönchen's offer and left 'with the doubly-initialled documents for a brief period of quiet consideration'. When Chen finally emerged, he agreed to initial the draft and the map, though he also submitted the rider that 'he would feel bound to await definite authority from his Government before the Convention was formally signed and sealed'.[376]

On 29 April, the Wai-chiao-pu repudiated the action of their plenipotentiary, which Chen was no doubt aware that they would do, and refused to permit him to proceed to full signature.[377] In Peking, Dr Wellington Koo of the Wai-chiao-pu protested against the validity of the Simla Convention. A day later, on 1 May, he proposed, in line with past tradition, that the talks should be transferred to London or Peking, where he was certain a satisfactory agreement would be arrived at.[378] Thereafter, the Chinese thought fit to demand undefined tracts of land south of the Kuen Lun range, all of which McMahon regarded as 'vague in its terms and unintelligible in its practical application' and therefore entirely unacceptable. The Tibetan objection to any further negotiations rested on the view that they had already signed away more than was strictly in the interests of Tibet. They had initialled a treaty restoring the lost suzerainty of China over Tibet by the re-instatement of an Amban at Lhasa; they had virtually ceded to China the rich revenue-producing provinces of Derge and Nyarong, and in return all that they had received was a promise to evacuate the land lying west of Chamdo and Markham. The Lönchen refused to make any more concessions without corresponding advantages.

McMahon would have preferred a dual signature to the document rather than forego some sort of final settlement. He was restrained by the India Office who told him that 'His Majesty's Government cannot authorise separate signature with the Tibetans'.[379] At the final meeting on 3 July, Chen informed McMahon that he had no authority to sign nor would his government recognise any document drawn up between the British and Tibetan representatives. Left with no alternative but to proceed without Chinese participation, McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra signed a joint Anglo-Tibetan Declaration which acknowledged the draft Convention to be binding on the two governments. They also accepted that 'so long as the

Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom'. To the document were attached copies of the Convention, duly initialled and sealed, with an accompanying map and a set of the new Tibet Trade Regulations.[380] The Chinese delegate was informed of the general line taken in the memorandum but was left in ignorance of the exact character of the document. McMahon was to maintain that when the Chinese plenipotentiary initialled the Convention on 27 April that he did so with great relief since he admitted to having obtained terms far more favourable than could reasonably be expected in view of the actual position of Tibet, but that his government, he agreed, had 'subsequently displayed their traditional dislike of finality and concluded agreements'. Chen made the somewhat sombre forecast that the Chinese would have to 'resort to ruinous military expenditure in the hope of retrieving their position in Tibet'.[381]

McMahon was convinced that substantial gains had been secured by the Simla Conference. He pointed to the new Trade Regulations and a firm definition of the Assam Himalayan border. Moreover, the British Government had secured the freedom of direct communication with the Tibetan Government without recourse to Chinese mediation. The only way to substantiate these gains was, in McMahon's view, through a Lhasa Agency. He wanted Archibald Rose, on his return journey to China, to go via Lhasa, Chamdo and Tachienlu and to do so under the auspices of the Tibetan Government. The plan was overruled by the Foreign Office on the grounds that the Anglo-Russian Convention continued to limit the right of direct communication with Tibet, and that the Indian Government could only act upon the initialled 1914 Convention so long as it did not violate the 1907 Agreement.[382] McMahon did, however, get his way over the Gyantse Trade Agent's escort, and its increase was approved in principle. He was convinced that until the Chinese signed the Convention, and he appears to have believed that in time they would, there existed a real threat to the Dalai Lama's Government from the Chinese forces in the eastern Marches. In the circumstances, McMahon thought that there was a good case to help the Tibetans militarily. After all, a powerful Tibet was more likely to withstand Chinese aggression than a weak one.[383]

Charles Bell summarised the gains for the British of the Trade Regulations.[384] It lifted restrictions on British commercial activities in Tibet and gave the right to export Indian tea to Tibet free of duty. The area of the Trade Marts was to be enlarged and Shashima in the Chumbi valley was confirmed as the new trading post instead of Old Yatung. Complete control of the Trade Agencies was granted to India, as well as provision for handing over posts and telegraphs. The British Trade Agent at Gyantse secured the right to visit Lhasa, with an escort, if he so chose; restrictions on British subjects from travelling in Tibet were withdrawn. Monopolies were abolished and the provision that Tibetan subjects in India should receive the same advantages as British subjects in Tibet was withdrawn. Imports of military stores, liquor and drugs was to rest on the option of either government. From now on the

The Maps

The 1914 Simla Conference maps reproduced here are taken from the Government of India publication *Tibetan Précis* by H E Richardson (Calcutta, 1945).

Maps by John Mitchell

Map No. 2 FRONTIER PROPOSALS AT THE SIMLA CONFERENCE

69 miles = 1 Degree

50 0 50 100 miles

East of Greenwich

1 Frontier of Tibet.
2 Boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet. } 1914 convention
3 First proposal by Sir H. McMahon for frontier of Tibet.
4 First proposal by Sir H. McMahon for boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet.
5 Frontier claimed by Chinese 1914.
6 Frontier claimed by Tibet.

Map No. 3 CHINESE PROPOSALS FOR A FRONTIER SETTLEMENT 1915–1919



1 Frontier of Tibet.
2 Boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet. } 1914 convention
3 Chinese proposal for Frontier of Tibet.
4 Chinese proposal for boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. } 1915
5 Chinese proposal for boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet 1919. (Approximate).
6 Frontier claimed by Chinese 1914.

Map No. 4 SKETCH MAP OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN TIBET

KWEN LUN
ALTIN TAGH
Arka Tagh
CHANG TANG
NEPAL
SIKKIM
BHUTAN
TSAIDAM
HUMBOLDT
NAN SHAN
Kara Nor
Koko Nor
Si-ning
Donkyr
Lan Chou
Hwang Ho
BANAKHSUM
AMDO
Burkhan Budda Ula
Marco Polo Mt.
HUANG HO YUAN
GOLOK
TRASHI GOMPA
Jyekundo
DERGE
HOR STATES
RONGBATSA
Kanze
NYARONG
GYARONG
CHENG-TU
Ta Chien Lu
No-kau
CHALA
Litang
Batang
Pamu-tang
CHANTRENG
MULI
Atuntzu
Champutong
Isu Razi
Wei-si
Npimaw
Myitkyina
Chiamdo
En-ta
RIWOCHE
HLATO
Tanta La
Shobando
GYALAM ROAD
Chamdun Draya
Gartok
TSARONG
Ata Gang La
Sangacho Dzong
Tila La
Menkong
Rima
Glei Dakhru
Manil Krai
Sadiya
Lohit R.
Dibrugarh
Nkamti Long
Brahmaputra R.
Salween R.
Mekong R.
Yangtze R.
TAKPO
KONGBO
PO-ME
ZAYUL
Giamda
Shan-wan
JYADE
NAGCHU
LHASA
Tsetang
Shigatse
Gyantse
Tsang-po R.
Tawang
Darjiling
Gartok
Ling-zi-Thang
LEM
Chaklik
Sachu
An-si-chau
East of Greenwich

69 miles = 1 Degree
50 0 50 100 miles

1. Frontier of Tibet. } 1914 convention
2. Boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet. } 1914 convention
3. The boundary at the time of the Manchu Empire 1727–1910.
4. The boundary from 1912–1917 (De Facto).
5. The boundary from 1918–1932 (De Facto).
6. The boundary at present. (De Facto), approximate.

Tibetans were to police the trade marts and routes and there was provision for the revision of the Regulations when that seemed necessary. All privileges, previously enjoyed by the Chinese, were cancelled.

The gains for the Tibetans relating to trade were far less substantial. The insistence on the abolition of monopolies affected the Tibetan wool industry; no substantial guarantees of arms and ammunition meant that Chinese troops continued to threaten Lhasa itself. The Government of India's refusal to permit the Tibetans to levy customs tariffs on exports from Tibet to India put an exceptionally severe strain on their finances. There was also the fear that if they were tempted, because of financial constraints, to conclude an agreement with the Chinese regarding their export markets, the Indian Government would not hesitate to repudiate it on threat of withdrawal of support or any other action which they deemed necessary.[385]

The McMahon Line

The new Trade Regulations and a defined north-east frontier were two of the more important advantages that the Government of India secured at the Simla Conference. It failed, however, to find a solution to Tibetan status. The Convention acknowledged that British recognition of Tibetan autonomy was to be based on the assurance that they would not recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet unless the Chinese Government ratified the Convention. This the Chinese refused to do. As a result, in the aftermath of the Simla Convention, Chinese suzerainty had little practical or diplomatic meaning in the Tibetan context. The suzerainty of China in Tibet as witnessed in the 1906, 1907 and 1908 Agreements, the Tibetans had consistently denied. The Dalai Lama himself had repudiated the Conventions in his conversations with Lord Minto in 1910, maintaining that they had been negotiated without Tibetan participation.[386] Here, at last, was a treaty in which Tibet, separately represented, had independently put her signature. What was more Tibet's independent representation at the Conference, however reluctantly, had been accepted by China. The conclusive action taken by McMahon and the Lönchen in initialling the amended Convention meant that the terms were placed beyond the limits of further discussion and no alteration thereafter was possible. The procedure, an ingenious compromise, avoided a dual signature to a document drawn up on a tripartite basis. It bound Britain and Tibet to the advantages of the Convention. It precluded China on her refusal to sign.

Much of the trouble in getting the Chinese to sign the 1914 Convention lay in McMahon's application of the Russian model relating to Outer Mongolia to his solution regarding Tibet. His draft agreement emphasised the partitioning of Tibet on geographical limits rather than on political realities. The proposed partition of Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet involved the surrender of traditional and valued rights by the Tibetans as well as by the Chinese. The Chinese were required to withdraw from Outer Tibet and surrender their claims to Batang and Litang in Inner Tibet. The Tibetans were being asked to relinquish Chamdo and territories in the KokoNor region. Chinese refusal to

sign the Convention was in large part due to McMahon's alignment of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. It meant that China would have to abandon Chao-Erh-feng's annexed territories in the Marches, from which the Tibetans had so far been unable to dislodge them completely. The Tibetans were no more satisfied with the concessions they were having to make to get a settlement on their eastern front. When the final concession of June 1914 came, it agreed to transfer the buffer zone in Inner Tibet to China and away from Tibet, thereby denying to the Tibetans a guaranteed eastern frontier with China and consequently international recognition of the limits of Inner Tibet. These zonal alignments, were designed principally to give India frontier security; their effect was to deprive Tibet of her traditional boundaries and the means of guaranteeing her own viable limits. The fact that China refused to ratify the Simla Convention meant that she had no intention of observing any of it, or that the settlement in itself gave any hope of permanency to the Tibetans.[387]

Tibetan acceptance of Inner and Outer zones in Tibet guaranteed for the Indian Government no direct territorial contact with the Chinese on their northern frontier. What remained outstanding and was required was some treaty definition of the boundary alignment. McMahon set about using the Simla Conference as the occasion for direct Anglo-Tibetan discussions on the question. By an exchange of notes on 24–25 March 1914, he obtained Tibetan agreement to a boundary definition which has since then been permanently associated with him by being known as the McMahon Line.[388]

McMahon took as his brief Lord Minto's telegram of 23 October 1910, which proposed to secure a buffer between the north-eastern frontier of India and Tibet.[389] The alignment was to follow the crest of the Himalayan range in Assam, from the eastern edge of Tawang district to the watershed between the Irrawaddy and Zayul, and onward from there to the divide between the Salween and the Irrawaddy.[390] However, in 1911, Lord Hardinge's various survey teams were in possession of far more information on the north-east frontier than in Minto's day. They found that the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra cut its way through the Assam Himalayan range. Any watershed alignment, based on the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, would mean that vast tracts of Tibetan territory, including Lhasa, Shigatse, Gyantse, to name but a few, would fall within India. It was, therefore, decided that the final form of the McMahon Line would follow a series of watershed alignments of the major rivers.

Tawang, in 1910, was recognised as being Tibetan territory, administered as such, and Minto accordingly did not consider its inclusion as part of the new Indian boundary. However, by the time McMahon had come to submit his final border alignments to the India Office in February 1914, the region around Tawang monastery had been included in British India.[391] McMahon, after studying various official reports on the demarcation of the frontier line around Tawang, agreed with General Staff's recommendation that the much used trade route between the Miri country and Bhutan would enable the Chinese to exert their influence on Bhutan and thereby deprive India of a salient of their own. He, therefore, agreed to a modification of the original proposed

boundary and included in it not only the occupation of Tawang but also the Tibetan administered centre of Tsona Dzong.[392] The arrangement went strictly against the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, but it was justified on the grounds that it was 'essential to our Imperial interests against any possibility of Chinese penetration'.[393]

To the east of the Tawang tract the new boundary alignment crossed the Subansiri (Tsari Chu) and its tributary the Chayul Chu. Here, McMahon included Migyitun, the southern limit of Tibetan occupation, as part of the new boundary. East of the Subansiri was the valley of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, and two boundary alignments were suggested. One included Pemakoichen which ran as far north as the Nam La and Namche Barwa (25,000 ft), and the other crossed the Siang between the villages of Korbu and Mongku. The first lay inside Abor country and in the second the Abors were in the minority. The second alignment was the one McMahon selected. At the head of the Dibang valley, on the Dri, Andra and Yongyap tributaries, was what the Chief Commissioner of Assam described as 'Tom Tiddler's ground'; here it was decided to push through it and towards the watershed between the Dibang and its tributaries on the one hand, and the rivers flowing northward into Tibet on the other.[394] Eastward from the Dibang basin lay the Lohit, visited by the Chinese on numerous occasions and where they had indicated, by pillars, their notion of the frontier. They had also put up boundary markers at the Yepak river in 1910 and again in 1912. British frontier officials warned McMahon that any Chinese or Tibetan post at the Yepak river would sit astride the route from Sadiya to the proposed British frontier post at Menilkrai near the Yepak. The Chinese had already infiltrated into the Hkamtilong district of northern Burma by way of the Talok Pass. To secure the Talok Pass route into Hkamtilong, it was proposed to include the village of Kahao in British territory, thereby running the line from the Lohit to the Talok Pass along the northern side of the Di Chu. East of the Lohit lay Burma and an undefined border with Tibet. At this point, there was the question of the Taron, a tributary of the Nmaihka branch of the Irrawaddy, with its sources near the Tibetan towns of Drowa and Menkong. The alignment chosen was near the vicinity of the Isu Razi Pass on the Salween-Irrawaddy divide; it was to run round the head of Mang Kha valley and down the watershed of the Mang Kha and the Lawang rivers. From there it would cross the Taron river at Hkindam gorge, and the ascending spur to the Taron-Tadzu watershed.[395]

In theory, the Simla Conference had been convened to discuss the Sino-Tibetan issues and the Sino-Tibetan border but, in the process, McMahon secured an agreement with the Tibetans to the Assam Himalayan border and also to the transfer of territory from Tibet to India. Areas such as Tawang, the Lohit between Yepak and Kahao, the upper Siang and Siyon valleys were all brought within the territorial limits of British India. On the Sino-Tibetan frontier a double boundary was laid down; a blue line indicating the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet, that is, between Chinese and Tibetan territory, and a red line being the boundary of 'Greater' Tibet, or the region that was to be partitioned. By delimiting approximately 850 miles of

boundary in the Assam Himalaya, Britain became the greatest beneficiary from the Simla Conference. The McMahon Line became a surety against China's forward policy in the north-east frontier; it also extended British territory into fifty thousand square miles of tribal country. Many of these tribal peoples had had close affinities for centuries with Tibet. Others were within the ecclesiastical influence of Tibet. The nominal transfer of this territory was transacted while the British, Tibetan and Chinese delegates were still discussing the various issues of the Simla Conference.[396]

What argument did Charles Bell use to persuade the Lönchen Shatra to surrender so much territory, without acquiring in exchange substantial safeguards in relation to Tibet's eastern borders and to China's claims to suzerainty in Tibet? The bargain, unequal at the very least, meant that in return for India's strategic frontier, the Tibetans got diplomatic and limited military support in their struggle with China. Since the full Lönchen Shatra-Bell minutes have never been revealed, one can only surmise why the Tibetan Minister agreed to the McMahon Line. The Tibetans were to argue, at a later date, that they had done so as part of a greater bargain. By agreeing to a boundary on the frontiers of India, the British would guarantee them a boundary with China, which, at the time, they were in no position to secure for themselves. It is possible that the Lönchen assumed at the time, as did McMahon, Jordan, the Viceroy and Chen himself, that the Chinese would agree to sign the Simla Convention at a later date.

The Lönchen was not altogether unsuccessful and managed to secure in the Tawang tract certain dues traditionally collected by the Tibetan Government from the Mönbas and Löbas, similar dues in the Lohit and Siang valleys and in the upper reaches of the Subansiri. Tibetan ownership in private estates was to be preserved, with the right to collect taxes by the owners.[397] Tibetan pilgrimages would be allowed as before. McMahon also assured the Tibetans that if, in the future, they found themsleves dissatisfied with the workings of the McMahon Line, it might be possible 'to modify the course of the boundary line at any place, we shall doubtless endeavour to show a similar attitude in regard to Tibetan interests'.[398] It was an anomalous position; it found regions like Tawang, though nominally in British territory, continuing to be administered by officials responsible to the Tibetan Government. Such a policy was of course in keeping with the India Office's declared views of 'loose political control', and it was to remain so until the 1930s. At the same time McMahon's red line was also used to define an adjustment of the Kashgar-Kashmir border. The red line was carried north-west to the extreme north-western frontier of Ladakh on the north bank of the Karakash river, the Aksai Chin. Since the red line was used to define 'the frontiers of Tibet', and since Tibet lay south of the red line, the logical conclusion was that part of the Aksai Chin, at the very least, lay in Tibetan territory.[399]

Having got Tibetan acceptance to the McMahon Line, it then became essential to secure Chinese approval of the boundaries. Sun Pao-ch'i, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, contended that KokoNor had always been an integral part of China, and it was intended to include it in the south-west

portion of Inner Tibet. With regard to Derge and Nyarong in eastern Tibet, China would agree to create no new military posts there. As Chao Erh-feng had annexed the territories of Batang, Litang and the Kham zone, they were considered to be indisputably part of China. Chinese claims on the north-eastern territory of India's borders included Walong at the Yepak tributary to the Lohit, the Lohit-Delei junction, and north-westwards across the Dibang basin to a point below the McMahon Line. From there Chen's line had gone on to include Giamda in Tibet, which he claimed was a town on the Sino-Tibetan border. However, when he withdrew his Inner-Outer Tibetan boundary to the Salween, he also abandoned his claims to these Assam-Himalayan territories. McMahon's red line was there to separate Tibet from China. It began on the Karakash river and proceeded to the Isu Razi at the Tibet-China-Burma trijunction. From the Isu Razi Pass the red line went onwards to Tawang where it divided Tibet from British India.[400] So when, on 27 April 1914, Ivan Chen initialled the map showing the limits of Inner and Outer Tibet, inclusive of the various tracts which divided Tibet from China and Tibet from British India, he duly accepted the McMahon Line. The Chinese Government's prompt repudiation of their plenipotentiary's signature was not so much that they objected to the McMahon Line *in toto*, but most specifically to the 'red line' boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet: in fact, to the inclusion in Outer Tibet of Chamdo and the southern portion of the KokoNor territory.

What did McMahon's zonal division of Tibet seek to achieve? Possibly a buffer territory between Mongolia and Tibet, the international recognition of which would make it impossible for China, in any future negotiations with Russia, to alienate. However, by his last proposed concession of June 1914, McMahon agreed to transfer most of the tract in question from Inner Tibet to China. By refusing to sign the Convention, China escaped according any recognition to the validity of the McMahon Line or to the Trade Regulations. By the same token, the Tibetans were freed from surrendering part of their sovereignty in return for Chinese guarantee of their autonomy. They were also relieved from the implications of McMahon's Note which acknowledged Tibet to be an integral part of China. The British had acquired the freedom of direct contact with the Tibetan Government and the right to send a representative to Lhasa. The Tibetans were now obliged to secure British consent before they thought of negotiating with any other Foreign Power.[401] The various concessions made by Lord Morley since the 1904 Lhasa Convention to the Chinese had steadily eroded Indian interests. Whatever else the 1914 Simla Conference achieved, it bestowed on Britain, once again, the most-favoured-nation status in regard to Tibet.

Once the Chinese had recognised that the Simla Conference was an established fact, they promptly approached HMG to enquire whether the negotiations in regard to Tibet could be reopened, this time in Peking.[402] The Wai-chiao-pu offered the retention of Chamdo in Outer Tibet in return for a modified Simla Convention, in which Chinese suzerainty would be emphasised by permitting Chinese Trade Agents to be stationed at Chamdo,

Gyantse, Shigatse, Yatung and Gartok. In fact, in any town where British Trade Agents might also have an interest.[403] The Viceroy was not averse to a permanent settlement with China. On the contrary, he believed that it would prevent any future Tibetan Government from entering into a separate arrangement with China which might come to harm Indian Government interests.

Yet, before Hardinge could contemplate any move towards China, he knew that HMG would need to secure Russian acceptance of the various ramifications of the Simla Conference. Attempts to persuade Russia to agree to some modifications in the 1907 Agreement had proved complex and protracted. Sazonov claimed that Russia had acted well within her rights in helping Mongolia and had done nothing to change the situation in regard to Tibet.[404] He did, however, object most specifically to Article VI, VIII and X of the Simla Convention. In all of them he accused Britain of having secured the most-favoured-nation status, and Article X was tantamount to establishing a British protectorate over Tibet. Sazonov was prepared to accept Articles VI and VIII provided the Russians also had the right to seek commercial concessions in Tibet and provided the British representative did not visit Lhasa without Russian approval. In both these cases, the Russians would promise, in secret, not to seek either concession. In agreeing to the Simla Convention, Russia would require some positive gain, in exchange, in Afghanistan and Persia.[405] In Afghanistan they would ask for the Herat region to be within the Russian sphere of influence.

The Viceroy thought it essential that there should be no negotiations regarding Afghanistan in St Petersburg without first consulting the Kabul authorities. He was overruled by both the India Office and the Foreign Office.[406] As the negotiations continued in Europe, it became clear that Sazonov was not going to agree to the terms of the Simla Conference, without a precise Afghan concession having been decided upon first. The deepening shadows of the First World War relieved the Viceroy of having to contend with a decision in London which ultimately would have proved unsatisfactory both to Afghanistan as well as to India. The British and Russian Ministers decided to postpone the talks until early in 1915. 'If at the end of the war we are able to come to terms with Russia on Asiatic questions our hands may then be more free to deal with China in regard to Tibet'.[407]

While the Chinese attempted to reopen negotiations with Britain, they were no less active in their approaches to the Kalon Lama, and to the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa.[408] However, these repeated overtures met with no more success than they had before the Simla Conference began.[409] In fact, at the end of 1915, Jordan was having to warn the Wai-chiao-pu not to attempt to send a Chinese envoy to Lhasa. The warning merely served to encourage the Wai-chiao-pu to approach Jordan next, with a renewed offer of a modified agreement regarding the inclusion of Chamdo in Outer Tibet, and Batang and Litang in Inner Tibet; any such agreement, they maintained, would remove all misunderstanding between Britain and China. The British Government refused to reopen the Tibetan question at this stage, and, thereby, probably

lost the one and only opportunity to secure a fresh tripartite agreement with China in regard to Tibet.

The political situation in China, at the time these fresh approaches were made to Jordan, was highly unstable. The Monarchist Movement was responsible for a major schism between the predominantly pro-north and the anti-monarchy, south. In 1916, Yuan Shih-k'ai died while attempting to restore the Chinese monarchy and with him went the prospect of a settlement with China over Tibet. Before his death, and in a conversation with Jordan, Yuan Shih-k'ai had explained his government's reasons for refusing to sanction China's signature to the Simla Convention. He explained that, in the circumstances prevailing in China, he had not the power to enforce the Convention upon the provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan. He had 'always been opposed to a policy of expansion on the Tibetan borderland and . . . had constantly formed one of a small minority who deprecated Chao Erh-feng's campaign. But, he repeated, that he could not consent to the alienation of places like Litang and Batang which had long been recognised as Chinese.[410]

Tibet, after the Simla Conference, became to all intents and purposes a neutral state, avoiding as far as possible too close an involvement with either of her powerful neighbours. The weakness of her neutrality lay in the very Simla Convention which had meant to establish her separate status. By agreeing to the terms of the Simla Convention in Article II, Tibet agreed to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty on condition that China guaranteed her autonomy. Although the failure of China to sign the 1914 Convention released Tibet from surrendering her sovereignty, yet it also released China from guaranteeing Tibetan autonomy and agreeing to a defined joint frontier. All the same, it is doubtful whether a Chinese guarantee of Tibet's autonomy would have saved them in view of consistent British unwillingness to help them substantially while they were neutral. For Tibet, it was a position of weakness. She had granted Britain exclusive political influence in Tibet, yet there was no intention of establishing a protectorate. Nor was there a guarantee that no other power would be allowed to do so. It meant that the Chinese would abstain from interference so long as they were unable militarily to effect their return. In the circumstances, it was only a matter of time before Tibetan neutrality, without effective safeguards, would succumb to outside pressures.

Tibet and China, 1914–19

Relations between Tibet and China continued on the basis of undeclared hostilities after the Simla Conference. The Chinese made sporadic attempts to negotiate an agreement regarding the frontier alignments in eastern Tibet. However, they found the Dalai Lama's terms too exacting and, in addition, the British Government were swift to inform both sides that they looked upon any such meeting as a 'most discourteous and unfriendly act', in the light of Tibetan acceptance of the terms of the Simla Conference.[411] The Tibetan Government, having resolutely refused Chinese overtures, repeatedly pressed the Government of India to secure Chinese agreement to the Convention, and

reminded them of their promise to supply arms and ammunition. Their request was for an adequate supply of mountain guns and machine guns with the loan of four mechanics to service them. To help meet the expenses of war, the Tibetan Government asked for a levy of tax on wool.[412] The Dalai Lama, having pinned his hopes on his new ally, found that each new shipment was attached to a *quid pro quo*; the presentation of rifles, for instance, was delayed until the Tibetan Government had abolished monopolies. Moreover, to the surprise of the Tibetans, the British Government in 1916, on the plea of international restrictions, placed a total embargo on the supply of arms to Tibet from India.[413]

The fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai's regime in 1916 was followed by the reinstitution of the Republic under a new constitution. Jordan in Peking was again urging negotiations regarding a fresh tripartite agreement based on the Simla Convention, but incorporating the Chinese proposals of 1915. While the British Government considered their next move, civil war broke out in the outlying provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan and the Tibetans found themselves having to contend, not only with the Chinese but with the local warlords as well.[414] By 1917, General P'eng Jih-sheng, Commander of the Chinese troops on the frontier, intensified his activities and directed the Chinese offensive towards Lhasa. P'eng had been on the frontier since Chao Erh-feng's early campaigns and towards the end of 1917 he found himself, together with his troops, in dire financial straits. He conceived the idea of breaking the truce, advancing on Lhasa with the two-fold purpose of securing loot and supplies, and of obtaining the post of Frontier Commissioner or Resident in Tibet. Times, however, had changed since Chao Erh-feng's day and the ill-led and ill-equipped Chinese failed to bring the Tibetan forces down. The Kalon Lama counter-attacked, recaptured Chamdo and drove the Chinese well back beyond the Upper Yangtse. In April 1918, Chamdo had surrendered and P'eng, with more than 2,000 Chinese troops, had fallen into Tibetan hands. The Tibetan advance did not stop there and soon they were threatening Batang and Tachienlu, and by the middle of 1918 were advancing on Nyarong and Kanze. Another month or two would have seen the Lhasa forces in possession of the country up to Tachienlu. Throughout 1917 and 1918, repeated messages poured in from the Tibetan Government entreating the British Government to help secure a permanent settlement with regard to the Tibet-China frontier. At the same time they redoubled their efforts to acquire more arms and ammunition from India, but neither request met with much response.[415]

It was at this juncture that the local Chinese leaders on the frontier sought the help of Eric Teichman, the British Consular Officer stationed at Chengtu. They appealed to him to try and negotiate a truce on the basis of the *status quo*. Teichman's efforts were directed in attempting to secure a Tibetan withdrawal from the regions they now occupied and, to reinforce his argument, he refused to supply them with more arms. In Teichman's view the Tibetans could have successfully captured Batang and the territory up to Tachienlu but that, in due course, a possible recovery by the Chinese would have led to further unrest. He finally managed to persuade them to accept a truce.

In the months that followed China displayed no interest in getting a settlement, although she had originally sought it. Jordan believed that once order was restored in Szechuan the Chinese would settle it for themselves and not accept any local agreement arranged through Teichman. Whitehall was in general agreement with Jordan that Teichman should be withdrawn from mediating in the Chinese-Tibetan dispute. However, with little or no knowledge of these strictures due to extreme difficulty in communications, Teichman managed to persuade the two sides to accept an armistice.[416] The Truce of Rongbatsa was signed in October 1918 by which the Tibetans agreed to withdraw to Derge, while the Chinese undertook not to advance beyond Kanze.[417] A line along the Upper Yangtse from KokoNor to Yunnan, almost the historic frontier of the Manchu period, was accepted as the provisional China-Tibet frontier. By the Rongbasta Truce China remained in control of Batang, Litang, Nyarong and Kanze and the area to the east of Kanze, while the Tibetans retained Chamdo, Draya, Markham and Derge.

The Truce of Rongbatsa provided for a year's armistice. Whitehall and Lhasa were impatient to secure an agreement within the time limit, but not so the Chinese. Jordan thought that China's refusal to settle the problem lay in the unsettled situation in Peking and the insistence by China to cling to shadowy rights of suzerainty in regard to Tibet. The Indian Government was, by now, convinced that there was no possibility of a settlement with China and urged Lhasa to claim self-determination at the forthcoming Peace Conference in Paris. In their view the promise to supply Tibet with arms and ammunition was long overdue and they feared that if they continued to rebuff Lhasa too often the Tibetans would be forced to seek help elsewhere, probably from Russia.[418] On Jordan's opposition to military help, the Viceroy was forced to postpone the decision.

In May 1919, the Chinese put forward proposals for a compromise formula based on the Simla Conference. They proposed that Tibet was part of China and that this should be inserted into the Treaty itself. Chinese Commissioners were to be stationed at the trade marts; autonomous Tibet should recognise Chinese suzerainty, and a revision of the old historic boundary line of autonomous Tibet should include an Inner Tibet consisting of Derge, Nyarong and the southern portions of the KokoNor territory. Tachienlu, Batang and Litang were to be included in Szechuan and the original jurisdiction of Yunnan and Hsiang Cheng was to remain unchanged. By any such arrangement it would have meant Tibet abandoning a good deal of the Inner Tibet of 1914 to China. Jordan was quite prepared to accept this reversal provided future discussions regarding these alignments was with the Chinese alone and that they would take place in Peking.[419] He was anxious to avoid breaking off formal negotiations initiated by Peking, particularly since he believed that they were a considerable advance when compared to earlier offers. If a united and stable China ever came into being, able to advance on Lhasa, the opportunity to come to an arrangement with China would be lost forever.[420]

The Chinese proposals brought a sharp response from the Viceroy. He was

particularly opposed to Chinese Agents at the trade marts. Nor was he impressed by the idea of a counter concession by Peking of a British representative at Lhasa. An advantage based on such a concession would be outweighed by the presence of Chinese Commissioners in Tibet. The India Office saw the danger to the Tang La Range. '. . . it lies across one of the two principal routes from China to Lhasa (the northern route via Hsi-ning), and that it is only some 250 miles from Lhasa. To give it to Inner Tibet would mean that China could station troops 250 miles from Lhasa without any serious geographical obstacle in between'.[421] Besides, Lord Chelmsford wanted the Tibetans to be kept informed regarding the negotiations.[422]

As exchanges continued between Jordan and the Viceroy, the former telegraphed Curzon at the Foreign Office urging him to come to an arrangement before the Rongbatsa Truce expired. In Jordan's view, if Chinese activities in Mongolia proved successful, then there was the danger that they would rethink their offer.[423] On 30 July, Curzon authorised negotiations with the Chinese Government; he was in broad agreement with Jordan that prior consultation with the Tibetan Government was unnecessary. The frontier as proposed by Peking he accepted on the assumption that the new KokoNor border would leave the Tang La Range in Tibetan hands. The request for Chinese Trade Agents, Curzon declared totally unacceptable.[424]

On 14 August, since the attitude of the Chinese Government to the negotiations appeared 'reasonable', Jordan decided to proceed on the following lines: Article IX of the Simla Convention should be replaced by a new article laying down a boundary between China and Tibet and safeguarding the Dalai Lama's religious rights in Chinese-controlled frontier regions. No reference was to be made to an Indo-Tibetan boundary. Article VII was to be left unchanged. Statements that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory and that Tibet recognised Chinese suzerainty were to be inserted in Article II, in return for a modification in relation to Article VIII regarding the right of British representation at Lhasa.[425] However, on 26 August 1919 Jordan was informed that in consequence of a change in public opinion, the Chinese Cabinet had decided to postpone negotiations. On Jordan's insistence that the Minister should give the true reason for his government's action, he was told that 'the Minister of a certain power [Japan] had received instructions from his Government to make enquiries about Sino-British negotiations, and he virtually admitted that this was the cause of their interruption which he personally deeply regretted'.[426]

Had the Japanese not thrown a spanner in the works and brought the Sino-British talks to a halt, it is highly unlikely that the Tibetans would have sat lamely by and let their future be decided in Peking.[427] No sooner did they suspect that Jordan had begun negotiations, than the Tsongdu despatched a resolution, bearing the seals of the three monasteries in Lhasa, requesting that negotiations should take place in Lhasa, failing that in Gyantse or, as a last resort, at Chamdo. The resolution went further and stated that Article II relating to Tibetan autonomy and Chinese suzerainty should remain unchanged; that Tibet was strongly opposed to the appointment of Chinese

officials at the trade marts and that this objection should be inserted into the Convention; that Tibet claimed the Kuen Lun territory for Outer Tibet, Markham and Nyarong for Inner Tibet with arguments for complete restoration of Nyarong to Tibet Proper, and that existing rights in Litang and Batang should be maintained as defined in Article IX of the 1914 Convention.[428]

The Tsongdu's letter indicated that the Tibetan Government had gone back to the terms of their 1914 Agreement and to the Rongbatsa Truce, concluded four years later. They totally rejected the Peking negotiations and the four points raised by China. They also insisted that in any future negotiations, the representative of the Tibetan National Assembly would have to be fully associated with the talks. Had the Chinese agreed to go on with the negotiations, the Viceroy would have found it difficult to get the necessary acceptance from the Dalai Lama's Government.[429]

The months following Peking's sudden repudiation of negotiations with the British also found the Wai-chiao-pu attempting to secure a bilateral agreement with Tibet. They argued that since Tibet herself had asked for her autonomy to be cancelled, the necessity of concluding a treaty with Britain about Tibet was no longer essential. 'We have always deeply appreciated England's good offices in bringing about a settlement, but in view of existing circumstances it would be truly harmful to open negotiations at present'.[430] Accordingly, they had decided to send a mission to act as an intermediary between Peking and Lhasa. The Kansu Mission made its way to Lhasa where it was reported as having made liberal promises to the Tibetan authorities. However, the Dalai Lama and his officials had learnt their lesson and were not to be persuaded to accept Chinese overtures. The failure of the mission made Peking promptly disown both its sponsorship and the proposals it had carried with it to Lhasa.

As the mission beat a hasty retreat from Tibet, it found the Dalai Lama's Chief Minister pressing the Indian Government to help secure a permanent settlement regarding their differences with China. They asked to be supplied with more arms and ammunition and for the appointment of an officer to represent the British Government in Lhasa.[431] Tibetan alarm at the presence of the Kansu Mission in Lhasa was no less when the news reached Charles Bell in Gangtok. He wrote off urgent letters to the Government of India blaming the Chinese presence on 'our turning the cold shoulder to the Tibetans'.[432]

The implications of the Kansu Mission's presence in Lhasa was not lost on Whitehall. It precipitated a rethinking of Britain's Tibetan policy. There were powerful arguments now in favour of arming the Tibetans and of sending a resident to Lhasa to remain there permanently. It was recognised that the previous policy of sterilising Tibet had merely played into China's hands. In fact, an open Tibet would mean a Tibet strengthened and developed under British patronage.[433] If the risk of China regaining control over Tibet was one reason for reversing Indian Government policy, the other was the collapse of the Imperial Government of Russia. The Indian Government found that the most pressing obstacle in Europe to an open door policy with regard to Tibet had been swept away at last.

Charles Bell's Mission to Lhasa, 1920–21

The abrupt suspension of the Peking negotiations, without adequate explanations, caused sufficient displeasure in London for them to recall their Minister, Sir John Jordan, to England. Charles Bell had repeatedly pointed out that failure to bring about a tripartite settlement and India's refusal to meet the Tibetan's demand for an increase in military aid had been the prime cause of reducing British prestige in Lhasa. To put matters right Bell was able to persuade his government to send him up to Lhasa. Thereafter, for months the Indian Government's decision to send Bell was held up in London. When permission did arrive it was hedged in with various provisos. Nevertheless, the main aim was to give a new impetus to British relations with Tibet, and Sir Charles Bell was appointed to lead the mission.[434] The Charles Bell Mission was to mark a turning point in British policy towards Tibet.

Bell's instructions were to urge the Tibetan Government to bring to an end hostilities between themselves and China. At the same time he was to refrain from any promise of arms or ammunition. In case of failure by China to resume tripartite negotiations, Bell was to find out whether the Tibetans were contemplating a separate settlement between themselves and the Chinese. Events had convinced Jordan that if and when the Chinese returned to Lhasa, they would make every effort 'to insinuate themselves once more between us and the Tibetans'. In total contrast to his previous recommendations regarding Tibet and China, Jordan now wanted the Government of India to provide adequate military support to Lhasa. 'The whole history of the Chinese on Tibet and on the Tibetan border', he told Curzon, 'has been one of alternate bullying, chicanery, and intrigue'.[435]

When Bell first arrived in Lhasa, Lord Curzon in London was attempting to get the Chinese Minister, Dr Wellington Koo, to agree to resume negotiations regarding Tibet either in London or Peking. Bell's instructions were to stay in the Tibetan capital no longer than a month, but as negotiations with China dragged on, Beilby Alston, who had taken over from Jordan in Peking, encouraged him to prolong his stay in the hopes that Peking might be impressed with the fact that the British Government were in earnest about negotiations. It was the Government of India, fearing that their representative's presence in Lhasa might prejudice the London talks, who wanted Bell to return. When the Chinese finally turned down British terms for negotiation, Bell was able to persuade the Indian Government to allow him to extend his stay and carry on his bilateral talks with the Tibetans.

Alston in Peking was instructed to deliver an ultimatum that unless the Chinese Government was willing to resume talks, within one month, 'we shall reluctantly be compelled, in fairness to the Tibetan Government, to proceed in the matter alone. In that case we shall regard ourselves as having a free hand to deal with Tibet as an autonomous State . . . without reference to China to send an officer to Lhasa from time to time to consult with the Tibetan Government'.[436] If China did not intend to resume negotiations, then the Tibetans would be permitted to purchase arms without any further communication being made to the Chinese Government. To justify the measure,

HMG had recourse to the 1919 Arms Traffic Control Convention which had been signed by the parties to the Peace Conference. The Convention specified that certain categories of state or polity were acceptable recipients of arms supplies, while others were not. The Convention required incorporation into national sovereign legislation by the signatories to the agreement. In the case of Britain, this took place in the Fire Arms Act of 1920. It followed that any state to whom the British Government, after 1920, supplied arms on a government to government basis was deemed a suitable recipient of such arms. In essence, the 1919 Convention defined 'suitable' as referring either to fully sovereign states, internationally recognized as such, or such states which enjoyed the equivalent of dominion status, as in the British Commonwealth where the right to acquire arms for the purposes of self-defence and internal security was not questioned.[437]

The Chinese Government sent its formal reply to the Foreign Office terms on 8 September 1921. They remained non-committal. The time did not seem opportune and besides there was the impending Pacific Conference in Washington which took up much of their time. Also they exercised no control over Szechuan and Yunnan, both of which were directly involved in frontier settlements concerning Tibet. They pointed out that the Chinese Government at present was far from being as strong as it was in the time of Yuan Shih-k'ai and Tuan Chi-li and yet under neither of these strong men had it been possible to reach a settlement.[438]

Tibet's internal affairs, 1921–30

Following China's last minute refusal to negotiate on a bipartite basis regarding Tibet, a radical policy change took place at the Foreign Office in London. No longer were they prepared to regard Tibet as the sole concern of the 'fictional' suzerain China, no longer was Tibet to be kept isolated. One of Bell's chief concerns on arrival in Lhasa was to impress on the Dalai Lama and his Ministers that Britain did not intend to abandon them to an attack from China. In his view there could never again be negotiations regarding Tibet unless the Tibetan Government was consulted throughout. For ten years the Tibetans had been involved in a war on the eastern front and Bell feared that Britain's refusal to permit the Tibetan Government to purchase arms and ammunition might result in pushing them towards an independent treaty with China. It was vital to Tibet's interests, let alone that of India, that a final agreement should be secured with China, but if not, Bell set out what he considered India's future policy towards Tibet should be.

The Tibetan Government had had to maintain an army on their eastern frontier at vast cost.[439] Having promised them machine guns and other munitions of war, it was hardly politic to now actively prevent them from obtaining them. The Indian Government should agree to let the Tibetans import munitions in reasonable quantities, to help train their troops at Gyantse, and allow British experts to teach them the mechanics of making

gunpowder, and mining prospectors should be despatched to assist in discovering and working mines. The Tibetan Government would readily pay for these facilities, and China, seeing Tibet developing and strengthening herself, would come forward and complete the negotiations. Bell did not think that the danger to the northern frontier came only from China but also from Japan, and he feared that India, with these influences working against her, would be unable to protect adequately 1,500 miles of her own frontier. 'We cannot bury our heads in the sand, like the ostrich, trying to prevent dangers by ignoring them'. China was pressing and now Japan had begun to press. Tibet could not wait for a China that did not intend to negotiate until it was in her interest to do so. Tibet did not wish for her internal administration to come under the misgovernment and oppression of China. By barring Tibet from obtaining munitions from India, the obvious result would be to undermine her hard-won freedom and above all jeopardise the security of the northern frontier of India.[440]

The India Office fully agreed with the broad lines of Bell's argument. In their opinion, the tripartite negotiations of 1913–14 had been blocked by Britain's relations with Russia perhaps more than Chinese unwillingness to ratify the agreement. Then had come the war, and Russia for the moment was knocked out, but would shortly re-enter the ring, more dangerous than ever. China was largely dominated by Japan, and Japan was interested in Tibet. Britain could not prevent Tibet from getting help from Japan or from the Bolsheviks if they succeeded in penetrating through to Tibet. 'Is there any sense in liberating Tibet from China only to let it fall under the influence of one or other of two Powers irreconcilably hostile to Britain's position in Asia? Can we afford to do so?'. If the Chinese had been willing to negotiate, then the British Government would have been bound by their previous admission to the Chinese position. But since the British Government had first recognised Chinese suzerainty, the Tibetans had ejected the Chinese and the Chinese had found themselves unable to restore their authority. The essence of the present situation was the refusal by China to ratify the 1914 Agreement or even to negotiate a new one. 'They cannot have it both ways. It is open to us to recognise Tibetan independence at any moment, and at least people who believe in the foolish, catch-word "self-determination" could not complain'.[441]

The Viceroy accepted that what Tibet wanted was either China's acceptance of the tripartite agreement or Indian Government assistance in developing her powers of self-defence so as to keep China at arms length.[442] He fully endorsed Bell's recommendations regarding military aid to Tibet. In June 1921, Curzon accepted the proposal to permit the Tibetans to purchase arms and ammunition for purposes of self-defence. When the Chinese Minister, Wellington Koo, called on Lord Curzon on 26 August he was presented with a memorandum to say that the British Government could no longer acquiesce in the delaying tactics of the Chinese Government and unless there was an immediate resumption of discussions, they intended to proceed in the matter alone. They regarded themselves as having a free hand to deal with Tibet as an

autonomous state, if necessary without further reference to China. In the interests of closer relations with Tibet, it was intended to send an officer to Lhasa from time to time and to give the Tibetans any reasonable assistance they might require in the development and protection of their country. On the other hand, if a settlement of the Tibetan question could be reached with the Chinese Government, then Curzon was prepared to give favourable consideration to a Chinese consular representative to reside in India.[443]

By late autumn, the Chinese were still insisting that they were too preoccupied with the forthcoming Pacific Conference in Washington to enter into negotiations regarding Tibet. While the Chinese Government protested their inability to discuss the Tibetan question, it did not stop Minister Koo from bringing up the status of Tibet at the Pacific Conference. He made it clear that the territories of the Republic of China did not merely signify China Proper alone but all the territories, which presumably meant he included in them Mongolia, Tibet and KokoNor.[444] Noting the uncompromising stand of the Chinese delegate, it was decided that the time had come to inform the Dalai Lama that the British Government were prepared to grant assistance to his country.[445]

On 11 October 1921, Bell communicated the information to the Dalai Lama. Almost immediately there began a lessening of Tibetan isolation. Tibet was to be supplied with more arms and ammunition, provided a written guarantee was given that they would be used solely for self-defence and internal order. Limited training was to be given to the Tibetan forces at Gyantse and a telegraph line was to be constructed from Gyantse to Lhasa; a Sikkimese officer was to go to Lhasa to organise the police force and a British school was founded for the sons of Tibetan aristocrats.[446] Thus, the cherished dream of Younghusband and his mentor Curzon had finally come to rest; not entirely as they had contemplated but enough to justify that their vision of Tibet as a buffer state, in the face of China's forward policy, was not so far off the mark if imperial interests were to be safeguarded.

When Bell submitted his report in November 1921, he believed that he had regulated future relations with Tibet.[447] It was his hope that, in time, a tripartite treaty between Britain and Tibet and China would resolve the outstanding differences. It was a somewhat unrealistic hope for during the year that Bell remained in Lhasa, the Chinese made no move to resume negotiations. On the contrary, to each overture the Chinese remained uncompromising. The trust that the Tibetan Government rested in Bell was evidenced in 1923, when the Tsongdu took it upon themselves to urge him, while he was in England, to use his good offices with the British Government to reopen negotiations with China.[448] The India Office's response to the Tibetan appeal was to ask Bell to discourage the Tibetans from addressing official matters direct to London. All such correspondence should be conducted through the Political Officer in Sikkim and the Government of India.[449]

The XIII Dalai Lama's prime objective from 1914 had been to stabilise Tibet on the basis of a permanent settlement, it at all possible, with China. Failing

that, he saw in Bell's various policies a way to modernise and develop Tibet. The first essential was an efficient armed force to counteract the threat from the east; the other was a police force to control internal disorders. India undertook to train young Tibetans, at various centres, to form the nucleus of an independent army for Tibet. Laden La was lent to train the police force and, at times, to act as a channel regarding Tibetan requirements for military aid.[450]

The Dalai Lama's experience of the various abortive negotiations with China since 1914, brought the realisation that there were severe limits to what British diplomacy could achieve to keep Tibet independent. To modernise Tibet, the Dalai Lama also needed the financial co-operation of the large and well-endowed monasteries. Although, in theory, the Dalai Lama's authority was supreme, in practice he found his attempts to modernise Tibet challenged by the traditionalists. While Bell was still in Lhasa, the lamas had joined battle against the Dalai Lama's attempts to set up an army and a police force and to try to get them to contribute their share of the costs.[451] The richest monasteries were to be found in Lhasa – Drepung, Sera and Ganden – and there were others like Kumbum at Sining and the Panchen Lama's Tashilhunpo at Shigatse. Without exception, all were unwilling to contribute financially to modernising Tibet.

The Panchen Lama was particularly unhappy with the Dalai Lama's passion for modernisation. He was convinced that these policies would undermine his political and spiritual authority, and he had no intention of subscribing financially or otherwise to what he considered must inevitably lead to his downfall. Relations between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama had been uneasy ever since the former first left Lhasa as the Younghusband Mission advanced on the capital. The Dalai Lama was well aware that the Panchen had first made various overtures to Younghusband and then to the British Government in India. He also suspected that he had set about compromising the Dalai Lama's position by his tacit, if not overt, support of the Chinese during his absence in Mongolia and China from 1904 to 1909, and then again in India from 1910 to 1912. Attempts to settle their differences had been made in June 1912 when the Dalai Lama was on his way back to Lhasa, but suspicion and distrust of the Panchen Lama's allegiance remained. Nor was the Dalai Lama prepared to relax his authority over the Tashilhunpo administration, on a matter as important as that of Tibet's security.

Signs of impending trouble came in 1922 when the Panchen Lama was asked to contribute towards the cost of the Tibetan army. He promptly appealed to the British Government to mediate between himself and the Dalai Lama. He found that his appeal was in vain. The request was refused on the grounds that it would constitute interference in Tibet's internal affairs.[452] In 1923, the Panchen Lama fled from Tashilhunpo, leaving behind a letter saying that he was unable to meet the exhorbitant demands of the Lhasa authorities. Attempts by Lhasa to stop him and his followers proved unsuccessful. Fears that he would come under Russian influence were as groundless as the hopes of an amicable settlement between the two most eminent figures in Tibet. It had been known to the India Office that when the Panchen visited Calcutta in

1906, he had intrigued with the Chinese; it was therefore quite reasonable to suppose that he would look to China to redress his wrongs.[453] In China, he was given hospitality for the next fourteen years and, until his death, inevitably became the focus of intrigue, his hosts exploiting him with considerable skill to counter the Dalai Lama's influence in Lhasa.

In Tibet itself, the flight of the Panchen Lama caused deep disquiet.[454] Shortly afterwards when Major Bailey visited Lhasa, he was urged by Tsarong, a member of the Kashag and others to use his influence to persuade the Government of India to act as intermediary in persuading the Lama to return and 'thereby remove a means of Chinese and Bolshevik intrigue in Tibet'.[455] The question was how to lure the Panchen Lama away from anti-British influences which were bound to beset him in Peking. Bailey found the Tibetans most anxious to have the Lama back, and recommended a policy of inaction. In March 1927, F W Williamson, acting as Political Officer in Sikkim, had an interview with the Panchen Lama at Mukden where he indicated his wish to return to Tibet, provided the British Government advised the Tibetan Government not to oppress him. There then followed a series of approaches by the Panchen to Bailey, and to the British Legation in Peking, each requesting British intervention on his behalf. Finally, Bailey decided to make these views known to the Tibetan authorities. On 5 May 1928, he wrote to the Dalai Lama pointing out the dangers inherent in the Panchen Lama remaining in Peking, and asked for an assurance that he would be well received if he did return to Tibet. The answer came on 8 June 1928. 'If his Serenity returns to Tibet with a pure mind, I shall do my best to help him . . . I hope that you will remember that in accordance with the Treaty, the British Government should not interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet'.[456] It was a reply symptomatic of the change in the Dalai Lama's attitude since Bell's day to British advice regarding Tibet, and most particularly in his relations with the Panchen Lama. The interests of the India Office lay in encouraging the continuing goodwill and confidence of the Dalai Lama, and they decided not to press the Panchen's case.[457] By the end of 1929, the Panchen Lama had made it clear that, unless he got a definite assurance from Lhasa that they would reinstate him, he intended to remain on in China.

The departure of the Panchen Lama considerably strengthened the hands of the ultra-conservatives in Tibet. Because of his modernisation plans, the Dalai Lama found himself having to contend with the constant rivalry between the clerical no-changers and his more forward-looking nobles. The change in attitude was particularly noticeable when Bailey visited Lhasa in the autumn of 1924. He found the Tibetan Shapés reluctant to put through the Dalai Lama's reforms. They complained that 'most of the revenue of the Tibetan Government goes towards religious expenditure and the remainder goes towards the maintenance of the troops. Thus, the Tibetan Government and their subjects are in financial difficulties'.[458] The India Office assessment was that a large section of the lamas, including the followers of the Panchen Lama, were pro-Chinese and rabidly anti-British and believed that the Dalai Lama's reforms resulted from his association with the British while he was in India.

By 1925, Williamson, deputising briefly as Trade Agent in Gyantse, gave

evidence of Lhasa's antagonism to British influence. The unpopularity of Ladan La's Lhasa police had given rise to an actual *coup*. It had brought down not only Laden La but the pro-British Tsarong and officers, trained in artillery work, were being systematically removed; arms and ammunition purchased from the Government of India lay idle. The British school at Gyantse had been closed down.[459] Williamson, however, considered that the significance of these events lay more in the fact that all the officers degraded were members of the military and progressive party, rather than proof of anti-British feeling. The priestly party had taken advantage of the absence of Tsarong in India to consolidate their influence with the Dalai Lama. It was quite certain that the military were unlikely to acquiesce quietly in the actions taken against them.[460]

In spite of Williamson's confidence that these events were in no way linked to anti-British feeling, the evidence for this is not entirely convincing. For instance, when Norbu Dhondup, Bailey's Personal Assistant, mentioned the dismissal of British-trained military officers to the Dalai Lama, he found him totally unconcerned, in fact, rather amused.[461] The India Office thought that the Tibetan Government had shown themselves to be politically naive; after all the Chinese threat to Tibet was no less than it had been a few years ago. They did, however, recognise that as far as the army and police were concerned the Dalai Lama had decided to turn his back, for the time being at least, on modernism. He had swung himself fully behind the great force of Tibetan conservatism.[462]

The decline in British prestige was principally due to the failure of the British Government to secure Chinese adhesion to the Simla Conference. Also, the separate attempts to get China to reopen the negotiations had proved unsuccessful. It led the Dalai Lama to consider negotiating with the Chinese alone, without the intermediary of the British Government. The other reason for British unpopularity was the conditions within Tibet itself. In Lhasa, the power behind the throne was Lungshar. Reports on Lungshar styled him as anti-Chinese and anti-British, and recognised that his main aim was for the old seclusion of Tibet to be re-established. He was essentially hated by officials and the general public for his extravagant bribe-taking and harsh dealings, but his closeness to the Tibetan Pontiff made him a power to be reckoned with.[463] It was partly due to Lungshar's influence that, when in 1929 the Political Officer, Colonel Weir, requested permission to visit Lhasa, he was given to understand that the visit would cause embarrassment to the Dalai Lama. Weir attributed the refusal to the Dalai Lama's fear that if he received a British officer in Lhasa, then he would have to invite the Chinese and the Russians as well.[464] In Tibet, the moment seemed ripe for direct talks with China.

When the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek took control in 1929, the Panchen Lama openly appealed to them to take charge of affairs in Tibet. Following on this, the Nationalists made a strong attempt to improve their position in Tibet and two missions arrived in Lhasa.[465] One was led by Yungon Dzasa, the Tibetan abbot of the Lama Temple in Peking, who was received in Lhasa with great honour and the letter he carried with him from the Chinese Government was publicly presented to the Dalai Lama. He was soon

joined by the second emissary in the form of a Chinese lady, Liu Man-ching.[466] The letters were rumoured to contain offers of friendship and, as an inducement to Tibet to join the Nationalist Chinese Republic, an invitation for Tibetan representatives to visit Nanking. Rumour had it that the Dalai Lama had accepted the invitation and despatched funds for the upkeep of the Tibetan representatives when they eventually reached Nanking. It was the timely presence of Laden La in Lhasa, who managed to delay the despatch of the Tibetan representatives; in an interview with the Dalai Lama he was able to point out the danger of Tibet losing her independence once she became a member of the Chinese Republic.[467]

One of the reasons for Laden La being in Lhasa was the worsening relations between Nepal and Tibet. Briefly, the two countries had never been on good terms since the Nepalese invasion of Tibet in 1856, plus Nepal's active assistance to Younghusband in 1904. In 1928, a dispute arose with the Nepalese representative in Lhasa. Lungshar seized the culprit within the precincts of the Nepalese Legation. The Nepalese Government then demanded an apology, the Dalai Lama sought to excuse Lungshar's action and the two sides found themselves on the brink of war. Laden La was despatched to diffuse the situation and to give advice to both sides. Eventually, the Dalai Lama directed his government to make amends to the Nepalese. On his return from Lhasa, Laden La brought back first-hand information of how Chinese influence was on the increase. He advised an early visit by the Political Officer to counteract the Chinese presence and consolidate the ground gained by his visit.[468]

It was not long after that Colonel Weir was invited to Lhasa. The unanimous view, both in London and India, was that past experience had proved the value of personal contact with the Tibetan authorities. By all means Weir should go and, while there, if an opportunity arose, attempt to promote a reconciliation between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. On 4 August 1930, Weir had arrived in the Tibetan capital.[469] The outcome of his visit was marked by the Government of India's willingness to accede to the Dalai Lama's request for increased arms and ammunition. To help him out of financial difficulties, it was agreed that payment for goods in silver was to be given preferential rates; the monopoly in relation to the sale of wool was lifted in contravention of Article VI of the Trade Regulations of 1914, but only on the proviso that the Government of India had the right to levy duty at sea-customs rate. As to the Panchen Lama, Weir found the Dalai Lama prepared to see him reinstalled at Tashilhunpo, but he feared that an approach from him personally would merely bring another rebuff. With regard to the 1914 Simla Convention, the Dalai Lama wanted it ratified, with some modifications, although he recognised that the present chaotic state of China made the time unpropitious for her to join in the discussions.[470]

The visit achieved a modicum of success in so far as Weir was able to counter the feeling of distrust which had resulted from the Nepalese affair, the British having been suspected of being in favour of Nepal. He was also able to offer his government's good offices when, and if, negotiations took place between Tibet and China. Although Chinese attitudes made progress at the time

impossible, the question of negotiations would have to be contemplated sooner or later. There was no question that HMG were opposed to an ultimate settlement with China or that they wanted Tibet to throw off Chinese suzerainty. On the other hand, they did not intend to leave 'Tibet to stew in her own juice'.[471] Past experience had proved that such a policy had been a mistaken one, it had led to the troubles which culminated in the expedition of 1904. This was the India Office view and, in general, it fell in line with Weir's observations. In his dealings with Tibetan officials, Weir found a strong undercurrent of anxiety and the belief that Tibet would not be able to retain her independence of China indefinitely without steps being taken to secure a final agreement with China on the basis of the 1914 Convention.[472]

Closer ties with Britain, 1930–33

Shortly after Weir's return from Lhasa, hostilities broke out in the east between the Tibetans and the Chinese. A dispute arose between two monasteries in the Chinese-controlled territory east of the Yangtse. The two monasteries known as 'Bheru Gompa' (lamasery) and 'Dhargye Gompa' had different loyalties, the one to Tibet and the other to China.[473] Both monasteries accepted the Dalai Lama as their spiritual head, but since the dispute was in Chinese-controlled territory, the Dalai Lama felt that he could not actively intervene. At first a local dispute, the quarrel later assumed serious proportions when Tibet and China espoused the cause of one or other of the lamaseries and sent troops to the scene of hostilities.

The Chinese troops in Szechuan were those of the Chinese war-lord Liu Wen-hui and in Chinghai of the independent Muslim Governor, Ma Pu-feng. To begin with, the Tibetans drove the Chinese eastwards, capturing Kanze and Nyarong, and managing to penetrate as far as a day's march of Tachienlu.[474] Reports coming out of the British Legation at Chungking claimed that the Chinese were getting the worst of it. In April 1931, the first of the temporary armistices was agreed, but within a week of it fighting broke out again and this time the Tibetans captured Chantui, inflicting heavy casualties, and were on the point of threatening Litang.[475] By now Ma Pu-feng's soldiers had also joined battle and were embroiled in the fighting in and around Batang. In September 1931 an armistice was arranged, which left the Tibetan troops in occuption of Kanze and Chantui; it also left them face to face with Chinese troops.[476]

In the circumstances, it was not long before hostilities broke out again. The armistice had given Liu Wen-hui a breathing space, and in January 1932 he broke the truce and attacked. This time his forces drove the Tibetans back to the Yangtse and by May 1932 were said to have occupied Kanze and Chantui. By the beginning of July, Rongbatsa had also fallen and so had Yu-lung. In August, Derge was captured, its fall posing a threat to Chamdo, while in Batang itself Tibetan troops had been compelled to raise the siege. In view of the Tibetan reverses, the Dalai Lama issued an order for the general mobilisation of the Tibetan army. The Tibetan army had been the concern of

Lungshar since the fall of Tsarong. To all intents and purposes he had been the *de facto* Commander-in-Chief, and there was no doubt that his policies had been to the detriment of the Tibetan forces. They found themselves ill-equipped and their general efficiency impaired. Although Lungshar's standing in the Dalai Lama's favour had already undergone an eclipse, the reverses suffered by the Tibetan troops provided an added incentive for the pro-Tsarong elements to put pressure on the Dalai Lama to find an opportunity to remove him.[477]

By August 1932, the Tibetan army had lost so much ground that the Dalai Lama appealed to the Government of India to intervene diplomatically, on their behalf, at Nanking. He also offered to negotiate a separate treaty between India and Tibet on the lines of the 1914 Convention, but without Chinese participation. The offer of a treaty was refused but the British Minister in Nanking, Mr Holman, was instructed to ask the Chinese Government to put an end to the fighting on the frontier and to negotiate a settlement. Weir was sent, on the Dalai Lama's request, once again to Tibet.[478] On arrival in Lhasa he found that Tibetan troops were continuing to fare badly at the hands of the Chinese, and many of them had actually surrendered. The reason given for the surrender was the Tibetans' suspicion that the Panchen Lama was helping their opponents. Weir's discussions with the Dalai Lama and his officials, as a result, were chiefly directed towards the restoration of peace between Tibet and China and the return of the Panchen Lama to Tibet. In his view, the Tibetans had been mistaken in invading Chinese-controlled territory during the dispute between the two monasteries. He asked that instructions should be issued to the frontier troops ordering them not to cross the Yangtse river. Orders went out from Lhasa and by September 1932, the commanders of the opposing Tibetan-Chinese forces at 'Gangto Druka' ferry on the Yangtse, had agreed to a ceasefire and to the troops remaining on their respective sides of the river.[479]

In his discussions with members of the Tibetan Government, Weir advised them to put forward a clear and complete statement of their wishes in regard to China. The Tibetan formula, the Kashag stated, was basically the Simla Convention of 1914. Although the Convention had settled all points of difference between Tibet and China, it had not done so in the matter of their mutual boundary. The Tibetans wanted the boundary to run in accordance with the Treaty of Eight Articles arrived at between Tibetan representatives and the two Commissioners appointed by China in 1912.[480] The question of 300 Chinese troops as part of the Amban's escort, which Article IV of the Simla Convention had allowed, the Tibetans wanted rescinded. A smaller number would be accepted and considered consistent with the dignity of a high Chinese official stationed at Lhasa. Any arrangement between Tibet and China would require the British Government to act as intermediary, since in their view, the Government of India could not remain disinterested spectators.[481] Finally, there were the problems associated with the Panchen Lama's continued presence in China. After some persuasion, Weir was able to get the Dalai Lama to agree to release the relatives and officials of the Panchen Lama, who had been imprisoned for several years, as a gesture of reconcilia-

tion and to write formally inviting him to return to Tibet. By the time Weir left Lhasa, no answer had been received from the Panchen to the Dalai Lama's friendly overture.

While Weir was conducting his talks in Lhasa, Holman at Nanking was attempting to get the Chinese to negotiate a frontier settlement and refrain from further hostilities. At first the Wai-chiao-pu denied all knowledge of the fighting, and thereafter accused the British Government of supplying arms, under their 1921 obligation, which they insisted were not being used for purely domestic purposes, but against Chinese forces on the Tibet-Szechuan border. To Holman's offer of placing his good offices at the disposal of both China and Tibet, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hsu Mo, maintained that as Tibet was part of China, there was really no question of a frontier.[482] However, Hsu Mo did offer a definite assurance that hostilities would cease, and the British Legation, in the hopes of having that assurance implemented, decided to continue to exert diplomatic pressure in Nanking. It was their understanding that the desire of the Chinese Government was to compel Tibet to accept a state of subservience to China, before she would be willing to make a lasting peace with Tibet.[483]

Early in 1933, the Tibetans managed to secure a local armistice, the results of which were that Tibet gave up everything to the east of the Yangtse and kept possession of the Yakalo (Yenchin) district to the west of the Yangtse, which hitherto had been in Chinese hands. The confused state in Szechuan, due to the fighting between Liu Wen-hui's forces and those of other war-lords, gave the Dalai Lama hope to recover, by force if necessary, some of the territory he had been forced to relinquish. 'As Colonel Weir is fully aware, we lost all territory on the other side of Yangtse (or Dri-chu) in the neighbourhood of Kamthok in Derge, when Liu Wen-hui of Szechuan and his troops attacked us in Kham last year . . . I also sent various telegrams to the Chinese Government to the same effect but the only reply being that matters could be settled between ourselves and that there is no necessity to have the British Government as an intermediary power, so that no decisive reply has yet been received'. He hoped that it would not compromise the Government of India if 'we recovered the territories previously lost by us either by peaceful or by armed action so that I may send definite orders to the front'.[484] The Dalai Lama was advised not to seek a confrontation for, however anxious India was to have a permanent solution to Tibet's frontier difficulties, she was only prepared to offer diplomatic assistance to induce the Chinese to conclude an agreement, but not to help out militarily. In fact, there was every chance that China would take counter action against Tibet.[485] HMG was less directly interested in the question of the location of the Sino-Tibetan boundary, of prime importance to Tibet perhaps, but not to Indian interests; their concern centred on the status of Tibet and her constitutional relations with China.

It had become clear that China did not intend to accept British intervention in matters concerning Tibet. The Simla Convention, which had recognised Tibetan autonomy in conjunction with Chinese suzerainty, meant that the Dalai Lama was not going to be persuaded to accept anything less. In fact, in

December 1932, the Dalai Lama had himself put forward specific terms on which he would be prepared to negotiate with China. But Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to accepting the British Government as intermediary in the dispute had remained and Whitehall was hard to put to find a means to resolve the deadlock. For them it was enough to recognise the suzerainty of China but not to run the risk of allowing that suzerainty to be other than nominal. Although China had never really wanted British intervention, yet she had accepted it in the past, not only at the 1914 Conference, but again in 1918 when Teichman was instrumental in negotiating the Rongbatsa Truce. In 1919 China had agreed to negotiate and again in 1921, when the Chinese Legation in London had informed Lord Curzon that they would be prepared to take up the question of Tibet with HMG as soon as the Pacific Conference was over. In all these instances China had repeatedly recognised Britain's special interest in Tibet. There could be no question that the Dalai Lama was going to overcome his profound distrust of Peking and negotiate without the Government of India. The general view at the India Office was that China should not be offered a permanent settlement but only a negotiated truce on the frontier; and, with the truce, a definite assurance from the Chinese that they would not renew their aggression on Tibet either in the KokoNor region or in Szechuan. If they agreed, then the question of a permanent settlement could be taken up later when a more favourable opportunity occured. After all, China had no government which could guarantee the observance of any agreement, and it was doubtful whether she could force her provincial war-lords to keep the peace on the Tibetan frontier. The Dalai Lama's distrust of China meant that, conversely, he depended on the Indian Government to stand by their obligations to him. In Whitehall it was understood that any abandonment of the present position would be regarded in Lhasa as a breach of faith.[486]

This view was not shared by Sir Miles Lampson in Peking. He advocated that Tibet should come to a direct understanding with China. 'I submit we should face facts and encourage, not discourage, the Dalai Lama to come to terms with China by direct negotiation'. He believed that the policy pursued by the British Government for the past twenty years was bound to lead nowhere in the face of Chinese determination to impose her will on Tibet.[487] He deprecated the Government of India trusting to artificial barriers of their own creation for keeping the Chinese and Tibetans apart. 'These barriers will break down one day – the traditional bonds between China and Tibet are too strong and longstanding – and if at that time we are still found trying to prop these barriers up, the result will be loss of face with Lhasa and a hostile China in Tibet'. The best policy would be to take advantage of the geographical position of Lhasa and Tibet Proper, 'which look out on India and turn their backs on China', and keep up their influence in Tibet as well as their friendly relations with China. 'I am sure that we are all agreed that we do not want to purchase the one at the price of the other'.[488]

Lampson's recommendation for a radical change of policy was not what the India Office had in mind. It might be politic to compromise with an unresponsive China, but it was not a priority, particularly since the

Government of India's interest lay in maintaining the integrity and autonomy of Tibet with an effective Tibetan Government, able to establish peace and order, and free from the influence of Russia or any foreign power. Free also, the India Office felt, from China.[489] Seeing no immediate possibility of a change in Chinese thinking, the Dalai Lama was informed that although the British Government would always take a friendly interest in Tibet and were anxious to see a permanent solution of her difficulties with China, yet in the face of Chinese Government refusal to negotiate on the confirmation of the 1914 Convention, their role as mediator was unlikely to bear fruit in the immediate future. If, in these circumstances, the Dalai Lama should decide to accept a Chinese offer of direct negotiations, the British Government would always 'be ready with friendly advice at all times during or after such negotiations'.[490]

In 1933, Frederick Williamson succeeded as Political Officer, Sikkim. Soon after taking over he wrote to the Dalai Lama assuring him that he would endeavour to keep up the friendly relations existing between Britain and Tibet. Promptly an invitation came to visit Lhasa.[491] Since relations with the Dalai Lama were so cordial, Williamson's visit was sanctioned without difficulty. His instructions were to reassure the Dalai Lama that, due to representations being made to the Chinese Government, fighting had stopped on the eastern front. Unfortunately, the time was not opportune to press the Chinese Government into general negotiations regarding the terms of the Simla Conference.[492] On the eve of his departure for Lhasa, Williamson received a letter from the Panchen Lama informing him of his wish to return to Tibet.[493] On the strength of this approach it was agreed that the Dalai Lama should be encouraged to try once again to persuade the Panchen Lama to return to Tashilhunpo. Williamson was also to discuss the reports in the Chinese press alleging that Tibetan troops were seeking to recover by force the Yangtse district of Derge, and to advise the Dalai Lama that any such action would not only be ill-advised but embarrassing to the Government of India.[494]

The Dalai Lama denied that his troops had resumed hostilities in the east. In fact, no orders for an advance had been given from Lhasa. As to the return of the Panchen Lama, detailed discussions had already taken place between the Tsongdu and the Panchen Lama's representatives, but unfortunately the Panchen was refusing to accede to any of the Dalai Lama's terms. However, the Panchen's representatives were on the point of returning to China bearing with them the Dalai Lama's terms. Although it was the Dalai Lama's wish that the Panchen Lama should return to Tibet, he wanted him to do so through India and not overland from China. He asked Williamson that the British Minister in Peking should be instructed to impress upon the Panchen Lama the desirability of the sea route, since in his view the Panchen would attempt to return to Tibet with a Chinese escort.[495] The Dalai Lama made it clear that Chinese troops would not be allowed into Tibet. The truth of this was borne out while Williamson was still in Lhasa when the Dalai Lama received a letter from Yungon Dzasa in Peking reporting that Feng Yusiang, with the approval

of the Central Government, had issued orders for the despatch of 30,000 troops to the KokoNor region.[496] The Dalai Lama viewed the gesture, timed as it was while delicate negotiations were in the balance between his officials and those of the Panchen, as tantamount to admitting that the Panchen Lama's return contained a distinct threat to Tibet's integrity.[497]

Death of the XIIIth Dalai Lama, 1933

While the Panchen Lama's representatives were preparing to return to China with a report of their negotiations in Lhasa, the situation changed dramatically when the Dalai Lama died on 17 December 1933.[498] With the death of the Dalai Lama, a struggle for power began almost at once. The departing Pontiff's political testament testified to his belief in non-alignment. 'The Government of India is near to us and has a large army. The Government of China also has a large army. We should therefore maintain firm friendship with these two; both are powerful'.[499] We shall see whether the forces which gathered in the interregnum before a new Dalai Lama was discovered paid anything more than lip-service to his admonition, or recognised that his dream of sustaining an independent Tibet required a policy which would encompass the separate ambitions of China and Great Britain in Tibet. A policy, moreover, to contain China's declared aim of absorbing Tibet when her own unsettled condition stabilised. But the winds of change which had begun to swirl and buffet the high plateau found the Tibetan Government, torn as it was with internal strife, singularly unaware of the need to prepare Tibet militarily against the dangers that threatened her from without.

The succession of a Dalai Lama depends on the discovery of a new incarnation in a child born about the time by a number of high lamas, with the help of oracles and a complicated system of tests, portents and perhaps ultimately a resort to lot. Meanwhile, and even afterwards, until the new Dalai Lama reaches the age of 17 or 18 years, when he assumes temporal power, the government is in the hands of a Regent. The Incarnate Lama or Hutuktu of Reting monastery was appointed Regent of Tibet in January 1934.[500] In theory, the Government of Tibet now lay with a newly-appointed Regent, but in practice it rested with Lungshar whose influence was still a matter of some importance and who had been responsible for the selection. The day-to-day administration of government should have been conducted by the Kashag (Council); but Lungshar, out of favour with that body, allied himself with the dissident figures of the Tsongdu or National Assembly together with the abbots of the three great monasteries of Drepung, Ganden and Sera and, between them, they sought to use the Tsongdu to strengthen the influence of the Monastic Party with whose support Lungshar aspired to supreme power.[501] Lungshar's dealings with the Chinese were hostile and independent. With the British he played the role of *agent provocateur,* warning the Political Officer in Sikkim that the Chinese, aware of the political vacuum, would attempt to fill it by sending a representative to Lhasa. He was essentially anti-British as well, but by alerting them to the danger of Chinese influence

increasing on the return of the Panchen Lama, he hoped to prevent that event from happening. Since Lungshar had been largely responsible for the Panchen Lama fleeing from Tibet, his return was something he had every reason to fear.

Opposed to Lungshar was the Kashag Party whose principal figure was Trimon Shapé, an elderly Conservative who had once been assistant to the Lönchen Shatra at the Simla Conference in 1913. He managed to gather the conservative elements around him and finally brought down Lungshar.[502] From this confused interlude emerged a cautious government, which relied chiefly on the testament of the Dalai Lama, and remained, perhaps not wholly united, but without any substantial change for the next seventeen years.

Sino-British rivalry in Tibet, 1934–37

During the four years before a new Dalai Lama was discovered, Sino-British rivalry became the most important factor in Tibet's foreign relations. No time was lost before the high-ranking General Huang Mu-sung, a member of the National Military Council, arrived from China to offer condolences on the death of the Dalai Lama and to start talks aimed at winning over his successors.[503] From Sikkim, the British sent Rai Bahadur Norbu Dhondup to keep a watch on the General.[504] Chinese and British reports differ widely on the degree to which the Regent and the Kashag were prepared to make concessions on Tibet's independence.[505] Let us see what the official records of the India Office reveal.

Before Huang Mu-sung's arrival in Tibet, the India Office spelt out the nature of the Government of India's interest in Tibet. It was the maintenance of the integrity and autonomy of Tibet, with an effective Tibetan Government, free from the influence of all foreign powers. The extent to which the Government of India would be prepared to tolerate Chinese influence in Tibet depended on whether the Chinese intended to try and establish full sovereignty. As the India Office saw it there were two issues outstanding between China and Tibet: the eastern frontier of Tibet which could be settled between Tibet and China if only both parties would agree to come together without any mediation, and the wider question of China's position in Tibet as a whole. The Tripartite Conference of 1914 had arrived at conclusions acceptable to all three participants over the question of autonomy and suzerainty but had broken down over McMahon's eastern frontier alignment between Tibet and China. If any fresh attempt were to be made to settle the question of autonomy and suzerainty, the British Government would expect to be given some *locus standi* in the negotiations. 'It has been the settled policy of HMG for many years to regard Tibet as an autonomous state and to treat Chinese claims to suzerainty over her as being of the very slightest and most nebulous character'.[506] The essential basis of British policy was the existence of a Tibetan Government that wanted that policy to exist. A change in the attitude of the Tibetan Government would necessitate some change in that policy. There was, however, no question that China could hope to influence it.

The Chinese proposals, once Huang Mu-sung reached Lhasa, consisted of Tibet admitting that she was subordinate to China; that her political system would be administered by China, who would also direct the country's foreign affairs, national defence, communications and appointment of high-ranking Tibetan officers. Huang Mu-sung also wanted the Tibetans to admit that they were one of 'the five races of the Chinese Republic' and to agree to a Chinese Amban in Lhasa, with a large escort.

The Tibetans took their stand on the Simla Convention of 1914 and acknowledged no more than the suzerainty admitted therein. Tibet considered herself free to conduct her foreign relations and did not intend to consult China on the subject. In view of their traditional ties, Tibet would be prepared to inform China only after the appointment of officers above the rank of Shapé.[507] They agreed to the appointment of a Chinese Amban, without escort, and accepted that the Panchen Lama should return at once to Shigatse to be reinstated.[508] To do so, he would have to return via India. The Tibetan counter-proposals accepted the 1914 Convention as the basis for discussion, but Williamson's observer, Norbu Dhondup, noted that Tibet's admission of Chinese suzerainty had been hedged around in a manner which actually asserted Tibet's sovereignty. 'On repeated pressure from Huang Mu-sung and in order to show the outside nations that as Tibet adjoins Chinese territory we admit that we are subordinate to China, but all our external relations and internal administration will be carried on by Tibet'.[509] In their direct negotiations with Huang Mu-sung, the Tibetan Government insisted that they had only admitted to nominal suzerainty because, as they understood it, a mere offer of diplomatic help on the part of the British Government would be of little use to them in their future difficulties with China. For Tibet to consider China's claim to suzerainty, it would need to be part and parcel of a bilateral bargain as embodied in the terms of the Simla Convention of 1914. Until such time as China fulfilled her part of the bargain, Tibet was under no obligation to discharge hers.

General Huang's mission and his departure from Tibet leaving behind, what appeared to China-watchers in Delhi, a representative with diplomatic status immediately posed the question as to whether the Tibetan Government should be approached as to a British counterpoise. A swift reappraisal by the Government of India of its policy was transmitted to London. The argument put forward was that Lhasa, the nerve centre of Tibet, was in danger of being abstracted from the mainstream of British influence. To secure her required active participation in matters of defence. What was on offer? 'The Government of India conceive that neither HMG nor themselves could consider for a moment any proposal to maintain the integrity of Tibet by force against the established Chinese Government. There is, however, the possibility of an early irruption of communist forces into Tibet from the east, of the Russian influences from the north, and in such a case effective assistance to Tibet, whether in the form of munitions or otherwise, would be defensible on the ground that the Tibetan Government had been attacked by an enemy whom the Chinese Government themselves regarded as hostile'.[510] On the other

hand, to maintain their traditional friendship the Indian Government were prepared to offer full diplomatic support in Nanking. They would not be prepared to enter into negotiations with China, in the matter of Tibet, unless Tibetan representatives attended the negotiations on equal terms, and they would treat any Chinese officer, posted in Lhasa, as a foreign representative. Furthermore, although they would not recognise the right of any other power to intervene in Tibetan affairs, they would not promise support or assist the Tibetan Government to adopt a separatist attitude towards China. Such terms, hedged around as they were with diplomatic ambiguities, were but some of the instructions Williamson carried for his guidance when he visited the Tibetan capital in August 1935.[511]

Other instructions related to Williamson ascertaining whether William Tsiang, the Chinese subordinate left behind by Huang Mu-sung, was regarded as a permanent representative of China, and, if so, what would be the Tibetan Government's attitude to a permanent British presence in the capital. The Tibetans were to be assured that although HMG were prepared to admit the theoretical suzerainty of China, they would, however, continue to adhere to their present policy of regarding Tibet as an autonomous country in practice.[512] Williamson was also to broach orally the subject of the Panchen Lama's return and to seek to promote a settlement, but not to offer a guarantee without the matter first being referred to HMG.

The question of the Panchen Lama had remained unresolved and its various ramifications continued to tax the Tibetan authorities. At the time of Williamson's arrival in Lhasa, the Tibetan Government had conceded all but three of the Panchen Lama's demands. These were control of the army in Tsang Province, control of additional Dzongs, and his wish to bring a Chinese escort and officials with him on his return to Tashilhunpo. The Tibetans were not prepared to risk, even by implication, a threat to their independence by the presence of a Chinese escort in Tibetan territory. With regard to the allotment of additional Dzongs and control of taxation they also stood firm.[513] When the Panchen Lama had first approached Williamson to bring about a settlement of his differences with Lhasa, he was given to understand that it would be best if he returned to Tibet without Chinese officials and troops. The Panchen Lama had fled to China in 1923 having refused to accept the XIIIth Dalai Lama's policy of centralised authority in Tibet. In Williamson's view he owed a great deal to China and was not prepared to break with her. It was probable that the idea of a Tibet independent of China was, in the Panchen Lama's opinion, out of the question.

For the Tibetans, however, the presence of Chinese officials and troops within Tibet would inevitably provide a nucleus around which latent pro-Chinese opinion might crystallise and thereafter tend to deprive the Panchen Lama of any temptation to abandon Chinese interests after his arrival. One thing was clear, which was that despite manoeuvring around various concessions, the Panchen Lama had shown no real sign of willingness to negotiate. It was hoped that, by judicious individual concessions, the Tibetan authorities could attract back some of the Panchen's entourage. Failing that,

the Panchen might cease to be a welcome, let alone an expensive guest in Peking; he might even reflect that the Tibetans would be unwilling to keep open indefinitely the reasonable terms they were, at present, prepared to grant. But in 1935 'a safe middle course honourable to China, Tibet and the Tashi Lama and ourselves had yet to be found'.[514]

By May 1936, it was rumoured that the Lama was on his way to Labrang monastery, where he would be joined by his Chinese escort. From there he planned to proceed south to Jyekundo and Sikang Province on his way back to Tibet. Telegrams from Peking indicated that Jyekundo was in Chinese territory, but in fact it was where Inner and Outer Tibet met by the 1914 alignment, and consequently the Panchen Lama and his Chinese escort would be 200 miles within the limits of Tibet. Entry of the escort within these limits would necessarily involve the Tibetan Government either in active opposition to the Panchen Lama's advance or the abandonment of claims to the control of Inner Tibet.[515]

While the question of the Panchen Lama's return was exercising the authorities in Lhasa, news came that the Chinese Communists had appeared approximately forty miles south-east of Kanze.[516] Subsequent information from Chungking reported that the Communists had captured Litang and were in possession of Derge, within the boundaries of Inner Tibet as defined in the 1914 Convention,[517] The Government of India were of the opinion that an advance into Outer Tibet would probably be met by active resistance on the part of the Tibetan Government; if so, the danger for the Indian Government would lie in a southward advance when the Communists would be in close proximity to Burma. The situation was fraught with unpleasant possibilities, particularly if the Chinese Government took the opportunity of sending troops into Tibet under the pretext of dealing with the Communists.[518] However, later reports coming in from Chungking showed that the Communist threat to the China-Burma border had not after all materialised for the time being, and as a result of the recapture of Litang by Chinese Government troops, the Communists in their peregrinations had turned northwards towards the Kanze-Derge area.

Basil Gould, Political Officer in Sikkim, considered that the proximity of the Communists, in an area so close to the Tibetan border, was likely to paralyse Chinese-Tibetan trade and bring economic hardship in its wake. In that case, the Chinese Government might thereafter attempt to establish a strong frontier force in Outer Tibet to keep the trade routes open and which, in its turn, might lead to a further advance towards Lhasa. There also remained the unresolved question of the Panchen Lama's return. It was hoped that in the face of a possible Communist advance northward, the Panchen might be inclined to expedite his return to Tibet. As a first step, Gould recommended that Rai Bahadur Norbu Dhondup should go to Lhasa and inform the Regent and Kashag that HMG, while exerting diplomatic pressure at Nanking in the matter of the escort, had found their efforts hampered by the Chinese Government's insistence that no direct protest had been received from Lhasa. In order to assist in finding a solution, Gould was prepared to address the

Panchen Lama direct, but only if the Tibetan Government were willing for him to do so.[519]

One of Norbu Dhondup's tasks was to find out the geographical limits within which the Tibetan Government claimed they exercised *de facto* control. Although in June 1932 the Chinese and the Tibetans had agreed that the boundary was to be near Batang, north-west of the Yangtse, yet it was necessary to establish the precise limits to which Chinese officials could accompany the Panchen Lama without entering Tibetan territory.[520] While discussions were taking place in Lhasa, the Tibetans discovered a large consignment of rifles, ammunition and bombs in the advance baggage of the Panchen Lama at Nagchuka. The event revived Tibetan suspicion of the Panchen Lama's true intentions; the discovery also had an impact on the Tibetan Government's attitude towards accepting the Political Officer in Sikkim as a mediator between Lhasa and Tashilhunpo.

In July 1936, the Tibetan Government gave Norbu Dhondup an invitation for Gould to visit Lhasa. Enclosed in Norbu's letter was another sealed one to General Huang Mu-sung for transmission to Peking. It contained a strong protest against Chinese officials attempting to enter Tibet with the Panchen Lama. The Kashag informed the General that 'in view of the fact that the outstanding Chinese-Tibetan question has not been settled, we cannot allow Chinese officials and troops to enter Tibet'. They reminded him that, in spite of repeated messages to the Chinese Government and to the Panchen Lama's representative at Nanking refusing to accept the Chinese escort, no reply had been forthcoming. On the contrary, when the British Minister at Nanking had attempted to discuss the matter, he was informed by the Chinese Foreign Minister that the Tibetan Government had raised no such objection.[521] This, the Kashag claimed, hardly accorded with the facts.[522]

While the Kashag was struggling to keep Chinese officials and troops out of Tibet, Basil Gould, accompanied by a party including Brigadier Philip Neame and Hugh Richardson, was on the point of setting off on a mission to Lhasa. Their task was to mediate between the Panchen Lama and the Tibetan Government, to impress upon the Tibetans the need for reorganising their army and finances, and in order to do so to offer instruction to their troops, and finally to establish some permanent contact with Lhasa. As Gould prepared to advance his mission, the Kashag, at the last moment, sent a 'categorical oral statement' to the effect that they did 'not desire HMG's intervention in the settlement of the dispute with the Tashi Lama, which is a matter of Tibetan internal affairs'. They referred to the promise made in 1929 by the Viceroy that no interference in internal affairs would be made by an Indian Government.[523] Nevertheless, after discussions with Gould, it was decided that the invitation to visit Lhasa should be accepted, in spite of the eleventh hour refusal to allow British intervention in the Panchen Lama negotiations.

On arrival in Lhasa, Gould found that responsible circles considered the Kashag had been unwise not to accept his offer of mediation and had rashly squandered important time since the Panchen Lama last invited mediation.

Gould also re-examined the general line of British Government policy in Tibet with particular regard to China. He discovered that since 1914, it had been largely in the form of supplying limited arms in order to help the Tibetans maintain an equilibrium on the eastern frontier. While the Dalai Lama had been alive the Chinese were largely preoccupied with their own affairs, and, therefore, a *status quo* had been maintained. On the Dalai Lama's death, military affairs had been entirely neglected.[524] Gould discovered that the consensus of opinion in Lhasa regarding British involvement was of its value, but the Tibetan's ultimate aim was to secure good relations with China. This aspiration was hindered by the rivalry of boundary claims in the east where a stalemate continued to exist along the line of the Yangtse. Because of the cordial relations existing between the Government of India and Tibet, Gould believed that it would be possible to exert some pressure to induce the Tibetans to accept a reasonable frontier with China. The Government of India thought otherwise. However desirable it might be to resume tripartite negotiations with China and Tibet, the possibility of China accepting the Indian Government as mediator was extremely unlikely. Chiang Kai-shek, as far back as 1932, had consistently refused to consider the suggestion and there was no reason to believe that his views had since then been modified. The best that could be expected was to settle by stabilisation, on the basis of the *status quo,* rather than by unfruitful attempts to fix a boundary through negotiations.[525]

The most urgent single matter during Gould's visit to Lhasa was the immediate return of the Panchen Lama to Tashilhunpo and the avoidance of complications in connection with his return. The Tibetan Government had failed to get an assurance from Nanking regarding the Panchen Lama's Chinese escort. The failure of these representations decided the India Office to try once again to get the British Minister in Peking, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, to report on the Chinese reaction to the Tibetan Government's protests. Knatchbull-Hugessen's reply was far from reassuring. He found the Chinese Vice-Minister claiming that it was not that no communication had been received from Tibet, but that they had merely been an exchange of views and 'nothing which could be considered a protest'. On being urged that the Tibetan letter, which the Ambassador had with him, would clear up the discrepancy, the Vice-Minister shifted his ground and said that it was a matter of honour and safety for the Panchen Lama to return to Tibet with an escort.[526] There then followed a note to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that HMG's interest lay in the preservation of peace in Tibet and the existence of a stable and effective Tibetan Government. It was feared that a Chinese escort would be forcibly resisted by the Tibetans, and with that possibility it would be best if Chinese troops were relieved at the frontier by an escort consisting of the Panchen Lama's own followers and representatives of the Tibetan Government.[527] In the British Minister's view, the only satisfaction these various exchanges produced was that, in future, the Chinese Government could hardly deny all knowledge of the Tibetan protest.[528]

While these protests and counter-proposals were taking place in Peking, Gould managed to get his departure postponed from Lhasa. He argued that an early departure of the British mission would tend to weaken the Tibetan Government's resolve regarding the Chinese escort, and in which case an established Chinese presence would make it more difficult to negotiate for a British representative in Lhasa.[529] 'This is due to their belief that the presence of the mission has been a factor in delaying the arrival of the escort, and to their regarding the continued presence of the mission as a material indication of the intention of HMG to continue effective diplomatic support'.[530] In case the Tibetan authorities might hope for more, Gould was to make it clear to the Kashag that in the event of armed opposition to the Chinese escort, HMG would not be prepared to do more than continue their diplomatic efforts on Tibet's behalf.[531]

Knatchbull-Hugessen in Peking saw no real obstacle in conveying the Panchen Lama and his escort to Tibet. In his view, the 'pusillanimity' of the Tibetan forces merely required the Chinese to exert their control over Liu Wen-hui in Sikang to achieve their objective. However, the risk of such an adventure and the danger involved in antagonising HMG meant that the chance of China undertaking it were negligible. For the present, Chinese policy towards Tibet was conciliatory. They did not wish to use force and would not persist in despatching a mission if it was going to be opposed. 'In that case the Tashi Lama would possibly not proceed either'.[532] The danger lay in the Tibetans allowing the escort to enter Tibet and then attacking it. In London it was felt that China's insistence on a Chinese escort, in the face of Tibetan objections, would inevitably lead to an indefinite postponement of the Panchen Lama's return. The one thing the Indian Government thought necessary was the immediate return of the Panchen to his homeland, for they recognised that the Chinese had managed to use him as a counterbalance to Lhasa, and to avoid coming to a settlement regarding the exact frontier between Tibet and China. In the course of these negotiations, one thing had become clear; that, above all, it was vital to secure a settlement of the Sino-Tibetan frontier. It was precisely because there was no settlement that the Tibetan Government deprecated the sending of a Chinese escort to Tibet.[533]

On the eve of his departure from Lhasa, Gould set out the danger as he saw it. If it was admitted that the Chinese Government had a right to take administrative steps in Outer Tibet, all hope of adjusting future Sino-Tibetan relations, on the basis of the 1914 draft Convention, would go by the board. The basis of the Convention had been that China would not interfere with the administration of Outer Tibet (Article II). It was now found that the Chinese Government were not prepared to give an undertaking that the escort, having deposited the Panchen at Shigatse, would then return to China. The presence of Chinese officials and the setting up of a separate administrative authority in Tibet were precisely the dangers the Tibetan Government feared. There was also no guarantee that the Panchen Lama would himself be willing to dispense with the escort once it had arrived in Tibet. Since the Panchen was

undoubtedly a Tibetan subject, his political aspirations could not be forwarded in contravention of the essential interest of the Tibetan Government. The Chinese reply indicated that for the future they intended to administer Tibet as an integral part of China. As Gould saw it, this would then involve the Government of India in fundamental and expensive changes in the north-east frontier regions of India.[534]

The Wai-chiao-pu's reply had taken the line that the despatch of an escort was a suitable 'administrative' arrangement for China to make in the circumstances, although they had no wish to bring into Tibet a situation which might adversely effect the quiet of the Indo-Tibetan border.[535] On receiving this reply, the Foreign Office instructed their Minister to remind the Chinese Government that HMG regarded Tibet, although under the suzerainty of China, as autonomous in her own administration and that the maintenance of her integrity and autonomy was in itself an important British interest. In the absence of an agreed settlement with China regarding Tibet, to attempt to alter the existing position by the despatch of Chinese troops into Tibet, particularly without the agreement of the Tibetan Government, would be looked upon by HMG as endangering their own interests in the region.[536]

A few weeks later the Panchen Lama put forward his terms to the Kashag. He was returning immediately to Tibet and wanted the withdrawal of Tibetan Government officials who had been administering Shigatse in his absence; he intended to bring a Chinese escort with him to Tibet, but promised to return it to China via India, by sea. The administration of Shigatse and the control of troops there would require, in the first instance, a visit from him to Lhasa. The Tibetan Government responded by accepting that they would withdraw their officials from Shigatse as soon as the Panchen Lama returned there. As to the Chinese escort, they were prepared to accept it provided the agreement was witnessed by the British Government as well. Finally, all disputes would have to be settled with Tibetan Commissioners at Kham before the Panchen Lama started out on his journey to Shigatse.[537]

Recognising that Lhasa's terms would probably be unacceptable to the Panchen Lama, an attempt to solve the stalemate was made by Hugh Richardson who offered to take an escort of Tibetan troops and accompany the Panchen Lama back to Shigatse. In his view, the state of affairs existing in China and the Tibetan Government's insistence on a prior settlement made it doubtful whether the Panchen would agree to return to Tibet. 'The reply of Tibetan Government points to prolongation of negotiations'.[538] Within days of Richardson's offer, Norbu Dhondup reported that the Tibetan Government had, after all, decided to allow the Panchen and his escort into Tibet, provided he gave an undertaking to proceed direct to Shigatse and to send his escort back to China within five months or earlier. The decision was apparently the result of intervention by the three Abbots of Sera, Drepung and Ganden.[539] However, by October 1937, in spite of the concession, the Panchen Lama had decided not to return to Tibet after all. He informed the Tibetan Government that he was returning to Kanze in Chinese territory and he gave, at the time, no other reason for his decision.[540] Tsiang, the Chinese

representative at Lhasa, told Norbu Dhondup that, owing to the Sino-Japanese trouble, the Chinese Government were not in a position to support the Panchen Lama if Tibetan troops resisted him and his Chinese escort. They had, therefore, advised him to stay on in Chinese territory and not to attempt the journey home. When asked by the Kashag to explain which one of their conditions he had objected to, the Panchen Lama wired back: 'I have received your message which I do not understand as you have included various obstructive conditions in it. Moreover, I have no orders from Chinese Government to proceed to Tibet. I am therefore returning to Chinese territory'.[541]

By the time Basil Gould left Lhasa, he and his party of British officers had spent five months having frequent talks with the Regent and other Tibetan officials. His departure in February 1937 marked a new phase in British relations with Tibet. The British presence in Lhasa was established on a new footing; a British officer, Hugh Richardson, was left behind to offset the Chinese foothold in Lhasa, while the Government of India was able to congratulate itself on the 'gradual emergence of a more trustful and confident attitude on the part of the Regent and Tibetan Government'. Richardson believed that, 'If the exact status of the Mission had ever been questioned by the Tibetan Government, there might have been recourse to the provisions of the Simla Convention, but this did not occur and the semi-permanent representation at Lhasa was, therefore, an example of the advantage of falling in with the Central Asian tendency to avoid precise definitions'.[542] Although the arrangement was undefined and considered temporary, yet from February 1937 it was to remain virtually unchanged until the Chinese invasion of 1950.

The North-East Tribal Frontier, 1935–47

The Government of India continued to assume that the Agreement signed at Simla in 1914 by McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra had settled the frontier between India and Tibet. However, the Panchen Lama affair made them look again at the exact location of the McMahon Line. During World War I and after, the Government of India tended to ignore the buffer territories along the whole northern frontier of Assam, between it and Tibet. Exploration along strategic river valleys had been slight and intermittent, and were conducted rather more on the lines of a military expedition than of political penetration. The main consideration had been the expansionist aims of China when, before the revolution, she had attempted to establish posts at several places within the tribal areas of the north-east frontier of India.

By the mid-1930s renewed interest in the McMahon Line was activated by cartographical encroachments issued by China and by the Kuomintang's denial of the validity of the maps issued by the Surveyor General of India. These showed the international frontier of India and Tibet as agreed during the Simla Conference of 1914.[543] The main reason for their issue being that Chinese map encroachments paid no heed to the 1914 Simla Conference alignments, which had been agreed on, by an exchange of notes, between

McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra. Since the Chinese had not put their signature to the arrangement, they insisted on issuing maps according to their own ideas. The Indian Government's intention was to keep both the issue of the maps and the forthcoming edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* free from undue publicity. As luck would have it, the error occurred in *The Times* India edition and alerted its correspondent, Peter Fleming, to the discrepancy in Indian Government claims and those of the Kuomintang. He wrote asking for information. 'Mr Lionel Curtis wrote to me a short time ago saying that you had some interesting information about the loss (on paper) of some 40,000 square miles of the British Empire, somewhere north of the Brahmaputra. It is, no doubt, a trifling loss; but the Editor feels that our readers would be interested in an accurate presentation of the facts regarding this cartographical lacuna'.[544] It was Sir Olaf Caroe, the Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, who decided to insert into the published records of the 1914 Convention the exchange of notes on the boundary and the Trade Regulations and there to show the 'correct' Indo-Tibetan frontier. He had the full backing of the India Office who did not intend to allow the Chinese Government an excuse to argue that no ratified agreement existed between India and Tibet.[545]

The other event which brought the frontier into question was the penetration by botanist and traveller, Frank Kingdon-Ward, into Tibet from Assam, without the prior sanction of the Tibetan Government. Protests by the Tibetan Government led Caroe to look into the frontier between Tibet and India as determined by McMahon in 1914. He found there had been considerable misunderstanding regarding the international position on the north-east frontier, and he sought the views of the Assam Government, only to discover that they had no copy of the Tibetan text of the 1914 Convention and consequently were ignorant of the exact position of the frontier. 'The north-east frontier does not ordinarily figure very prominently in our records and it was only with considerable difficulty and almost by chance that we were able to unearth the true position . . . Incidentally from a reference in the Kingdon-Ward case we came to know that the McMahon Line, by which the delimited frontier in this region is known, is well known to the Tibetan Government and is still fully accepted by them'.[546] Since the Assam Government, the authorities most concerned, appeared to be in total ignorance of the exact position of the McMahon Line, Caroe thought it vital that 'the 1914 Convention with Tibet and connected agreements should be published (with due avoidance of unnecessary publicity) and that the boundary as then laid down should be shewn on maps published by the Survey of India'. The manoeuvre would negate the cartographical activities of the Chinese who had set up a claim to absorb into Sikang Province a portion of India, namely Tawang. It had also come to light that the Tibetan Government, over whom the Chinese claimed suzerainty, were still collecting revenue and exercising jurisdiction many miles on the Indian side of the international frontier. The danger for India lay in China asserting her authority over Tibet, and thereby claiming prescriptive rights over a part of territory recognised, under the terms of the 1914 Convention, as lying within India.[547]

The 1914 McMahon agreement had resulted in the recognition by Tibet of British authority up to a frontier line which extended for more than 500 miles from west to east, and over some 50,000 miles of tribal territory. On the whole the arrangement had worked well, but as Caroe saw it the potential danger lay in the western portion of the Balipara Frontier Tract which included Tawang, Dirang Dzong and Kalaktang. Here the Tibetans continued to exercise *de facto* authority and which they had long enjoyed prior to 1914. The Government of India considered it undesirable that this should happen on the British side of the line, and it was proposed that Basil Gould should raise the matter with the Tibetan Government during his present visit to Lhasa. The India Office knew full well that the juridical position in regard to the north-east frontier was not perfectly secure. For the final frontier alignment agreed in 1914 had been with Tibet and not with China, and China had an acknowledged claim to suzerainty over Tibet. Therefore, the present proposal to simply reaffirm the Anglo-Tibetan undertaking would not, of course, cure the defect.[548]

Acceptance by the Tibetan authorities when Gould raised the question with them was hardly in line with the views of either the Indian Government or officials in the Assam hills. They claimed that Tawang up to 1914 had undoubtedly been Tibetan, and they regarded the adjustment of the Tibet-India boundary as part and parcel of the general adjustment and determination of boundaries as contemplated in the 1914 Convention. In other words, if they could secure a definite Sino-Tibetan boundary, then they would be prepared to observe the Indo-Tibetan border as defined in 1914. Tibet, they claimed, had been encouraged in thinking that HMG and the Government of India sympathised with the matter, since at no time had they taken any steps to question Tibetan, or to assert British authority, in or around the Tawang area.[549]

In Gould's opinion there would be no difficulty in securing the withdrawal of the Tibetans to the 1914 boundary if their difficulties with the Chinese could be resolved, with or without British help. He was certain that, in the present circumstances, they would decline to give a written undertaking reaffirming the McMahon Line. Therefore, the best method of resolving the Tawang problem would be for British officials to undertake regular tours to the frontier, and while there to conduct revenue collection, thereby relieving Tibetan officials from the duty. By this measure, the Indian Government would be seen to establish 'our control over the area gradually but definitely, reiterating our rights orally in Lhasa'.[550] Accordingly, Captain Lightfoot, Political Officer for the Balipara Frontier Tract was deputed to go up to Tawang 'for the summer months, with instructions to collect a light tax but at the same time to leave the people to manage their own affairs'.[551] He was also to submit proposals for the formation of a control area to include Tawang and other tribal territory to the south.

In April 1938, Lightfoot visited Tawang. As soon as the Tibetan Government heard of his arrival, they enquired from Gould why the expedition had come to Tawang without prior notification, and they asked for the expedition to be withdrawn. Gould refused on the grounds that since Tawang had been

ceded to India in 1914, it was in order for the Assam Government to send officials to inspect the country.[552] On his way to Tawang, Lightfoot had found at Senge Dzong Tibetan officials collecting taxes on behalf of the Tibetan Government. The place, he claimed, was strictly on the Indian side of the Se La Pass and within the boundary agreed to in 1914, and it was clear to him that Tibetans should cease to show themselves in Indian territory.[553] In his official report Lightfoot set out the complexities of the Tawang administration and its geographical boundary. If British influence was to be established, the removal of the Tsona Dzongpons was absolutely essential, but in that case some alternative form of control would have to take its place. The single alternative, readily available on the spot, were the monasterial officials, the only people capable of collecting such a lump sum tribute. On the other hand, Tawang monastery was 'under the control of Drepung monastery in Lhasa, and thus any monastery rule would be strongly influenced from Tibet, and after a short time Tibetan dominance would again creep in to the detriment of British prestige. To substitute the control of Tibetan monasterial officials for that of the Tibetan Government would entirely fail to indicate to the people that the country was part of India'.[554] He ventured to suggest that the Government of India should place on record their intention to assume full responsibility for the area.

The Governor of Assam saw difficulties associated in implementing Lightfoot's far-reaching proposals. Was the occupation of Tawang absolutely necessary as a matter of high policy? Was the Government of India on firm ground juridically with regard to Tawang? Sir Henry Twynam had his doubts. If it was proposed to base the Government of India's claim on the exchange of notes between McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra of 24 and 25 March 1914, with the maps that accompanied it, then these notes lacked the formalities associated with a treaty, even though the Tibetan plenipotentiary had received orders from Lhasa agreeing to the boundary. If they were to be based on Article IX of the Convention, that did not refer to the maps accompanying the interchanged notes, but only to the small scale map attached to the Convention, which was subsequently not ratified by China. Did the fact that no steps were taken to implement Article IX from 1914 to 1938 affect the British position from the point of view of international law, and also in equity in view of the lapse of time, and altered circumstances? In Twynam's view, Indian Government policy should be to remain on good terms with Tibet. 'That being so, is it desirable to press for the inclusion of the Tawang salient in British India when perhaps our object could be achieved by fixing the boundary further south'.[555] On the basis of the Governor of Assam's recommendations, it was decided not to pursue the scheme for establishing control over Tawang.[556]

Apart from the 1914 Treaty maps, the external frontiers of India and Tibet had not been shown in detail on any atlas. For much of its length it traversed the high snow line of the Himalaya, where demarcation had been considered to be more or less impossible. However, from the Government of India's viewpoint, Chinese cartographical inaccuracies and the Second World War

brought into focus the strategic significance of the Assam Himalaya. The practical questions of the time were what measures could be taken to re-activate the McMahon Line, and how any such action would cause the least disturbance to Anglo-Tibetan relations. Gould spelt out the difficulty as he saw it. The 1914 boundary had been concerned with obtaining a frontier that looked well on a map rather than dealing with the establishment of a convenient ethnic and political boundary. 'Thus, the Tawang, Dirang Dzong and Kalaktang area, included in India a region which is as Tibetan in character as the Chumbi valley; in the Siang valley they cut in half the territories of the then King of Po; and in the Zayul-Chu (Lohit) valley, while leaving Rima in Tibet, they ran the frontier line through an area which appears naturally to come within the orbit of Rima'.[557] His advice was to get well ahead in the Siang and Lohit areas before disturbing the *status quo* in the Tawang, Dirang Dzong and Kalaktang areas.

Thoroughly alarmed by Chinese claims to the Assam Himalaya, the Government of India decided to take no risks and appointed J P Mills, Secretary to the Governor of Assam, to substantiate the McMahon Line.[558] His first task was to activate the Political Officers in the Mishmi country, and to get them to extend their control into the tribal territories to the north of Assam. As a practical step a number of exploratory expeditions were to be made into the unadministered territories. Once tribal territory had been brought under permanent occupation and control, it was thought that the Chinese Government would be less likely to seriously challenge the British position. It would then only require the Tibetan Government to agree, which might be possible if certain areas south of the McMahon Line, long under their full administration, were conceded to them.[559]

Infiltrations by the Tibetans in the Tsangpo valley in March 1939 saw R W Godfrey, Political Officer for the Sadiya Frontier Tract, despatched to the area with the object of ascertaining the exact position of the infiltration, and once there to remove the 'trade blocks'; he was also to settle any inter-tribal disputes between the main Abor clans. He was to journey as far north as Ramsing and Pangin, the furthest outpost, and to take with him an escort of two sections of the Assam Rifles.[560] By March 1940, in consequence of his report, posts were established at Karko and Riga on the Tsangpo river, and sanction was given for annual tours to take place right up to the McMahon Line.[561] In the Lohit valley, Godfrey paid a visit to the Tibetan town of Rima in December 1939. Here, he was to find that in respect of the left bank of the Lohit the boundary ran due east from Menilkrai until the Burma boundary; in consequence, the Tibetan concept of the international frontier ran a good deal south of the McMahon Line, including in it Menilkrai and Walong in Tibetan territory. He was convinced that the Chinese boundary stone at Menilkrai had been placed there deliberately after a very careful survey of the valley.[562] In November 1941, a further visit was authorised to Walong and Menilkrai, and it was decided then to establish military posts in the territory and to undertake periodical exploratory expeditions from those posts up to the McMahon Line.

The problem of Tawang proved intractable. It was discovered in 1940 that

the Tibetans were still continuing to exercise *de facto* control of the western portion of the Balipara Frontier Tract; also of that part of the Siang valley (Dihang, Brahmaputra) which once formed part of the King of Po's territory, and a small area to the south of Rima. Moreover, the actual position of the McMahon Line on the two forks of the Subansiri river was not precisely known. The various options were either permanent occupation or retrocession of part or whole of the area to Tibet. The reason being that the Assam Government could not financially contemplate further expeditions which were not followed by continued exercise of control. Due to India's commitment to World War II these expeditions were of necessity restricted, both financially and politically. For the present, the Government of Assam decided to allow the *status quo* to remain.[563]

In 1943 encroachments by Tibetan officials took place at various points along the common frontier at Tawang, at the Tsangpo and on the upper waters of the Lohit at south Rima. Here again, effective action depended on the Assam Government being able, while seasonal conditions permitted, to establish an all-season supply line via Tashigang in eastern Bhutan, which, in turn, was contingent on the availability of a military force, *ie* the Assam Rifles. They, for their part, were fully extended in operations against the Japanese on the Assam-Burma frontier. The political considerations were more complex. 'Chinese ambitions to absorb Tibet have recently been publicly stated as one of their post-war *desiderata,* and it may be supposed that there will be considerable American support for the Chinese expansionist designs . . . Chinese cartographers' conception of the frontier with India in this area varies fundamentally from our own, and Tibetan encroachments at this moment may, if they are allowed to remain, help in future to embitter relations between China and India after the War'.[564] Both Gould and Twynam in Assam were against insisting on the absorption of Tawang into India. They were reluctant to extend control to areas north of the Se La Pass to which, for one, the Tibetans attached special importance, and which, moreover, did not materially add to a sound frontier from a military or political point of view.[565]

Throughout the next two years, the Tibetan Dzongpons continued to collect tribute in the Tawang and Kalaktang areas, and, when challenged, to maintain that they had been ordered to do so by the Lhasa Government. In their opinion the boundary, in this particular zone, between British and Tibetan territory remained unresolved.[566] The Foreign Bureau of the Tibetan Government made their position clear. 'The Indo-Tibetan boundary which is marked with a red line in the map shows all the areas below Tawang as within British territory. Occupation has also been effected south of the Se La . . . the British Government have occupied indisputable Tibetan territory'. They insisted that since the Sino-Tibetan question had not been finally settled, therefore the areas occupied by British officials were not shown in the 1914 treaty as being within Indian territory.[567] The Tibetan protest brought from the Government of India a concession with regard to the Tawang area, and a recommendation that control should be extended instead to the Se La Range, locally regarded as a natural boundary, and no further. Once the question of

Tibetan monastic claims in the Se La Agency had been settled, it would become the new administrative boundary.[568] To counteract the monastic tribute in the Se La Agency, the Government of India gave its approval to imposing a house tax, the collection of which was to be conducted through a headman or village council. The boundaries of the areas to be so taxed were also defined.[569]

When, in 1944, F P Mainprice, Assistant Political Officer, Lohit, toured the valley he found that four villages south of the McMahon Line were still paying revenue to the Rima officials. The Dzongpons were told that, under the terms of the Simla Convention, the Indian frontier ran just north of the Tho Chu and Di Chu and, therefore, included within that frontier the four hamlets of Walong, Tinai, Dong and Kahao. The response was 'Why no one had ever said so before, although several sahibs had visited Rima'.[570] By the time Mainprice had finished his task, the McMahon Line had been demarcated twenty miles north of Walong and the village of Kahao was included in Indian territory. Its main significance was strategic, for the Di Chu commanded the summer route into the Lohit valley and the Diphuk La route into northern Burma. There was some satisfaction, Mainprice thought, in acquiring 'This small rectification of the McMahon Line, of comparative insignificance to Zayul and eastern Tibet, but of vital importance to our whole political, strategic, and commercial position up the Lohit valley, which provides the only link between eastern Tibet and India'.[571]

By 1944, the Assam Government had outlined its plans for the Subansiri basin. On the basis of reports submitted by Fürer-Haimendorf and Captain Davy, it was decided to create a separate jurisdiction in the Subansiri area of an officer serving under the overall control of the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract.[572] However, in November 1945, J P Mills, Adviser for Tribal Areas, toured the region as well and recommended a reversal of policy, in which he was supported by the Governor of Assam.[573] His policy was the gradual expansion of influence rather than further exploratory expeditions, for he had found no evidence of Tibetan influence in the areas already penetrated and the indications were that, while there was Tibetan influence higher up, it did not take an official form. Mills was over-ruled by the Government of India and the India Office who held that the fundamental reason for military operations in the north-east frontier had been to counteract Tibetan encroachments towards the McMahon Line, to stabilise the frontier but not to administer it.

Under the general supervision of Mills a systematic penetration into the Assam tribal areas was undertaken in an attempt to bring these sensitive frontiers under Indian administration.[574] The work of Mills and Stonor in the Tawang Tract, of Mainprice in the Lohit valley, of Fürer-Haimendorf and Davy in the Subansiri, all contributed towards a transformation of political control in the jungle tracts of the Assam Himalaya. Posts were established in the Siyon valley and on the Dihang-Siang 'right up to the Tibetan frontier on the McMahon Line'.[575] The Subansiri basin, visited by Fürer-Haimendorf, became, after his tour, a new administrative area with Captain F N Betts in

charge. By 1947, the Tawang tract up to the Se La Pass had been brought under British administration, but not Tawang itself.[576]

These measures aroused considerable resentment in the Tibetan Government. They argued that the frontier had been settled by treaty in 1914, and there it had been agreed that established Tibetan ownership of territory south of the border should not be disturbed, at least not until the whole of the McMahon Line had been agreed upon. Something of the logic of the Tibetan's argument was recognised by the Indian Government in the case of Tawang, where the question was postponed, although it was agreed that nothing should be done to compromise any future claim. Time was to prove that not only Tibetan claims to parts of north-eastern territory, but the Chinese challenge to the McMahon Line itself, showing parts of Tibet-Indian territory on their maps as part of China, would demand clarification. 'While these frontiers are, strictly speaking, undemarcated, the eastern frontier of Tibet runs, in the view of HMG, from the most north-easterly point of Burma northwards, very roughly, along the line of the Upper Yangtse', and the international frontier 'between Assam and Tibet as running not along the northern administered border of Assam but a considerable way to the north, along the main ridge of the Himalayas'.[577] It was the extension of British administration in the sub-Himalayan region which made it possible to make so categorical a statement. It did not stop China from continuing with her cartographical inaccuracies, nor did it entirely persuade the Tibetans of the correctness of the boundary alignment.[578] By the time independence came to India in 1947, the Tibetans had still not accepted in totality the 1914 boundary settlement. In fact, a note from the Tibetan Bureau in Lhasa to the British High Commissioner in Delhi laid claim to districts south of the McMahon Line and vast tracts of the cis-Himalayan region to which, in the course of her long history, Tibet had ever felt herself to have a valid claim.[579]

The discovery of the XIVth Dalai Lama, 1937–39

In the absence of a Dalai Lama, the inclination of the Tibetan Government was to avoid making any changes on their Chinese border, or indeed in their relations with the Government of India. The Tibetan Government, contrary to expectation, had refused offers of mediation between themselves and the Chinese and by 1936, on the eastern front, a position of stalemate existed along the line of the Yangtse. The march of the Communist Chinese Eighth Route Army towards this boundary indicated that this was the line up to which both China and Tibet were able to make felt such power as they separately had, whether against Communism or each other. The Indian Government had long held the view that the Sino-Tibetan frontier could best be settled by stabilisation on the basis of the *status quo* rather than by unfruitful attempts to fix the boundary by means of long, drawn-out negotiations.[580]

While the Dalai Lama had been alive and the main executant of his policy a sort of *status quo* had existed. With the Dalai Lama's autocracy dead, Tibetan statesmen were seriously concerned, for the sake of a stable Tibet, to come to a

settlement with China. It was their intention to send an emissary to open preliminary discussions on a bipartite basis regarding their differences. How far this object could have been achieved, with an unwilling China and a no less unwilling Government of India, remains a debatable point. '. . . it would clearly be unwise to encourage Tibet to send emissaries to China since, first, we might compromise thereby our claim to enforce other important Treaty rights which we enjoy vis-a-vis Tibet under the 1914 Convention, *eg* Tawang, and, secondly we think it most improbable that any satisfactory results will accrue to Tibet or ourselves from negotiations in which HMG takes no part at all'.[581] These were but some of the more complex problems facing the Tibetan Government, but in 1937 the most important consideration in their affairs was the search for a new incarnation of the Dalai Lama.

The question of a successor had been going on for some time, and by the beginning of 1938 there were strong rumours that a likely candidate had been discovered in the Amdo district of Sining, a part of the Chinese province of Chinghai. The Tibetan Government maintained strict secrecy and made efforts to bring the child quickly to Lhasa. However, the move was frustrated by the Muslim Governor of Chinghai, General Ma Pu-feng, who demanded that the Tibetan Government should pay a sum of 100,000 Chinese dollars before he would let the child go. Initially, the Tibetan Government seriously considered paying the sum but on reflection realised that, since no assurance had been given, the matter could be left unresolved even after payment had been made. Consultation with the Chinese Government in Nanking revealed that Ma Pu-feng was essentially playing his own hand, and they advised that a Tibetan official from Chungking, together with a Chinese official, should proceed to Amdo to settle matters with the General. The Chinese were said to have ordered the Sining Amban not to prevent the child from going to Lhasa.[582] The Tibetan Government sent a party of high officials to Sining for further negotiations, who then agreed to pay the Governor of Chinghai the sum of 220,000 Shanghai silver dollars in return for allowing the child to proceed to Lhasa. The Government of India stepped in and secured Reserve Bank permission for the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank to telegraph the money direct to the Tibetan Government.[583] In July 1939, the child eventually set out for Lhasa with an escort of thirty Chinese soldiers and eight Chinese officials.[584] Soon after the child left Amdo, a special meeting was held in the Potala where 'signs by which the Silling [Sining] candidate was known to be the true reincarnation of the Dalai Lama were reported to the Assembly. All officials present signed a document accepting the child as the true reincarnation'.[585] Sixty officials were deputed to meet him at Nagchuka and escort the new Dalai Lama to Lhasa. He reached the capital on 8 October 1939.

No sooner had the Tibetan Government begun the serious business of selecting a successor to the Tibetan Pontiff, than the Chinese promptly put forward their claim to take part in the choice 'by lot'.[586] They approached the Foreign Office in London for facilities for Wu Chung-hsin, President of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committee of the Chinese Government, to travel through India en route to Tibet and while there to represent the Chinese

Government at the Installation ceremony. Dr Chen, Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in London, was informed that the Indian Government would be reluctant to embark on any arrangements for Wu and his entourage, without some assurance from the Tibetan Government that his visit would be acceptable to them.[587] This permission the Tibetan Government, at first, firmly refused to give. However, by September 1939, the Tibetan Government had reversed their decision and given permission for Wu Chung-hsin, together with 13 officials, to be present at the Installation. In Lhasa, it seemed that the Regent's pro-Chinese tendencies had brought about this change in attitude; it was clear that a determined effort would be made by the Chinese, while they were in Tibet, to restore their control over Lhasa. Wu was expected to stay some time in the capital and 'if he does not convert himself into an Amban is likely at the least to leave behind him when he goes, one or more officials of higher standing than the present Chinese representative here'.[588] In view of the influence of the Regent, the Indian Government did not anticipate any active opposition to an increase in the Chinese presence in Lhasa.

Sir Basil Gould attended the ceremonies of Installation on behalf of India and Wu Chung-hsin represented China. Promptly after the ceremony, the Chinese made tendentious claims about the part played by Wu. It was alleged that Wu had personally conducted the enthronement, and thereafter the Dalai Lama had prostrated himself in the direction of China's Imperial Abode.[589] This report had been prepared and issued before the event took place and it may, therefore, have represented what the Chinese had intended should happen. In actual fact, Wu took a minor role in the ceremonies. Gould interpreted Wu's false account as stemming from the fact that he had been allotted the 26 February for his presentation of gifts, but had then insisted on approaching the throne on the earlier date of 22 February. The dissatisfaction at his part in the proceedings, or perhaps the seat allotted to him on 22 February, was partly responsible for the false account he chose to give. When the Chinese gifts were presented on 26 February, Wu chose not to attend. The net result of these events was that the Chinese did nothing which was not also done by representatives of Britain, Nepal and Bhutan. It did not perhaps suit the Chinese to admit this, and Wu certainly believed that it had lowered his prestige in Lhasa.[590]

Wu's visit to Lhasa, the Chinese Foreign Minister in Peking claimed, had been to dispel the impression that China had designs on Tibet, and to persuade her that China hoped to see her developing along her own lines without interference.[591] The statement was looked upon by the India Office as a 'measure of expediency' and they anticipated that the Chinese would, if opportunity permitted, go back on the declaration. In which case, the Tibetan Government was to be promised support to maintain their practical autonomy, if the Chinese resiled from it, and to be told that the declaration was in general accord with the factual relationship between China and Tibet as the British Government saw it.[592] The single point of importance gained by Wu's mission was the establishment of a Chinese official on a higher standing than the stop-gap who had been representing Chinese interests at Lhasa. On Wu's

departure in April 1940, the man appointed was Dr Kung Ch'ing-tsung, who had been one of Wu's party, and he was to remain in the post for the next four years.[593] He managed, during his stay, to strengthen the position of the Chinese officer at Lhasa as a *de facto* permanent representative of his government. In line with tradition, the Tibetans continued to treat him as a temporary foreign representative, and he took no part in the direction of Tibetan affairs. The danger for Tibet lay in that, having got their Dalai Lama and disposed of Wu, they might be inclined to rest on their oars and ignore possible external danger and the need to build up an efficient army to sustain their independence.

Encroachments on neutrality: China and Tibet, 1940–46

The war affected Tibet but little. The Tibetan Government avoided any open commitment to the war effort and confined themselves to strictly neutral aspirations for the restoration of peace. This they managed to achieve, in spite of the fact that the threat of enemy forces penetrating into Tibet was always present. In the case of the Sino-Japanese war, the fear was that China, driven into the west, might come to take a more active interest in Tibet. Or, indeed, that Japan would come forward as the more dangerous heir to Chinese claims in Tibet. Another factor was Russian domination of Sinkiang, as a result of which Russian garrisons were located at certain points on the northern frontier of Tibet. Nevertheless, surrounded as they were by hostile neighbours, the Tibetan Government made no concessions, and refrained from an open-door policy towards China.

In 1941, however, two events occurred which brought Tibetan neutrality into question. The first was the resignation of the Regent, the Reting (Radreng) Rimpoché, on whom the Chinese placed great reliance. His favourable disposition to the Chinese was largely due to the generous payments he received from them, and his increasing unpopularity with the Kashag and the monks because of his rapacity.[594] The second was China's attempt to coerce the Tibetan Government into accepting a highway through Tibet without prior consultation and without their consent.

In 1938, the Japanese Navy successfully blockaded the China coast. To counter this, the Chinese began to build various highways, one of which, the Loshan-Sichang highway, was constructed to run through Wel and Yungjen to join the Burma road at Hsiangyun. By late 1939, the war had assumed global proportions, with China openly allied on Britain's side. As a result, the British agreed to open the Burma road as a supply-route for the hard-pressed Chinese army. However, in 1940, Japanese victories in Burma closed the Burma road, and the Chinese were forced to look around for an alternative route for their supplies. Chiang Kai-shek ordered a new highway, designed to link south-western Szechuan through the Tibetan province of Zayul via the Lohit valley with Assam.[595] To open up this route, it was essential for China to secure the co-operation of the Government of India to the scheme, but above all to consult with Tibet, through whose territory the highway was intended

to run. This the Chinese refused to do. It was the Government of India who approached the Tibetan Government for their assent to the joint Anglo-Chinese effort. The Tibetan National Assembly stood firm and refused permission. Promptly the Chinese decided to disregard the refusal and sent a survey party to the Tibetan border. Here they were turned back by Tibetan troops. For the moment the crisis appeared to have blown over.

When Chiang Kai-shek visited India in February 1942, another joint effort was made to persuade the Tibetans to reverse their decision, this time under threat of loss of British support. The Tibetans, in spite of repeated warnings from the Indian Government, continued to decline to consider the proposal, particularly when it was found that the Chinese intended to use their own officials for the supervision of these routes.[596] The Tibetan Government regarded an injection of Chinese personnel into their country as another ill-disguised attempt to sabotage Tibetan independence. Meanwhile, the Chinese, well aware that the Tibetans were without British backing, decided to increase their pressure by an armed incursion into Tibetan territory from Chinghai. Reports came flooding in that 3,000 Tungan troops were moving south from Sining to Tibet, and further indications that Chiang Kai-shek had instructed both Ma Pu-feng and Liu Wen-hui to move troops to Tibet's eastern borders.[597] A meeting of the Tibetan National Assembly decided to fight if Tibet was invaded; Tibetan troops were sent to Nagchuka and an urgent appeal went out to the Indian Government. 'If they do encroach on our territory we will be obliged to use armed force and also apply to our Ally the British Government for a supply of arms and ammunition, and it is sincerely hoped this will be granted as it is required for defence of our own territory . . . it is hoped that British Government will accord every possible assistance for preservation of our religious and political independence'.[598]

There was little doubt that British intervention on behalf of China was responsible for the Chinese advance into Tibet. The India Office gave evidence of this: 'Our experience with the Chinese in regard to Tibet is that they do not press aggressive intentions so long as we maintain without weakening our diplomatic obligation to them'.[599] Telegrams despatched to Chungking stating Britain's diplomatic obligation to the Tibetan Government against any Chinese military aggression, and requiring Chinese assurance of their peaceful intent towards Tibet, produced no immediate response.[600] When the reply came, it was unconciliatory, merely stating that whatever the views of other governments, the Chinese Government regarded Tibet as an integral part of China. In the light of this response, HMG decided to interest the United States Government in the matter of preventing the Chinese Government from diverting their war effort, and the war supplies furnished by Britain and America for the war against Japan, 'into a senseless adventure against Tibet'.[601]

In the hopes of getting the Tibetan authorities to fall in line regarding the supply route, it was decided to apply pressure of economic sanctions on Tibet. It had the desired effect; the Regent and the Kashag were forced to reverse the National Assembly's decision and to agree to transmit commercial goods for

China through Tibetan territory, provided 'no warlike supplies' were sent.[602] The goods were to be carried by Tibetan transport contractors with the Tibetan Government fully responsible for their supervision. No Chinese supervisors were to be allowed employment in Tibetan territory. To guarantee the agreement, HMG would be required to act as intermediary. The Chinese refused to give the assurances.[603] Instead they countered by accusing the Tibetan Government of receiving arms and ammunition from Japan and preparing an airfield for Japan's use in Kham. To this false rumour, the Tibetan Government gave a categorical denial: '. . . we rigorously guard our frontier from intrusion, and emphatically deny having any dealings or understanding with other foreign powers'.[604] Lhasa had stood its ground. The Chinese, having been encouraged by Britain to despatch goods to China via Tibet, failed to keep the trade channels open. The Government of India conceded that 'Lack of further progress has been due to the unforthcoming attitude of China and Tibet's suspicion of their intentions'.[605]

One result of the crisis over routes was that the Government of the United States of America was moved to take an active interest in relations between Tibet and China. It was in the context of exerting diplomatic pressure on Tibet that Captain Tolstoy and Lieutenant Brook Dolan, representatives of the American Government, were despatched to Lhasa. Originally, they had attempted to visit Lhasa from China but had been refused permission by the Tibetan authorities. Thereafter, they approached the Government of India, without first informing them of the Tibetan refusal. The Indian Government assured the Tibetans that the two men were genuine emissaries of the American President, and on that basis the visit was allowed, but only on condition that they would not attempt to progress eastwards to China. No sooner had the two Americans arrived in Lhasa, than they expressed the desire to go on to China via Jyekundo, Sining and Lanchow, putting the British Mission in Lhasa in what they considered was a thoroughly invidious position.[606]

Tolstoy, greatly impressed by the Tibetans' fight for an independent state, recommended that Tibet should be represented at the forthcoming Peace Conference. He emphasised that the suggestion was entirely his own, not inspired by the American Government, but he hoped that it would receive favourable consideration. It struck the British Embassy in Chungking that 'the visit of these two American officers to Lhasa, establishing as it has done direct American contact with the Tibetan Government and Tibetan affairs, may have an important bearing on the future of the vexed question of Tibetan relations with China and India and the Western World'.[607] At the same time they were in broad agreement with the Viceroy regarding the 'amateur efforts' of the two Americans concerning their suggestion of Tibetan representation at the Peace Conference. 'Unfortunately Ludlow . . . committed himself to personal expression of opinion in support of this view. I am taking steps to inform him of the un-wisdom of this action'. Nor was the Viceroy impressed by suggestions emanating from Gould and Richardson that Tibet should, through the American representatives, follow up their contact with the American President and place before him their theory of Tibetan

independence.[608] Diplomatic considerations affecting British relations with China were involved, and the British Government did not intend to encourage the Tibetan authorities to pursue the matter independently of China or indeed of them. Accordingly, the Tibetan Foreign Bureau was discouraged from seeking representation at the Peace Conference.[609]

Chinese representation at Lhasa, 1943–45

Tibetan intransigence, as well as British inability to force them into submission regarding the supply route, was made the subject of a grievance by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr Soong, when he met Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, in Washington. Soong complained that 'the Generalissimo had not been wholly reassured by what he had learned of the attitude of the Government of India during his visit to that country and, as I would be aware, the Government of China had always regarded Tibet as part of the republic'.[610] Later in May 1943, Dr Soong returned to the charge at the Pacific Council meeting in Washington.[611] The British response to Soong rested on what has come to be known as the Eden memorandum of July 1943, which made British recognition of Chinese suzerainty conditional upon China's acceptance of Tibetan autonomy.[612] Eden stated that China had attempted since 1921 to import some substance into her suzerainty over Tibet, while the Tibetans had continued to repudiate any measure of Chinese control. Evidence of Chinese attempts to press their claim that Tibet was part of China had arisen recently when they tried to post Chinese officials in Tibet to supervise the supply route, contrary to the wishes of the Tibetan Government. Essentially, HMG had always been prepared to recognise China's nominal suzerainty but only on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous. Any unconditional admission of Chinese suzerainty the British Government were not prepared to acknowledge.

The events of 1943 had already alerted the Tibetans to the danger of Chinese intentions and to their own vulnerable position on finding the British Government pressurising them to make concessions to China. Their successful insistence on maintaining a fragile neutrality gave evidence of the Tibetan Government's intention to reinforce a policy based on the total exclusion of Chinese interference. How far their good intentions could succeed depended on building up diplomatic support and an adequate army, and who better to turn to than the Government of India. Let us see what was on offer.

The Tibetan Government's request for additional arms and ammunition was partially accorded, and then only with some delay attached. It was the Government of India's hope that by delaying the supply of ammunition the Tibetans would not be tempted to attack first, and given time existing tension over Chinese troop movements on the eastern border of Tibet would die down. On the other hand, a supply of ammunition in reasonable quantities 'would be an earnest of our good faith and support, and might go some way to restore the nerves from which the Tibetan Government have suffered over Chinese intentions recently'.[613] The India Office looked upon it as an

unfortunate business, 'almost certain to produce suspicion, either on the part of the Tibetans that we are letting them down, or on the part of the Chinese that we are playing the Tibetans up against Chinese suzerainty'.[614] In line with this thinking, small-scale training facilities were granted at Gyantse, and Lieutenant Sendall moved up to Lhasa to inspect and repair existing guns and munitions.[615] Although the India Office believed that the fault lay with the Chinese for adopting a minatory attitude towards Tibet, yet great secrecy was to attached to the transaction, in the hopes of avoiding the risk of China making propaganda out of it. However, the visit to Lhasa of the two Americans, the presentation of several wireless transmitters by the American Government, and however modicum the offer of arms and ammunition by the British Government, it alerted the Chinese authorities to their own isolation in respect of Tibet. They decided that it was time they sent another high-ranking officer to Lhasa to put their case.

In May 1944, Shen Tsung-lien, an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, arrived in Delhi en route to Lhasa, with the specific aim of finding a solution to the Tibetan problem.[616] The Tibetan Government raised strong objections when they discovered that the Indian Government had authorised the Consul-General in Chungking to grant transit visas to Shen and three others, without prior reference to them. They were further alarmed when Shen arrived in Calcutta not with three but with seven companions, all with transit visas granted in Chungking. Within days, Shen was asking for a further nineteen Chinese to be admitted to Tibet. It was evident that the manoeuvre was pre-planned, with every intention of increasing the Chinese Mission in Lhasa. Eventually, under pressure from the British Minister in Chungking, the Tibetan authorities agreed to admit fourteen Chinese with the assurance that no further grant of visas would be extended at Chungking, without prior authority from the Tibetan Government.[617]

In a discussion in India with Olaf Caroe, Shen revealed that one of his prime objectives, once he reached Lhasa, would be to discover the reasons behind the difficulties being experienced by China in Tibet. The difficulty, as Caroe pointed out, was the difference in political concept. The Chinese Government spoke of Tibet as a province of China, whereas the Tibetans, although they had acknowledged the protection of the Manchu Emperor, conceived themselves to be independent and most particularly since 1911 when the Chinese had been forced to leave Lhasa. The British-Indian concept was one of seeking a *via media*, namely that the Tibetans should recognise Chinese suzerainty, while the Chinese, for their part, should admit Tibet's autonomy.[618] Although, to Caroe, Shen maintained that responsible Chinese did not really regard Tibet as just a province of China, within weeks he was telling Gould quite the opposite. His mission was to carry out Chiang Kai-shek's personal instructions and bring about an agreed frontier between China and Tibet, with a large measure of autonomy for Tibet. The Generalissimo, however, could not regard Tibet other than as an integral part of China, and nor would Chinese public opinion tolerate a tripartite agreement about Tibet. Any suggestion that the future status of Tibet could be the subject for discussion at

the Allied post-war deliberations would not be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek.[619]

Shen's arrival in Lhasa raised points of protocol. It was assumed that the Tibetan Government would recognise Shen as a representative on much the same footing as the officer in charge of the British Mission. However, the Tibetan Foreign Bureau insisted that Shen should be treated as a special delegate sent to discuss the settlement between themselves and China. Shen's insistence that he should be described as Tru-Trung or Head of Office was firmly refused;[620] the Tibetans were keenly on guard against any infringement of Shen's position. The official view in India saw Shen's open-handed offer of co-operation in various fields such as education and medicine as specifically designed to help build up his position in Tibet and then to oust them. Recognising that the Kashag was weak and ineffectual, Shen set out to gain as much monastic support as possible by means of Chinese monks and large cash presents.[621] It was also his intention that, if he failed to bring about a direct Tibet-Chinese settlement, then he might be able to persuade the Government of India to accept a conference between Britain and China, with Tibet playing a subordinate role, if any at all.

To persuade the world that Tibet occupied no more than the position of a province of China, an intensive Chinese publicity campaign was set in motion. Chinese cartographers persistently delineated Tibet as a part of China; on the elevation of Chiang Kai-shek to the Presidency of the Chinese Republic, the Chinese Ministry of Information published an English version of a congratulatory message, alleged to have come from the Kashag, so expressed as to convey the impression that the Tibetans acknowledged that their country was part of China, and acclaimed the Generalissimo as their own President. There then followed the discovery of a new Panchen Lama by the Chinese, and his enthronement at a ceremony presided over by a member of the Kuomintang's Central Executive. The Tibetans immediately denied the reincarnation. And most dangerous of all to Tibetan claims to separate status was Chiang Kai'shek's attempt to prove that the Tibetans, the Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Tanguns and Mohammedans were of common ancestral origin. The apparent purpose of this falsification of history was to supply justification for a policy of economic, cultural and political assimilation of the border peoples, which might otherwise, in the eyes of the world, have carried the stigma of imperialism.[622]

The propaganda was immediately recognised by the British Mission in Lhasa as a Chinese attempt to avoid having the status of Tibet examined by an international body.[623] To competent observers the scene was being set for the absorption of Tibet, either peacefully or by forcible means, after the war was over. Since it would be no less important to HMG and the Government of India, after the war, to maintain Tibet as a buffer state, it was decided to send Sir Basil Gould to Lhasa in an attempt to bring the Tibetan Government to a realisation of the dangers inherent in China's policy. And above all to make it unequivocally clear, both to Shen and the Tibetan authorities, that the British Government did not intend to dissociate themselves from any direct

discussion which China might attempt to have with Tibet, and which would affect their own interests.[624]

Basil Gould's brief, when he visited Lhasa in 1944, was to uphold Tibet's position against Chinese influence, and to assure the Tibetan Government of HMG's diplomatic support. Any agreed solution between Tibet and China, whereby the former recognised Chinese suzerainty in return for Tibetan autonomy and an agreed frontier, would be welcomed by HMG. Shen was to be informed from the outset that HMG could not but concern themselves with any discussions that might take place between Tibet and China. The Tibetans were to be reminded of HMG's Treaty rights under the 1914 Convention. Gould was not to insist on representation in any possible discussion between Tibet and China, but he was to request the Tibetans to keep him fully informed of any developments.[625] The concern felt in India at the intensity of Chinese propaganda was to be transmitted to the Tibetan Government, and Gould was to try and induce them to stiffen their attitude towards Chinese moves to undermine their independence. He was also to take up the question of the vindication of the McMahon Line, particularly in relation to the Tawang area, to drop a hint that there might be some 'prospect of a frontier rectification in Tibet's favour in this area [Tawang] provided that Tibetan goodwill is displayed towards the operations along the McMahon Line generally'.[626]

In Gould's first round of talks with Shen, he found the latter anxious to remove Tibetan mistrust. To show good faith, Shen put forward certain terms. China was ready to recognise Tibetan autonomy on condition that Tibet's external relations were under Chinese control. No internal changes were contemplated, unless asked for by Tibet. It would be necessary to settle matters with HMG, in which case Tibet might attend discussions but not as representatives. China needed Tibet for her defence and objected to the presence of British troops at the trade marts. Shen was also critical of Britain's suspicions of China which made it necessary to keep Tibet as a buffer state. Hong Kong and Tibet remained the two main obstacles to Anglo-Chinese accord. In Shen's opinion, it was only the lay Tibetan who favoured the British connection, whereas the monasteries were unanimous in being pro-Chinese. When it came to the territorial limits of Tibet, and as to what autonomy meant, Shen remained deliberately vague.

It appeared that Shen's inclination to go slow indicated that he hoped to take advantage, as occasion might offer, of any friction that might arise in connection with the McMahon Line, when the Indian Government would be tempted to impose on Tibet restrictions on trade and other related matters, and which would then reconcile the Tibetans to accept that their foreign relations would fare better in Chinese hands.[627] Shen, Gould thought, spoke with two voices. At one time he was without any special authority, and at others he was fully informed of the limits to which the Generalissimo was prepared to go. Territorially, provided Tibet raised the question, China might agree to the Lhasa authorities having direct control up to the present *de facto* limits, which would run west of Jyekundo and down the Di Chu to the Isu

Razi Pass. Tibet might be allowed to decide her own form of government, and choose her own ruler eventually. The Dalai Lama had always been recognised, Shen claimed, as head of religion, and 'with this indomitable monastic reverence there need be no interference'. As to the interpretation of what direct control by Lhasa might mean, Gould concluded that it would amount to Tibet having no voice in the conduct of her foreign relations, and consequently an abnegation for India of the McMahon frontier. Any settlement, Shen wanted to be primarily between HMG and China, begun at Lhasa, continued at Delhi and later transferred to London or Chungking. The Tibetan Government was to be permitted a ring-side seat at these discussions, but Shen was having difficulty, he alleged, in discovering in whose hands plenary authority in Tibet was vested. It was Shen's aim to obtain from HMG an admission that Tibet was an integral part of China; once that was admitted China might deal with Tibet considerately, but would in fact be able to deal with it as she liked.[628]

Since discussions with Shen had brought the question of Tibet's status out into the open, the India Office sought the views of the Foreign Office. Their joint views represented the following points.[629] HMG would not consent to any arrangement which did not preserve the *status quo* between India and Tibet. Tibet was entitled to continue to maintain direct relations with India. Nor was HMG prepared to enter into negotiations with the Chinese about Tibet over the head of the Kashag. Shen's proposal of an exchange of notes between China and HMG regarding Treaty and Trade Regulations, already subsisting between HMG and Tibet, was refused on the ground that it would not be consistent with HMG's view of Tibet's position. There was to be no reference to a post-war conference, in case the Tibetans regarded it as a commitment to bring the question of Tibet's status before the Conference. In any international discussion, HMG would feel bound to support Tibet's claim to full practical autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. Any analogy regarding Dominion Status was to be avoided since the term might be found to permit a greater degree of Chinese control than was acceptable to HMG. The Wallace-Chiang Kai-shek declaration was to be avoided since it would give the Chinese a pretext to claim that HMG subscribed to it.[630] Diplomatic support was to be reaffirmed to the Tibetan Government, but they were not to be informed that the talks had proved abortive because of Shen's refusal to participate with them as equals in any discussion.

Before Gould's departure from Lhasa, the Kashag raised various points with him. They stated that from the remote past there had been religious ties between Tibet and China, but everyone knew that Tibet was independent. The 1914 Convention, however, had chosen to recognise Tibetan autonomy. In order 'that the whole world may be aware that Tibet is autonomous', the Kashag proposed that HMG should help Tibet to send a delegation to the post-war Peace Conference and that Britain should help Tibet to conduct negotiations with the Chinese on the basis of the 1914 Simla Convention. Finally, to secure for them substantial military support in their endeavours to build up a Tibetan army.[631] The Tibetan Foreign Office explained that they did not anticipate China actually employing force against Tibet until Japan had

been defeated. But it was likely, in the absence of any assurance from the British Government, that she would push her influence gradually forward in the eastern regions of Tibet. The crucial question, therefore, was how far was HMG prepared to go to give active military aid to Tibet? Would they, in fact, see them through their difficulties with China?[632]

The response was categorical. There was to be now no guarantee of military support since it would raise difficulties with their ally in the present war. Moreover, since China was a war-time ally, HMG were in a favourable position to use their diplomatic influence to bring about a peaceful settlement. Britain could not, however, subscribe to the presence of a Tibetan representative at the Peace Conference as a non-belligerent. In fact they went so far as to advise the Tibetan Government to reach a settlement on the lines of the 1914 Simla Convention directly with Shen. They reaffirmed that the British Government had no designs on Tibetan territory, yet they intended to secure their rights in the frontier areas, which they were glad to observe were not disputed by the Tibetan Government. In any international discussion, HMG were prepared to support Tibet's claim to full practical autonomy under Chinese suzerainty.

When it came to the McMahon Line, HMG were willing to alter the frontier so as to run from the Se La, not to the north of Tawang but to the south. They would not object to voluntary contributions from monasteries being collected even south of the Se La, but they would prefer instead to make an annual lump sum contribution to the monastery or monasteries so affected. Tibetan ownership in private estates on the frontier would not be disturbed. If the holy places, Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa were on the British side of the frontier, but within one day's march of it, then the alignment in this area would be adjusted, to accord with Tibetan sentiments, as promised in 1914. The posts already established in the McMahon Line area would not be withdrawn.[633]

The Tibetans had by now discovered that British imperial policy was aimed at maintaining Tibet as a buffer state, primarily in order to ensure the security of the north-east frontier. They were not prepared to help them towards the full independence they sought. To fulfil the British Government's objective, it was essential to ensure that Tibet should continue to enjoy the autonomy which she had achieved when she ejected the Chinese in 1911 from Tibet. The kind of autonomy that HMG had in mind was one that would entitle Tibet to receive and send out diplomatic representatives 'though we would not, of course, welcome the opening up of diplomatic relations between Tibet and any country other than India and China'.[634] In other words, an autonomous Tibet sustained and upheld by the mutual goodwill of her two imperial neighbours; at the very least it would require that China did not absorb Tibet. If she ever did, it would bring her right up against the north-eastern frontier, thereby causing any local disputes between Tibet and the Government of India to be raised to the diplomatic level, with the added complication that China would then make the settlement of such disputes contingent on concessions in a wider diplomatic sphere. For India, the other diplomatic consideration was that once China was established in Tibet they might indeed seek to exploit

an old Manchu claim to suzerainty over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.

Throughout his stay in Lhasa, Shen had shown himself to be wholly unaccommodating on the issue of Tibetan status. As Shen perceived it, the Tibetans stood essentially without the full-scale backing of HMG. The door was open for a last minute attempt, no doubt with the express instructions of the Generalissimo, to try and extract from the Government of India a formal invitation to discuss Tibetan affairs. He proposed a bilateral conference in Delhi but only if the Indian Government set it up. The purpose was to manoeuvre the Indian Government into taking the initiative to discuss Tibetan matters behind the back of the Tibetan Government. They, of course, saw through the ruse and offered informal discussions in Delhi instead, but not the full-scale conference Shen had hoped for.[635]

The Tibetan Mission to India and China, 1945–46

One outcome of Shen's stay in Lhasa was that he managed to persuade the Tibetan Government to send an official delegation to China. The ostensible reason being the Chinese National Assembly meeting in Nanking in May 1946 where future constitutional arrangements were on the agenda and the Tibetans were encouraged, in their own interests, to depute officials of cabinet rank.[636] In fact, the Chinese had provided for Tibetan representation in the new National Assembly. The Tibetan Government, learning of this, found a suitable way round the difficulty and proposed instead to send a goodwill mission to both India and China, whose sole aim would be to assert their independence.

Early in March 1946, the Mission arrived in New Delhi to take part in the victory celebrations and to be received by the Viceroy.[637] The opportunity was taken to give some publicity to the visit so as to make it plain that Tibet was an autonomous country, with a system of government and a culture separate from China. The explicit assurance given by the Mission before it left Lhasa that its functions would be purely complimentary and that they would not attend the Chinese National Assembly did not wholly convince the Indian Government. They believed that, once in China, the Tibetans would be manoeuvred into compromising their position and however unwilling, would find themselves participants as elected members to the National Assembly. The authorities in India, fully alive to the danger, repeatedly warned the Tibetan Government not to respond to Chinese blandishments.[638] They reflected that instances in the past of Chinese appointments to the People's Political Council of so-called representatives of Tibet had, in fact, been residents of Chinese-controlled areas in the Tibetan-speaking districts of Chinghai and Sikang, and could not correspond with Tibetan Government representation in the Chinese National Assembly. There was no precedent for such an action, and the Tibetan Mission were made aware that any attendance would, in the eyes of foreign observers, be derogatory to Tibetan autonomy and misunderstood, particularly by Americans with their stereotyped ideas about parliamentary representation.[639]

No sooner had the Mission arrived in China, than their presence in the capital was heralded as Tibetan members of the National Assembly.[640] To coincide with their arrival, the Tibetan Tsongdu sent a letter demanding the return of territory held by China and for the withdrawal of Chinese officers from Tibet. Simultaneously, the Government of India was asked to consider the return of Tibetan territory in the McMahon area, with a rider that a proper gesture from India would ease the Tibetan problem vis-a-vis the Chinese. The territory they had in mind was the area around Tawang and Walong. India's denial was prompt. The Kashag was reminded of the 1914 Convention whereby no actual territory had been annexed, and they would do well to realise that the Convention stood as the most crucial evidence of their autonomy.[641]

Internal unrest in China necessitated the postponement of the National Assembly Meeting and during the months before it reconvened, the Chinese authorities kept the Mission on a string. There was little doubt that the Tibetan Government had anticipated that the Mission would have to attend the Assembly, even if they did not send them to China for that express purpose.[642] In India, it was recognised that the visit of the Mission had made no actual contribution to Indo-Tibetan relations, while it could not be evaded that its subsequent visit to China might mark a definite weakening of Tibetan determination to assert their own practical autonomy. It was hoped that 'the Tibetan Government's selection of such unworthy representatives, its members preoccupied with prospects of personal gain . . . and apparent present incapacity to appreciate any problem of major importance, may have more significance and purpose in resisting Chinese encroachment on the position which Tibet had so far succeeded in maintaining, than in their resistance to our own efforts to awaken them to a sense of peril'.[643] Months later, when eventually two leaders of the Tibetan Mission called on the British Minister in Nanking, they admitted that when it became clear that they could not expect any positive assistance from HMG in their difficulties with China, it had been decided to comply with Chinese conditions whereby Chiang Kai-shek would see them to discuss frontier questions, but only after they had put their case before the National Assembly. Moreover, they had been given an assurance that they would be allowed to air their grievances, but so far had no idea in what capacity they were expected to attend.[644]

When the Tibetans finally appeared in the Assembly, one of them, Dzasa Thubten Samphel, was, as predicted, elected a member of the Presidium. He claimed that he had accepted the nomination in order that the Tibetans might not be misrepresented by a Chinese nominee from Chinghai or Sikang.[645] He had also presented a letter to Chiang Kai-shek asking for frontier rectification, but had made no progress on that score. He appeared not to have understood that the National Assembly was there to adopt a constitution, not to deal with frontier matters in which Tibet was specifically interested. Samphel's action constituted a break from the 1914 Convention, but it was assumed in India that, in view of the general ineptitude of the Tibetan Mission, he had acted on his own initiative rather than on the authorisation of his government.[646] By December 1946, it had become clear to the Kashag that the Chinese National

Assembly in their Constitution had relegated Tibet to the position of a self-governing province on the same lines as Inner Mongolia.[647]

The British Embassy in Nanking reported that the Tibetan Mission, so far from taking a firm stand on the provocative issues relating to Tibet, never made any gesture to withdraw from the Assembly. On the contrary, they abstained from taking any prominent stand in the proceedings, in notable contrast to the Mongol and Sinkiang delegates who were found to be extremely vocal in their demands for independence. The presence of the Tibetans at the Assembly was joyfully exploited by the Chinese as confirmation of the dependent status of Tibet 'which pretence the almost stooge-like performance of the said Tibetans did nothing to dispel'.[648] The Tibetans' belated attempts to reverse the trend by insisting that they were the only authorised representatives of their government, and to give publicity to the fact, showed their determination about their independence; it also confirmed their ignorance of the world and the self-satisfaction with which they had paid so little attention to the danger their goodwill mission would run into in China. There was some comfort to be drawn from the fact that delegates from other parts of the world had attended and were scarcely taken in by China's boasted suzerainty over Tibet, whether aired in the press or more solemnly in the National Assembly. What mattered most, in the aftermath of this misadventure, was for the Tibetan Government to stand firm in their refusal to accede to any more Chinese attempts to exhibit their claimed over-lordship, instances of which were in the process of developing whether by intervention in the selection of a reincarnation of the Panchen Lama or by the despatch of Chinese bodyguards to Shigatse for his protection.

While the Tibetan Mission was still in China, the Congress Party of India organised an unofficial Inter-Asian Relations Conference in India for 1947, and an invitation was sent to the Tibetan Government.[649] Although the decision to send representatives was reached in Lhasa, it was kept secret for some time in case the Chinese representative might attempt to bring the Tibetan Mission with them as part of their delegation. When the danger was past, the Tibetan Government readily agreed to attend. By inviting Tibet to the Conference, the future leaders of India gave proof of their recognition of Tibetan independence. The Tibetans attended as an independent delegation, under their own flag, and in no way connected with the Chinese representatives.[650] An immediate protest, lodged by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, secured the withdrawal of a map of Asia showing Tibet outside the boundaries of China. It did not, however, stop the Tibetan delegation from continuing as part of the Conference, nor did it stop them from meeting Gandhi and Nehru and being welcomed by both as representatives of Tibet.

Conspiracy in Tibet, 1947

Simultaneously, with the Asian Conference in India, two immediate problems presented themselves in Tibet itself. The ex-Regent, the Reting

Rimpoché, attempted a *coup d'etat*. His principal support came from the Che College of Sera monastery which was suspected of collusion with the Chinese. The crisis lasted for about three weeks, at the end of which the ex-Regent was murdered in prison. It then became clear that this internal dissension was proof of continuing Chinese machinations at a particularly sensitive time, when the transfer of power to a National Government of India was about to sever Tibet's traditional link with the British Government.[651]

The other danger appeared in the form of the new reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The final selection of a Panchen Lama is the duty of the Dalai Lama or the Regent and the National Assembly in Tibet. The search for the reincarnation had been going on for more than two years. Three candidates had emerged at different times, two of whom were backed by the Chinese. In 1947, however, one of the candidates was selected by the Chinese with the active participation of officials from the Tashilhunpo monastery and acknowledged and enthroned in the lamasery of Kumbum near Sining. The circumstances of his recognition ceremony suggested that, like his predecessor, he would be a tool in the hands of the Chinese Government, to be used when necessary in their forward policy towards Tibet.[652]

The Tibetan National Assembly refused to accept the child as the Panchen Lama, and ordered the Tashilhunpo officials to bring the three candidates to Lhasa for the final selection. They were supported in their stand by the three great monasteries against recognition of any candidate as Panchen Lama, except at Lhasa. Shades of the old Panchen Lama's tactics, that the new incumbent would proceed to Tibet with a Chinese escort, agitated the Tsongdu who declared their readiness to fight off any such attempt. The Chinese themselves appeared to have thought better of foisting their Panchen Lama on to the Tibetans, and he, together with his large Chinese escort, turned back towards China.[653] The sequel to this affair took place in 1951, when Tibet's position in relation to the Communists was desperate, and they decided to give official recognition to the Chinese appointee.

Tibet's treaty relations with the National Government of India, 1947

The establishment of the interim government and the meeting of the Constituent Assembly in India marked a turning point in relations between India and Tibet. The Tibetans, realising this, wondered how they should adapt themselves to changing conditions in India. Doubts arose in Lhasa as to whether the future Government of India would be willing or able to continue to sustain Tibetan autonomy in the face of the Chinese Government's avowed intent to incorporate Tibet into China. They sought clarification of their position from the British Mission in Lhasa. The 'frontier men', steeped in usage and knowledge of Tibetan affairs, wanted a gesture from the leaders of the future Indian Government, in which they openly proclaimed their intentions to safeguard the autonomy of Tibet on the basis of existing relations. It would reassure the Tibetan Government. 'Tibet is a medieval anachronism wrapped in ignorance of international methods of procedure,

and cannot be compared with other countries.'[654] It needed special treatment, and they pressed the Indian Government to recognise this element.

The British Government itself did not intend to maintain a Mission at Lhasa once the existing Mission was Indianised, particularly since their interest in Tibet was derived solely from their treaty engagements with the Tibetan Government which, in turn, was based upon their position as controlling power in India. It was their intention to inform the neighbouring foreign states in treaty relation with them that they could no longer be responsible for the performance of their obligations under international treaties of local application. It would be for India to decide the extent to which she would assume these obligations. Any change in the character of the Mission in Lhasa was to be preceded by a joint announcement by HMG and the new Government of India as to the continuance by the successor government to the international obligations of the provisions of the Simla Convention of 1914, and the Trade Regulations attached to the treaty. Once the Government of India issued a declaration to the effect that, after the transfer of power, they would continue to regard the treaty instruments in force between HMG and the Tibetan Government as binding between themselves and Tibet, and HMG simultaneously announced the transfer of obligations as the normal consequence in international law of the transfer of power to India as the successor government, then any attempt by China to introduce controversial issues could be successfully resisted.[655]

Just before the transfer of power, the Tibetan Government were informed that the 'Government of India induced by their friendly interest in Tibetans and in preservation of Tibetan autonomy, are prepared (until such time as either party wishes to enter into fresh arrangements) to assume obligations of HMG under the Simla Convention of 1914 and Associated Trade Regulations, and trust that the Tibetan Government will continue to abide by them'.[656] When the transfer actually took place on 15 August 1947, the British Mission at Lhasa formally became the Indian Mission and the existing staff were retained in their entirety.[657] The devolution of rights upon the new Dominion of India bound it to the Simla Convention of 1914 and to the Eden memorandum of 1943, which made it clear that the British Government's recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was conditional on China recognising Tibetan autonomy. That if, at any time, the Chinese Government contemplated the withdrawal of Tibetan autonomy, then HMG and the Government of India would have to ask themselves 'whether, in the changed circumstances of today, it would be right for them to continue to recognise even a theoretical status of subservience for a people who desire to be free and have, in fact, maintained their freedom for more than thirty years'.[658] The frontiers which the British Government had acquired by treaty, agreement and occupation were inherited by the new Indian Government.

The international status of the new India brought into focus the assumption of her international obligations, such as those (a) concluded expressly on behalf of present India and (b) those concluded in the name of His Majesty or HMG but which were applicable to India. The legal position was that India

would *prima facie* inherit all existing international treaty rights and obligations which had local and territorial application. Those obligations relating to frontiers, which run with the land, would consequently pass to the future sovereign of the territory in question. Legally HMG, who in the eyes of foreign governments had brought about the change, would not be relieved of their political duty towards those governments until the Treaty position of the new Dominion had been satisfactorily regularised. In relation to Tibet, in category (b) most of the stipulations could only be wholly fulfilled if the successor authority observed them, *ie.* the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1914.[659]

The Tibetan Government chose to reserve judgment until questions relating to boundaries, trade and the supply of arms and ammunition had been fully explored, thorny questions which had bedevilled negotiations with the British Government ever since the establishment of the forward areas of the McMahon Line.[660] It was no less so now. The Tibetan Government asked for the return of 'excluded Tibetan territories gradually included into India', and a review of trade relations affecting the economic welfare of Tibet.[661] The message raised three issues: the question of Tibet's independence, as distinct from autonomy; the question of the return to Tibet of the northern fringe of the tribal areas on the north-east frontier of India; and the question of Indo-Tibetan trade relations. Since the request was submitted to both British and Indian Governments, the implication was that the Tibetans looked to the former for support not only in their future dealings with China, but also in any negotiations they would have to enter into with the new Government of India. They were informed that they would have to deal exclusively with the Indian Government.[662]

The Indian Government merely reiterated their wish to have an assurance from the Tibetan Government that they would be prepared to continue relations on the existing basis, and that, if necessary, any new arrangement could be taken up later. Months later, when the Tibetan Government announced their acceptance of the continuation of the former relationship with the new Indian Government, the Tibetans had agreed to sign away to India those extra-territorial privileges, previously enjoyed by the British administration. These were the right to maintain Trade Agents at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok with military escorts; to try cases occurring in the Trade Marts between Indian subjects; to hold joint enquiries into disputes between Indian subjects and Tibetans. An additional right was the post and telegraph service and the staging of bungalows between the Indian border and Gyantse.

It was the Tibetan fear that, as a result of Indian independence, a joint Indo-Chinese agreement flowing from Nehru's close friendship with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would be detrimental to her interests which probably accounted for the delay in affirming, under changed conditions, the rights and obligations to the new Government of India.[663] In a sense the Tibetans were right in suspecting that the new Indian Government was in no position to prejudice its relations with so important a neighbour as China. In any case, it was Nehru's avowed policy to evolve India towards becoming 'a

potent but benevolent force in world affairs and particularly in Asia'. It followed, therefore, that while the Government of India were glad to recognise Tibetan autonomy, they were not prepared to do more than encourage this and to do nothing which would bring India into conflict with China on the issue. The attitude best suited to this policy was one they chose to describe as 'benevolent spectator'. When they recollected the participation of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission in the recent session of the Chinese National Assembly, they saw no reason to interfere with any arrangement that Tibet might come to directly with China. When it came to the Indo-Tibetan boundary, the Indian Government were more specific. 'The Government of India stand by the McMahon Line and will not tolerate incursions into India such as that which recently occurred in the Siang valley. They would, however, at all times be prepared to discuss in a friendly way with China and Tibet any rectifications of the frontier that might be urged on reasonable grounds by any of the parties to the abortive Simla Conference of 1914'.[664] The Indian Government were willing to claim the specific obligations of the Simla Conference relating to the McMahon Line. On the other hand, they denounced it as being both abortive and as having no relevance to Tibetan status. In actual fact, since the arrangement was with Tibet there could be no question that the one was mutually exclusive to the other.

In China, Chiang Kai-shek, facing defeat by the Communists, continued to treat Tibet as part of China. He was by now highly suspicious of Indian motives and believed that Nehru's wholesale adoption of British policy had encouraged the Tibetan Trade Delegation to assert their practical independence by visiting Delhi, and thereafter travelling on to Britain and the United States.[665] In Britain, Downing Street laid down that as Tibet was capable of entering into treaties, there was no reason why HMG should be chary of receiving a Tibetan Trade Mission or of recognising Tibetan passports. 'Nor would we be in favour of admitting the claim of the Chinese Embassy that our official contacts with the Mission should be through them.'[666]

When eventually the Mission arrived in Nanking, as with past tradition, they were promptly described as a delegation to China's National Assembly. In the last days of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek proposed to Delhi that the 1908 Tibetan Trade Regulations should be revised. The Generalissimo knew full well that the terms of the Trade Regulations had left the Chinese as the ultimate authority in Tibet. The main details of the Trade Regulations had been decided upon between the British and Chinese representatives and, in fact, the role that Tsarong Shapé, the Tibetan delegate, played had been finally settled in Peking. Recognising a trap to get India to admit that the Simla Convention of 1914, where Tibet had been a full participant and which had established the nominal suzerainty of China, and above all defined the McMahon Line frontier of India, was not a valid document, back came the reply that India recognised only the validity of the Agreement which superseded the 1908 Regulations.[667]

Meanwhile in Tibet, Government officials took the precaution against Communist infiltration by dismissing everyone associated with the Kuomin-

tang Government and forbade communications with China. With the help of the Indian Government, the Tibetans intensified their military preparations, and the consequent increase in arms and ammunition brought high-ranking military officers to offer help and advice.[668] Realising the need for publicity, the Tibetans decided to take over the wireless station. They also permitted the American commentator Lowell Thomas to visit Lhasa in the hopes that he might inform the world of their status and of their difficulties with China.

Tibet: the question of status

Throughout their long and complicated association with Tibet, British policy in its essentials had been to keep Tibet undisturbed by any outside political interference in its internal affairs. To achieve this end they had been willing to strengthen Tibetan autonomy and economy by diplomacy, to give limited military aid when asked, without attempting to encourage the Tibetans to declare their full independence. As a consequence, the policy had secured and 'set India's frontier on the Kuen Lun mountains and the upper waters of the Yangtse' at negligible expense; it had depended on preventing China from incorporating Tibet into the Chinese Empire. Thus, a policy which supported Tibetan autonomy as a *quid pro quo* for a secure frontier was strictly in keeping with imperial self-interest.

Curzon's determination to explode the myth of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as 'a constitutional fiction and a political affectation', to force the Tibetans to negotiate directly, was the driving force which brought the uninvited Younghusband Mission to Lhasa in 1904. The terms of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 found the British and Chinese Governments mutually agreed to acknowledge the latter's special position in Tibet. The Tibetans themselves may have accepted the phraseology in the various agreements imposed on them by their imperial neighbours, yet in the finer print of such acceptance they considered their own status as independent and free from China's control. Until the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Manchu Empire had attempted to establish a measure of control in Tibet which fluctuated from military occupation to a mere nominal link. Since 1911 Tibet had enjoyed *de facto* independence. After 1911, the British Government made repeated attempts to bring the Tibetan and Chinese Governments to accept Tibetan autonomy under the nominal suzerainty of China, but the attempts broke down on the question of the McMahon Line boundary between China and Tibet. Eventually in 1921, the British Government presented the Chinese Government with a declaration that they recognised the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and intended to deal with Tibet on that basis.[669]

Since that time the Chinese Government had attempted, to an increasing extent, to import some substance into their suzerainty over Tibet and found the Tibetans equally determined to repudiate any measure of Chinese control. In 1943, when Dr T V Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister, informed Anthony Eden that his government regarded Tibet as part of China, the British

Government were faced with a dilemma, either to give practical support to Tibetan autonomy or to attempt to mollify their wartime ally. The guidelines laid down were that Tibet had maintained her autonomy for over thirty years and they were willing to recognise Chinese suzerainty, but only on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous. No unconditional admission of Chinese suzerainty was to be given. In fact, there was increasing doubt in the British Government's mind, at the time, whether in the changed circumstances of the day it was right to acknowledge even a theoretical status of subservience for Tibet. 'I think you will be fully aware that the Chinese claim to control Tibet's external relations is no new thing. Both we and the Government of India have, for over thirty years, insisted on maintaining direct diplomatic relations with the Tibetan Government, and so far as we can recall, have on no occasion admitted the frequently expressed claim of the Chinese Government that they are responsible for the conduct of Tibet's external relations.'[670]

On the eve of their departure from India, the British Government recognised that it was not inconceivable that a Congress Government, from inexperience, lack of background or in the belief that they understood relationships with eastern governments better than themselves might embark upon a policy of conciliation and appeasement with China, and become more forthcoming with China in regard to Tibet. They feared that it would lead to a weakening in India's defence position along the northern frontier and in the end to increased military preparations. Although the risk of Tibet being used as a springboard for a fullscale invasion of India was, at the time, discounted, yet there was no doubt that it could be used as a useful base for an airborne attack by a power equipped with modern weapons and aircraft. In 1947, however, it seemed improbable that a newly independent India could assume responsibility for defence and protection against a major military power.[671] On the other hand, any use that might be made of Tibet by a major power (China) could not leave the British Government disinterested. Indeed, they saw the possibility of having to use their diplomatic support in any discussion which might take place in the future between Tibet and China, with a view to the recognition by China *de jure* of Tibet's *de facto* autonomy.[672]

As the new Dominion of India attempted to cope with the problems of partition, events in China were moving towards a final confrontation between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and diplomacy was the last thing that either side had in mind. On 4 January 1949, the Kuomintang surrendered to the Communists and Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the Chinese People's Republic. From the north and the east, across the great wastes of Sinkiang, a new voice was calling to Tibet to return to the fold. Nehru was responsive to the call, and within the year his government had given formal recognition to the Communist Government of China. This early recognition stemmed from Nehru's conviction that regular diplomatic exchanges would exercise a moderating influence on Chinese activities in Tibet, and would allow India to keep a foothold in the country. He genuinely thought that China would clarify her relations with Tibet by peaceful means and 'would listen when asked not

to take a strictly legalistic view on India's recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet'.[673] It is difficult to reconcile Nehru's optimism when considered in conjunction with the ambiguity of his statements regarding Tibet's autonomy. It certainly alerted the Communist Government to the fact that the Indian Government would not stand by their treaty obligations to Tibet.[674] By acknowledging the validity of China's claims to Tibet, Nehru failed to uphold the obligations India had inherited under the Simla Convention of 1914, by which recognition of Chinese suzerainty was to be withheld until China acknowledged Tibetan autonomy. To Nehru's friendly overture, Mao's response was to announce officially the liberation of Tibet as being one of the main tasks of the People's Liberation Army. Within one year the invasion of Tibet was underway.

The British experience of maintaining the integrity of Tibet as a buffer state, an insurance which had fully justified the premium, was a security Nehru thought could be brought about by friendly persuasion. India wanted Tibet to be autonomous but did not intend to guarantee that autonomy. Much of the trouble lay in the unsatisfactory nature of the treaty basis of the Simla Convention of 1914 itself. It had been negotiated at a time when the Chinese were not in control of territory adjacent to the Indian frontier and Tibet was master in her own realm. It produced for the British Government satisfactory trade benefits and a frontier as much designed as part of the defence against Russia as against China. Yet, between 1914 and 1947, it prevented the British Government from ever expressly recognising Tibetan independence as opposed to autonomy. Although the British Government *de facto* dealt with Tibet as if it were a sovereign state, still *de jure* they continued to accept China's suzerainty, however fictional or non-existent, in Tibet. When, in 1950, the Chinese Communists were in a position to impose upon Tibet that suzerainty, the Indian Government made no move to protest that China was committing an act of aggression on an independent or an autonomous neighbouring state.

The Sino-Tibetan Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, signed in Peking on 23 May 1951, sealed China's complete control of Tibet.[675] Chinese troops could now be stationed on the borders of India, Burma, Pakistan, Russia and Afghanistan. For India, 500 miles of Chinese occupied territory now marched with her northern frontier. Surprisingly, there was little reaction from Indian leaders to this vital change in the balance of power on India's borders. Occupation of Tibet meant that it was only a matter of time before the Chinese had built a road through southern Sinkiang and which, when first discovered in September 1952, the New York Times forecast would bring the Chinese 'to control all passes through the Himalayas from Tibet into India and Nepal . . . Thus, in effect, the Iron Curtain can be extended to the Himalayas if the Chinese communists so wish'.[676]

In spite of every evidence to the contrary, Nehru continued to insist that no major territorial differences existed between India and China. In fact, he took the initiative in the Sino-Indian talks in 1953 which led to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954.[677] Tibet was referred to as the 'Tibet region of China', a recognition, Nehru claimed, 'of the existing situation there'.[678] In

one part of the Agreement, India undertook to 'voluntarily renounce all the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by Britain in Tibet'. Nehru insisted that India's dislike of imperialist mores had never been more evident than when he agreed to sign away these extra-territorial privileges from India to China.[679] Since these privileges had been transferred to India when she undertook the obligations of the 1914 Simla Convention, no argument in law justified Nehru's gesture in making over to China rights which India had secured from Tibet. The fact that the Simla Convention of 1914 had been negotiated on a tripartite basis, designed to uphold Tibetan autonomy in the face of China ever attempting to claim sovereignty in Tibet, and was in force between the Indian and the Tibetan Governments, was totally disregarded by India in 1954.

At the time it was more important to make Panch Shila, or the five principles of co-existence, the pattern of peace in Asia. Issues such as the status of Tibet and the McMahon Line were relegated in deference to Chinese proposals not to discuss either of these sensitive topics. It was British imperialism, Premier Chou En-lai claimed, that had established the McMahon Line, yet since it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations existing between India and China, he was prepared to give provisional recognition to the Line. 'They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so.'[680] Nehru was assured that Tibetan autonomy would be respected. His trust in Chinese goodwill was such that he agreed to act as mediator between Chou and the Dalai Lama, who was on an extended stay in India. In fact, he was able to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. When, in February 1957, Mao Tse-tung announced the postponement of far-reaching reforms in Tibet, plus the token withdrawal of Chinese troops, Nehru assumed that these concessions had been won by him. The explanation was to be found more in the resistance by the Khampas in eastern Tibet to Chinese control than to Nehru's influence at the Court of Mao.

Clouds, however, were beginning to appear on the Sino-Indian horizon. In spite of much evidence of Chinese forward movement, both in Tibet and Ladakh and cartographical encroachments claiming vast tracts in the north-east frontier of India and in Bhutan as part of Chinese territory, Nehru continued to remain conciliatory towards China. That is until late 1957, when the Chinese announced the completion of the road between Sinkiang and Tibet and it was found that in the Aksai Chin, the road had taken in vast chunks of Indian territory. One Indian patrol, sent up to inspect, was captured by Chinese frontier guards and the other prevented from carrying out its instructions. Moreover, the Indian Army discovered that Chinese troops were already in control of the road across the Aksai Chin. Indian suspicions were aroused at last. Behind the facade of face-saving statements, mutual distrust and irritation began to creep into the correspondence between Premiers Nehru and Chou En-lai.[681]

In Tibet itself, tension had been building up for some time past. The Khampa rebellion was but one aspect of it, the other was the strained relations existing between the Chinese Communists and the Dalai Lama. In March

1959, China first struck at Tibet. As China, rather in the manner of Chao Erh-feng, swept her flying columns once again through Tibet, Nehru came alive to the dangers inherent on India's own northern borders. It was not impossible for China to pour into India under the same irredentist urge. He promptly claimed the McMahon Line as the definitive frontier of India 'which by history, by custom or agreement have long been integral parts of India'.[682] He did so without acknowledging the country or the treaty which had defined these frontier alignments, the obligations of which still bound India legally.[683] Having condoned the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, and agreed to sign away in 1954 the various extra-territorial privileges and obligations which India had inherited from Tibet, Nehru found it increasingly difficult to strike a mutually advantageous bargain with Chou En-lai in terms of frontier adjustments. That he chose to accept the validity of the McMahon Line, having denied the status of Tibet, merely went to expose the weakness of India's argument.[684] Chou En-lai was not slow to challenge the assumption.[685]

Chinese claims to suzerainty over Tibet dated from 1720 when Lhasa was first occupied by the Manchus, but no attempt to administer Tibetan territory was made until after the British expedition to Lhasa in 1903–04. The arrival of the Younghusband Mission in 1904 suggested a potential rival and caused China to contemplate the possibility of a British protectorate over Tibet. Louis King, at his listening post at Tachienlu, was able to report the Chinese reaction with a good deal of accuracy: 'Steps were at once taken to earmark as much territory on the western border of Szechuan as possible'.[686] The first Chinese challenge came in the territory of which Tachienlu was the capital. There then followed the campaigns of Chao Erh-feng who, within three years, brought the Marches of Szechuan and Yunnan under Chinese administration for the first time. Thus in 1910, the Dalai Lama saw the danger of Tibet becoming a province of China. He appealed to the British Government to intervene and stop the Chinese from despatching their troops to Lhasa. In 1904, the Dalai Lama had turned to China in the face of impending aggression from Britain; now he was forced to seek British help. The wheel had come full circle.

To achieve what Curzon had hoped for, Tibet as a sound buffer between India on the one hand and China and Russia on the other, would have meant bringing Tibet under a measure of British protection. The opposition to Curzon's Tibetan policy by the Home Government resulted in limitations being imposed upon the action of the Indian Government in its relation to Tibet. At the same time, the arrival of the Tibet Mission and the subsequent Lhasa Convention of 1904, served to undermine the Dalai Lama's authority and opened the way for China to attempt to reassert her control. The Chinese revolution in 1911 saved Tibet for the time being, and she managed to expel the Chinese from Lhasa and from the territories of eastern Tibet; it gave the XIIIth Dalai Lama the chance to assert his country's independence. This independence was recognised by the British Government in the 1914 Simla Convention, although with some ambiguity, as the 'fiction' of Chinese suzerainty remained intact. It did not stop the Dalai Lama's government from

maintaining Tibet's separate status, nor did it restrict them from establishing external relations with their other neighbours, namely British India, Russia and Mongolia. That China repudiated the 1914 Convention meant that it gave her hope to give effect, in time, to her theoretical control over Tibet.

British policy-makers did not remain indifferent to China's forward policy in Tibet, especially when it bade fare to challenge them along the whole Tibet-Indian frontier. On the contrary, the response to Tibet was immediate, but limited, and held out no promise of substantial material assistance. For British imperial policy in the nineteenth century, and to the end of their Indian association with Tibet, remained ambivalent. Imperial self-interest required a *de facto* sovereign Tibet, without calling into question China's claim to a *de jure* status there. China's imperial aim, by contrast, was unequivocal: the military domination of the Dalai Lama's dominions, though diplomacy dictated the tempo at which it was implemented. Herein lay the Dalai Lama's dilemma.

In the colonial era, the balance of power in Asia was determined by the three great imperial powers on the Asian mainland, Britain, Russia and France. In building their frontier systems, and sustaining their buffers, they possessed control over the internal affairs of the territories they ruled. They were not too much troubled by Asian opinion, nor did they mind their imperialist roles. In the case of Tibet, British relations were to a great extent conditioned by the demands of the rivalry between Britain and Russia. Whereas to Curzon the danger appeared in the form of Czarist Russia, to Nehru it was the presence of Communist China. When independence came to India in 1947, the imperial mantle had fallen on Nehru. He was more than reluctant to assume the role, particularly when he found that the solution to Tibet was not so very different from the one advocated by Lord Curzon. To guarantee Tibetan autonomy, in the face of Communist China, would have meant bringing Tibet under some measure of Indian control. It was a solution which had no appeal for Nehru whose life-long struggle had been against British imperialism; moreover, he aspired to 'an Asia, freed from Western imperialism' moving 'towards an enlightened Asianism'.[687] In retrospect the aspiration may have been romantic, it certainly was short-sighted and overlooked the ruthless expediency of Communism. But in the ferment of change which was taking place in post-war Asia, Nehru failed to recognise that his policy would force the Tibetans into being the first casualty of imperial association. If the pattern of peace in Asia meant India accepting China's full sovereignty over Tibet, so be it.[688] The value of Tibetan independence, which had secured for British India her strategic frontiers and kept at bay China's imperial demands, was allowed silently to lapse. Tibet became a military area of China. The political chessboard had finally yielded 'the smallest of pawns'[689] and Tibet, faced with a neighbour unwilling to guarantee her independence, fell victim to her own weakness and in the face of imperialist expansionism.

Notes

1. Tsong Khapa (1357–1417), founder of a new sect, the Gelugpa, popularly known as the Yellow Hats. Tsong Khapa, so named after his birthplace, the district of Tsong-kha near the KokoNor, founded the Gelugpa monastery of Tashilhunpo near Shigatse which was to play so important a part in early British relations with Tibet. Some years after his death in 1475, it was recognised that his spirit had undergone reincarnation in a young monk named Gedun Gyatso, and he too, in due course, similarly succeeded. The IIIrd Incarnation Sonam Gyatso was the first to assume the title of 'Dalai' and that title continued thereafter for his successors.
2. Song-tsen Gampo, reigned AD 629–649. To him are attributed not only the creation of Tibetan military greatness, but also the introduction of writing and of the Buddhist faith.
3. *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*, Alastair Lamb (London, 1960), p.4.
4. Panchen Lama is more correct. It is an abbreviation of Pandita Chen-po, 'Great Scholar'. The title was given to the abbots of Tashilhunpo monastery for their learning, when they were appointed at a mature age. It was not until 1662 that the Vth Dalai Lama pronounced that the Panchen Lama of the time would reappear after his death in a recognised child-successor.
5. IOR: *E/4/8* Letter from Bengal 17 Oct 1774, p.390.
6. *Early travels in India 1583–1619*, ed. William Foster (London, 1921), p.27.
7. *Narratives of the mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, ed. Clement Robert Markham (London, 1876), pp.5–8.
8. The Tibetan spelling appears as bKra-shis-lhunpo. It is the capital of the province of Tsang.
9. IOR: *MSS Eur E 226/31* Bogle Papers, late 1775, pp.424–37.
10. Demo Nga-bang Jampal (1757–77). The Regent is selected by the Tsongdu or National Assembly to represent the Dalai Lamas during their minority.
11. Civil officers appointed to represent the Emperor of China.
12. IOR: *MSS Eur E 226/24* Bogle Papers, pp.415–23.
13. IOR: *Eur E 226/50/1–2* Bogle Papers, pp.1–67.
14. IOR: *MSS Eur E 226/34* Bogle Papers, Aug 1779, pp.1–3.
15. IVth Panchen Lama, Lobsang Tan-pai Nyi-ma (1781–1854).
16. *An account of an embassy to the court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, Capt Samuel Turner (London, 1800).
17. VIIIth Dalai Lama, Jampal Gyatso (1758–1804). The title Dalai Lama is Mongolian in origin, meaning 'Ocean'. It was conferred on the IIIrd reincarnation Sonam Gyatso in 1578 by the Tümät Mongolian Prince Altan Khan whom he converted to Buddhism. It was the Vth Dalai Lama, Nga-wang Lozang Gyatso, who assumed both the supreme temporal and spiritual rule of Tibet in 1655. The Tibetans know him as Kyan-gön Rimpoché (Precious Protector); Gye-wa Rimpoché (Precious Sovereign); Lama Pon-po (Priest Officer); Kündün (The All-Knowing Presence).
18. *Ibid*, p.373.
19. *Gosain* is an Indian vernacular modification of the Sanscrit term *goswami*, and is applied to Hindu religious mendicants in general. Bogle refers to them as 'trading pilgrims of India', and explains that their humble deportment and holy character, heightened by the merit of distant pilgrimages, their accounts of unknown countries and remote regions, and above all their professions of high veneration for the Panchen Lama, procured them not only a ready admittance to Tibet, but great favours at Tashilhunpo.
20. IOR: *E/4/631* Despatch to Bengal, 27 Mar 1787, p.549.
21. Lord Cornwallis (1738–1805), created Marquis 1792; Governor General of Fort Willam in Bengal, 1786–93, and again from 30 Jul – 5 Oct 1805.
22. IOR: *H/608* Home Miscellaneous, p.33, 6 Jan 1789.
23. *The invasion of Nepal*, John Pemble (Oxford, 1971), pp.66–69.

24. *Tibet: a political history*, Tsepon W D Shakabpa (Yale, 1967), pp.153–72.
25. IOR: *L/P&S/5/276* Secret Letter from India, 7 Jul 1874, pp.25–33.
26. *BM Add MSS* no 39871, Warren Hastings Papers, Turner to Hastings, 25 Nov 1792, f.51.
27. IXth Dalai Lama, Lungtok Gyatso (1806–15).
28. *Christianity in China, Tartary and Thibet*, Evariste Regis Huc (London, 1857).
29. William Moorcroft, Veterinary Surgeon in the Bengal Army, apparently employed as a secret agent during his journey to Bokhara in 1820. Travelled with Hyder Young Hearsey in 1812 across the Himalaya to trace the source of the Sutlej and the Indus rivers.
30. Treaty of Tientsin, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1858, lxvi, C 2755, p.285.
31. *Mongolia, the Tangut country and the solitudes of northern Tibet*, Nicolai Mikhailovich Przhevalsky (London, 1876).
32. *Chefoo Convention*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1876, lxxii, C 4735, pp.67–75.
33. *A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and the neighbouring countries*, Charles Umpherston Aitchison, vol XII, pt IV (Calcutta, 1931), no 1, pp.244–52.
34. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II (Calcutta, 1931), no iii, pp.61–65.
35. The creation of the Tsungli Yamen, or more correctly Tsung-li ko-kuo shi-wu ya-men (Office in General Charge of Affairs concerning all Foreign Nations) was a direct result of the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking, in October 1860. It continued to handle Chinese Foreign Affairs until replaced by the Wai-wu-pu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in July 1901.
36. *Papers relating to Tibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1904, lxvii, Cd 1920, no 1, 21 Oct 1889, pp.3–5.
37. *Sir Mortimer Durand: a biography*, Sir Percy Sykes (London, 1926), p.166.
38. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol II, pt V (Calcutta, 1909), no 106, 1890, pp.330–32.
39. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol II, pt V (Calcutta, 1909), no 107, 1893, pp.332–33.
40. *Yatung*: a small village where the roads from Nathu La and Jelep La reach the Chumbi valley.
41. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit* no 16, 15 Feb 1896, p.52.
42. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, enc 12 in no 14, 3 Sep 1895, p.50.
43. *The Younghusband Expedition*, Parshotam Mehra (London, 1968), p.90.
44. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit* no 26, 30 Mar 1899, pp.74–75.
45. IOR: *MSS Eur D510/1* vol XIII, Hamilton Collection, Curzon to Hamilton, 23 Mar 1899.
46. Lord George Francis Hamilton (1845–1927), Secretary of State for India, 1895–1903.
47. XIIIth Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso (1876–1933). *Ibid* Curzon to Hamilton, 24 May 1899.
48. *Vakil*: an attorney or authorised representative.
49. IOR: *MSS Eur D510/3* vol XV, Curzon to Hamilton, 28 Dec 1899.
50. *Garpons*: principal officials in Ngari, laymen who held 4th rank in their own region and 5th rank in Lhasa.
51. IOR: *MSS Eur D510/6* vol XVIII, Curzon to Hamilton, 18 Nov 1900.
52. IOR: *MSS Eur F111/340B*, Curzon Collection, Ugyen Kazi's Tibetan letter, 12 Apr 1910.
53. IOR: *MSS Eur D510/7* vol XIX, Curzon to Hamilton, 11 Jan 1901.
54. IOR: *MSS Eur C126/3* vol III, Hamilton Collection, Hamilton to Curzon, 22 Aug 1901.
55. *Russia in Central Asia in 1889*, George Nathaniel Curzon (London, 1889), pp.318–20.
56. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, enc 3 in no 44, 31 Oct 1901, pp.129–30.
57. *The Mongols and Russia*, George Vernadsky (Yale, 1953), p.75.
58. *Russia: a history and an interpretation*, Michael Florinsky (New York, 1953), vol I, p.63.
59. *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, Sir Charles Bell (London, 1964), p.62. The Dalai Lama to the Maharaja of Sikkim: 'Why do the British insist on establishing trade marts? Their goods are coming in

from India right up to Lhasa. Whether they have their marts or not, their things come in all the same. The British, under the guise of establishing communications, are merely seeking to over-reach us. They are well practised in all these wiles'.

60. *On the frontier and beyond*, William F. O'Connor (London, 1931), pp. 125–27. See also Mehra, *op cit*, pp. 136–39.
61. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/8*, vol xx, Curzon to Hamilton, 10 Jul 1901.
62. *Ibid*, Curzon to Hamilton, 11 Jun 1901.
63. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/10*, vol xxii, Curzon to Hamilton, 18 Feb 1902.
64. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/3*, vol iii, Hamilton to Curzon, 4 Jul 1901.
65. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, nos 48–49, 2–5 Aug 1902, pp. 140–41.
66. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/3*, vol iv, Hamilton to Curzon, 11 Sep 1902.
67. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 3 in no 66, 11 Jul 1902, p. 158.
68. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 59, Yu Tai's appointment, p. 146; no 60, his instructions, pp. 146–47; no 67, his plans, p. 177; Yu Tai was the brother of Sheng Tai, the Chinese negotiator of the 1890 Convention regarding Tibet.
69. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, annexure 2 in no 66, 15 Aug 1902, pp. 167–70.
70. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/11* vol xxiii, Curzon to Hamilton, 27 Aug 1902.
71. Lamb, *op cit*, p. 272.
72. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 44, 13 Feb 1902, p. 127.
73. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, annexure 2 in no 45, 26 Mar 1902, p. 131.

73a. *Sikkim and Bhutan*, John Claude White (London, 1909), p. 85.

74. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 61, 17 Dec 1902, p. 148.
75. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/4* vol iv, Hamilton to Curzon, 13–20 Feb 1902.
76. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/3* vol iii, Hamilton to Curzon, 22 Aug 1902.
77. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 66, 8 Jan 1903, pp. 150–53.
78. *Ibid*, p. 154.
79. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/5* vol v, Hamilton to Curzon, 28 Jan 1903.
80. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 72, 11 Feb 1903, p. 180.
81. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 83, 8 Apr 1903, p. 187.
82. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/5* vol v, Hamilton to Curzon, 20 Feb 1903.
83. *Ibid*, Hamilton to Curzon, 15 Apr 1903.

83a. Curzon, *op cit*, p. 321.

84. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 99, enc 2, 6 Apr 1903, p. 196.
85. The word Dzong, literally fortress, is usually the headquarters of the Dzongpon or official who heads the district administration. Often referred to here as Khamba Dzong.
86. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 89, 7 May 1903, p. 190.
87. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 95, 28 May 1903, p. 193.
88. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/14* vol xxvi, Curzon to Hamilton, 4 Jun 1903.
89. For full account of Younghusband's career see *Francis Younghusband*, George Seaver (London, 1952); *Bayonets to Lhasa*, Peter Fleming (London, 1961); Mehra, *op cit*, pp. 174–85.
90. *The light of experience*, Francis Edward Younghusband (London, 1927), p. 48.
91. Mehtar is a Persian title meaning 'greater'. In this case, the Ruler of Chitral.
92. Seaver, *op cit*, p. 198.
93. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband Papers, Younghusband to his father, 7 Jul 1903, p. 19.
94. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 3 in no 99, 3 Jun 1903, pp. 198–200.
95. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 28 Jun 1903, p. 18. 'I shall give out that my camp equipage has been detained by the rains . . . that in the meanwhile a portion of my escort (really the whole) has been sent to prepare the camp and make all the preliminary arrangements'.
96. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, annexure 1–2 and enc 5 in no 129, 22 Jun 1903, p. 223.
97. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 15 in no 129, 10 Jul 1903, p. 226.
98. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 19 Jul 1903, p. 21.

99. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 97, 23 May 1903, p.194.
100. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 106, 23 Jul 1903, pp.204–05.
101. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 28 in no 129, 8 Aug 1903, p.243.
102. For text of the speech, see *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, annexure and enc 21 in no 129, 22 Jul 1903, pp.232–34.
103. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 2 Aug 1903, p.24.
104. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, nos 107–109, 15–24 Aug 1903, pp.205–06.
105. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 24 in no 129, 29 Jul 1903, pp.241–42.
106. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/14* vol XXVI, Curzon to Hamilton, 12 Aug 1903.
107. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 36 in no 129, 25 Aug 1903, pp.250–51.
108. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/14* vol XXVI, Curzon to Hamilton, 12 Aug 1903. The two men, whom Lord Rosebery called 'the two dubious and anonymous British subjects' were found a year later, hale and hearty, but for a whole twelve months Curzon used their imaginary torture and death to rouse public feeling.
109. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc in no 131, 2 Nov 1903, p.293.
110. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc 23 in no 129, 24 Jun 1903, p.241. The evidence for this assertion is to the contrary, since neither the Tibetans nor the Chinese had agreed to Khamba Dzong, but that Curzon had faced them with a *fait accompli*.
111. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/5* vol V, Hamilton to Curzon, 26 Aug 1903.
112. PRO: *FO 17/1746*, Younghusband's memorandum on Tibet, Aug 1903, p.41. 'When we have obtained this access to Tibet, and acquired as much influence there as is required for keeping Russian influence at bay, we shall have averted an insidious political danger to India'.
113. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/14* vol XXVI, Curzon to Hamilton, 16 Sep 1903.
114. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 120, 1 Oct 1903, p.213.
115. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/15* vol XXVI, Curzon to Hamilton, 2 Sep 1903.
116. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 9 Oct 1903, p.35.
117. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/14* vol XXVI, Curzon to Hamilton, 26 Aug 1903.
118. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/162*, Curzon to Godley, 23 Sep 1903, p.332.
119. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/162*, Brodrick to Curzon, 29 Oct 1903, p.283. St John Brodrick, first Earl of Midleton (1856–1942), Secretary of State for India, 1903–1905.
120. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 132, 6 Nov 1903, p.294.
121. *The end of isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900–1907*, George Monger (London, 1963), p.142. Balfour, Arthur James (1858–1944), created first Earl 1922; Prime Minister, 1902–05.
122. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 143, 19 Nov 1903, pp.299–300.
123. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 148, 28 Nov 1903, p.302.
124. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/162*, Brodrick to Curzon, 20 Nov 1903, p.305.
125. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 141, 17 Nov 1903, pp.298–99.
126. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 20 Dec 1903, p.66.
127. James Ronald Leslie Macdonald, Royal Engineers, was first appointed to the Tibet Mission Force on 29 September 1903, when he was placed under the orders of the Director-General Miscellaneous Works. Later he came under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, India, as Commander of the Tibet Mission Force.
128. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 20 Dec 1903, p.67.
129. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 30 Jan 1904, pp.75–76.
130. For an account of relations between Younghusband and Macdonald, see Mehra, *op cit*, pp.241–56.
131. Fleming, *op cit*, p.130.
132. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 173, 17 Jan 1904, p.312.
133. Fleming, *op cit*, p.131. 'He was placing in jeopardy the whole enterprise with which he had been entrusted, courting

a martyrdom of which the consequences, directly involving Imperial prestige, would have metamorphosed Britain's hesitant Tibetan policy in the harshest possible manner'.
134. *India and Tibet*, Francis Edward Younghusband (London, 1910), pp.160–63.
135. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/209*, Curzon to Younghusband, 23 Jan 1904, p.24.
136. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 5 Feb 1904, p.82.
137. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 4 Apr 1904, p.97.
138. *Papers relating to Tibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1904, lxvii, Cd 2054, no 12, 4 Apr 1904, p.6.
139. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 12 Apr 1904, p.99. 'Literally our only loss between India and here has been two fingers and an arm'.
140. Mehra, *op cit*, p.233.
141. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/174*, Younghusband to Curzon, 9 May 1904, pp.103–05.
142. Fleming, *op cit*, pp.164–72, for full account of the fighting.
143. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/413*, Curzon Collection, Younghusband to Curzon, 12 Jul 1904, p.140.
144. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 1 May 1904, p.102.
145. *Papers relating to Tibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1905, lxviii, Cd 2370, no 20, 14 May 1904, p.9.
146. Ta Lama, a Mongolian title, used to address a high-ranking Tibetan official.
147. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 72, 2 Jul 1904, p.24.
148. *With mounted infantry in Tibet*, Brevet-Major William John Ottley (London, 1906), pp.180–95.
149. Ugyen Wangchuk, the Tongsa Ponlop, was, by this time, the *de facto* ruler of Bhutan. His intercession on the mission's behalf was greatly valued by Younghusband, both at Guru and later at Lhasa.
150. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 94, 16 Jul 1904, p.32.
151. Yutok Shapé: Shapé means Minister.
152. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 105, 25 Jul 1904, p.41.
153. Ganden, Drepung and Sera. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 111, 1 Aug 1904, p.44.
154. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 1 Aug 1904, p.132.
155. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/209*, Younghusband to Curzon, 14 Apr 1904, p.206a.
156. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 19 Aug 1904, p.136. Major General Edmond Roche Elles, Member of Council, Military Department.
157. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/209*, Curzon to Younghusband, 4 Apr 1904, pp.83–86.
158. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 66, 26 Jun 1904, p.22.
159. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/39*, Ampthill Collection, Godley to Ampthill, 1 Jul 1904, p.53.
160. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 79, 6 Jul 1904, pp.26–27.
161. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/413*, Curzon to Ampthill, 8 Jul 1904, pp.28–29: Curzon to Brodrick, 8 Jul 1904, pp.29–30.
162. *Ibid*, Younghusband to Curzon, 12 Jul 1904, pp.138–39.
163. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 134, 27 Aug 1903, p.54.
164. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/413*, Younghusband to Curzon, 8 May 1904, p.26.
165. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband to his father, 1 Aug 1904, p.131.
166. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/413*, Younghusband to Curzon, 6 Aug 1904, p.189.
167. *Papers relating to Tibet*, *op cit*, no 123, 14 Aug 1904, p.50.
168. Ganden Tri Rimpoché means 'Enthroned-one of Ganden monastery'. Considered to be the most learned figure in Tibet. The Tri Rimpoché had been appointed by the XIIIth Dalai Lama to be at the helm of affairs in his absence.
169. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/413*, Younghusband to Curzon, 17 Aug 1904, p.207.

170. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* enc in no 261, 19 Aug 1904, pp.219–20.
171. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* enc in no 318, 19 Aug 1904, p.247.
172. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* enc in no 316, 9 Sep 1904, p.245.
173. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/38,* Ampthill to Brodrick, 17 Aug 1904, pp.157–58.
174. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/39,* Brodrick to Ampthill, 26 Aug 1904, p.144.
175. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 132, 25 Aug 1904, p.53, and no 149, 8 Sep 1904, pp.60–61. The Viceroy asked whether there were precedents for degradation of Dalai Lama by Chinese Emperor, or for the assumption of his place by 'Tashi Lama'. Younghusband's reply was at best a half-truth: '. . . it was on the initiative of the Amban that he [Dalai Lama] was deposed'.
176. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 135, 28 Aug 1904, p.54.
177. Younghusband, *op cit,* p.175. Younghusband believed that Yu T'ai's dismissal and later imprisonment were inspired by a desire to sweep away all Chinese officials who had helped conclude the Lhasa Convention.
178. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/37,* Brodrick to Ampthill, 26 Aug 1904.
179. Lamb, *op cit,* p.302. The Tsongdu, in the above circumstances, is described by Lamb as being a body of doubtful constitutionality. Hugh Richardson has this to say: 'Of course it was not an elected parliament but was an important and unquestioned part of the Tibetan Government; nor was there a Tibetan constitution'. There is no evidence in the India Office records to suggest that, in the absence of the XIIIth Dalai Lama, the Tsongdu or the Tri Rimpoché had the authority to negotiate a treaty on Tibet's behalf. Nor had the XIIIth Dalai Lama given them that authority.
180. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* enc in no 360, 8 Sep 1904, pp.270–71.
181. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 62, 18 Sep 1904, p.65.
182. Aitchison, *op cit,* vol XIV, pt II, no i, pp.22–25.
183. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* enc in no 349, 9 Sep 1904, pp.265–66.
184. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* enc no 189, 18 Oct 1904, p.81.
185. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 127, 18 Aug 1904, p.51.
186. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* annexure in enc no 318, 19 Aug 1904, pp.247–49, contains the full text of the Tibetan reply.
187. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145,* Younghusband to his father, 9 Sep 1904, p.142.
188. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 151, 12 Sep 1904, pp.61–62.
189. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/39,* Brodrick to Ampthill, 15 Sep 1904, p.126.
190. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 156, 16 Sep 1904, pp.63–64.
191. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit,* no 349, 9 Sep 1904, pp.254–55.
192. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145,* Younghusband to his father, 9 Sep 1904, pp.142–44.
193. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/413,* Younghusband to Curzon, 26 Oct 1904, p.328.
194. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/37,* Ampthill to Brodrick, 5 Oct 1904, p.242.
195. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/38,* Brodrick to Ampthill, 13 Oct 1904, p.141.
196. Aitchison, *op cit,* vol XIV, pt II, no ii, p.26. The indemnity was reduced to 25 lakhs to be paid in three instalments. The Tri Rimpoché was informed that, while the Viceroy appreciated the Tibetan understanding to allow the Trade Agent at Gyantse to proceed to Lhasa, the right would not be incorporated in a formal agreement.
197. Aitchison, *op cit,* vol XIV, pt II, no i, p.24.
198. PRO: *FO 535/5* no 52, Satow to Lansdowne, 1 Nov 1904.
199. VIth Panchen Lama, Chos-Kyi Nyi-ma (1883–1937).
200. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet,* part VII, 1906, 23 Nov 1905, pp.7–8. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8835 (Jan–Jun 1906).
201. Minto, Gilbert John Murray Kynynmound Elliott (1847–1914), 4th Earl; Viceroy of India, 1905–10.
202. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/1,* Morley Collection, Morley to Minto, 28 Dec 1905.

203. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/2*, Morley to Minto, 18 Jan 1907.
204. PRO: *FO 535/5* no 15, Lansdowne to Satow, 6 Oct 1904. The example might affect the Afghans into direct negotiations with Russia.
205. *The McMahon Line*, Alastair Lamb (London, 1966), vol I, p.36, for note on T'ang Shao-yi.
206. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part VI, 1905, 29 Nov 1904, p.9. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8688 (Apr 1906).
207. *Ibid*, 23 Dec 1904, pp.22–23.
208. *The law of nations*, James Leslie Brierly (Oxford, 1955), pp.125–30.
209. PRO: *FO 17/1755*, Satow to Lansdowne, 10 Aug 1907. *Chu Kuo* is a Chinese term used to mean 'part of the political entity which made up China'; *Shang Kuo* to mean 'powers in a tributary relationship with China, but not under Chinese rule'. The Chinese claimed that the first term applied to Tibet.
210. *Affairs of Thibet*, part VI, 10 Jul 1905, p.68.
211. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/175*, Curzon to Brodrick, 15 Nov 1905, pp.202–03.
212. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part VII, 1906, 23 Jan 1906, pp.14–15. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8835 (Feb 1907).
213. *Ibid*, 24 Feb 1906, p.23.
214. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol II, pt VI, no 120, pp.348–50.
215. *Affairs of Thibet*, part VI, 15 Nov 1905, p.133.
216. *Ibid*, 21 Nov 1905, pp.137–38.
217. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/23*, Minto to Morley, 17 Mar 1910.
218. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part IX, 1907, 5 Jan 1907, p.6. Foreign Office Confidential Print 9043 (Oct 1907).
219. Lamb, *op cit*, p.55.
220. John Morley (1838–1923), created Viscount Morley of Blackburn, 1908; Secretary of State for India, 1905–10 and 7 Mar 1911–25 May 1911.
221. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/1*, Morley to Minto, 11 Oct 1906. 'They wear blinkers and forget the complex intrigues and rival interests which make up international politics for a vast sprawling Empire like ours'.
222. *Affairs of Thibet*, part VII, 14 Mar 1906, p.43.
223. *Ibid*, 10 Apr 1906, p.54.
224. *Ibid*, 20 Sep 1906, p.109.
225. *Ibid*, 3 May 1906, p.71.
226. *Ibid*, 3 May 1906, p.69.
227. *Affairs of Thibet*, part VII, 8 Jun 1906, p.102.
228. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part VIII, 1906, 13 Jul 1906, p.5. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8964 (May 1907).
229. *Ibid*, 15 Jun 1906, pp.114–15.
230. *Ibid*, 21 Jul 1906, pp.21–22.
231. *Affairs of Thibet*, part IX, 16 Feb 1907, p.82.
232. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part X, 1907, 9 Oct 1907, pp.60–61. Foreign Office Confidential Print 9231 (May 1908).
233. *Anglo-Russian Convention*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1908, cxxv, Cd 3750, 31 Aug 1907, p.477 and Cd 3753 [ratified version of Cd 3750], p.489.
234. Lamb, *op cit*, p.107.
235. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/12*, Minto to Morley, 26 Sep 1907.
236. *Affairs of Thibet*, part VIII, 2 Oct 1906, pp.47–48.
237. *Affairs of Thibet*, part IX, 25 Oct 1906, pp.6–7.
238. *Ibid*, 26 Jan 1907, p.127.
239. *Ibid*, 13 Apr 1907, p.179.
240. *Ibid*, 3 Feb 1907, pp.62–63.
241. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/2*, Morley to Minto, 8 Feb 1907.
242. *Affairs of Thibet*, part IX, 23 Apr 1907, p.157.
243. *Ibid*, 1 May 1907, p.156.
244. Sir Ernest Wilton as he was to become, had been a member of Younghusband's staff during the Tibet Mission and had also played a prominent part in the Calcutta negotiations of 1905.
245. The position of Tsarong Shapé was disputed by Chang and Dane. The British, on the one hand, acknowledged him to be a fully authorised representative of the Tibetan Government. Chang, on the other hand, wanted him to be

described as acting under the instructions of the Chinese.
246. PRO: *FO 371/209*, no 31724, Jordan to Grey, 7 Aug 1907.
247. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/2*, Morley to Minto, 7 Sep 1907.
248. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, pt II, no iv, pp.28–33.
249. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/3*, Morley to Minto, 3 Jan 1908.
250. PRO: *FO 371/619* no 707, FO memo, 31 Dec 1908.
251. PRO: *FO 535/1*, IO to FO, 21 Sep 1908.
252. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part XI, 1908, 2 Jun 1908, pp.81–82, enc by Lien Yu, the Imperial Resident. Foreign Office Confidential Print 9468 (June 1909).
253. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XI, 30 Sep 1908, pp.96–98. Details of Dalai Lama's arrival and visit.
254. *Ibid*, 25 Oct 1908, pp.101–02.
255. *Ibid*, 12 Oct 1908, pp.98–99.
256. *Ibid*, 3 Nov 1908, pp.105–06.
257. *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, Eric Teichman (Cambridge, 1922), pp.19–27.
258. Lamb, *op cit*, p.188. Note on Chao Erh-feng.
259. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part XII, 1909, 25 Nov 1909, p.37. Foreign Office Confidential Print 9653 (Apr 1910).
260. *Twenty years in Tibet*, David Macdonald (London, 1932), pp.65–74.
261. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 1910, 22 Feb 1910, pp.14–15. Foreign Office Confidential Print 10017 (Apr 1912).
262. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 176*, Historical note on relations between Nepal and China, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, 4 Nov 1910.
263. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 23 Feb 1910, p.15.
264. *Ibid*, 20 Feb 1910, p.10.
265. *Ibid*, 26 Feb 1910, p.18. Hutuktu means the chief abbots of the Lhasa monasteries.
266. *Ibid*, 12 Mar 1910, pp.38–40.
267. PRO: *FO 371/854*, no 19526, Bell to India, 30 Apr 1910.
268. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/5*, Morley to Minto, 30 Jun 1910.
269. IOR: *L/P&S/10/147*, P 382, Minute by William Lee-Warner, 8 Mar 1910, p.195.
270. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/25*, Minto to Morley, 28 Jul 1910.
271. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 27 Jun 1910, p.79.
272. *Ibid*, 8 Sep 1910, p.133.
273. *Ibid*, 21 Sep 1910, p.135.
274. *Ibid*, 17 Nov 1910, p.151.
275. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part XIV, 1911, 29 Mar 1911, pp.35–36. Foreign Office Confidential Print 10183 (Mar 1913).
276. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/4*, Morley to Minto, 1 Sep 1910.
277. Hardinge, Sir Charles (1858–1944), created first Baron Hardinge of Penshurst, 1910; Viceroy of India, 1910–16.
278. *Ibid*, 18 Dec 1911, pp.99–100.
279. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 22 Apr 1910, p.63.
280. IOR: *L/P&S/10/180*, P 1918, Hardinge to Crewe, 22 Dec 1910.
281. *Ibid*.
282. *Banya:* trader.
283. *Ibid*, P 1918, Hirtzel to Ritchie, 12 Jan 1911.
284. *Ibid*, Hardinge to Crewe, 21 Sep 1911.
285. IOR: *L/P&S/10/183*, P 1822, Bailey's report on a journey from Peking to Sadiya, 19 Sep 1911.
286. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 189*, Chinese activity on the Mishmi border by J E Shuckburgh, 9 Sep 1912, para 1.
287. IOR: *L/P&S/11/3*, P 285, Dundas' tour diary of 30 Nov 1911.
288. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 189*, *op cit*, para 3.
289. *Ibid*, para 4.
290. *Ibid*, para 5.
291. IOR: *L/P&S/10/181*, P 3057A annexure E and G, Notes by Dundas on the north-east frontier and the political results of the Mishmi Mission, 1 May–17 Jun 1912.
292. *The road to Rima*, Major C Stansfield (Shillong, 1914).
293. *History of the frontier areas bordering on Assam*, Sir Robert Reid (Shillong, 1942), pp.244–45.
294. IOR: *L/P&S/10/180*, P 1648, Williamson's diary for Jan and Feb 1911.
295. *Ibid*, P 656, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 Apr 1911.

296. *Operations against the Abors*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1911, lx Cd 5961, Assam to India, 16 May 1911, pp.15–16.
297. IOR: *L/P&S/10/181*, P 2345, Despatch describing the operations against the Abors by Major General H Bower, 11 Apr 1912.
298. IOR: *L/P&S/10/182*, P 1742, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 Jun 1911.
299. Reid, *op cit*, p.238.
300. IOR: *L/P&S/11/74*, P 886, Kennedy to India, 23 Sep 1913.
301. *Ibid*, The Aka Report, 2 Jul 1914.
302. Reid, *op cit*, p.242.
303. IOR: *L/P&S/10/182*, P 1742, Minute by Hirtzel, 25 Oct 1911.
304. IOR: *L/P&S/11/6*, P 603, Diary of W C H Dundas, Political Officer, Mishmi Mission, 5–12 Dec 1913.
305. *Ibid*, 6 Feb 1911, p.7. Tsarong Shapé had accompanied Chang Yin-t'ang to the 1908 Trade Regulations. When in 1912 the Tibetans turned the Chinese out they also turned on many of their collaborators. Tsarong Shapé, along with his wife and two of his sons, was put to death. The Panchen Lama, in his support of the Chinese, moved his residence from Shigatse to Lhasa. However, open acts of hostility to the Panchen in Lhasa made him shy off attempting to dispossess the Dalai Lama.
306. PRO: *FO 371/1329*, no 43284, Gould to Bell, 10 Sep 1912.
307. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIV, 21 Sep 1911, pp.75–78.
308. IOR: *MSS Eur D 573/5*, Morley to Minto, 18 Jul 1910.
309. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 22 Apr 1910, p.63.
310. IOR: *L/P&S/10/218*, P 912, Bell to India, 2 Feb 1912. Bell wanted the Chinese out of Tibet, so as to enable the Dalai Lama to establish an effective counterpoise to Chinese pressure on the north-east frontier.
311. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part XV, 1912, 25–28 Nov 1911, pp.94–95. Foreign Office Confidential Print 10775 (Sep 1916).
312. *Ibid*, 3 Jan 1912, p.18. Chung Ying had commanded Chao Erh-feng's flying column into Lhasa in 1910.
313. *Ibid*, 24 Dec 1911, p.15. Translation of a Tibetan letter from the National Assembly of Tibet.
314. *Ibid*, 17 May 1912, pp.60–61. Perhaps it was an attempt by the Panchen to pacify the Dalai Lama for his own collaboration with the Amban Lien Yu during the Dalai Lama's absence from Tibet.
315. *Ibid*, 24 May 1912, p.65.
316. *Ibid*, 31 May 1912, p.75. Laden La was a Sikkimese who had been connected with all phases of British-Tibetan policy since the Younghusband Mission. Since 1910, he had been employed as a Liaison Officer between the Indian Government and the Dalai Lama.
317. *Ibid*, 27 Jul 1912, p.127.
318. *Ibid*, 26 Jul 1912, p.127.
319. *Ibid*, 2 Aug 1912, p.128.
320. *Ibid*, 13 Aug 1912, p.130. Tibetan version of the Agreement, p.192.
321. PRO: *FO 371/1329*, no 51046, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 Nov 1912.
322. Teichmann, *op cit*, p.40.
323. IOR: *L/P&S/10/147*, P 12, Letter from China's President Yuan Shih-k'ai to the Dalai Lama, 29 Oct 1912. While restoring to the Dalai Lama his rank and titles, Yuan Shih-k'ai did not fail to point out that 'The Republic has now been established; out of the five races we have created a new State'.
324. *Ibid*, 31 Mar 1912, p.39.
325. *Ibid*, 2 Sep 1912, pp.177–78.
326. *Ibid*, 7 Sep 1912, p.159. Yang Feng had to reconcile himself to a long wait in Sikkim and was still to be seen in Darjeeling in May 1913.
327. Lamb, *op cit*, vol II, pp.398–402. For Lu Hsing-chi's career in India.
328. PRO: *FO 535/15*, no 67, Jordan to Grey, 27 Apr 1912.
329. *Ibid*, 22 Feb 1912, p.39.
330. *Ibid*, 17 Feb 1912, p.26.
331. IOR: *L/P&S/10/147*, P 12, Jordan to Grey, 14 Dec 1912.
332. *Ibid*, 10 Jun 1912, pp.90–91.
333. *Ibid*, 11 Jun 1912, pp.91–92.
334. *Ibid*, 11 Apr 1912, p.37.
335. IOR: *L/P&S/11/28*, P 3106, Hirtzel to Montagu, 26 Jan 1912.
336. IOR: *L/P&S/10/225*, P 753, Memo by Shuckburgh, 23 Feb 1912.

337. PRO: *FO 535/15*, no 193, Jordan to Grey, 17 Aug 1912. Considered one of the most important documents in the history of British dealings with China.
338. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XV, Memorandum to Russian Chargé d'Affaires, 17 Aug 1912, pp. 145–46.
339. IOR: *L/P&S/10/225*, P 753, Jordan to Grey, 20 Feb 1912.
340. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XV, 24 Sep 1912, p. 169.
341. *Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol of 21 October*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1912–13, lxviii, Cd 6604.
342. Cited in PRO: *FO 371/1609*, no 7222, Buchanan to Grey, 14 Feb 1913. The chief Tibetan signatory was Aguan Dorjieff, who then went from Urga to St Petersburg carrying another letter from the Dalai Lama to the Czar. Historians have been divided in their views as to the validity of the Tibet-Mongol Treaty. Charles Bell tended to dismiss it. W K Lee, in *Tibet in modern world politics*, (New York, 1931), p. 139, accepts it as a valid treaty. Chinese historians deny Dorjieff's right to make a binding agreement on Tibet's behalf. The Foreign and India Office, at the time, accepted its validity.
343. PRO: *FO 371/1610*, no 12462, Minute by Nicolson, 12 Mar 1913.
344. IOR: *L/P&S/10/340*, P 421, Memo by Hirtzel, 27 Jan 1913.
345. *Ibid*, P 191, Memo by Hirtzel, 25 Feb 1913.
346. *Ibid*, P 920, Jordan to Grey, 6 Mar 1913.
347. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XV, 3 Dec 1912, p. 230.
348. The Wai-chiao-pu was the Chinese Republican Foreign Office. Under the Imperial Government, the Ministry had been known as the Wai-wu-pu, but was reorganised along more western lines and became the Wai-chiao-pu. It survived until the end of the Kuomintang era.
349. *Ibid*, 16 Dec 1912, p. 242.
350. *Ibid*, 26 Dec 1912, p. 250.
351. IOR: *L/P&S/10/340*, P 770, Jordan to Grey, 4 Feb 1913. Full summary of discussions at the Wai-chiao-pu.
352. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XV, 3 Dec 1912, p. 231. Lamb, *op cit*, vol II, fn, p. 460, maintains that it was McMahon's insistence that the Chinese should surrender Chamdo, more than any other factor, which prevented them from signing the Simla Convention of 1914.
353. IOR: *L/P&S/10/341*, P 2986, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 Jul 1913.
354. IOR: *L/P&S/10/340*, P 2105, Jordan to Grey, 26 May 1913.
355. PRO: *FO 371/1610*, no 14001, Jordan to Grey, 27 Mar 1913.
356. PRO: *FO 371/1611*, no 25790, Jordan to Grey, 11 Apr 1913.
357. *Ibid*, 5 Jun 1913.
358. IOR: *L/P&S/10/341*, P 3244, Alston to Grey, 10 Aug 1913.
359. *Ibid*, P 3058, Memo by Hirtzel, 30 Jul 1913. When Yuan Shih-kai told Alston in Peking that it was too soon to talk of appointing a Resident in Lhasa, he had already appointed Lu Hsing-chi (the Calcutta Agent) as Acting Resident.
360. IOR: *L/P&S/10/341*, P 2642, Memo by Holderness, 7 Jul 1913.
361. *Ibid*, P 2874, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18 Jul 1913.
362. *Ibid*, P 2376, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 Jun 1913. There is evidence in the correspondence to suggest that the Indian Government thought that this difficulty would make the Lönchen Shatra more amenable to the British point of view.
363. For details of negotiations and the outcome of the Simla Convention, see IOR: *L/P&S/10/342-44* and *L/P&S/18/B 201*, *B 206*, *B 212*. The most important source for the Simla Convention is McMahon's Final Memorandum to be found in *L/P&S/10/344*, *L/P&S/18/B 212* and in PRO: *FO 371/1931*, no 43390, IO to FO, 26 Aug 1914.
364. IOR: *L/P&S/10/341*, P 3240, McMahon's Commission, 7 Jul 1913.
365. PRO: *FO 371/1612*, no 34848, IO to FO, 28 Jul 1913.
366. IOR: *L/P&S/10/342*, P 4215, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 Oct 1913.
367. *Ibid*, P 4964, 20 Nov 1913.
368. *Ibid*, 18 Nov 1913.

369. IOR: *L/P&S/10/344*, Final Memorandum, 30 Apr 1914. McMahon, in his memorandum, states that Chen relied entirely upon extracts from the pamphlet of General Fu Saung-Mu which recorded the frontier campaigns of Chao Erh-feng in 1906 and on the published works of foreign authors, notably Sir Thomas Holdich. The Lönchen, on the other hand, produced the text of the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of 822 AD and 'tomes of delicate manuscripts bound in richly embroidered covers. He confronted his opponent also with the official history of Tibet, compiled by the Vth Dalai Lama and known as the *Golden Tree of the Index of the Sole Ornament of the World*, a work of great scope and collosal dimensions'.
370. *Ibid*, 21 Nov 1913–24 Dec 1913. McMahon was convinced that a treaty existed between Tibet and Mongolia, and that any tripartite agreement must be so worded as to safeguard British interests in relation to Mongolia and Tibet.
371. *Ibid*.
372. Teichmann, *op cit*, p. 2. The boundary marker had been erected by the Chinese in 1727 when they expelled the Dzungars from Tibet.
373. IOR: *L/P&S/10/344*, for Articles of the Convention, see Final Memorandum.
374. *Ibid*, Proceedings of 6th Meeting of Conference, 7 Apr 1914.
375. *Ibid*, Proceedings of 7th Meeting of Conference, annexure II, 27 Apr 1914.
376. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 206*, Final Memorandum, enc 4, 8 Jul 1914.
377. PRO: *FO 535/17*, no 104, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 Apr 1914.
378. PRO: *FO 371/1929*, no 19289, Chinese Minister to Grey, 1 May 1914.
379. PRO: *FO 371/1931*, no 30825, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 3 Jul 1914.
380. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 206* and *L/P&S/10/344*, 3 Jul 1914.
381. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 206*, enc 4 to Final Memorandum, 8 Jul 1914. Views differ as to whether Chen initialled or signed the Simla Convention. Those who state that it was signed are as follows: *Tibet*, Foreign Office Peace Handbook no 70 (London, 1920), p. 42; *Tibet*, Central Office of Information (London, 1958), p. 5; *Tibet and the rule of law*, International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, 1960), p. 140. Those who maintain that Chen merely initialled the Convention are: Lamb, *op cit*, vol II, p. 519–20; *The historical status of Tibet*, Tieh-Tseng Li (New York, 1956, pp. 135–42.
382. PRO: *FO 371/1931*, no 30835, FO to IO, 14 Jul 1914.
383. PRO: *FO 371/1931*, no 30077, FO to IO, 6 Jul 1914.
384. IOR: *L/P&S/10/344*, P 3609, Bell to India, 6 Aug 1915.
385. *Ibid*, P 3609, India to Bell, 3 Sep 1915.
386. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 17 Mar 1910, p. 40. 'He appealed to us to secure the observance of the right which the Tibetans had of dealing with the British direct. But he also desired the withdrawal of Chinese influence, so that his position might be that of the Vth Dalai Lama who had conducted negotiations, as the ruler of a friendly State, with the Emperor . . . treaties of 1890 and 1906, to which they were not party, could not be recognised by the Thibetans'.
387. PRO: *FO 350/12*, JORDAN PAPERS, Jordan to Langley, 28 Jan 1914.
388. IOR: *L/P&S/10/342*, P 1517, Lönchen Shatra to McMahon, 24 Mar 1914 and McMahon to Shatra, 25 Mar 1914. See also IOR: *L/P&S/12/4188*, PZ 7549, Crombie to Peel, 20 Oct 1938. The Anglo-Tibetan exchange of secret notes of 24–25 March 1914 were assumed to have been published in the 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties*. In actual fact the original 1929 edition left out the texts of the McMahon Line notes and the Simla Convention itself, and merely stated that a Tripartite Convention was drawn up and initialled in 1914. The revised edition of Vol XIV of Aitchison's *Treaties* was eventually published in 1938; it was identical to the earlier edition, even to the date of publication, '1929'. Sixty-two copies of the new edition were sent to the India Office with the request that all the originals should be destroyed. Certain number of the volumes are

known to have survived, two, at least, in the India Office and one at Harvard.

389. *Affairs of Thibet*, part XIII, 23 Oct 1910, pp.144–45.
390. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 206*, enc 5 of Final Memorandum, North-East Frontier with map, 8 Jul 1914.
391. IOR: *L/P&S/10/343*, P 893, McMahon to Hirtzel, 17 Feb 1913. In an outline map of 22 January 1914, McMahon showed the alignment of the new boundary being the Se La. In a map sent to Hirtzel on 19 February 1914, the boundary was shown further north and included within the McMahon Line was the region of the Tawang monastery.
392. IOR: *L/P&S/10/181*, P 3057A, annexure F, Note by General Staff on the North-East Frontier, 1 Jun 1912.
393. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 206*, enc 5 of Final Memorandum, 8 Jul 1914.
394. IOR: *L/P&S/10/342*, P 4595, Assam to India, 17 Sep 1913, 6 Oct 1913, 17 Oct 1913. Detailed definition of the boundary of central and eastern sections of the north-east frontier tract.
395. *Ibid*, P 4790, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 Nov 1913.
396. IOR: *L/P&S/10/343*, P 1192, Memo by McMahon, 26 Mar 1914.
397. Hugh Richardson, in a note to the author, says 'dues collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Dzong, and in Kongbo and Kham (nowhere near the McMahon Line) from Mönba trade were also allowed. It was very different from what the Tibetan Government claimed later'.
398. PRO: *FO 535/17*, no 91, Memo by McMahon, 28 Mar 1914.
399. IOR: *L/P&S/10/344*, P 2653, Jordan to Grey, 16 Jun 1914.
400. Lamb, *op cit*, vol II, pp.530–66, for full discussion of the McMahon Line. *The McMahon Line and after*, Parshotam Mehra (Madras, 1975). *The Sino-Indian question*, Sir Olaf Caroe, Royal Central Asian Journal, v L, pt III and IV (Jul–Oct 1963), pp.238–51.
401. *Tibet and its history*, Hugh Edward Richardson (London, 1962) pp.114–17.
402. *Ibid*, P 3204, Grey to Lew Yuk Lin, 8 Aug 1914.
403. *Ibid*, P 2845, Jordan to India, 2 Aug 1915.
404. PRO: *FO 371/1937*, no 2684, Grey to Buchanan, 24 Jan 1914.
405. PRO: *FO 371/1930*, nos 22413, 22567, 22959, 18–21 May 1914. For negotiations between Buchanan, British Minister in St Petersburg and Sazanov, Russian Foreign Minister.
406. PRO: *FO 537/17*, no 148, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 May 1914.
407. IOR: *L/P&S/10/344*, P 2479, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6 Jul 1915.
408. Kalon Lama was Commander of the Tibetan forces in eastern Tibet.
409. *Ibid*, P 3303, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 Sep 1915.
410. IOR: *L/P&S/10/433*, P 4317, Jordan to Grey, 29 Sep 1914.
411. IOR: *L/P&S/10/433*, P 5062(3), Jordan to Chinese Minister, 19 Sep 1914.
412. IOR: *L/P&S/10/344*, P 671, Bell to India, 28 Oct 1915.
413. IOR: *L/P&S/10/714*, P 3344A, Bell to India, 18 Jun 1917.
414. Teichman *op cit*, pp.47–58. For a full account of Sino-Tibetan relations 1914 to 1918 in eastern Tibet.
415. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 344*, IO to FO, 15 Oct 1919–10 May 1920.
416. IOR: *L/P&S/10/713*, P 5361, Agreement for the restoration of peaceful relations and the delimitation of a provisional frontier between China and Tibet, 19 Aug 1918. *See* also Mehra, op cit, p.322. Paradoxically, what brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion was that by the time news reached Teichman, countermanding this order or that, his deals were already through.
417. IOR: *L/P&S/10/714*, P 3260, Teichman to Jordan, 11 Oct 1918. Contains the Truce of Rongbatsa, with enclosures.
418. IOR: *L/P&S/10/715*, P 5191, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 Aug 1919. 'We therefore request authority for sale to Tibet of limited quantity of munitions viz: two machine guns with 50,000 rounds and 1,250,000 rounds for rifles. This would be enough to enable Tibetans to resist aggression but not to encourage them to take the offensive'.

419. *Ibid*, P 3125, Jordan to Curzon, 1 Jun 1919.
420. IOR: *L/P&S/10/715*, P 4657, Jordan to Curzon, 1 Jun 1919. '. . . that a stable and satisfactory settlement can only be reached here, but at the same time the presence of a Thibetan Delegate in Peking is wholly undesirable . . . they must be prepared to sacrifice some of their recent gains, perhaps Derge, in the interests of a stable government'.
421. *Ibid*, P 3260, Note by Hirtzel, 17 Jul 1919.
422. *Ibid*, P 3802, Viceroy to Montagu, 27 Jun 1919. Viscount Chelmsford, Viceroy from 1916 to 1921; Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India from 1917 to 1922.
423. *Ibid*, P 4131, Jordan to Curzon, 6 Jul 1919.
424. *Ibid*, P 4396, IO to Viceroy, 1 Aug 1919.
425. *Ibid*, P 4999, Jordan to Curzon, 14 Aug 1919.
426. *Ibid*, P 5191, Jordan to Curzon, 27 Aug 1919. 'I regard incident as a direct challenge by Japan of our whole position in Asia and I venture to hope that the challenge will be accepted . . . Example of Persia has been held up to Chinese as a warning of what Tibet will become under British guidance and every conceivable weapon . . . has been used to induce Chinese to abandon negotiations'.
427. *Ibid*, P 5575, Curzon to Alston, 1 Sep 1919. The Japanese Ambassador denied Japanese involvement in the Tibetan negotiations. '. . . it was ridiculous to believe that Japan could have any object in preventing an agreement between China and Great Britain with regard to Tibet, that it was no concern of theirs and that the Chinese Government had doubtless invented this excuse in order to exculpate their own action'.
428. *Ibid*, P 5377, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 Aug 1919.
429. Mehra, *op cit*, fn p. 342. Cites Charles Bell quoting the Lönchen Shatra, 'As regards Inner Tibet, the best men will win, and since the Simla Convention the Tibetans had consciously done this'.
430. *Ibid*, P 8000, Chinese Minister to Curzon, 6 Dec 1919.
431. IOR: *L/P&S/10/716*, P 886, Lönchen Shokang to Campbell, 7 Dec 1919.
432. *Ibid*, P 3256, Bell to India, 23 Apr 1926.
433. *Ibid*, P 3495, Alston to Curzon, 27 Apr 1920. Alston's solution to Tibet was that she should be regarded as a self-governing dominion of a Chinese Commonwealth, standing in the same relation to China as Canada does to Great Britain.
434. IOR: *L/P&S/10/716*, P 7727, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 Oct 1920.
435. PRO: *FO 228/2962*, no 253, Jordan to Curzon, 1 Jun 1919.
436. IOR: *L/P&S/10/717*, P 3939, Curzon to Alston, 27 Aug 1921.
437. *Ibid*, P 2811, FO to IO, 24 Jun 1921.
438. *Ibid*, P 4279, Alston to Curzon, 8 Sep 1921.
439. IOR: *L/P&S/11/203*, P 4946, Army Headquarters India to Eastern Command, 30 May 1921.
440. *Ibid*, P 1751, Bell to India, 21 Feb 1921.
441. *Ibid*, Minute by Hirtzel, 7 Apr 1914. Edwin Montagu commenting on Hirtzel's minute had this to say: 'I agree with Sir A Hirtzel – with a cavil at his description of self-determination'. To which Hirtzel replied: 'Not original – quoted from Cardinal Bourne and Col T E Lawrence'.
442. *Ibid*, P 2241, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11 May 1921.
443. *Ibid*, P 4126, Curzon to Alston, 26 Aug 1921.
444. *Ibid*, Balfour to Curzon, 19 Nov 1921. Balfour noted that Wellington Koo's suggestion had created a bad impression, and that the American Secretary of State, Elihu Root, had made it clear that 'It was outside the powers of the Conference to determine "what is China?"'.
445. *Ibid*, P 4407, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 24 Sep 1921.
446. *Ibid*, P 168, India to Lhasa, 23 Oct 1921.
447. IOR: *L/P&S/10/718*, P 1460, Bell's report, 29 Nov 1921.
448. *Ibid*, P 124, Bell to IO, 8 Jan 1923. Bell was by now retired and living in England.
449. *Ibid*, P 3782, Wakely to Bell, 5 Oct 1923.

450. *Ibid*, P 3943, Laden La to Weir, 26 May 1930.
451. *Ibid*, P 2336, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 May 1921. '. . . 20,000 unruly monks are always a potential source of danger, for, as the Dalai Lama himself says, they are liable to precipitate outbursts'.
452. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4174*, P 334, Bailey to India, 12 Dec 1922. '. . . it has always seemed curious to me that the Tashi Lama has borne such a small proportion of the expenses of the central administration, which have increased considerably owing to the situation on the Chinese frontier and the necessity of purchasing arms'.
453. *Ibid*, P 491, Bailey to India, 31 Dec 1923.
454. *Ibid*, P 1769, Translation of Panchen Lama's instructions, 26 Dec 1923: P 1431, translation of Dalai Lama's notice to the Panchen Lama, 26 Jan 1924. 'You seem to have forgot the sacred history of your predecessors and wandered away to a desert where there are no people – like a butterfly that is attracted by the lamplight, and thus brings trouble to yourself . . . you ran away with your sinful companions who resemble mad elephants and followed the wrong path'.
455. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1113*, P 4604, Bailey's report, 28 Oct 1924.
456. IOR: *L/P&S/10/4174*, P 8374, IO Note on Tashi Lama, 20 Jan 1930.
457. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1113*, P 4604, Bailey's report, 28 Oct 1924.
458. IOR: *L/P&S/10/718*, P 4674, Tibetan Shapés to Bailey, 7 Aug 1924.
459. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1088*, P 1129, Williamson to Bailey, 10 Apr 1925.
460. *Ibid*, P 1741, Williamson to Bailey, 28 Apr 1925.
461. *Ibid*, P 1741, Bailey to India, 28 Apr 1925.
462. *Ibid*, P 3870, IO minute, 18 Nov 1925.
463. *Ibid*, P 3537, Weir to India, 15 Apr 1929.
464. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1113*, P 5738, Weir to India, 13 Aug 1929.
465. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1088*, P 4010, Weir to India, 25 May 1930.
466. *Ibid*, P 3943, Note on Liu Man-ching. She was said to be an aristocratic Tibetan and not a Chinese, but this was not borne out by the treatment she received while in Lhasa.
467. *Ibid*, P 3943, Laden La's report, 26 May 1930.
468. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1113*, P 3315, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 May 1930.
469. *Ibid*, P 2954, IO to FO, 20 May 1930. Weir was permitted to take his wife along, which was denied to both Bell and Bailey.
470. *Ibid*, P 6929, Weir to India, 3, 14, 15 Sep 1930.
471. *Ibid*, P 1148, Note to Hirtzel, 12 Mar 1930.
472. *Ibid*, P 8573, Weir's report, 18 Nov 1930.
473. IOR: *L/P&S/10/1228*, P 7717, Weir to India, 21 Sep 1930. The file has the above spelling of place names. Hugh Richardson suggests Darg'ye and Beri as being more correct.
474. *Ibid*, PZ 3707, Toller to Lampson, 14 Apr 1931.
475. *Ibid*, PZ 4555, Toller to Lampson, 17 Jun 1931.
476. *Ibid*, PZ 2179, Toller to Lampson, 25 Jan 1932, includes Sino-Tibetan Treaty, amended version.
477. *Ibid*, PZ 3964, Report from Lhasa, 2 Jun 1932. 'On 29 April 1932, Dhumpa Dzasa, the nominal Commander-in-Chief was dismissed, disgraced and sent away from Lhasa . . . Chiwa Lunsiar, the *de facto* Commander-in-Chief has also been removed on various charges by the Dalai Lama and degraded to his former appointment as Chipon of Chikhang office'.
478. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4165*, PZ 1824, India to Weir, 17 Aug 1932.
479. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4169*, PZ 6626, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 31 Oct 1932. The cessation of hostilities on the part of the Chinese troops was due, not so much to orders from the Chinese Government, but to outbreaks of civil war in Szechuan which necessitated the withdrawal of Liu Wen-hui and his troops.
480. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part XV, 1912, 13 Aug 1912, p. 130. Foreign Office Confidential Print 10775 (Sep 1916).

481. *Ibid*, PZ 5761, India to Secretary of State, 22 Sep 1932.
482. *Ibid*, PZ 7088, Ingram to Simon, 24 Sep 1932.
483. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4175*, PZ 1922, Weir to India, 1 Mar 1933.
484. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4169*, Dalai Lama to Williamson, 18 Feb 1933.
485. *Ibid*, India's reply to the Dalai Lama, 22 Feb 1933.
486. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4169*, PZ 1510, Williamson to India, 22 Feb 1933. 'The Dalai Lama had told Colonel Weir that he would prefer not to have either Chinese or British representatives permanently at Lhasa, but that if he had a Chinese one he must have a British one also'.
487. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4170*, PZ 803, Lampson to Simon, 7 Feb 1933.
488. *Ibid*, PZ 5007, Lampson to Wellesley, 2 Jun 1933.
489. *Ibid*, PZ 803, Minute by Walton, 14 Feb 1933.
490. *Ibid*, PZ 803, IO to FO, 17 Feb 1933.
491. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4175*, Dalai Lama to Williamson, 1 Feb 1933.
492. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4177*, PZ 1572, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18 Mar 1933.
493. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4175*, Tashi Lama to Williamson, 2 Feb 1933.
494. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4177*, PZ 6071, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24 Sep 1933.
495. *Ibid*, PZ 6311, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 2 Oct 1933.
496. *Ibid*, PZ 6250, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 30 Sep 1933.
497. *Ibid*, PZ 1340, Williamson's report, 6 Jan 1934. 'In any case he [Dalai Lama] did not want a Chinese official ever to visit Lhasa, as all that the latter would want to do would be to pave the way for the renewal of Chinese domination'.
498. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4178*, PZ 8152, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 Dec 1933.
499. *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, Sir Charles Bell (London, 1946), p.379.
500. *Ibid*, PZ 1339, Kashag to Williamson, 24 Jan 1934.
501. *Ibid*, PZ 1993, Williamson to India, 18 Feb 1934.
502. *Ibid*, PZ 4376, Williamson to India, 28 May 1934.
503. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4177*, PZ 499, Ingram to FO, 18 Jan 1934.
504. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4178*, PZ 4115, Williamson to India, 26 May 1934.
505. *Tibet today and yesterday*, Tieh-Tseng Li (New York, 1960), pp.168–75, for Chinese version of events. See also IOR: *L/P&S/12/4177* and IOR: *L/P&S/12/4175*.
506. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4177*, PZ 1140, Minute by Donaldson, 21 Feb 1934.
507. *Ibid*, PZ 7568, Williamson to India, 22 Nov 1934. Contains the Huang Mu-sung proposed 14 Article Agreement.
508. *Ibid*, PZ 7568, IO minutes, 3 Jan 1935. Neither the India Office nor Williamson were in favour of an Amban remaining in Lhasa, yet because of the 1914 Agreement it was found difficult to object, once the Tibetans and Chinese had agreed to it.
509. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4175*, PZ 898, Williamson to Metcalfe, 20 Jan 1935, literal translation of Norbu Dhondup's letter.
510. *Ibid*, PZ 4682, Caroe to IO, 28 Jun 1935.
511. *Ibid*, PZ 5625, Minute by Rumbold, 15 Jul 1935.
512. *Ibid*, PZ 2623, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 17 Aug 1935.
513. *Ibid*, PZ 1514, Panchen Lama to Williamson, 3 Nov 1935, translation.
514. *Ibid*, PZ 2042, Gould's report, 18 Feb 1936. In the midst of these negotiations, Williamson died in Lhasa on 17 Nov 1935.
515. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4182*, PZ 3710, India to Secretary of State, 27 May 1936.
516. For details of correspondence regarding civil war in China, see IOR: *L/P&S/12/4182*.
517. *Ibid*, PZ 4182 and PZ 4289, Cowan to FO, 12 and 18 Jun 1934.
518. *Ibid*, PZ 4677, Minute by Rumbold, 22 Jun 1935: '. . . the defence of Tibet from attack either from the north or the east would be easy if the Tibetans could be persuaded not to meet an invading force on the frontier, but to draw transport and supplies along the routes, and to attack communications, making

it impossible for an invading force . . . ever to reach Lhasa'.

519. *Ibid*, PZ 2275, Caroe to IO, 13 Apr 1936.
520. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4186B*, PZ 5331, Gould to India, 8 Jun 1936.
521. *Ibid*, PZ 5304, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 Jul 1936.
522. *Ibid*, PZ 5853, Howe to FO, 10 Aug 1936. Howe in Peking thought the best course was to hand the letter to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining that the Tibetan Government had had to resort to this course since the Chinese maintained that previous communications had gone astray. 'It is a delicate matter and there is always the possibility that the Vice-Minister may refuse to accept at our hands a letter from the Tibetan Government'.
523. *Ibid*, PZ 5266, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 Jul 1936.
524. Richardson, *op cit*, pp. 146–47. 'Although they were pleased to invite Neame to inspect all their military resources and to ask his advice . . . their practical interest centred on securing more weapons. The need for constant and expert training in the use of such weapons was something the Tibetans could never bring themselves to face'.
525. *Ibid*, PZ 7066, Gould to India, 30 Sep 1936.
526. *Ibid*, PZ 7717, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, 26 Oct 1936.
527. *Ibid*, PZ 8296, Eden to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 19 Nov 1936.
528. *Ibid*, PZ 8697, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 Dec 1936.
529. *Ibid*, PZ 7301, Gould to India, 10 Oct 1936.
530. *Ibid*, PZ 8904, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 Dec 1936.
531. *Ibid*, PZ 514, Minute by Walton, 30 Jan 1937. 'The India Office view is not to advise the Tibetan Government either to resist or not to do so, because in either event we should have to take the odium if the course advised turned out unfortunately'.
532. *Ibid*, PZ 1137, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, 15 Feb 1937.
533. *Ibid*, PZ 1345, Knatchbull-Hugessen to Chang Ch'un, 10 Dec 1936.
534. *Ibid*, PZ 1598, Gould to India, 1 Feb 1937: '. . . and particularly in view of position regarding Tawang, any line of action which tends in any way to impair force of 1914 Convention precisely as it stands is to be deprecated'.
535. *Ibid*, PZ 2155, Wai-chiao-pu to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 28 Jan 1937.
536. *Ibid*, PZ 3812, FO to Knatchbull-Hugessen, 10 Jun 1937.
537. *Ibid*, PZ 4856, Norbu to Richardson, 23 Jul 1937.
538. *Ibid*, PZ 5383, Richardson to India, 22 Jul 1937.
539. *Ibid*, PZ 6452, Norbu to Richardson, 29 Sep 1937.
540. *Ibid*, PZ 6651, Norbu to Richardson, 7 Oct 1937.
541. *Ibid*, PZ 7075, Norbu to Richardson, 12 Oct 1937.
542. Richardson, *op cit*, p. 148. The Lhasa Mission was never exclusively linked with the post of British Trade Agent at Gyantse. Although Richardson held both posts jointly for a period of time, there were several other officers who had charge at Lhasa without connection with Gyantse.
543. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4189*, PZ 4911, Walton to Caroe, 16 Jul 1936.
544. *Ibid*, Fleming to Caroe, 20 Apr 1937.
545. *Ibid*, PZ 2374, Rumbold to Caroe, 26 Apr 1937.
546. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4188*, PZ 2788, Caroe to Walton, 9 Apr 1936. It is difficult to know exactly what Caroe meant. For instance, right up to 1947 and after, the Tibetans refused to accept British claims to Tawang and continued, with the tacit approval of the Government of India, to administer it.
547. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4200*, PZ 6153, Metcalfe to Walton, 17 Aug 1936.
548. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4188*, PZ 6152, Minute by Walton, 9 Sep 1936.
549. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4200*, PZ 291, Gould to India, 15 Nov 1936. Gould replied that it was not possible for him to assent to the Kashag's version. 'There could be no doubt that . . . what lies to the north of the McMahon red line is

Tibetan and what lies south of any part of that line is British'.

550. *Ibid*, PZ 291, Minute by May, 20 Jan 1937.
551. *Ibid*, PZ 4744, Assam to India, 27 May 1937.
552. *Ibid*, PZ 3507, Gould to India, 4 May 1938.
553. *Ibid*, PZ 3854, Lightfoot to Assam, 26 Apr 1938.
554. *Ibid*, PZ 7366, Lightfoot's report on the Tawang expedition.
555. *Ibid*, PZ 2029, Twynam to Linlithgow, 17 Mar 1939.
556. *Ibid*, PZ 2947, India to Secretary of State, 4 May 1939.
557. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4188*, PZ 5515, Gould to India, 2 Aug 1940.
558. *History of the frontier areas bordering on Assam, 1883–1941*, Sir Robert Reid (Shillong, 1942). A comprehensive account of the frontier districts of Assam.
559. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4200*, Ext 1810, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 20 Apr 1943.
560. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4213*, PZ 4458, Report by Godfrey, 29 May 1939.
561. IOR: *L/P&S/12/3144*, PZ 6257, Report by Godfrey, 28 Nov 1940.
562. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4214*, PZ 3932, Godfrey's report on his tour up the Lohit valley to Rima, 27 Feb 1940.
563. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4200*, PZ 5515, Note on discussions held at Government House, Shillong, 1 Aug 1940.
564. *Ibid*, Ext 1240, India to Secretary of State, 11 Mar 1943.
565. *Ibid*, Ext 1810, India to Secretary of State, 17 Apr 1943.
566. *Ibid*, Ext 2650, Shillong to India, 30 Apr 1945.
567. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4188*, Ext 2872, Tibetan Foreign Office to British Mission, Lhasa, 18 Apr 1945. 'If the officers and troops posted at Kalaktang and Walong are not withdrawn immediately, it will appear like a big insect eating up a small one, and the bad name of the British Government will spread like the wind'.
568. *Ibid*, Ext 3437, Assam to India, 27 Jun 1945.
569. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4200*, Ext 2645, Assam to India, 1 May 1945.
570. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4214*, Ext 29, tour diary of F P Mainprice, Nov 1943 – May 1945, entry for 4 Feb 1944.
571. *Ibid*, Ext 1247, Mainprice's memo, 12 Aug 1945.
572. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4219*, Ext 5262, Tour diary of Captain A E G Davy, 1 Dec 1944–10 Mar 1945. See also Ext 7435, Ethnographic notes on the tribes of the Subansiri region, 1944–45 by Baron Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf.
573. *Ibid*, Ext 1255, Mill's report on a tour in the eastern Dafla and Apa Tani country, November and December, 1945.
574. IOR: *L/P&S/12/3114*, Ext 5293, Report on the Assam Tribal Areas, 30 Jun 1946.
575. IOR: *L/P&S/12/3115A*, Ext 6551, Memo on the Tribal and Excluded Areas of the North-East Frontier, May 1947.
576. IOR: *L/P&S/12/3114*, Ext 8553, Report on the Assam Tribal Areas, 30 Jun 1947.
577. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4189*, Ext 3907, Maps of China, 16 Sep 1944.
578. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4190*, Ext 7163, Memo by Richardson, 24 Apr 1947. 'Because of what the Chinese say and put on their maps, regardless of facts, appropriating Tibetan and incidentally Indian territory to China, American maps follow suit. Because of what Chinese plus American maps show, British maps follow suit, regardless of the 1914 Convention entered into by HMG'.
579. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4197*, Ext 8640, Tibetan Foreign Bureau to High Commissioner, 16 Oct 1947. 'Contrary to all accepted Tibetan practice, the message was in English and not signed . . . it should be withheld and returned to the Lhasa Foreign Bureau on the ground that it is not in the correct official Tibetan form'.
580. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4194*, PZ 7066, India to Secretary of State, 30 Sep 1936.
581. *Ibid*, PZ 2644, India to Secretary of State, 19 Apr 1937.
582. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4178*, PZ 1459, Gould to India, 18 Feb 1939.

583. *Ibid*, PZ 6754, Gould to India, 14 Oct 1939. Hugh Richardson, in a note, says that the Government of India, to help out, waived the duty on a consignment of silver to Tibet.
584. *Ibid*, PZ 5763, India to Secretary of State, 15 Sep 1939. For details of negotiations regarding the new Dalai Lama, see IOR: *L/P&S/12/4179*, PZ 2533, Report on the discovery, recognition and installation of the XIVth Dalai Lama by B J Gould, 23 May 1941. XIVth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobsang Tenzin Gyatso (1935–).
585. *Ibid*, PZ 6045, Richardson to Gould, 24 Aug 1939.
586. *Ibid*, PZ 2080, FO to IO, 31 May 1939.
587. *Ibid*, PZ 2942, FO to Chen, 9 May 1939.
588. *Ibid*, PZ 6675, Richardson to Gould, 21 Sep 1939.
589. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4194*, PZ 2542, Gould to India, 23 Mar 1940. For Chinese version of events *see* also Li, *op cit*, pp. 180–85.
590. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4178*, PZ 2006, Gould to India, 8 Mar and 14 Mar 1940. Also Gould's report in *L/P&S/12/4179*.
591. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4194*, PZ 1517, Clark-Kerr to FO, 7 Mar 1940.
592. *Ibid*, PZ 2602, India to Secretary of State, 6 May 1940.
593. *Ibid*, PZ 2747, India to Secretary of State, 14 May 1940.
594. Richardson, *op cit*, pp. 157–58. For Chinese version regarding Regent's resignation, see Li, *op cit*, pp. 187–88.
595. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4182*, Ext 560, Report by Vice-Consul Franklin, 29 Oct 1941.
596. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4614*, Ext 651, Tibetan Foreign Bureau to Ludlow, 11 Dec 1942. One of the most important files regarding the Tibetan Government's refusal to compromise their independence.
597. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4210*, Ext 2188, India to Secretary of State, 23 Apr 1943.
598. *Ibid*, Ext 2283, Tibetan FO to Sherriff, 1 May 1943.
599. *Ibid*, Ext 2188, Minute by Rumbold, 27 Apr 1943.
600. *Ibid*, Ext 2378, FO to Chungking, 4 May 1943. 'You should not deal with question of transport of supplies in the same communication, although if the Chinese raise it in their reply you must explain present position to them. You might do so separately and in a way which does not connect what you say with [their] military movements'.
601. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4614*, Ext 4086, News summary, 26 Jun 1943.
602. *Ibid*, Ext 2643, Ludlow to Gould, 8 Apr 1943.
603. *Ibid*, Ext 2488, Chungking to FO, 11 May 1943.
604. *Ibid*, Ext 2606, Tibetan FO to Sherriff, 14 May 1943.
605. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4194*, Ext 1690, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 31 Mar 1943.
606. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4229*, Ext 3093, Note on Tolstoy and Brooke-Dolan's visit to Lhasa, 4 Apr 1943.
607. *Ibid*, Ext 2538, Seymour to Ashley Clarke, 20 Apr 1943.
608. *Ibid*, Ext 2359, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 May 1943.
609. *Ibid*, Ext 4544, Sherriff to India, 30 May 1943.
610. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4194*, Ext 1546, Eden to Churchill, 16 May 1943.
611. *Ibid*, Ext 2734, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 24 May 1943.
612. *Ibid*, Ext 4526, Eden to Seymour, 22 Jul 1943, with enclosure.
613. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2175*, Ext 5187, Young to Peel, 7 Sep 1943.
614. *Ibid*, Ext 4560, Minute by Monteath, 26 Aug 1943.
615. *Ibid*, Ext 882, Lhasa letter, 30 Jan 1944.
616. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4218*, Ext 2134, India to Secretary of State, 10 May 1944.
617. *Ibid*, Ext 3481, Kashag to Chungking, 11 Jun 1944. 'Tibet is a self-governing country but its territory is small. In case such a large number of Chinese officers and staff come to Tibet . . . the Tibetan populace will resent it'.
618. *Ibid*, Ext 2903, Note by Caroe, 8 May 1944.
619. *Ibid*, Ext 3043, India to Secretary of State, 8 Jul 1944.
620. *Ibid*, Ext 4113, Richardson to Gould, 17 Aug 1944.
621. *Ibid*, Ext 2397, Sherriff to Gould, 2 Apr 1945.
622. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4217*, Ext 1626, India to IO, 3 Apr 1944.

623. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4218*, Ext 3566, Richardson to Gould, 6 Jul 1944. '. . . so far from living up to the Atlantic Charter by allowing Tibet the government of her choice, China wants to reduce the degree of freedom already enjoyed by Tibet, and to extend the Chinese Empire'.
624. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4217*, Ext 3361, India to Secretary of State, 26 Jul 1944.
625. *Ibid*, Ext 3583, Secretary of State to India, 17 Aug 1944.
626. *Ibid*, Ext 1723, Peel to FO, 12 May 1944.
627. *Ibid*, Ext 4253, India to Secretary of State, 23 Sep 1944.
628. *Ibid*, Ext 4556, India to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1944.
629. *Ibid*, Ext 4577, Secretary of State to India, 17 Oct 1944.
630. *Ibid*, Ext 3726, Extract from Joint Press Statement on American Vice-President Wallace's Chungking visit, 24 Jun 1944. Amongst other points, it mentioned the 'recognition of the fundamental right of presently dependent Asiatic people to self-government, and the early adoption of measures in the political, economic and social fields to prepare those dependent peoples for self-government, within a specified practical time limit'. The declaration was considered to have been aimed at Britain, the Dutch and the French as the foremost colonial powers in the East.
631. *Ibid*, Ext 4832, Note by Kusho Chang-ngo-pa (Ringang) of the Tibetan Foreign Office, 7 Sep 1944.
632. *Ibid*, Ext 5254, India to Secretary of State, 15 Nov 1944.
633. *Ibid*, Ext 140, Aide-memoire, 4 Dec 1944.
634. *Ibid*, Ext 5255, IO memo, [nd].
635. *Ibid*, Ext 296, Secretary of State to India, 20 Jan 1945.
636. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4226*, Ext 5849, India to Secretary of State, 8 Nov 1945.
637. *Ibid*, Extract from private letter, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 Mar 1946.
638. *Ibid*, Ext 1251, Hopkinson to India, 29 Jan 1946. Hugh Richardson says that he warned the Tibetans at Lhasa 'without, so far as I can remember, any encouragement from New Delhi'.
639. *Ibid*, Ext 908, Hopkinson to India, 18 Jan 1946.
640. *Ibid*, Ext 2932, Chungking to India, 18 Apr 1946.
641. *Ibid*, Ext 3632, Richardson to Sikkim, 16 Apr 1946. Also translation of Tibetan Foreign Bureau letter to Richardson, 12 Apr 1948.
642. *Ibid*, Ext 4013, Memo by Richardson, 7 Apr 1946. 'The evil genius in this matter appears to be Surkhang Dzasa. He was in frequent touch with Shen during the latter's stay here; the idea of a good-will Mission was his; and the Kashag who, I understand, are largely swayed by his advice seem to have left arrangements to him. In addition, Surkhang has told me, for the first identifiable time, a deliberate lie in saying that the Foreign Bureau had instructed the Mission to keep clear of the Chinese Assembly. This has been denied by Kapshopa Shapé and by Dzasa Lama of the Foreign Bureau'.
643. *Ibid*, Ext 4013, India to Secretary of State, 28 May 1946.
644. *Ibid*, Ext 7826, Nanking to India, 25 Oct 1946. '. . . the Chinese authorities have, from the date of the arrival of the Mission, made no attempt to conceal the fact that they were here to attend the National Assembly'.
645. *Ibid*, Ext 8546, Nanking to FO, 20 Nov 1946. Six 'tame' Tibetan supporters of the Panchen Lama also attended the ceremony.
646. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4197*, Ext 6072, Report by Richardson, 16 Jan 1947. The Tibetan Government did in fact instruct the Mission in June 1946 to present their demands by letter to Chiang Kai-shek and return immediately, but without effect.
647. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4226*, Ext 5366, Minute by Ross, 11 Feb 1947.
648. *Ibid*, Ext 5935, Lamb to Kitson, 28 Feb 1947.
649. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4636*, Ext 6758, Official report on the Asian Relations Conference, 29 Jul 1948, pp. 8 and 277.
650. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4197*, Ext 6072, Note by IO, 31 Mar 1947. 'To condone any future absorption of Tibet by a foreign

power would hardly be in harmony with recent utterances by Pandit Nehru. There are grounds for hope therefore that the present attitude of India towards Tibet will continue'.

651. Richardson, *op cit*, pp. 169–72. The course of events are described by Hugh Richardson, who was present during the crisis in Lhasa.
652. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4212*, Ext 7178, FO to IO, 3 Jul 1947. See also Shakabpa, *op cit*, pp. 306–07.
653. *Ibid*, Ext 7725, Extract from Tibetan Intelligence Report, 16 Jul 1947.
654. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4197*, Ext 6072, Report by Richardson, 16 Jan 1947.
655. *Ibid*, Ext 6697, Secretary of State to India, 3 Jun 1947.
656. *Ibid*, Ext 7305, India to Secretary of State, 10 Jul 1947.
657. *Ibid*, Ext 7469, India to Sikkim, 23 Jul 1947. Hugh Richardson, in a note, says that 'The British Government was disgracefully slow in telling the Tibetans what they intended to do in August 1947. I was left with no instructions whatever until 23 July, I think. I informed the Tibetan Government on 25 July. HMG also assured the Tibetan Government that they would continue to take a friendly interest in the welfare and autonomy of the country, and hoped that contacts might be maintained by visits from the British representative in India (a rather hollow gesture as it turned out). The Tibetans were definitely told that HMG's rights and responsibilities would devolve on the successor government'.
658. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4210*, Ext 4526, Eden to Seymour, 22 Jul 1943.
659. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4197*, Ext 6949, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 24 Jun 1947.
660. *Ibid*, Ext 7922, India to Secretary of State, 29 Aug 1947.
661. *Ibid*, Ext 8640, Fry to Donaldson, 7 Nov 1947. Richardson, *op cit*, p. 174. '. . . it was an attempt to test the Indian attitude to border regions where their British predecessors had, by a series of agreements, established the frontier of India, but it was also an example of the way in which Tibetans interpreted the political testament of the late Dalai Lama . . . The request to India was the counterpart of the message conveyed to the Chinese Government by the Goodwill Mission in 1946, in which they asked, in equally wide terms, for the return of all Tibetan territories still in Chinese hands'.
662. *Ibid*, Ext 8800, Fry to Donaldson, 25 Nov 1947. In addition to much of the tribal areas, the Tibetans asked for territory in Ladakh up to the boundary of Yarkhim (Yarkand) and parts of Bhutan, Sikkim and Darjeeling.
663. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4195*, Ext 7475, Shattock to Walsh-Atkins, 27 Oct 1948.
664. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4210*, Ext 6243, Fry to Hopkinson, 8 Apr 1947.
665. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4195B*, Ext 7000, Central Daily News, Nanking, 20 Jul 1948. 'During the last 100 years, the British have continually encroached on Tibet and planted the seeds of political trouble. The results of their work has been taken over by the Indians'.
666. *Ibid*, Patrick to Dening, 16 Nov 1948.
667. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2175*, Ext 6870, Nair to Donaldson, 3 Jun 1947.
668. Richardson, *op cit*, p. 178. States that though the Tibetans were ready to accept arms and ammunition, yet they would not commit themselves to a thorough-going training programme which would have greatly improved their prospects of resisting Communist attack.
669. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4210*, No 656, FO to Chungking, 21 Jul 1943.
670. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4195B*, Patrick to Dening, 16 Nov 1948.
671. *Ibid*, Ext 1484, IO memorandum. 'HMG's interest in Tibet arises from: (a) HMG's existing responsibility to Parliament both for the external affairs of India and for the defence of India against aggression by a Great Power; (b) the relations of the UK and India on the one side and China on the other. It is hardly conceivable that the latter responsibility will not be continued in some form even after India attains complete independence'.
672. *Ibid*, Minute by Monteath, 18 Feb 1949.

673. Krishna Menon quoted in the *New York Times*, 16 Aug 1950.
674. *In two Chinas*, Krishna Madhava Panikkar (London, 1955), p.102. 'The only area where our interests overlapped was in Tibet and knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuomintang, had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area I had, even before I started for Peking, come to the conclusion that British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interests could not be maintained. The Prime Minister had also in general agreed with this view'. It was Panikkar who was responsible for blocking the attempt to debate the Tibetan question at the United Nations in 1950. The British Government followed India's line.
675. Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet of 23 May 1951, *see* Appendix.
676. *New York Times*, 28 Aug 1951.
677. Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, 29 Apr 1954.
678. *Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the Governments of India and China:* white paper [no I], (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1959), pp.98–110.
679. *Ibid*, white paper [no II], Nehru to Chou En-lai, 26 Sep 1959.
680. *Ibid*, white paper [no I], Nehru to Chou En-lai, 14 Dec 1958.
681. *Ibid*, white paper [nos I, II and III], for correspondence between Nehru and Chou En-lai, 1954–65. See also *Himalayan frontiers*, Dorothy Woodman (London, 1969), pp.212–95, for full analysis of events from 1947 to the India-China war in 1962.
682. *Ibid*, white paper [no III], Nehru to Chou En-lai, 21 Dec 1959.
683. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations* [VI] (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1963), 10 Sep 1959, p.142. 'The other day in a speech he [Dalai Lama] delivered, I think somewhere in Delhi, he talked of the McMahon Line and the status of Tibet being at the same level, which was quite incorrect'.
684. *Ibid*, 4 Sep 1959, p.110. 'The Tibetans claim that they were independent for many periods except when they were forced into some kind of subservience. It is a fact, of course, that ever since the Manchu Dynasty fell . . . Tibet was practically independent, even so not 100%, even so China never gave up her claim. But in effect it was independent'.
685. *Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the Governments of India and China:* white paper [no III], (Ministry of External Affairs, India). China to India, 21 Dec 1959. Chou reminded Nehru of his previous unwillingness to benefit from British imperialism. After all, China had made it clear that they did not wish to touch on the boundary question in the negotiations in 1954 and that position had been accepted by India.
686. IOR: *L/P&S/10/432*, P 5062, King to Alston, 5 Nov 1913.
687. Woodman, *op cit*, p.217.
688. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations*, *op cit*, 27 Apr 1959, p.35. '. . . we hope China will also do likewise and that nothing will be said which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the point of view of the peace of Asia and the world'.
689. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/3* vol III, Hamilton to Curzon, 22 Aug 1902. '. . . the Tibetans are but the smallest of pawns on the political chessboard, but castles, knights, and bishops may be all involved in trying to take that pawn'.

Sikkim

Sikkim, the Gurkhas and early contacts with the East India Company, 1768–1816

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the country now known as Nepal was fragmented into a number of fealties, all paying theoretical allegiance to the Mughal Emperor in Delhi. Imperial authority, however, had never been found effective in subduing the hill states, and as the Mughal body politic declined, the truculent hill chiefs seized the opportunity to take matters into their own hands. The resulting in-fighting brought into prominence the Shah family of the small state of Gurkha in the Narayani or Gandak basin. By the middle of the eighteenth century, under the leadership of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the people of the area embarked on a campaign to conquer the Nepal valley. By 1768, Kathmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon had fallen to the Gurkhas and the state of Nepal was born.[1]

Prithvi Narayan Shah paused only briefly to consolidate his hold on the valley, before resuming his operations in a north-easterly direction and in the process acquiring other lands for the new Kingdom of Nepal. One such territory was the Morung. The Gurkhas, having overrun it, turned their attention to the Himalayan state of Sikkim, whose boundaries in those days stretched in the south-west to Baikantpur in the Indian plains, and in the north-west to the Arun river in the hills. Sikkim was a settlement of Lepchas, a Himalayan people who had for their rulers not Hindu chiefs from India but Buddhist princes from Tibet.[2] As the Gurkhas made preparations for an invasion of Sikkim territory, a warning from Tibet, which considered Sikkim to be a dependency, together wtih the death of Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1775, temporarily put a stop to the Gurkhas' plans. Infiltration and skirmishing between the Lepchas and the Gurkhas continued along the Arun river until the Tibetan Government was forced to agree to move the frontier further east, making the Kankai river the boundary in the lowlands and leaving to Sikkim the two passes of Ilam and Taplejung in the hills.

The Gurkhas had no intention of honouring the treaty, and almost immediately launched an attack into Sikkim by the very two passes left to them of Taplejung and Ilam. For nine years, the Lepchas held up the Gurkhas, until in 1788 the ruling prince was defeated and fled to Tibet. While there, the Tibetan Government provided him with military assistance as did the Deb Raja of Bhutan, and with their joint help he returned to evict the Gurkhas from his land. By the time the Sikkim Raja had expelled them, the Bhutanese troops sent to help him had mutinied amongst themselves due to lack of pay and provisions, thus providing the Gurkhas with an opportunity to take refuge in the fort at Nagri, within the borders of Sikkim, and there to await for their own reinforcements to arrive. When the Gurkhas finally returned, they were able to conquer Sikkim territory west of the Tista river, and compel the Raja and his loyal Lepcha General to take refuge in the fort at Gangtok. Here they ensconced themselves and were found, with their faithful band of followers, still harassing the Gurkhas when the British went to war with Nepal in 1814.[3]

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Nepal, the Bengal Government decided that the move would affect its own commercial interests and that the stakes were high enough to justify an attempt to contain the Gurkhas by military intervention. In June of that year, Captain Kinloch marched to the assistance of the Raja of Kathmandu with a force of 2,400 men.[4] The expedition was a total failure, and the Bengal Government's enthusiasm for direct confrontation with the Gurkhas distinctly cooled. In direct contrast their enthusiasm grew for establishing a trans-Himalayan trade. Because the Gurkhas were steadily expanding their empire across the eastern Himalaya, it was inevitable that they should be held responsible for obstructing British attempts to transport their goods through the passes leading to Tibet.[5]

By the time Warren Hastings had become Governor General of Bengal in 1771, he was convinced that trade between Bengal and Tibet via Nepal had once been considerable, and it was the Gurkha intervention that had broken the rhythm of interchange and all but destroyed the route and the trade itself. In actual fact, there is little evidence to suggest that Nepal, previous to the Gurkha conquest, had been a thriving centre for trans-Himalayan trade, but it was one of the arguments Hastings used to persuade the Bengal Government to send George Bogle to Tibet in 1774.[6] His aim was to try and establish trade marts, for the idea of attacking the Gurkhas and forcing open a route to Tibet was an undertaking Hastings was not prepared to consider, particularly when he remembered the abortive Kinloch expedition.

It was Bhutan that provided an opportunity to put into effect Hastings' plan to establish an alternative route into Tibet. The Bhutanese had been harassing the state of Cooch Behar for many years, but in 1773 they launched a major offensive against the Raja's troops. The Raja sought the help of Warren Hastings, who sent a force to assist him, determining at the same time to use the opportunity to acquire Cooch Behar itself for the Company. By April 1773, the Bhutanese, sufficiently alarmed at the turn of events, appealed to the Panchen Lama at Tashilhunpo in Tibet.[7] The Panchen Lama's intervention on behalf of Bhutan brought not only a letter pleading for clemency towards the Bhutanese, but gifts of Russian gilt leather, talents of gold and silver, bags of musk, Tibetan wool cloth and Chinese silk. The gifts themselves were conveyed in chests of considerable workmanship, with dove-tailed joints, their finish greatly impressing the Bengal merchants. In fact, all the circumstances provided proof to indicate '. . . an extensive commerce, internal wealth and an advanced knowledge of the arts of common life'.[8] The opening afforded Hastings a chance for direct contact with Tashilhunpo which he did not hesitate to take.

Warren Hastings' insistence on trying to open up alternative routes to Tibet served also to alarm the Gurkhas. The ultimate aim of both was to foster their separate commercial interests with that country, the one believing that trans-Himalayan markets were vital for the upkeep of Bengal, while, on the other hand, the Gurkhas had no intention of allowing British interests in any way to diminish their own close economic ties with Tibet. It is likely that the Gurkhas, noting that Bogle's mission was followed closely by various other

embassies,[9] and fearing that the British would seize by force the country that had long been their own goal, decided them to invade Tibet in 1788.

In Tibet itself, the Gurkhas found that Chinese control of Tibet's economy and trade relations was indicative of their political control in Lhasa but not so in Shigatse. As a result, the Tibetan authorities usually invoked the Chinese presence as an obstacle to closer commercial ties with them and, for that matter, with any other outside country. Bogle and Turner had found the same stumbling block, but somehow had managed to persuade themselves that bypassing the Gurkhas, and concluding arrangements with Shigatse and Bhutan, was enough in itself and would eventually remove all serious impediments to trade. But trade did not pick up, nor did merchants come to the markets in Bengal. In fact, it was whispered in Tibet and Bhutan that the Panchen Lama's death in Peking in 1780 while paying his respects to the Emperor, was China's way of showing what would happen if Lhasa attempted to show friendship to the British.[10]

One of the main causes of dispute between the Tibetans and Gurkhas was the currency arrangement between the two countries. The Tibetans insisted that their currency, debased with copper, was equal in value to the purer silver currency issued by the Kathmandu mint. The Gurkha Government demanded the recall of the Tibetan currency. Negotiations to solve the problem between the two states went on for nine years, during which time trade suffered a dramatic decline. In addition, the Gurkhas objected to the Tibetan habit of adulterating salt and levying arbitrary and excessive duties on Nepalese goods.[11] Finding the Tibetan Government deaf to all their complaints, the Gurkhas then decided to send a punitive expedition to teach the Tibetans a lesson. The attack, in 1788, was wholly unexpected by the Tibetans, who, having no force of their own with which to oppose the Gurkhas, appealed to the Emperor of China. The principal of the three Chinese generals sent to help the Tibetans withstand the assault decided to come instead to a secret understanding with the Gurkhas and sent a false report to the Emperor. The Gurkhas were persuaded to withdraw on the promise of a yearly tribute from the monastic authorities in Tibet. Lhasa, however, refused to honour the bond and, in 1791, the Gurkhas invaded Tibet once again. While the Gurkhas looted and pillaged Tashilhunpo, the Chinese Amban withdrew the infant Panchen Lama from Shigatse, the monastic officials refused to resist and the Chinese General, fearing severe punishment when his culpability was found out and exposed, drowned himself. All was confusion in Shigatse.

By the autumn of 1791, the Chinese Amban found that it was impossible to conceal the true facts from the Emperor. When he learned what had happened, the Emperor had the Amban of Shigatse shackled with a cangue, and sent his best Manchu General, Fuk'angan, at the head of an immense expeditionary force to chastise the Gurkhas. By June 1792, the Chinese army had expelled the Gurkhas from Tibet and were preparing to invade Nepal. The Gurkhas were pursued within twenty miles of Kathmandu, where they surrendered and agreed to send a regular tribute to Peking as vassals of the Celestial Empire.[12]

Having arrived in Tibet, the Emperor seized the opportunity afforded to reorganise the administration of Tibet in the interests of China. The old economic dispensation was cancelled and money struck in Nepal was henceforth banned in Tibet, where a new mint was set up with Chinese expertise. All foreign trade with Tibet was subjected to the strictest regulations and Tibetans were allowed to trade with outsiders only under licence and then only by approved routes. The Chinese Ambans now became the sole medium of communication with the outside world, and the Gurkhas found that their attempt to frustrate the closure of Tibet by China had merely precipitated the event. The Chinese success in Tibet served not only as a painful lesson to the Gurkhas but a warning to the British not to interfere. It certainly taught the Bengal Government that the principal obstacle to Himalayan trade was not the presence of the Gurkhas of Nepal, but the jealousy of the Manchus in Tibet.[13]

In 1792, with the Chinese hammering at the doors of Kathmandu, the Gurkhas agreed to sign a commercial treaty with the Company.[14] They did so in the hope that Lord Cornwallis, the Governor General,[15] would help them in their fight against China. That hope was completely belied, for Lord Cornwallis was merely prepared to offer the services of Captain William Kirkpatrick as peacemaker in the Gurkhas' quarrel with China. Kirkpatrick was to go to Kathmandu, and while there to supervise the implementation of the commercial treaty.[16] The trade in question merely related to local goods between the Nepalese lowlands and northern India. The treaty, therefore, made no mention of Tibetan trade. But the importance attached to it was not overlooked by Kirkpatrick who saw the Chinese presence in the neighbourhood of India leading to increased border incidents which would come eventually to '. . . disturb, more or less, the commercial relations subsisting between them and the East India Company in another part of Asia'.[17]

The closure of the Bhutan route after the Chinese intervention in Tibet meant that Nepal alone, with its commercial treaty of 1792, offered an opening for British goods to reach the Tibetan plateau. The potential was not great, but in Kirkpatrick's view it was the sole alternative left to Bengal. In 1795, Sir John Shore, the Governor General, decided to take his advice. 'I have deputed a Native to Napaul with Merchandize; the Attempt is made upon so moderate a scale, that the Loss will be trifling even if it should entirely fail; but I have better hopes'.[18] A Muslim trader, Abdul Kadir Khan, was despatched with a stock of British goods to Nepal with instructions that, if the opportunity seemed favourable, he was to find a means of getting the goods into Tibet. On his return, Abdul Kadir reported that not only had all his goods found a ready market in Nepal, but that some of them were purchased for re-export to Tibet. He was of the opinion that a substantial trade could be developed on the Indo-Nepalese border provided '. . . if it should be found practicable hereafter to carry on direct trade with the natives of Thibet or of China . . . without the agency or intervention of the inhabitants of Napaul'.[19]

In 1800, trade through Nepal having shown no signs of an appreciable increase, Lord Wellesley, the Governor General,[20] took advantage of a crisis in

Nepal to place a Resident at Kathmandu. He first sent Captain Knox to arbitrate in a quarrel between the ex-Raja Rana Bahadur, who was in exile in Benares, and the new government in Kathmandu and, if possible, to restore Rana Bahadur as a puppet of the Company. The scheme failed, but the interest shown by the Company in the ex-Raja at Benares had a salutary effect on Damodar Panre's government in Kathmandu.[21] The Panre Government agreed to a new treaty, and Captain Knox went to Kathmandu in 1801 as the first British Resident.[22] His instructions were to obtain the maximum amount of information while arousing the minimum amount of suspicion. He was to investigate the possibility of opening up a beneficial trade with Tibet through Nepal, for it was emphasised that 'The importation into the Company's Provinces of Gold and Silver bullion is an object of considerable importance'.[23] But in carrying out his instructions, Knox was to be careful not to offend the Chinese. Although Wellesley did not consider the Kingdom of Nepal to be in any degree dependent on the Chinese Empire, yet '. . . considerations . . . connected with the security of the interests of the Hon'ble Company in China rendered it necessary to observe a considerable degree of caution in contracting political engagements' with the Gurkhas.[24]

As it happened, Knox's stay achieved very little in the way of establishing trade, for the political confusion existing in Kathmandu meant that the Nepal Darbar obstructed and prevaricated and Knox, instructed not to offend China, was unable to pressurise the Nepalese in order to accomplish his ends. Two years after his arrival, Lord Wellesley realising that further efforts in the direction of Nepal would yield no positive results, withdrew Knox and dissolved the existing treaties with Nepal.[25] Thereafter, the Bengal Government's main aim was to avoid all involvement in projects and policies concerned with the Nepal Darbar. It proved, however, to be an unrealistic decision for the Gurkha empire was by now contiguous throughout its length to territories either administered or protected by the Company. Before long, both the Company and Nepal found that along with their new dominions they had also inherited local disputes in and around the border areas. From the Ganges eastwards, the Company's territories in the Indian plains were separated from the Himalayan foothills by a low-lying swampy area which abounded in forests of *sal*,[26] elephant grass and teak. This fringe, called the *Terai*, extended along most of the Nepalese border and was known as the Morung in the extreme north-east on the borders of Sikkim and Nepal.

From 1768, when the Company first started to show an interest in the Morung, the Gurkhas had already begun a campaign to establish their supremacy, not only in Nepal but in the *moffusil*[27] territory of north-eastern India where administration had been transferred by the Mughul Emperor to the Company in 1765. As a result, Company *zamindars*[28] accused the Gurkhas of encroaching on their lands, and the disputes and complaints became so numerous that the local law courts found themselves overwhelmed. In an attempt to relieve the situation, Lord Cornwallis, in 1795, went out of his way to assure the Raja of Nepal that he was prepared to define the long uncertain border between the Morung and Purnea in conformity with the Raja's

representations. At the time, the Gurkhas showed themselves anxious to have these disputes settled, but not long after they began to threaten British interests in the north eastern district of Kheri in the province of Avadh (Oudh). The hill rajas, who had previously owned the territory in the *Terai*, finding themselves unable to defend their states had agreed in the end to cede them to the Gurkhas. Inevitably, problems regarding the limits of their respective dominions then arose between the Company and the Gurkhas. Both found that trying to establish the jurisdiction of each of the hill rajas was almost impossible to define since most of them had not been *zamindars* of these lowland tracts, but tenants in them of the Nawabs of Bengal and Avadh.[29]

To unravel the knot of precedent and rights, the task demanded good faith and a wish to compromise on both sides. But compromise was not a word much in use at the Court of Kathmandu, where the fall of the Prime Minister, Damodar Panre, had brought forward a new Chief Minister in the form of Bhim Sen Thapa, assisted by his father, General Amar Thapa. General Thapa's first excursion occurred into Gorakhpur territory which had been annexed by the Company from the Nawab of Avadh sixteen years previously. The Gurkhas were requested to evacuate the territory but apart from offering to pay the Company rent, they refused absolutely to abandon it. General Amar Thapa, taking British quiescence as tacit recognition of Gurkha rights to the area, started to extend his occupation to more and more villages in the Butwal region. Eventually, Company officials persuaded the local Gurkha officials to discuss the limits of each other's territory. Negotiations between the two sides were conducted by Major Paris Bradshaw, Head Assistant at the Lucknow Residency and Krishna Pandit, a Gurkha Commissioner. However, relations between Bradshaw and the Gurkha representative steadily deteriorated and in April 1814, the Gurkhas broke off negotiations and returned to Nepal.

In Kathmandu, a council of war was held to determine whether the Gurkhas should make a stand against the British. General Amar Thapa was in no mood to yield to the Company's demands and in this he was fully backed by his son, Bhim Sen Thapa. Others counselled restraint but in the end the party of resistance carried the day, and General Thapa was instructed to prepare the military defence of the territories under his command. 'To humiliate the haughty British, by turning against them the model soldiers he had drilled and rehearsed with solicitude and pride, was the paramount ambition of this ailing but ferocious old war lord'.[30] General Thapa saw his chance when the Magistrate of Gorakhpur ordered seventeen companies of native infantry to take possession of Butwal and Siuraj. At first, General Thapa's men retreated as the British advanced, but on 20 May he regrouped his troops and attacked a number of *thanas*[31] in Butwal and managed to kill eighteen Company policemen.

When news of the attack reached Calcutta, the consensus of opinion amongst Company officials including those of the Governor General, Lord Moira,[32] was that no alternative remained but to use force to stop the Gurkhas from exploiting the collapse of Mughal authority to the detriment of

Company revenue and the security of its officers. Lord Moira pointed to the Gurkha advance westwards towards the Sutlej and eastwards far into Sikkim as posing a certain threat to British interests. He was uncertain as to whether China would come to the aid of her tributary Nepal if a war arose between the Company and the Gurkhas. There was evidence to suggest that the Gurkha ambassador at the Imperial Court in Peking had asked the Chinese authorities for military aid in 1813 against the Sikkimese, who had been proving truculent.[33] The request, at the very least, had received a sympathetic hearing. As a result, Lord Moira believed that there was a very real danger of the Chinese coming to the aid of the Gurkhas in the hopes of providing a diversion and forcing Company troops to fight on two fronts. He decided '. . . that there could never be real peace . . . until we should yield to the Gurkhas our provinces north of the Ganges, making that river the boundary between us'.[34] He had no intention of letting that situation ever arise. In 1814, having failed to persuade the Gurkhas to negotiate, Lord Moira decided to go to war with Nepal.[35]

The most crucial question facing Lord Moira at the outbreak of the Gurkha War was what would be the Chinese attitude if the British annexed Nepalese territory, an event which the war might indeed make necessary? William Moorcroft, a Veterinary Surgeon with the Bengal Government, who had travelled widely in the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs and the Karakorum with a view to exploring the various trade routes, was able to provide the Governor General with some valuable information. Moorcroft's contact was Mir Izat Ullah, an agent of a Kashmiri commercial house in Patna, who related that the Nepalese, fearing a British attack, had sent '. . . a letter to the principal Chinese Tajun residing at Lassa, desiring him to forward another letter to the Emperor of China'[36] The Chinese reply had declared the readiness of the Emperor to afford the necessary help and had asked to know 'its amount', both in money and in men.

In March 1815, it came to Lord Moira's notice that the Gurkha Raja had again appealed to the Chinese Emperor for help. 'From Khunka to the Sutleje, for a thousand *coss*,[37] war is waging between us. Entertaining designs upon Bhote [Tibet], the enemy endeavours to get possession of Nepaul, and for these objects he had fomented quarrel and declared war'.[38] The letter went on to ask that the Emperor should send an army of three thousand men to attack Bengal from Bhutan 'thus spreading alarm and consternation among the Europeans as far as Calcutta'. The fact that the Nepalese Raja had acknowledged the supremacy of the Emperor of China 'above all Potentates on earth', and put forward the suggestion that the Company's ultimate designs were on Tibet itself, Lord Moira was convinced were arguments that would find sympathy in Peking. It was necessary, therefore, to try and allay Chinese fears. Two methods suggested themselves.

Dr Buchanan, who had accompanied Captain Knox to Kathmandu in 1801, was the Company's chief expert on Nepalese affairs and advised that it was not in the Company's interests to annex Nepal. 'The actual situation of the Bengal Government, therefore, with respect to Nepaul, presents to my idea an

enormous length of frontier, more difficult perhaps than any in the world, to guard by defensive measures against the sudden predatory attacks of a hostile, vigorous, rapacious and cruel neighbour, to place whom in a different situation seems therefore to be a precaution most urgently requisite'. Buchanan was certain that the Chinese would probably have no objection to restoring the Nepalese chiefs who had been dispossessed by the Gurkhas, provided 'they are allowed perfect independence; and I believe that they are as fully tired of the insolence of Goorka as the British Government appears to be'.[39]

The second alternative was to present to the Chinese the Company's aims and ambitions in relation to Nepal and to appraise them of their case against the Gurkhas. To do so needed a channel of communication with China, and John Adam, Secretary to the Bengal Government, thought that the hill state of Sikkim, with its close political ties with Tibet, was the obvious answer. 'The Princes of Siccim, being closely connected with the Lamas of Lassa and Bootan, their restoration to their ancient territory would, no doubt, be highly acceptable to the authorities in those countries, and induce them to regard our proceedings with satisfaction'.[40] It was also known that during the second Gurkha invasion of Tibet, proffers of aid to the Chinese had gone out from the Sikkim Raja; and that during the many disputes which had arisen between Sikkim and the Gurkhas, the Manchu Amban had prevailed upon the Gurkhas in 1794 not to disturb the *status quo* of the hill kingdom. However, the closeness of Sikkim's rulers to the hierarchy in Tibet had not gone unnoticed by the Emperor Ch'ien Lung when he seized the opportunity in 1792 to reorganise the Tibetan administration; for at the same time he had forbidden the tribes of Sikkim to trade across the Tibetan frontier.[41]

One of the Company's main objectives was to isolate Nepal, particularly when it came to Bengal's notice that Nepal and Bhutan were about to conclude an alliance. The fact that they were separated by the State of Sikkim was an added reason to establish contact. Moreover, they knew that the warlike Gurkhas had harried the Sikkimese for thirty years and compelled the Raja of Sikkim to withdraw into the hills; in consequence it was more than likely that he would be ready to help the British if he was offered assistance in recovering the lands wrested from him. Lord Moira, however, was well aware that, although the Raja now governed his truncated kingdom from Gangtok, he had before the Gurkha invasion possessed '. . . a territory to the southward, including a portion of the low lands adjoining the zillah of Purnea'. He wanted it to be made clear to the Raja that there would be no question of this particular piece of land reverting to the Sikkim Darbar at the end of the war. For the present, the political advantage of assisting Sikkim militarily would far outweigh the disadvantage of not involving the state in the Company's war with the Gurkhas. Above all it might open up a channel of communication with Lhasa, keep the Gurkhas and Bhutanese from intriguing together, and provide '. . . a number of points at which . . . to assail the Gurkhas'.[42] David Scott, Magistrate at Rangpur, was instructed in December 1814 to try and establish contact with Lhasa, either through Sikkim or through Bhutan, and

Captain Barre Latter of the Bengal Army was sent to encourage the Sikkimese to keep up their attacks on the Gurkhas.

In March 1815, Latter, with a force of 2,000, entered the Morung and established contact with the Sikkim Darbar. He did not find it too difficult to persuade the Sikkimese to co-operate and, in return for some modest supplies of ammunition, the Raja himself offered that when the British '. . . commence hostilities in the low country, we will attack the Goorkas in the hills'.[43] He also made a spontaneous gesture of offering to open up a channel of communication with the administration in Lhasa. In return for Sikkim's help, David Scott assured Raja Tsugphud Namgyal that he could rely on British support in his attempts to recover the territories lost to the Gurkhas, together with a stipulation that Sikkim's future independence would be safeguarded in any treaty of peace which the British Government might make with the Nepalese.[44]

Throughout the hostilities with Nepal, Lord Moira had genuinely feared that the Chinese might come to the aid of their tributary Nepal. In fact, he had gone so far as to issue an order in 1815 to General Marley in the field not to fire on Chinese troops unless it was absolutely certain that they were hostile. '. . . to convey to him the most distinct assurances, that we had no design of appropriating territory to ourselves in that quarter, our sole object being to punish the insolent aggression of the Nepaulese'.[45] Although the signing of the Treaty of Segauli on 2 December 1815[46] which brought the Gurkha War to an end, the terms of the Treaty itself brought into question the status of Nepal as well as that of Sikkim. Lord Moira was faced with the problem of wondering whether the Nepalese, being a tributary of China, had the right to make an agreement with the East India Company at all. And, indeed, how would China react to British annexation of the hill states of Kumaon and Garhwal, and to placing Sikkim, a state under the suzerainty of Tibet, under British protection?

Having entered into 'friendly communication and connexion' with the Sikkim Raja, the British Government pledged to secure for him all the territory which he had possessed prior to the Gurkha intervention, or whatever else could be recovered from the Gurkhas.[47] When the Treaty of Segauli was finally signed, under Article III all the lowlands between the rivers Mechi and Tista and all the territories within the hills eastward of the river Mechi, including the fort and lands of Nagri, the pass of Nagarkot leading from the Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between Nagarkot and Nagri, were ceded to the East India Company in perpetuity by Nepal.[48] These were the lands which Raja Tsugphud Namgyal had hoped to recover in exchange for helping the Company at war. He soon found that Lord Moira held to his earlier conviction not to cede back the area to Sikkim. There is no evidence to suggest that the Raja had ever been informed of the Governor General's decision. On the contrary, the status of Sikkim itself was changed without so much as a passing reference to the ruler or the Darbar. Under Article VI, the Raja of Nepal had to promise not to molest or disturb the Raja of Sikkim in the possession of his territories, and to agree that in the event of any

differences arising between Nepal and Sikkim, the dispute would be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by whose award the two sides would engage to abide. It was not long before this somewhat anomalous position was rectified and Sikkim became a fully protected state under the British Government. The suzerainty of Tibet, which both Sikkim and Tibet invariably acknowledged at various times in their difficulties with the British, Lord Moira chose to ignore.

A few months after the signing of the Segauli Treaty, news reached Kathmandu that a large Chinese force was on its way towards Nepal. Edward Gardner, the British Resident at Kathmandu, informed Bengal that the Gurkhas had no reason to welcome this development, since they feared that the Chinese had probably come to punish them for going to war with the Company or furthermore for concluding a treaty with it.[49] Lord Moira was totally averse to involving the Company in any dispute that Nepal might have with China, and therefore hoped that the crisis would blow over. In the meantime, he wanted someone from the Kathmandu Residency to go to Lhasa and while there to explain to the Chinese, in detail, that the Treaty of Segauli in no way affected existing Nepalese relations with China. At the same time, he was to justify the extension of British rule into the Kumaon hills and Sikkim, and on no account to commit the Company to withdrawing from these regions. Only in the last resort, if it seemed essential and the Chinese insisted on it, was the agent to agree to the Kathmandu Residency being withdrawn.[50]

Edward Gardner decided against the deputation of one of his officers to Tibet, although it was agreed to send an explanation to the Chinese in Lhasa giving a detailed account of the reason why the Company had gone to war with Nepal. The despatch was to go by the Sikkim route.[51] By the time the Chinese crisis was over, and no one in India appeared to know the reason for 2,000 Chinese troops suddenly descending on Lhasa, it confirmed Lord Moira in his decision to try and establish a regular channel of communication with Peking. Nepal and Sikkim offered the obvious intermediaries let alone routes for overland communication, but Bengal soon found that setting up the requisite network required active co-operation from the Chinese Government in Peking, and they, when asked, appeared to have no interest whatsoever in establishing such a service.[52]

The Treaty of Titalia and relations with the East India Company, 1817–26

Following the political settlement after the Gurkha War, relations between the Company and Sikkim were further extended. During the war, the Company's intentions had been to isolate Nepal and, towards that end, to use Sikkim to facilitate communication with China if the need arose. To ensure that the Raja kept to his side of the bargain until the war was successfully over, the Company decided that the Nepalese territorial conquests in Sikkim should be surrendered, in the first instance, to themselves. Thereafter, the transfer of these possessions to the Raja of Sikkim would depend on his agreeing to

conclude an engagement with the Company 'for defining and recording the conditions of our future connexion with that State'. Only then would 'the territory and forts east of the Mitchie, ceded by the Goorkhas' be declared to be conferred in perpetuity on the Raja of Sikkim and his heirs and then only 'under the protection and guarantee of the British Government'.[53]

With this bargaining card, Captain Barre Latter did not find it difficult to persuade the Raja to agree to negotiate a treaty with his government. Raja Tsugphud Namgyal having given his consent, the agreement was incorporated in the Treaty of Titalia.[54] The treaty ran to ten Articles. First and foremost the Company guaranteed Sikkim against Gurkha aggression. In return, the Sikkimese in Article I had restored to them only part of the wrested Sikkim territory, namely the lands lying between the rivers Mechi and Tista; in Article II, it was agreed that the Sikkimese would abstain from acts of aggression or hostility against the Gurkhas or any other State; Article III gave the British Government the right to arbitrate in any dispute arising between Sikkim and Nepal, or those of any other State, and that Sikkim agreed to abide by the decision of the British Government. In Article IV, Sikkim agreed to furnish military aid to the British Government whenever they were engaged in warfare in the hills; Article V required them to return fugitives from British justice who might seek shelter in the Sikkim hills; Article VI promised to deliver up any dacoits or offenders who took refuge in Sikkim territory; Article VII agreed not to afford protection to any tax evader from British territory; Article VIII assured British Indian traders protection and freedom from exorbitant taxation within Sikkim; Article IX guaranteed the full possession of the hilly tract specified in Article I; and Article X required the Raja of Sikkim to ratify and exchange the treaty within the period of one month.

The political significance of this treaty meant that Sikkim, by agreeing to place her foreign relations under British control, became a British protectorate. Any ideas the Gurkhas may have had to expand into Sikkim territory would have found them in direct conflict with Company troops. The aim was '. . . to shut out the Nepalese from any ambitious views of aggrandizement to the east, and to circumscribe their territory on three sides while on the fourth, the stupendous range of the Heemalya and the Chinese frontier present an effectual barrier'.[55] At the same time it effectively limited the freedom of action the Sikkim Raja had possessed previously in his relations with other states, most particularly with Tibet. The British, for their part, had acquired valuable trade privileges, the most significant being the right to trade up to the Tibetan frontier through the territory of a client state.[56] The fact that Sikkim was able to provide ready communication with Lhasa and through her with China than had ever been found possible through Bhutan, Lord Moira considered as something of a diplomatic triumph '. . . which we could never have imposed by force of arms from the extreme difficulty of the country'.[57]

The treaty's main aim was to strengthen the Company's position in an area of the Himalaya which would offer good prospects for opening a route for British trade to reach the markets of Tibet, and also to act as a channel for

Anglo-Chinese diplomacy. Within two months of the signing of the Treaty of Titalia, Captain Latter recommended to the Bengal Government that the territory of Morung should be ceded back to Sikkim to '. . . subsist the garrisons he must maintain for the protection of the passes' between his kingdom and Nepal.[58] Lord Moira having agreed, the *sanad*[59] granting the land to the Raja of Sikkim acknowledged him as a feudatory and the British Government's supremacy over the Morung. Various stipulations were attached to the cession, namely that British Laws and Regulations would not be introduced into the Morung but that existing laws, suited to the habits and customs of the inhabitants, were to continue in force; that the Sikkim authorities would have to surrender all criminals who might have taken refuge in the territory, and to allow police officers from British territory to pursue defaulters into the Morung; that in times of emergency, the Governor General's orders to the local authorities in the area so ceded were to be obeyed as if they emanated from the Raja of Sikkim himself; and, finally, that the Articles and Provisions of the Treaty of Titalia were to be in force in the Morung.[60] Thus the cession of the Morung carried with it an obligation for the Raja of Sikkim to permit the British Government to exercise their suzerain rights to the territory.

During the following nine years, the Sikkim route was not exploited, nor did the Company find any need to impose any of the conditions acquired by them under the Treaty of Titalia. Within Sikkim itself dissension between the Lepcha and Tibetan sections of the population were a common feature. An instance of this arose in 1819 when a quarrel between Raja Tsugphud Namgyal and his Dewan or Chief Minister, Bho-lod, who was in fact his uncle, led to serious consequences for the latter. The disagreement between the two continued for many years until 1826 when, on the death of the Rani, who appears to have been friendly to the Dewan, the Minister was murdered near Tumlong, allegedly by the orders of the Raja.[61] The murder had been committed by Tung-yik Menchoo, father of Tokhang Donyer Namgyal, who was to become, in time, Dewan Namgyal and a thorn in the flesh of the British Government. The murdered Minister had been the leader of the pro-Lepcha faction, whereas the Raja supported the Tibetans due to his close matrimonial and religious ties with Tibet. The assassination led to the migration of hundreds of Lepchas, led by the late Dewan's cousin, Yuk-Lhat Grup (Eklathoop) who, fearing a similar fate, escaped to the Ilam area in eastern Nepal. Here, with the help of the Gurkhas, the Lepchas frequently launched raids into western Sikkim which gave rise to endless local border disputes. The Raja turned time and again to the British in the hopes of getting them to use their good offices with the Nepal Government to help extradite the offenders. At the same time, Yuk-Lhat Grup also pleaded for Company support and protection against the excesses of the Raja.[62] The Bengal Government chose to ignore both requests and tried to follow a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Sikkim.[63] They did, however, request the Nepal Government to impose restrictions on the activities of the Lepcha refugees, and advised the Raja of Sikkim to adopt a more conciliatory

policy towards his Lepcha subjects. As can be seen, in this one instance, the Sikkim Darbar was compelled, under the terms of the 1817 Treaty, to look to the Bengal Government to act as intermediaries in their communications with the Nepal Darbar.

Negotiations and the cession of Darjeeling, 1827–40

Shortly after this, in 1827, a boundary dispute arose between Sikkim and Nepal regarding the jurisdiction of a piece of land called Ontoo, which was situated on the eastern side of the river Mechi. The Raja referred the dispute to the British for arbitration. Two officers, J W Grant and Captain G S Lloyd, were deputed to investigate the dispute, and it was during their enquiries that they came upon a deserted Gurkha outpost called Dorje Ling.[64] They thought that the hill tract was ideally suited for the purpose of both a military station and a sanatorium for convalescent British officers, and they made their views known to the Bengal Government. Lord William Bentinck was impressed with 'the extreme earnestness' of Grant's views in particular, and decided to send Captain Herbert, the Deputy Surveyor-General, in the company of Grant, for a further survey of the area. The second report in 1830 being equally favourable, Bentinck decided that the Company would derive considerable commercial and political benefit from the acquisition of this particular piece of hill territory. In October 1830, Bentinck advised his Council that Captain Lloyd was to open negotiations with Raja Tsugphud Namgyal for the transfer of Dorje Ling to the Company.[65] Sir Charles Metcalfe, Member of Council, opposed the proposal on the grounds that it would involve the Company in disputes with the Raja of Sikkim who would suspect that they had plans to annex Sikkim territory. Furthermore, it would arouse the suspicions of the Nepalese, who would be sure to think that British possession of hill territory so near their own frontier was a preliminary step to a future attack on Nepal. Metcalfe's opinion was to prevail for the time being, but when in 1835 he was no longer a Member of Council, Bentinck revived the question of the transfer of Darjeeling – as it now came to be known to the British – in exchange for an equivalent either in land or money to the Sikkim Darbar.[66]

The opportunity to pursue this objective presented itself in 1834, when some of the Lepcha refugees made a further incursion into Sikkim territory, and the Raja sought the Bengal Government's help. The Governor General took the opportunity to depute Lloyd to negotiate on behalf of the Sikkim Darbar and to put forward a proposal for the cession of Darjeeling to the British Government.[67] Once Darjeeling became British territory, Lloyd's opinion was that the Lepchas would need little persuasion to take up residence in the area, and thereafter would be able to provide a labour force for the construction of the proposed sanatorium. In fact, Lloyd envisaged not a 'single Lepcha' remaining in Sikkim, and, indeed, in time coming to prefer '. . . the Christian to the Lama religion'. The prospects seemed endless once a road was built through Darjeeling, for it would find the people of Sikkim readily taking

the opportunity '. . . to open a traffic, not only between themselves and the inhabitants of Doorjeling but between Bengal and Chinese Tartary'.[68]

On 8 February 1835, Lloyd started on his journey to the Sikkim capital of Tumlong. The day after his arrival, he was received by Raja Tsugphud Namgyal when it was Lloyd's intention to propose that Sikkim should agree to cede to the Company the territory of Darjeeling. However, before Lloyd could do so, the Raja himself put forward three suggestions of his own. They were that the boundary of Sikkim should be extended to include Konchi; that his agent in the Morung, Kummo Pradhan, having embezzled for two years the Sikkim Darbar's revenue and then decamped into British territory, should be compelled to account for the money, and finally that Debgaon should be restored to Sikkim.[69] Lloyd maintained that he was in no position to grant the Raja's requests, and that he had come to Sikkim with the sole purpose of mediating between the Raja and his Lepcha subjects. He did, however, manage to mention the Governor General's proposal for the transfer of Darjeeling in exchange for other lands in the lowlands or for a sum of money.[70]

The Raja, having deliberated for six days, met Lloyd before his departure and presented him with a written statement of his requirements for ceding Darjeeling. He had withdrawn the first stipulation regarding Konchi, but required that Kummo Pradhan[71] should be made accountable for the embezzlement of the Darbar's funds, and that Debgaon should be ceded back to Sikkim. If these two requests were complied with by the Company, then the Raja was prepared to give Darjeeling to the British 'out of friendship'. The act of ceding Darjeeling, curious in itself, was to give rise to contradictory explanations by the Raja and by Lloyd. The official History of Sikkim by Maharaja Thutob Namgyal offers two explanations for this unusual act.[72] The Lepchas, he explains, had continued to raid Sikkim territory with the tacit, if not open backing of the Gurkhas, whom the Raja believed would '. . . not do anything in the matter as it was more to their interest to allow these people to carry on the vexatious raids and encroachments constantly'. His appeal to the Tibetan authorities to help with armed assistance merely brought offers of mediation and 'a most lenient view of the case'. Furthermore, the Lepcha rebels claimed Darjeeling 'as their patrimonial lands' and had made a voluntary gift of it to Captain Lloyd. The Raja, deprived of help from Tibet, was left with no alternative but to try to come to terms with the British. He had tried in vain to offer concessions elsewhere, rather than cede Darjeeling, but Lloyd was not prepared to consider anything else.[73]

The India Office records reveal that the original deed of the Darjeeling grant was given to the Raja's officers accompanying Lloyd out of Sikkim. These officers were instructed to hand over the deed to Lloyd only after the Raja's two demands had been met. Lloyd, however, succeeded in getting possession of the deed, which he promptly redrafted and despatched back to the Raja with the request that he should 'substitute this or similar paper' for the original deed. On receiving the revised deed, the Raja duly signed and returned it to Lloyd. To Lloyd's suggestion that if the Raja '. . . from friendship to the

British Government, still thought proper to give Darjeeling he should say so', the latter's singular response was that having already given the grant, he would not depart from it.[74]

It was only months later that the sequel to this curious exchange brought to light the reason for the Raja of Sikkim agreeing to the revised draft of the Darjeeling grant. After months of waiting for an answer to his two stipulations regarding Debgaon and Kummo Pradhan, the Raja enquired as to when the Bengal Government intended to discharge their part of the bargain. He pointed out that when he had said that the grant having been made he would not depart from it, he assumed that his terms had already been honoured, otherwise the cession of Darjeeling was something he would, on no account, have agreed to. 'Have the goodness to settle firmly the boundary for me . . . about Darjeeling, but last year the grant of Darjeeling under my red seal was delivered to you through my *vakeels*[75] and there can never be any departure from that by my government'.[76]

It is obvious that before signing Lloyd's redrafted deed, the Raja apparently made no attempt to ascertain whether the Governor General had acceded to his two requests. If he had, he would have found that there was no question of ceding Debgaon since it had already been ceded to the Raja of Jalpaiguri in 1828; nor did the Bengal Government intend '. . . to call people to account for money transactions which have taken place in foreign territories' and, therefore, the question of repatriating Kummo Pradhan for his crimes did not arise. Under Article VII of the Treaty of Titalia, the Raja of Sikkim was bound over to return those who defaulted over revenue matters and then sought sanctuary in his kingdom. He required that Article VII should be applied to the case of Kummo Pradhan and went so far as to provide proof of Pradhan having deposited the revenue from the Morung with the British authorities on the frontier. The Governor General's plea that money transactions which had taken place in Sikkim were beyond his jurisdiction, merely confirmed the Raja in the belief that he had been double-crossed. In the years ahead the compensation for Darjeeling, whether financial or territorial, became a source of intense grievance in the Sikkim Darbar's relations with the British Government.[77]

In rejecting the Raja's conditions for the transfer of Darjeeling, the Bengal Government thought it wise to find a piece of waste land in the neighbourhood of Sikkim which would suffice as a suitable exchange for the hill station. Lloyd was instructed to locate the waste land, and if he failed to find it then he was to suggest an adequate financial settlement for Darjeeling. Lloyd valued Darjeeling at Rs 120,000, but he doubted very much whether the Raja would accept financial compensation, since, in his opinion, money had little or no value for him.[78] It was at this point that Sir Charles Metcalfe, acting Governor General at the time, intervened once again and ordered Lloyd to refrain from further negotiations particularly since the Raja was not 'cordially disposed to cede' Darjeeling. On receiving the order, Lloyd decided that it was time to inform the Bengal Government that the Deed of the Darjeeling grant was already in his possession. Lloyd's action not only went against Metcalfe's

ruling of 1834 when he had opposed any involvement in Sikkim affairs, but also against Bentinck's original mandate which had stated that '. . . the cession of Darjeeling should not be ultimately insisted on, unless the terms offered as an equivalent to the Sikkim Raja should be really satisfactory to him'.[79] On Lloyd insistence that the transfer was unconditional and that the Raja '. . . makes the grant freely, mentions no conditions whatsoever and seems to regret that he has been misunderstood', the Bengal Government accepted the gift outright and merely acknowledged the transfer. A financial settlement was not discussed but small presents were despatched to the Raja to show the Governor General's appreciation.[80]

The cession of Darjeeling was to prove of great importance to the British, not only in their relations with the hill states of Bhutan and Nepal, but as 'a reminder of the possibilities of trade with Tibet'. The manner of the annexation and the failure of the Bengal Government to compensate adequately Raja Tsugphud Namgyal led to strained relations between the ruler and Lloyd. Lloyd was to complain that the Raja put every obstacle in the way of the development of the hill station, particularly in regard to preventing Sikkimese labour from going down to Darjeeling. He suggested inviting 'Eklathoos Kazee, his friends and relations with about 1,200 followers' to Darjeeling, provided they agreed to construct a road and convey 'the post within the Hills and furnishing workmen'.[81] The Bengal Government declined Lloyd's proposal, knowing full well that to encourage the opposing Lepcha faction to settle in Darjeeling would only unsettle relations with Sikkim still further and in no way advance British interests with regard to trans-Himalayan trade.

The official History of Sikkim produces sound reasons, from the Darbar's point of view, to justify the resentment felt by them at the presence of the British on their soil. 'But in real fact ever since your arrival in Darjeeling you have not only done nothing to help me, but giving ears to all the talks of evil minded people, endless disputes have arisen. The neighbouring States are perpetually bothering me. It will not do if Darjeeling falls into another State's hands'.[82] The Raja found that both Bhutan and Tibet had turned against him and accused him of having sold Darjeeling to the Company. The Tibetans went so far as to deprive the Sikkimese of their traditional grazing rights along the Tibetan frontier which marched with that of Sikkim. As for the Bhutanese, in 1844, they attempted to assassinate the Raja while he was on his way to Lhasa on a pilgrimage.[83]

The Sikkim authorities particularly resented the singular interpretation put upon Article VII of the Treaty of Titalia by which the Bengal Government refused to surrender slaves who sought refuge in Darjeeling territory, and at the same time held the Sikkim Darbar responsible for criminals who escaped from Indian territory and found asylum in Sikkim.[84] Nor was the Raja free from pressure from his other neighbour, Tibet. Article VIII of the Treaty of Titalia, the British took to mean that it gave their officials the right to travel through Sikkim and up to the Tibetan border. The Tibetan authorities found the practice objectionable and made their position clear to the Sikkim Raja.

'That though Sikkim is a country under the direct control of Tibet, yet the Sikkim Durbar had given a portion of their land called Wangdu-Dorji Ling to European powers [Ferangi Sahebs], and was taking an annual subsidy of some thousands of rupees from them for it . . . if the above statements be true, it [Tibet] will demand back the Rhenock land'.[85] It was inevitable that the Sikkim Raja, already resentful at the manner of the annexation of Darjeeling, should take note of Tibet's warning. She stood, after all, in the category of Sikkim's traditional suzerain.

Under pressure from both of his neighbours, the Raja took the line that his allegiance lay with Tibet. Moreover, he was smarting under the blow of having lost Darjeeling without any adequate compensation to show for it. As a result of these conditions, two events were to precipitate the inevitable crisis. One was the appointment of Dr Campbell as Superintendent of Darjeeling in 1839.[86] The other was the death in 1847 of the Chief Minister of Sikkim, Dewan Ilam Singh, the only man of the Sikkim Darbar who found it possible to negotiate with Campbell. Campbell's appointment as Superintendent gave him charge of civil, criminal and fiscal matters relating to the Darjeeling district; it also put him in charge of political relations with the Sikkim Darbar. Soon after his arrival in Darjeeling, Campbell received a letter from Raja Tsugphud Namgyal protesting that so far no compensation had been given for Darjeeling, and requesting the new Superintendent to expedite matters. The Raja thought it wise to address the Governor General as well, particularly in view of the fact that throughout his negotiations with Lloyd, although promises had been made to recompense him either in land or money, nothing had been forthcoming. He set out some new demands; since the Company was not prepared to cede back Debgaon, he was prepared to accept a small tract of land lying east of the Mahanandi river and west of the river Tista. Campbell's first response to the Raja's request was to express surprise that he needed compensation over and above that of satisfying the wishes of the British Government.[87] Moreover, he went further, and denied that Lloyd had ever promised the Raja land in exchange for Darjeeling.

In Sikkim itself it was noted that the growth of Darjeeling had been rapid. The original village had scarce one hundred inhabitants, but each year following its take-over, the population increased by leaps and bounds. Newaris and Bhutias poured in from the neighbouring kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan and the indigenous Lepchas soon found themselves totally outnumbered. One reason for the popularity of the hill station was that it offered free trade and every encouragement was given to merchants, whether from India or the neighbouring hill states, to settle there. The new trend, the Raja of Sikkim and the other monopolists in the kingdom regarded as a direct challenge to their traditional interests.

Measures relating to free trade and free labour had, in fact, substantially increased trade through Darjeeling; it had also deprived the Kazis and monasteries in Sikkim of their slaves, who took every opportunity to flee into neighbouring Indian territory. Once the slaves settled in Darjeeling and found occupation, their owners had a hard job trying to get them back into the

kingdom. It resulted in a substantial loss of revenue for the Darbar. Added to which, Tibet's action in depriving the Sikkimese of traditional grazing rights across the Tibetan border and forbidding the Raja to visit the Chumbi valley except every eight years, whereas before he had freely commuted between his estates in Chumbi and Tumlong, decided Raja Tsugphud Namgyal to devise ways and means to prevent the development of Darjeeling. The means most at hand were to forbid his people from visiting the trade marts, and to make it difficult for others who chose to use the Sikkim route to visit Darjeeling. The measure proved extraordinarily effective, in so far as it managed to bring trade to a virtual halt and prevented the settlement from flourishing.

Campbell soon came to realise the consequences of the Raja's measures on Darjeeling and referred the matter to the Bengal Government, recommending that the Raja should be 'shown that they were not insensible to the benefits derived from his gift', and some form of recompense should be made immediately. In March 1840, Campbell was instructed to inform the Raja that although no territorial exchange could be offered for Darjeeling, yet the Company was prepared to make yearly payments of Rs 1,000 per annum, with a rider that any increase in the amount would only be considered if the Raja gave permission for '. . . free intercourse between Darjeeling and the interior of Sikkim'.[88]

In January 1841, Campbell opened formal negotiations with the Raja's *vakils*. By now the compensation offered had been increased to Rs 3,000, to be paid annually and restrospectively from the date Darjeeling had been ceded to the British.[89] Meanwhile, the Raja, not having heard for some time, applied once again to the Governor General for the cession of Debgaon. This led Campbell to retract the first offer and to recommend that payment was to be made only from the date that the Raja had accepted the British offer of payment. In the meantime a reply came from the Raja, more in sorrow than in anger: '. . . the offer of rupees in exchange for Darjeeling has vexed me, but out of friendship which I bear to the British Government, and which is important to me, I agree to take Rs 3,000 annually in exchange for Darjeeling tract from the time Darjeeling was made over to the British Government to this time'.[90] In spite of the evidence being to the contrary, Campbell was to insist that the Raja had accepted the second offer. The Sikkim Darbar's repeated representations went, for the most part, unheeded, and the negotiations themselves were carried on with Campbell rather than with the Bengal Government. This fact alone was to cause Raja Tsugphud Namgyal endless problems.

Dr Campbell and the Sikkim Darbar, 1841–59

The Raja found in Campbell a personality ill-suited to the business of delicate negotiation and compromise. It was not long, therefore, before relations between the two deteriorated sufficiently for the Raja, pushed beyond endurance, to embark on a course of action which was to have disastrous

results both for himself and for Sikkim. The problem started with the compensation paid for Darjeeling, which the Raja believed to be inadequate. From there it led to Campbell's interference in another piece of Sikkim territory called Ontoo Hill. In 1827, the dispute between Sikkim and Nepal regarding Ontoo had already brought about arbitration by the British. At the time, Captain Lloyd had been deputed to investigate the problem and, on his findings, it was decided that the hill was part of Sikkim territory. In 1838, the Nepalese decided to appeal against the 1827 decision and the Bengal Government appointed Campbell to re-examine the two claims. His findings went against the Sikkim Darbar and in favour of Nepal. The Raja's insistence that Ontoo had been Sikkim territory long before the Gurkha invasion of his country, cut little ice with Dr Campbell.[91] On his insistence the hill was marked out as part of Nepalese territory.

By 1846, relations between Campbell and the Sikkim Darbar had steadily worsened, and the former accused the Raja of various misdemeanours. The accusations levelled against the ruler were of deliberately causing delays and exactions upon traders passing through Sikkim en route to Darjeeling; of refusing to apprehend and surrender criminals who sought sanctuary in Sikkim; of delaying the demarcation of the southern boundary of Darjeeling; of obstructing British Indian subjects from visiting Darjeeling for purposes of trade and labour; of refusing to allow Bhutanese subjects to pass through Sikkim territory to Darjeeling and, moreover, stopping Tibetan merchants from visiting Darjeeling. Campbell also accused the Raja of demanding the surrender of slaves settled in Darjeeling against whom no criminal charges could be levied, and of preventing the British from using the lime deposits which were to be found in abundance in Sikkim. Finally, he warned the Raja that if he persisted in his unfriendly attitude towards the British Government, they would be compelled to annex the Morung as well.

The charges in themselves did not seriously breach the terms of the 1817 Treaty, but Campbell's threat to annex the Morung the Raja found serious enough to send his Chief Minister, Ilam Singh, to Darjeeling. Dewan Ilam Singh denied all Campbell's charges but agreed to further discussions regarding three of them. With regard to the settlement of the southern boundary of Darjeeling, it was agreed that the matter could not be resolved until the Raja had received some notification regarding the affair from the Governor General.[92] The Dewan, however, agreed to permit the British the use of the lime deposits of Sikkim; as to the question of the surrender of slaves in Darjeeling, it was decided that, in future, no further demands would be made, but a letter would be sent to the Superintendent informing him if household slaves took refuge in the hill station.[93]

In the light of this agreement, the Bengal Government decided to review their policy regarding the compensation paid for Darjeeling. It was agreed that an increase from Rs 3,000 Rs 6,000 annually was in order and that it was to take effect immediately. Having looked into the problems that had arisen between Campbell and the Raja, they found that the Superintendent had been, both in correspondence and in proceeding, 'harsh and irritating' and he was ordered to

treat the ruler '. . . not as a dependent, but as a prince who though possessed of little power is regarded by the British Government as one of its allies'.[94]

The increased compensation for Darjeeling did little to cement over the difficulties which existed between the Sikkim Raja and the British Government's representative in Darjeeling. In fact, the Bengal Government found that the continued presence of Campbell together with the confused conditions existing within Sikkim itself were leading the two governments towards an inevitable confrontation. Matters did not improve when, in 1847, Dewan Ilam Singh died, thereby leaving both a vacuum in the state itself and no one of any stature with whom Campbell was prepared to negotiate. In Campbell's words, the Minister's death had lost to '. . . the Raja's Counsels the only man of any honesty, or to be trusted in word or deed'.[95] On Ilam Singh's death, the struggle for power began almost at once between the two rival sections of the community, the Lepchas and the Bhutias. The man who eventually succeeded to Ilam Singh's position was Tokhang Donyer Namgyal, the leader of the Tibetan faction. Dewan Namgyal was the son of Tung-yik Menchoo, the pro-Tibetan leader who had earlier led the conspiracy against the Raja's uncle, Bho-lod. Apart from this natural advantage, Dewan Namgyal had married Raja Tsugphud Namgyal's illegitimate daughter and soon became one of the ruler's chief advisers.[96]

Dewan Namgyal was an implacable opponent of the British, and particularly resented their interference in Sikkim affairs. He was totally suspect to men like Campbell who thought of him as being '. . . the most deceptive, and lying of all the faithless Sikim chiefs and officials'.[97] All the same, the British could not fail to recognise that he was a man of considerable ability whose force of personality would enable him to play a significant part in the relations of Sikkim and Tibet with the British. His influence in Sikkim itself was to remain considerable throughout his life even after he was permanently exiled to Tibet in 1861. His chief failing appears to have been his consistent underestimation of the power of the British; but as the History of Sikkim explains, the Sikkim people were not '. . . aware or used to the usages of a powerful Government'.[98] At the time of his appointment to the office of Dewan, Namgyal's power was unchallenged since the Raja of Sikkim had chosen to remove himself to a life of religious contemplation on his Chumbi estate at Tromo. The only effective opposition to Namgyal's power came from the Lepcha faction led by the Chebu Lama, a firm ally and consequently an advocate of friendship with the British, for which he was to be amply rewarded in the years ahead.[99]

From the moment of his appointment as Chief Minister, Namgyal and the Chebu Lama were locked in a struggle over the question of the succession to the Sikkim throne. Raja Tsugphud Namgyal's only surviving son was a celibate Lama. The only other candidate to the throne was the illegitimate son of the Raja, and Dewan Namgyal's brother-in-law, Tinley Namgyal. Naturally, the Dewan favoured the succession passing to the illegitimate son, while the Chebu Lama pressed the claims of the celibate Lama, Prince Sidkeong Namgyal. In his wish to get his candidate selected, the Chebu Lama

went so far as to try and persuade the Dalai Lama in 1848 to dispense with the vows of celibacy for Sidkeong Namgyal, and, to show that he was eligible for temporal life, attempted to arrange a suitable marriage for the Lama. When the Raja found out the Chebu Lama's part in the affair, he wanted to have him put to death, but for the sake of his son, the ruler desisted and held his son '. . . responsible for any misdeeds in future which may be committed by this wicked man'.[100]

In sharp contrast to the Chebu Lama was Dewan Namgyal, whose policy was to enter as little as possible into any communication or alliance with the British in India. To exclude this possibility, the Dewan insisted that there should be no freedom of access allowed to Europeans to visit Sikkim. However, in 1848, the English naturalist, Dr Joseph Hooker, arrived in Darjeeling with a view to exploring the Himalayan flora. With the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie's permission,[101] Campbell approached the Raja of Sikkim on behalf of Hooker. The Raja promptly declined to give permission on the grounds that foreigners were expressly forbidden from travelling in his kingdom.[102] He had also decided that, in future, the Darbar would correspond through the agency of the Sikkim *vakil* at Darjeeling, and not directly with Campbell. The measure infuriated the Superintendant and convinced him that his letters, sent by this convoluted route, were not reaching the Raja, but were being handled by Dewan Namgyal. Since he saw no possibility of getting permission from the Sikkim Darbar, Campbell sought Lord Dalhousie's approval to pay a visit to the Raja instead, it being the only way '. . . of ascertaining his real sentiments and feelings towards our government'.[103] The permission being duly granted, Campbell set out for the Sikkim capital, Tumlong, 'without any specific diplomatic powers for the occasion' on 29 November 1848.

On reaching the Tista river, Campbell was confronted by Darbar officials who objected to his crossing the border into Sikkim. He was informed that the Raja would not see him due to his religious preoccupations. On the next day, finding Campbell adamant about not returning, Sikkim officials advised him to stay on at Namchi for some time 'or go on to Burmeok' and to wait there for further instructions. Innumerable excuses were put forward in the hopes of stopping Campbell progressing further into Sikkim. The health of the Raja could not stand the strain of such a meeting; the bridge across the Ranjit river was in no state to effect a crossing; the Tibetans would object to the presence of Englishmen in Sikkim; and finally the protocol of such a meeting demanded that it took at least two years to arrange. To all these entreaties, Campbell turned a deaf ear: 'I find the Raja's officers manifest such an anxiety to delay me, that although I cannot clearly see the reason, I am quite satisfied it is for some tricky end that would not serve my objects in desiring to see the Raja, and I am therefore resolved not to delay until I am shewn some good cause for slackening my pace'.[104]

Eventually, for reasons best known to themselves, the Sikkim Darbar gave way and Campbell was allowed to meet the Raja, having in the meantime been joined by Dr Hooker. Before starting the visit, Campbell decided that he

would submit his presents after the audience, but found that they had been smuggled in ahead of him thus giving the visit the character of a tribute mission. 'I do not grudge the Raja the satisfaction of putting me down in the annals of this house, as a bearer of presents on visiting him.'[105] Although Campbell was far from successful in improving relations between himself and the Darbar, he did return with some first-hand knowledge of the situation in Sikkim. It was his opinion that the Sikkimese were woefully ignorant and misinformed on 'the real nature of our power in India and England'. Moreover, his encounter with Dewan Namgyal during the days before he met the Raja convinced him that the situation would not improve unless some member of the more docile Lepcha community, preferably the Chebu Lama, was functioning at the Court of Sikkim. Until that time, no change could be expected in the Sikkim Raja's attitude towards the British Government.[106]

In 1849, Dr Hooker, who was making a second tour of Sikkim, wrote complaining that the Sikkimese were resorting to their usual practice of putting various obstacles and annoyances in his way, and suggested that the reason for the difficulty was that officials responsible for his journey did not fully acknowledge the authority of the Raja and were in some degree subordinate to Tibet.[107] To understand Hooker's difficulties, Campbell decided to investigate the situation for himself and pay a second visit to Sikkim. 'Campbell was badly smitten by what amounted to an occupational disease among British officials along the Tibet frontier, a burning desire to see for himself that mysterious and forbidden land whose tantalizing proximity to British territory was a continual challenge.'[108] As Campbell wrote in his diary, on setting out for Sikkim: 'I can scarcely believe that I am really en route for Tibet. For 20 years it has been a primary object of my ambition to visit that land, of which so little is really known'.[109] It appears from his diary that this aspect of his journey was closer to his heart than any political settlement with Sikkim, and that he firmly believed that no insuperable difficulty stood in the way of imposing his will upon the Sikkim authorities. His self-assurance was to be rudely shaken once he had arrived, welcome as he insisted he was, in the capital.

On arrival at Tumlong on 2 October 1849, accompanied by the Chebu Lama, Campbell wrote off to the Raja demanding the punishment of those officials responsible for obstructing Hooker during his botanical searches in the mountains of Sikkim. Within days, having been joined by Hooker, the two men proceeded to the Kangralama Pass and crossed by it into Tibet, returning to Sikkim via the Donkhya La Pass; the journey there and back was undertaken despite strong protests from Sikkim officials and the Tibetan frontier guards. By November, Campbell and Hooker, having completed their journey, arrived back in Tumlong hoping that the Chebu Lama had, in their absence, been able to arrange an interview for them with the Raja. Campbell found, much to his annoyance, that the Dewan's supporters, the Dewan himself being in the Chumbi valley, had prevented the meeting from taking place. In fact the Raja, on hearing of Campbell's escapade, wrote requesting him to return to Darjeeling forthwith. Campbell's response was to

ignore the request and to set out once again with Hooker, intending to go via the Chola Pass from Sikkim into the Chumbi valley and while there to investigate the area for a possible route for Indian trade with Tibet. As the two men crossed the Chola Pass, a number of Tibetan troops met them on the other side and forcibly turned them back. When they reached Sikkim territory on 7 November 1849, the Raja's officials were waiting for them and they were both arrested.

Campbell, in his diary, maintained that he was subsequently tortured in the hopes of forcing him to agree that the British would refrain in future from interfering in Sikkim affairs. He refused to sign an assurance to that effect and informed them that, if he did, his own government would repudiate it immediately. The Chebu Lama, who had accompanied Hooker and Campbell, was also arrested although Hooker was eventually left free to continue his botanical searches. Like ordinary criminals, the two men were escorted back to Tumlong, Campbell being forced to march with his hands bound to the tail of a mule. A fortnight later, Dewan Namgyal returned from the Chumbi valley, and the prisoners were then permitted to inform their government of their arrest. In reply, the Sikkim Raja soon received from the Bengal Government a despatch, '. . . such as the latter was accustomed to receive from Nepal, Bhotan, or Lhassa, and such as alone commands attention from these half-civilized Indo-Chinese, who measure power by the firmness of the tone adopted towards them'.[110]

The Dewan, realising that the treatment meted out to Campbell in particular, might bring the wrath of the Bengal Government down upon him personally, began to deny responsibility for the arrests, pointing out that when the incident had taken place he was himself in Tibet. Nevertheless, in spite of the Dewan's assurances to the contrary, delays continued regarding Hooker and Campbell's release. The Sikkim Darbar were to explain later that the two British officers had been expressly forbidden to cross into Tibetan territory, but had done so regardless of the warning. Moreover, Campbell had thrashed most severely his Bhutiya servants and because of these two incidents, the Sikkim authorities had had no option but to arrest him. Campbell protested that his entry into Tibet had broken no international law and consequently his arrest was wholly unjustified. He argued that, before crossing into the Chumbi valley, he had made a point of ascertaining whether the Raja had treaty relations with Tibet. On receiving an assurance that he had not, he [Campbell] had decided to cross over into Tibet. The real reason for his arrest, Campbell claimed, was his refusal to accept Lasso Kazi, an adherent of Dewan Namgyal, as Sikkim's *vakil* in Darjeeling.[111]

By the time Hooker and Campbell were actually released on 9 December, they found, to their surprise, that they were to be accompanied by Dewan Namgyal himself who was on his way to Darjeeling to sell ponies for use on the British frontier. On 24 December 1849, the party reached Darjeeling. No sooner were the captives back in British territory, than the Raja's allowance of Rs 6,000, which he had been receiving in lieu of Darjeeling, was stopped. A military expedition was despatched along the Ranjit river where it 'attached all

the Sikkim Tarai, and all the land lying below Ramam in the north, and the Rangeet and Teesta in the east, and the Nepal Sikkim frontier in the west'.[112] The Chebu Lama, for his faithful services, was given his reward and appointed Sikkim's *vakil* at Darjeeling. The Bengal Government went further and showed their appreciation by granting him a large tract of land in the Darjeeling district, where he remained for many years the confidant and adviser to the British on matters relating to Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. The appointment was made without consultation with the Sikkim Darbar, whose representative he was supposed to be and whose interests he was meant to oversee. There is no question that the Sikkim Darbar had their doubts as to where the Chebu Lama's allegiance lay and said as much. It was fortunate for Sikkim that, for the present, the British had no wish to extend their influence further into the Himalayan region. Lord Dalhousie, having no means of gauging the Raja's ability, let alone his Dewan's, to draw Tibet into their quarrel, wisely decided that he had no wish to enmesh his government in a war with Tibet, particularly when he was advised by his military commanders that the hill territory of Sikkim was quite unsuited to a campaign by British troops.[113]

The news of Campbell's arrest had caused, at first, considerable anxiety in Darjeeling itself. However, Captain Byng, who was officiating Superintendent in Campbell's absence, was highly critical of Campbell's part in the affair. In his view, Campbell had brought the mischief upon himself by repeatedly defying the Raja's orders '. . . such as no sovereign, however insignificant, could be expected to endure'. The criticism was no less in London, where they saw Campbell's insistence on entering Tibet as 'an act of grave indiscretion', and for which, they believed, Campbell should have been severely censured; '. . . an act certain to embroil the Sikkim Raja with the Chinese. A weak power between two great powers must doubly suffer – we seem to have punished the Sikkim Raja for his [Campbell's] offence'.[114]

The annexation of the Sikkim Terai together with the withdrawal of the annual compensation for Darjeeling which followed the Campbell episode was blamed on Dewan Namgyal. The already impoverished Sikkim Raja was forced to forbid him his court. The Dewan, having been disgraced and turned out of office, found himself equally unwelcome in Tibet. He was warned not to attempt an entry, under threat of being dragged with a rope around his neck, to Lhasa. But Hooker did not believe that the set-back would mean that Sikkim had seen the last of Dewan Namgyal. 'Consider, however, his energy, a rare quality in these countries. I should not be surprised at his yet cutting a figure in Bhotan, if not in Sikkim itself; especially if, at the Rajah's death, the British government should refuse to take the country under its protection'.[115]

Once Dewan Namgyal had been removed, nothing stood in the way of the Chebu Lama and his faction coming to power. However, there was little that the Chebu Lama could do, even if he had been so inclined, to rescue the Sikkim Darbar from the financial straits it now found itself in. The annexation of the Morung which had followed Campbell's arrest meant that Sikkim was now deprived of direct access to the plains of India for the purposes of trade except

through British controlled territory.[116] Darjeeling itself had become contiguous with the British districts of Purnea and Rangpur, and Campbell saw to it that traders from Sikkim were denied free access to the trade markets. Having dismissed Dewan Namgyal, the Raja appealed to Lord Dalhousie to reinstate his annual allowance of Rs 6,000. He explained that the loss of the Morung had further depleted the Darbar's resources and that the Governor General should consider an increase in the allowance.[117] The appeal fell on deaf ears, Dalhousie insisting that it would place his government in a humiliating position to go back on his earlier decision; in his opinion any weakening 'would bring the power of the Government into contempt with other savages like the Raja of Sikkim'.

The crisis of 1849 had cost the Sikkim Darbar approximately 640 square miles of territory which were then included into British India. The punitive measures imposed on Sikkim did not go towards improving relations between the two governments. The Bengal Government insisted that the dominant influence of Tibet was the cause of it all. The Raja, having lost the *Terai* area and his subsidy, found himself having to turn to the Tibetan Government to make up the lost revenue. The Raja obviously felt that the trouble had been brought upon Sikkim by his obeying Tibetan and Chinese orders to exclude Europeans from Sikkim. 'The Tibet and Chinese Government, on whose behalf these losses had been incurred, granted as compensation an order ensuring the delivery of 1,000 score measures of grain, tea and salt annually to be delivered at Chumbi'.[118] Despite the removal of Dewan Namgyal, the strength of the Tibetan faction remained, particularly since the Raja saw no reason to withdraw his personal allegiance from Tibet. In fact, within a few years, Dewan Namgyal had been able to persuade the Raja to allow him to play a prominent part, once again, in Sikkim affairs. By 1853, Raja Tsugphud Namgyal, finding himself rather too old to govern the kingdom and perhaps with some persuasion from his energetic Dewan, decided to retire to the Chumbi valley and there to take up his religious pursuits. Having done so, the Dewan, from his place in Chumbi, was not only in a position to influence the Raja but to make difficulties for the opposition in Sikkim itself.

In March 1859, Dewan Namgyal, apparently with the full backing of the Raja, despatched a deputation to the Bengal Government requesting payment of an enhanced annual allowance of Rs 12,000 for Darjeeling, or the restoration to Sikkim of all territories confiscated in 1850.[119] The Bengal Government's response to the request was to demand an apology from the Raja for the Dewan's insolence. The Sikkim Darbar chose to ignore the demand, and countered by preventing traders from entering British territory altogether. At the same time, border raids, which were a common feature on the frontier, appeared, in the eyes of the Bengal Government, suddenly to increase. One such incident took place in March 1860 when a large band of Sikkimese raided an Indian village called Tukdah and kidnapped two women. British officials on the frontier insisted that the raiders were relations of Dewan Namgyal and wanted to take retaliatory measures against the Raja's property, in the hopes that the ruler would put a stop to the Dewan

encouraging his people from making these predatory raids. The suggestion was turned down by the Bengal Government who felt that, since the Raja was innocent of the crime, he should not be subjected to coercion.

In Darjeeling, Dr Campbell continued to look for ways in which to avenge himself on Dewan Namgyal for the indignities to which he had been subjected. He was, therefore, far from pleased when the Government of India refused to punish the Raja for the Dewan's crimes. By October 1860, Campbell thought that he had been patient enough and sent off an ultimatum to the Sikkim Darbar demanding the return of the kidnapped persons together with their kidnappers and compensation for those who had been subjected to dacoity and plunder.[120] Unless the authorities acted swiftly, Campbell declared his intention to occupy the territory lying to the west of the Ranjit river and north of the river Rummam. The Raja's reply was prompt. It was brought by the Chebu Lama who explained that, though the Raja had directed his officers to arrest the criminals responsible for the outrage, they had chosen to ignore the ruler's orders. The response merely confirmed Campbell in his opinion that the Raja and his Dewan were in league one with the other with the sole purpose of ignoring his requests. He was convinced that the only way the two would learn their lesson would be by the forceful occupation of Sikkim territory until due restitution had been made.

In November, Campbell crossed the Rummam river and marched at the head of a company of local troops into Sikkim. The small force was under the command of Captain Murray and they advanced as far as Rinchinpung where, having met with no resistance, they encamped. 'All is quiet here. The Sikkimites have retired everywhere from our territory, and also it appears from the immediate frontier', Campbell was able to report, with some satisfaction. He also advised the Bengal Government to 'threaten the occupation of the Bhootan Dooars on Terai' in case the Bhutanese thought of coming to the assistance of Sikkim.[121] Campbell had spoken rather too soon regarding the absence of the hostile Sikkimese, for on 27 November, the Chebu Lama's spies brought word to say that Dewan Namgyal's troops were intending to attack that very night. The next day the Dewan's son-in-law sent a letter to Campbell demanding that he withdraw to Darjeeling or face the consequences. Campbell chose to ignore the warning, and on 29 November 1860, the Sikkimese attacked with a large force. Fighting went on throughout the day and well into the night, and the next day the head Lama of the Rinchinpung monastery brought word that Lasso Kazi, Dewan Namgyal's agent, was on the point of attacking Darjeeling as well. Captain Murray, having taken stock of his ammunition and realising that if Darjeeling was attacked his force would be without emergency support, decided to beat a hasty retreat. In fact, the retreat was so rapid that Murray's force had to abandon Rinchinpung, leaving behind their bags and baggage.[122]

During the retreat, the Sikkimese waylaid the British force, capturing large amounts of ammunition and rifles, and it was only after a perilous night's march of fifty miles that Campbell and Murray managed to reach Goke in British territory. Campbell, in his defence, was to insist that his reception on

entering Sikkim territory 'was no ordinary manifestation of good will, but a cordial and substantial one', and he had, therefore, been encouraged to proceed further into Sikkim; the only reason that he had agreed to withdraw was that his capture would have placed the Government of India in an invidious position. He was, however, unable to account for the 'unprecedented outbreak of the Sikkimites' except that it was under the Dewan Namgyal's forcing; nor, he insisted, was the Chebu Lama, who knew the Sikkimese well, able to account for the unexpected attack. On the other hand, Campbell had no difficulty in pinpointing the real culprit. 'In the absence of information on this point, I am inclined to believe that, knowing of our war with China, and not of the result, the Dewan ventured on the course he took, in the hopes of approval and countenance from the Chinese at Lhasa'.[123]

The Government of India found little justification for Campbell's adventure into Sikkim. Nor had events proved Campbell's assumption, with which he had convinced the Bengal Government, to be correct, which was that the Sikkimese would welcome the invading troops. A rebuke was offered by Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State, who considered that a grave error had been committed in sending so small a force into Sikkim territory and in direct disobedience of standing orders. 'No presumption of the friendly disposition of the people, a common and often a fatal snare, ought to have been suffered to blind the British agent to the danger of sending a detachment of 130 men into a difficult country, ruled by a hostile chief, and a still more hostile minister'.[124]

The Eden Mission and the 1861 Treaty, 1860–62

However much the Indian Government disapproved of Campbell's adventure, and for which it denied responsibility, it was not prepared to allow, for reasons of privilege, 'his discomfiture to go unavenged'. To '. . . secure the coercion and punishment of the refractory chief', it was decided to send an expedition against Sikkim under the command of Colonel Gawler, with Ashley Eden as Envoy and Special Commissioner in Sikkim. It appeared to the Government of India that to remove the discredit suffered by the retreat of the Superintendant from Sikkim, and to end 'the presumption which manifestly it has engendered in the Rajah's people', it was essential to show the Raja that resistance to the British Empire was not to be tolerated. To achieve that end, lands adjoining British territory were to be occupied in the first instance, and thereafter it was to be made clear to Sikkim that British power intended to make itself felt in the 'interior of the country'. There was to be no question of annexing the whole of Sikkim since it was not the Government of India's intention 'that an independent State should cease to intervene between the British dominions and the vast regions and intractable people and government of Chinese Tartary'. Other guidelines laid down for Eden's benefit were that the territory to be annexed should include the Great Ranjit river as the boundary in the east, and the mountains of Nepal as the boundary in the west; the country so described being the most accessible and the most valuable part of the Raja's territory. None of the outposts were to be more

than a few miles from the Indian frontier. It was also hoped that since this territory would include the monasteries of Tashiding, Pemiongchi and Sanga Choeling, the Lamas of the monasteries who were generally supposed to be well disposed towards the British, would 'understand our power and the importance of coming to terms with us, and to influence the Rajah and the governing powers to this effect'. The expedition's final destination was to be the capital, Tumlong. Once there, it was essential that the atonement exacted from the authorities should be manifest for all to see. This would be achieved by forcing Dewan Namgyal into exile and by insisting that the Raja replace him by a minister well-disposed towards the British Government. If, on arrival, it was found that Dewan Namgyal had already fled from Tumlong, then the Raja was to be compelled to make an apology, on his behalf, and proclaim it in the capital. Should both the Raja and the Dewan have left Tumlong, then their respective properties and residences were to be destroyed. The point to be borne in mind was that the Government of India's quarrel was with the rulers alone and not with the people of Sikkim. Finally, Eden was to take care that nothing was said or done by him which would give 'ground for a supposition that British rule is to be planted permanently in any part of Sikkim'.[125]

The Sikkim expedition left Darjeeling on 1 February 1861 and proceeded towards Tumlong without facing any substantial opposition. Before his departure, Ashley Eden had asked permission that he should be permitted to insist upon the surrender of Dewan Namgyal. His explusion, Eden claimed, could not be relied upon, for once before the Dewan had been banished, 'yet it now turns out that the old Raja is still nominally regnant, and the Dewan is in greater power than ever. So long as this man is at liberty it will be impossible, I fear, to place our relations with Sikkim on a satisfactory footing'.[126] In any case, Eden intended that if the Dewan was found to be no longer in Sikkim, the Darbar would have to give an assurance against his re-admission into the kingdom.

Prior to leaving Darjeeling for Tumlong, Eden had taken the unusual step of writing to the Raja warning him of what to expect once the expedition reached the capital. The letter itself was couched in peremptory tones and left the Raja in no doubt that the Sikkim Commissioner meant business. 'The force which will enter your country will be so powerful that resistance will be ruin; it is, therefore, better that you should assemble the lamas and chief persons of your country, and take counsel . . . bearing in mind that the longer the delay made by you, the greater your fault will be considered'. The Raja was ordered to meet the Commissioner personally, or depute his son to the British camp. There he would be obliged to surrender Dewan Namgyal into Eden's hands and agree to appoint a chief minister approved of by the Commissioner; all prisoners and equipage taken from Campbell's camp at Rinchinpung were to be returned; financial compensation was to be made to British subjects injured during the raids by Sikkimese and, finally, the Raja would have to offer 'such apology for your past misconduct as shall be considered sufficient by the Government of India'.[127]

As the British force approached Tumlong, Eden discovered that Dewan Namgyal had already fled to Tibet. The Raja, since his retirement, had taken up residence on his estates in the Chumbi valley and was, therefore, also absent from Sikkim. Eden had to be content with Lasso Kazi who brought letters from the Raja to his camp at Temi. The Raja, in his letter, consented to comply with all Eden's demands provided he was allowed a little time. Eden's reply gave him little cause to hope; he made it clear that certain demands would have to be met immediately and thereafter he would take into 'consideration the propriety of giving a little time for compliance with the others'.[128] Throughout the progress of the expedition towards the capital, various envoys brought messages, both from the Raja and Dewan Namgyal, agreeing to Eden's demands, provided the expedition did not advance to the capital itself. A near relative of the Chebu Lama, the Chota Dewan, also endeavoured to dissuade Eden from insisting upon the presence of the Raja's son at Tumlong. Although Eden found him 'a thoroughly frank and intelligent young man' and someone to be trusted, particularly since he was a relation of the faithful Chebu Lama, he remained adamant that having dispensed with the attendance of the Raja himself, on the plea of ill health and advancing age, he was not prepared to concede any more.[129]

As if the expedition was not fully stretched during its advance to Tumlong, Campbell was sending urgent messages to Eden warning him that Darjeeling was in danger of imminent attack. Colonel Gawler, having made enquiries, found that there was not the remotest chance that the people, having refused to face the expedition in their own fastnesses, would then decide to leave their territory and attack Darjeeling.[130] By the time the second and third alarms had been set off by Campbell and he was refusing to supply Gawler's force with stores, on the excuse that Darjeeling's need was paramount, 'you are quite right in assuming that I am not prepared to learn that you are so much pressed', Eden was thoroughly put out.[131] He complained to Bengal that 'Darjeeling seems to have been again in a considerable state of alarm from some imaginary foe', and he deplored Campbell's periodic panics since they managed seriously to affect the morale of the expeditionary force as well as those troops who had been left behind in Darjeeling itself.[132] When, therefore, Campbell, following on his refusal to assist the expedition, then forwarded a list of claims for compensation during his abortive raid into Sikkim, and for which he furnished neither details of the items nor proof that the claims had been investigated, Eden refused to be convinced of the correctness of his case. 'I do not think that the Sikkim Darbar can possibly pay anything like this amount: it exceeds the revenue of 10 years'.[133] He went further and recommended the Government of India refusing compensation until a Court of Inquiry had reported on Campbell's expedition and 'pronounced an opinion upon the necessity of abandoning lives and property as was there done. The more I hear of the details of this flight, the more disgraceful does it seem'.[134]

When eventually Eden arrived in Tumlong, he found that Raja Tsugphud Namgyal had decided to stay away but had sent his son, Sidkeong Namgyal,

in his place. Eden was informed that the old Raja wished him to be recognised as the regent power, and a letter to this effect was on its way. 'I have therefore treated the Rajah's son as the Maharaja, and shall in future write of him as such'. The young Maharaja was induced to appoint the Chebu Lama in place of Dewan Namgyal, a gesture which Eden considered would be 'the best security we could possibly have for the future good government and friendly disposition of this country'. Eden was not going to allow the opportunity to pass without giving the young ruler a word of advice. 'I pointed out as forcibly as I could, that a thriving trade was the best defence against future misunderstanding, and that if the Raja had all along remained in Sikkim, taking part himself in the government, instead of placing himself in the hands of the Amlah at Choombi, the events which had led to our invasion of his country would never have occurred'.[135]

The Treaty which Eden negotiated with Maharaja Sidkeong Namgyal was signed on 28 March 1861. It consisted of 23 Articles and cancelled all former treaties between Sikkim and the British Government.[136] In Article II, it undertook to return to the Maharaja of Sikkim the territory occupied by British forces, while under Article III, the Maharaja undertook to restore to the Government of India all property abandoned during Campbell's retreat from Rinchinpung; by Article IV, Sikkim agreed to pay an indemnity of Rs 7,000 in three separate instalments, and if it was found that the Sikkim Darbar defaulted on the payment, then the territory bounded on the south by the Rummam river, on the east by the Ranjit river and on the north by a line running from the Ranjit to the Singaleila range, including the monasteries of Pemiongchi, Tashiding and Sanga Choeling, would be attached until such time as the indemnity had been paid; Article V bound the Sikkim Darbar not to make predatory raids into British territory; in Article VI, the Sikkim authorities agreed to deliver up any criminals, defaulters, or other delinquents who took refuge in Sikkim. The Sikkim Darbar agreed in Article VII not to allow Dewan Namgyal or any of his blood relations to set foot in Sikkim again, or to hold office in the Councils of the Raja, or any of the Raja's family residing at Chumbi; Article VIII undertook to abolish all restrictions on travellers and monopolies on trade between British territory and Sikkim; Article IX agreed to afford protection to merchants and traders, and to deliver up all those who committed offences contrary to the laws of Sikkim to the British Resident at Darjeeling; Article X agreed not to levy import or export duty on British goods; Article XI agreed to levy only 5% *ad valorem* duty on goods imported from or exported to Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal. In Article XII, it was agreed that to protect the Sikkim Government from fraud, a right existed to purchase goods at the value affixed by the owner; Article XIII gave the Government of India the right to construct a road through Sikkim; Article XIV gave the British the right to conduct topographical or geological surveys in Sikkim. In Article XV, the Sikkim Government agreed to abolish the slave trade; Article XVI gave the subjects of Sikkim the right to free access in and out of the kingdom, and to permit the subjects of other countries, provided they were not criminals or defaulters, to take refuge in Sikkim; by Article XVII, the Sikkim Government

agreed to refer to the Government of India all disputes with neighbouring states and to refrain from any acts of aggression against any of the states who were allies of the British; Article XVIII promised to aid and grant facilities to British troops when engaged in the hills. In Article XIX, the Sikkim Government agreed not to cede or lease any portion of Sikkim territory to any other state without the prior permission of the British Government. In Article XX, no armed force belonging to any other country would be allowed to pass through Sikkim without the sanction of the British Government; Article XXI agreed to secure the return of the seven criminals escaped into Bhutan; in Article XXII, the Maharaja of Sikkim agreed to remove the seat of his government from Tibet to Sikkim and to reside there for nine months of the year, and to appoint a *vakil* accredited to the Sikkim Government who would reside permanently at Darjeeling; and finally, Article XXIII provided for the ratification of the Treaty by the Governor General within six weeks from the date that the Treaty was signed.

The most significant concession made to the British Government by Sikkim in 1861 was to allow them to intervene in the internal affairs of the state. For instance, in the case of Dewan Namgyal, the Maharaja had no option but to banish him from the kingdom. There was no evidence to suggest that either the Maharaja or his subjects had been waiting for the moment of deliverance from the Dewan's autocratic rule, as Eden repeatedly stressed in his communications to Bengal. When it came to the appointment of Sikkim's *vakil* in Darjeeling, the selection was no longer the personal choice of the Darbar, but of Eden. The fact that the Raja's personal freedom was restricted under Article XXII was to bring, in time, its own disadvantages. In fact, the Government of India lost very little by not annexing Sikkim outright. On the contrary, they secured many trade privileges and a right to intervene in Sikkim's relations with neighbouring states, and most particularly in the case of Tibet. There was no doubt in Eden's mind that the Sikkimese would soon see the advantage of becoming the high road for trade between India and Tibet. 'I anticipate that, in a few years, a very considerable trade will spring up between Lassa, Jigutishur [Shigatse] and Darjeeling. The Thibetans will only be too glad to exchange gold dust, musk, borax, wool and salt, for English cloth, tobacco, drill etc; the people of Sikkim will gain as carriers of this trade, and their Government will raise a considerable revenue from the transit duties'.[137]

The British Government had no wish to establish an outright protectorate over Sikkim in 1861, particularly since Eden foresaw that any attempt to annex the territory might have embroiled his government in a long and expensive war with Tibet and possibly with China. He attributed the reason for these states remaining aloof from the quarrel to the fact that it had been distinctly understood from the start, that the British Government did not intend to annex any part of Sikkim. Moreover, the Tibetans, Eden claimed, had been considerably reassured by British policy towards Sikkim and he saw no reason 'why our subjects should not be admitted into the chief cities of Thibet' in the future and as soon as the Sikkim authorities had completed the

remaining portion of the road between the Chola Pass and the Tista. The whole proceedings appeared to have cast a rosy glow over Eden's perceptions; whereas before he thought of the Sikkimese as being 'treacherous and wily', by the end of his stay in Tumlong he had changed his mind. 'In frankness and open-heartedness they appeared to me to approach the European standard more nearly than any other oriental race. They are free from all scruples of caste, truthful, hospitable, and in many respects far more civilised than the natives of Hindoostan'.[138] He looked forward to a flourishing trade developing between India and Sikkim and through her with Tibet. As time was to reveal, Eden's optimism was totally unfounded.

By their failure to annex Sikkim, or to define what Sikkim's relations were with her Tibetan neighbour, the British, in effect, admitted that the Tibetans had claims over the kingdom. Eden went so far as to say that he had stopped short of annexation because he had no wish to upset the *status quo*, knowing full well that 'Nepal is tributary to China, Thibet is tributary to China, and Sikkim and Bootan are tributary to Thibet'. Nevertheless, the 1861 Treaty specifically dealt with Sikkim on the basis of her *de facto* status and chose to ignore her *de jure* status. The Secretary of State's pious wish that the moderation shown by not annexing 'any portion of the Sikkim territory to the British Empire, will contribute as much to the maintenance of a lasting peace as it did to the speedy conclusion of the war' did nothing of the sort.[139] For the Sikkim campaign of 1861 was one of the main factors which was to lead to the Bhutan War. Tibet, having witnessed the discomfiture of the Raja of Sikkim, thought it wise to close her frontiers to merchants from British possessions and advised Bhutan to follow suit. This gave rise to interminable disputes and incidents along the Bhutanese border and which increased in frequency once the British were in occupation of Assam. Moreover, after the Sikkim campaign the Bhutanese gave asylum to the followers and relations of the exiled Dewan Namgyal, and refused to surrender them to British justice. This fact alone provided the immediate excuse, if one was needed, for Ashley Eden to take a mission into Bhutan in 1863.

Within a year of signing the 1861 Treaty at Tumlong, Raja Tsugphud Namgyal officially abdicated in favour of his legitimate surviving son, Sidkeong Namgyal. The succession of the new ruler was to mark a far more tranquil period in Sikkim's relations with the British in India than had the years during his father's rule. When Raja Tsugphud Namgyal died in 1863, to show their confidence in the new Maharaja the Government of India agreed to restore the annual allowance of Rs 6,000 which had been forfeited by his father in 1850.[140] By 1868, the allowance had been increased to Rs 9,000, and when in 1873 the Maharaja accepted an invitation to pay a visit to Darjeeling to meet Sir George Campbell, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, it was with the express purpose of asking the Governor to increase his annual stipend yet again, from Rs 9,000 to Rs 12,000.[141] The increase was agreed on the understanding that it was granted without any reference to the enhanced value of Darjeeling itself and purely as a mark of personal consideration for the Maharaja. As we shall see, the increase was, in actual fact, granted only under certain specific conditions.

British influence in Sikkim was to increase considerably after 1861, the chief reason being the removal of Dewan Namgyal and the appointment of the Chebu Lama in his place. Although the Bengal Government, most particularly influenced by Ashley Eden and Dr Campbell, thought of the Chebu Lama as a man of probity, the History of Sikkim paints quite another picture of the Lama's activities. Dewan Namgyal, having been banished from the kingdom, sought the help of the Tibetan Government. As a mark of distinction, they gave him 'a blue-stone cap button . . . created him an officer of the 4th grade, granting him the Tayling properties as a Jagir'. As the History of Sikkim explains, these gestures aroused the jealousy of the Chebu Lama. 'And this time it was the Cheebu Lama who won the game, because he was confirmed in his post as Sikkim Agent in Darjeeling. Subsequently, Cheebu Lama applied for and obtained the title of a Donyer [Dewan] from the Sikkim Maharaja'. Having obtained the position of Chief Minister, the Chebu Lama appears to have had no difficulty in appropriating a large part of the annual allowance of Rs 6,000 together with 'a lion's share of the grant of Rs 20,000 – which the British Government kindly made to the Sikkim Maharaja to extricate him from the debts incurred during the late expedition to Rinchenpong. Only a sum of Rs 9,508 reached the Sikkim Maharaja. The rest . . . all amounting to Rs 24,262 were swallowed up by Cheebu Adan Lama'.[142]

Sikkim and attempts to develop the trade route to Tibet, 1863–73

The Treaty of 1861 changed the status of Sikkim both in its relation to the paramount power in India, but also to her traditional suzerain, Tibet. At the same time it renewed interest in India of the advantages to be gained by opening Sikkim as a trade route to Tibet. Brian Hodgson in Nepal and Dr Campbell in Darjeeling had long been advocates of developing a road through Sikkim to Tibet, and now that both men were living in Darjeeling, they visualized that an improvement in the conditions of trade in the Himalaya 'would greatly improve the resources of Darjeeling'. There was little doubt in their minds that the rapid development of the tea industry in Kumaon, Darjeeling and Assam needed an outlet and that a ready market was likely to be found among the traditional tea drinkers of Tibet whose own speciality, the brick tea of Szechuan, was separated from the markets of Tibet by a long and arduous road.[143] No such obstacle would exist in the case of Darjeeling with its proximity to the Tibetan frontier.

The agitation to open up markets in Tibet largely stemmed from an improvement in Britain's diplomatic position in China itself. Added to which, acquisition under the Sikkim Treaty of 1861 of access to the Tibetan plateau gave rise in London and India to ambitious plans for developing communications between India and China. The English Chamber of Commerce were but one of the bodies involved in trying to exploit the markets of the Chinese Empire, and 'the loudly expressed wish of various missionary bodies to bring the Gospel to the benighted inhabitants of the roof of the world' was but

another.[144] These various pressures led the Indian Government to give serious thought to a mission to the Tibetan capital.

Captain E Smyth of the Bengal Army had originally proposed that he should be granted permission to explore 'Chinese Tartary NE of Ladak' in 1860, but the suggestion had been turned down. The Sikkim Treaty, however, presented an alternative and the Government of India were only too glad to reconsider Smyth's proposal; they agreed to send him and several of his companions on an exploration of Tibet and Chinese Turkestan up to the Russian frontier. The plan was for Captain Smyth and three of his companions to enter Tibet from Kumaon, while the other three would travel by way of Sikkim. The Indian Government anticipated no difficulty in acquiring passports for the travellers from the British Minister in Peking. The Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, in their view, fortuitously provided for the issue of passports for a Tibetan venture from the Chinese Government.[145] However, when consulted, the British Minister in Peking, Sir Frederick Bruce, did not think that the Tientsin Treaty applied to British travellers wishing to enter Tibet, nor did he advise that the time was propitious to apply for travel documents from the Chinese. For the time being, the Indian Government took Bruce's advice and postponed the Smyth expedition.[146]

By 1863, however, the Government of India were prepared to wait no longer and allowed Smyth to set out on his journey to western Tibet without Chinese passports. The Tibetans refused him entry and he was forced to turn back. Tibetan frontier officials made it clear to Smyth that they would only let him into Tibet with the express permission of the local government at Gartok; at the same time, they insisted that they were in no position to allow him to proceed to that place. Smyth believed that the Tibetans would have welcomed his mission if only he had possessed Chinese passports. But, right up until the 1880s, he tended, as did the Indian Government, to overestimate Chinese influence in Tibet. The Chinese may not have been willing to open Tibet to European exploration, but no more were the Tibetans prepared in the 1860s to allow the Chinese to dictate terms to them.[147]

The potentialities of Indo-Tibetan trade remained a preoccupation both in India and in London. It did so despite various failed attempts to go through Lhasa and China. Thomas Cooper, describing himself as a 'pioneer of commerce' was one such enthusiast.[148] In his view 'the great highway along which the Chinese send their brick-tea, beads and tobacco into Central Asia' was a trade route ready for the Indian Government to tap by opening up just such another from Sikkim or Bhutan into Central Tibet. Cooper's recommendation was welcome news to British officials on the frontiers of Bengal and Assam, and most particularly to Colonel Haughton, Commissioner in Cooch Behar. The Bhutan War having just been concluded, Haughton felt that steps should be taken, without further delay, to establish relations with the hierarchy in Tibet. The Bengal Government, where Ashley Eden was now Secretary, thought that any direct approach to Tibet would 'excite suspicion as to our motives, and do more harm than good', and they were for leaving well alone.[149] Moreover, Eden saw difficulties arising if the Government of India

were obliged, at some future date, to undertake another campaign like those carried out in Sikkim and Bhutan, and thereafter found themselves in the position of 'choosing either to let the offending states go unpunished, or of refusing a request of a friendly power' [China] to mediate in the dispute.[150] It had been possible to act against Sikkim and Bhutan, without raising the international temperature, by assuming that they were independent sovereign states. 'Tibet has always declined to take any action in matters relating to frontier politics when applied to for its interference by its two quasi-feudatories, Sikkim and Bhutan, for fear by so doing, it should be brought into collision with the British Government. Their reply . . . has always been that so long as the British Government does not attempt to interfere with the frontier of Tibet proper, they have no desire to intervene'.[151]

The Government of India did not share Ashley Eden's doubts and decided that Colonel Haughton should be allowed to examine the whole question of relations, commercial and political, with Lhasa. Haughton had no doubt that the best route for Tibetan trade lay through Sikkim, particularly since this route lay astride the tea-producing districts of Darjeeling and the Bhutan Duars. The fact that Indian tea was prohibited from entering into Tibet, Haughton concluded was the fault of the Chinese, who feared that the much shorter route would enable Indian tea to oust that of China. The first step was to persuade the Court of Peking to remove all restrictions on the free passage of British Indian merchants and travellers to Tibet. The second was to induce the Raja of Sikkim to write to the Tibetan Government asking what restrictions, if any, would be placed on the importation of goods from India into Tibet, and 'to cause a letter to the same effect, written in Tibetan, to be sent to the officer commanding the Chola Pass for transmission to his superiors'.[152]

Sir Thomas Wade in Peking was informed of the Indian Government's hopes for opening relations with Tibet and asked to sound the Chinese Government for their reactions. Wade's response was far from encouraging. It was not that the Chinese alone were opposing the opening of Tibet but that the Tibetans themselves would have none of it. The best advice that he could offer to the Indian Government was for them to try and bribe the Chinese and Tibetan officials in Lhasa.[153] Having received no encouragement from Wade, Haughton next tried to send his Tibetan interpreter, Gellong, up to Phari, the Tibetan frontier town at the head of the Chumbi valley. Gellong's instructions were to convey to the Tibetan officer there the good wishes of the Indian Government and express the hope that friendly relations might be established in the near future; on no account was he to discuss political matters with them. He chose, however, to disobey his instructions and told the Phari Dzongpon that the patience of the British Government was more or less spent and it would be best if the Tibetans tried to fall in with British demands. The attempt having failed, Haughton in July 1871 tried another approach. This time, he sent a letter to the Dzongpon of Phari, through the Sikkim authorities, asking him to transmit the letter to his superiors in Lhasa. Once again, the Dzongpon refused the request, giving as his excuse the policy of Lhasa which was to

receive no communication whatsoever from the rulers of British India.[154] For the time being, the Government of India was forced to accept that no further action on the Tibetan frontier was possible.

In Peking, Sir Thomas Wade saw no occasion to change his mind regarding China allowing Britain to gain a foothold in Tibet. In London, however, the India Office appeared not to appreciate the difficulties involved in getting the Tibetans to agree to communicate, let alone deal with the British in India. 'Surely, what was done directly from India in the time of Warren Hastings, should not be quite impossible now', was their opinion.[155] When, therefore, a deputation of several 'old Tibet hands' in the form of Drs Campbell and Hooker, Colonel Gawler and Brian Hodgson called on the Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll,[156] to put forward proposals to improve the trade routes into Tibet, they were given a favourable reception. They stressed that the best commercial route lay through Sikkim, now open as a result of the 1861 Treaty, its chief advantage being that it led up to Tibet by way of the Chumbi valley, a region offering an ideal spot for a future trade mart. The suggestion, for the first time, concentrated almost exclusively on the Sikkim route as opposed to other alternatives put forward previously in the form of Bhutan or Nepal.

In India, official circles continued to believe that the Chinese alone were responsible for British exclusion from Tibet. Although the British Legation gave ample indication to the contrary, Indian officials preferred to believe travellers like William Thomas Blanford who, having crossed the Jelep La into the Chumbi valley, brought back news that the Tibetan guards at the frontier had confirmed that it was the Chinese Emperor's orders to exclude all foreigners from Tibet.[157] Blanford was convinced that the Tibetans themselves felt no animosity whatsoever towards the British, though the presence of Dewan Namgyal in the Chumbi valley might work to some extent against British interests. However, he was in no doubt that Namgyal's friendship could easily be bought with suitable bribes. What Blanford could not guarantee nor find a solution to were the continual interruptions which occurred in Indo-Tibetan trade on the frontier.

By 1873, the Tibetan authorities had stopped all trade at Phari. The event was directly connected with the deterioration of relations between the Nepal Darbar and Tibet. The Tibetans harboured a deep resentment against the terms of the Tibet-Nepal Treaty of 1856, by which they had been forced to accept a Nepalese representative in Lhasa and had agreed to pay Nepal an annual tribute. They feared that the Nepalese, after the Gurkha War of 1814, had managed to establish a close friendship with the British in India, and, moreover, the various Nepalese tribute missions which went back and forth to Peking had bought over the favours of the Chinese as well. Evidence of this was to be found in Chinese officials visiting Kathmandu in 1871 and, while there, investing the Prime Minister, Sir Jang Bahadur, with various imperial decorations. The Tibetans were convinced that the Chinese, with Bhutanese and Gurkha help, were planning to reinforce their hold on Lhasa. Apart from a strong tide of anti-Gurkha sentiment which resulted in frequent attacks on

Nepalese traders, a further aspect of the crisis appeared in the stoppage of all trade on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.

The Bengal Government decided that it was time to depute a British official to the Tibetan border to enquire into the causes of the stoppage. Accordingly, when the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Sir George Campbell, met the Maharaja of Sikkim in 1873, not only was an increase in the subsidy on the agenda but the question of Tibetan trade as well. It was proposed that, for an increase in his annual subsidy to Rs 12,000 as he had requested, the Maharaja would have to agree to assist Bengal in opening up trade with Tibet. To do so, he was to facilitate a visit to the Tibetan frontier by J W Edgar, Deputy Commissioner at Darjeeling. The reason for the mission was justified on the grounds that it was the policy of Bengal to 'seize every opportunity of opening up and developing trade with Central Asia, and to secure, by increased frequency of communication with Sikkim, more full and accurate knowledge of what goes on in the hills'.[158] Added to which, the Chebu Lama's recent statement had made it clear to Bengal that the Sikkim Darbar was anxious to help open up relations for the British Government with Tibet and were only prevented from doing so by fear of offending the Chinese.[159]

The Sikkim authorities were asked to inform the Phari Dzongpon, the chief Tibetan representative on the frontier, that a British official was proposing to visit the border and would welcome a meeting. The Phari Dzongpon's reply suggested that he had heard the rumour before and did not consider it necessary to hold talks nor apply to Lhasa for permission to do so. The Bengal Government and Edgar felt that the rebuff was merely a defensive measure on the part of the Dzongpon in order to protect himself against the wrath of the Chinese, and did not reflect his true opinion. However, no sooner had the Tibetans got the Dzongpon's report than they started to fortify the passes leading from Sikkim into the Chumbi valley.[160]

Edgar left Darjeeling on 23 October 1873 and after a few days' march arrived at the head of the Chumbi valley. As soon as he reached the Tibetan frontier, messengers arrived from the banished Dewan Namgyal to enquire whether Edgar would be prepared to receive him. Since the Phari Dzongpon had firmly refused to give permission for Edgar to set foot into Tibet, he thought nothing would be lost if he saw the Dewan even if it went against Article VII of the 1861 Treaty. '. . . I decided that it would be well to receive him, as such meeting might give opportunities of finding out his exact position and influence, as well as his present sentiments towards our Government. Besides this, I had heard on all sides that, if he liked, he could give me more information on all subjects connected with Thibet than any one else'.[161] Edgar was not disappointed in his assessment that Dewan Namgyal was the man to consult. He found him 'to be a man of great mental and bodily activity, and an unusually quick intelligence', and he hoped that much use might be made of the ex-Dewan in his dealings with the Tibetans. To Dewan Namgyal and the Phari Dzongpon, Edgar expressed the wish to enter the Chumbi valley to meet the Maharaja of Sikkim since that was the main purpose of his visit. Permission, however, was refused on the grounds that an

agreement between Tibet and China forbade foreigners from crossing the frontier and, in any case, the management of Tibetan frontier affairs was in the hands of the Chinese Amban. Having learned of Edgar's request to enter the Chumbi valley, the Tibetan authorities warned the Maharaja of Sikkim not to allow the visit, and accused him of duplicity in granting the British facilities in road-making which was steadily bringing them up to the doors of Tibet. 'If you continue to behave in this manner, it will not be well with you. In future you should fulfil your obligations and obey the orders of the Dalai Lama Rimbochay and the twelfth Emperor of China'.[162]

Edgar, in the face of open hostility from the Tibetans, had no recourse but to abandon the idea of crossing over into the Chumbi valley. On his return from Sikkim in December 1873, he made a number of proposals outlining ways in which to improve relations with Tibet. Chief among them was the suggestion that the British Minister in Peking should approach the Tsungli Yamen[163] and get them to agree to remove the obstacles placed in the way of Indian traders visiting the frontier. If possible 'a formal expression of the Emperor's disapproval of the interference of his representatives at Lassa' should also be secured. Since the entry of Europeans into Tibet was a sensitive issue for both the Tibetan and Chinese governments, the answer would be to establish a trade mart on the Sikkim side of the Tibetan frontier. Edgar suggested Gnatong as a suitable site for a mart where traders from Tibet, Nepal and Kashmir, finding easy access, would decide to settle and transmit goods to and from India. A trade mart would require a road through Sikkim and though the construction of such a road might initially be regarded with suspicion by the Tibetans, yet, once a profitable trade had sprung up, Edgar was convinced that the Tibetans would cease to feel threatened by the British presence so near their frontier. To make doubly sure, it was essential to get the Chinese to give their blessing to the enterprise.[164]

The Bengal Government studied Edgar's various proposals in the light of Tibetan opposition to any form of commercial intercourse with British India. 'In nearly every page of his writing we find evidence of this hostility – from the account of the nervous opposition by the Phari Jungpens to his [Edgar's] passage to the frontier, to the curious disclosures of the letter from the Chinese Ampahs at Lassa to the Sikhim Rajah, remonstrating in not very moderate tones against any concessions to foreigners as regards access to their territories'.[165] In spite of such evident hostility from Tibet, Bengal was reluctant to abandon plans which would divest Darjeeling of badly-needed trade. The Government of India, on the contrary, were not so oblivious to the complications which would set in if they went ahead with plans for developing trade through Sikkim against the wishes of Tibet and China.[166]

When Sir Thomas Wade was instructed to approach the Tsungli Yamen once again, he did so with great reluctance and then not directly. He did so through his Chinese Secretary who brought back the reply that the Tibetans themselves were opposed to foreigners entering Tibet, and particularly so since the activities of French missionaries in Szechuan had given them cause to fear for their own religion. As a result, the Chinese authorities were not

prepared to undertake the protection of foreigners who chose to enter Tibet without prior permission. Wade felt that there was more behind the excuse than the Chinese inability to protect Europeans who might venture into Tibet. 'The Manchus greatly relied on the support of the Buddhist hierarchy, and they had no intention of surrendering their influence in Lhasa'.[167] All that Wade could suggest was that, if the Government of India were determined to establish trade on the Tibetan plateau, it should be pushed forward without reference to China since she was always able 'to declare that in this, or any other matter, Tibet may act as she pleases'.[168] The full implications of opening up Tibet in 1874, without reference to China, seemed an impossibility without a crisis arising in British relations with China. The crisis, of course, was in the making: the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention of 1876[169] contained provisions for the sending of British missions both to Lhasa and to Chinese Turkestan. Although for several years it was ignored by the Indian Government, it was not wholly forgotten. What was of great importance was that Tibet had been mentioned and was therefore involved in British treaty relations with China. This being so, Wade believed that it gave the British Government a treaty right to send a mission to Tibet if they were so inclined to do.[170]

Internal affairs: increased British influence in Sikkim, 1874–77

In Sikkim itself, the Bengal Government decided to press ahead, in spite of opposition from the Darbar, with building roads up to the Chumbi valley for the hoped-for Tibetan trade. By 1879, a cart road to the Jelep La Pass and from there into the Chumbi valley had been completed. In 1881, a narrow gauge branch of the Great Eastern Bengal Railway was brought right up to Darjeeling from the main line at Siliguri in Assam. It now took less than a week to reach the Tibetan frontier from Calcutta.[171]

British influence in Sikkim had greatly increased after Edgar's visit in 1873. It was regarded with anxiety and suspicion by the Sikkim Darbar, but they found themselves helpless in the face of the Bengal Government's insistance that the 1861 Treaty gave them every right to introduce measures for the improvement of Indian trade. British influence was further brought to bear on the disputed succession to the throne on the death of Maharaja Sidkeong Namgyal in 1874. The Maharaja died without leaving any issue, and the succession rested between his two half-brothers, one legitimate and the other illegitimate. The legitimate son, Thutob Namgyal, was only able to secure the succession with the active participation of the British Government, while the other, Tinley Namgyal, was forced to take up residence in Tibet. His presence in the Chumbi valley gave rise to British officials accusing the Darbar of intriguing with Tinley Namgyal, with the tacit backing of his brother-in-law, the ex-Dewan Namgyal. It had been rumoured in 1868, when the late Maharaja Sidkeong Namgyal had asked the Government of India for permission to allow the ex-Dewan to return to Sikkim, that it was with the express purpose of supporting Tinley Namgyal's claims to the throne.[172] At

the time, the Indian Government had stood firm in their refusal to permit the Dewan to return to the kingdom. When Sidkeong Namgyal died, Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling and responsible for relations with the Sikkim ruler, suspected that an attempt would be made by the Tibetan faction to set aside the legitimate heir, Thutob Namgyal, in favour of Tinley Namgyal. To prevent this happening, Edgar, acting in anticipation of orders from the Government of India, caused Thutob Namgyal to be proclaimed Maharaja. The 1861 Treaty did not give the British Government treaty rights to interfere in the succession to the Sikkim throne; it did, however, establish the right to deal with Sikkim without reference either to Tibet or to China. Herbert Risley, Secretary to the Government of India, was to comment, with some satisfaction, that 'Not a whisper was heard on the frontier of remonstrance against this vigorous piece of king-making, and Tibet acquiesced silently in an act which struck at the root of any claim on her part to exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the Sikkim State. The march of subsequent events was altogether in tune with our proclamation. In all our dealings with the Raja there never was a question raised as to the claim of Tibet to control him, while his absolute dependence on our Government was throughout acknowledged by him and his people'.[173]

Meanwhile, Tinley Namgyal, residing close by in Chumbi, was able to make political capital out of the fact that, under British protection, Sikkim had been over-run by settlers from Nepal, a land traditionally hostile to Sikkim. The Nepalese settlers soon began to displace the Lepcha and Bhutiya inhabitants and the Sikkim ruler had good cause to object to Indian Government policy. The Maharaja, having issued an order to restrict the settlement of Nepalese in Sikkim, found that his British-appointed Dewan, the 'Cheebu Adan Lama acted in direct defiance of the orders, by allowing Paharias (Goorkhas) to settle in the lands of Chakoong, Rishi and Ramam rivers. His example was soon followed by the old Lasso Kazi (Lha-Tenzin) who allowed Paharias to settle in Kitam and Namchi and without so much as asking permission from the Maharaja, he opened and began to work a limestone quarry and made lime. Then the contagion of disobedience spread to the Phodang Lama and the Khangsa Dewan who allowed Paharias to settle in Tchadam'.[174] Tinley Namgyal and the ex-Dewan could not fail to note these developments and, with some satisfaction, accused the Maharaja of being a tool in the hands of the British. Their view of the ruler did not go unnoticed in the councils of Lhasa.

Nepalese encroachments in Sikkim; the Colman Macaulay Mission, 1877–87

The Government of India's policy with regard to Nepalese immigration into Sikkim was based on their wish to encourage economic growth in the sparsely populated kingdom, and also to counteract the pro-Tibetan leanings of the Lepchas and their rulers. Before long disputes broke out between the Nepalese settlers and the local inhabitants and representations were made to the Bengal

Government. Sir Ashley Eden, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, invited the Maharaja to visit him at Kalimpong to settle the question 'between the Sikkim people and the Newars'. Eden accepted that the Nepalese infiltration would have to be restricted. 'The lands of Sikkim belong to the people of Sikkim and to no one else . . . if the waste lands and un-inhabited places are to be given to the Newars yet the headmen should be Sikkimites. On no account should any natives be deprived of their lands to be given to strangers and aliens'.[175] Having agreed to do as the Maharaja requested, and limit Nepalese settlements to a line drawn just north of the town of Gangtok, it was found difficult to implement the restriction. Disputes between the immigrants and the Lepchas continued, and in 1880 riots took place between the two groups at Rhenock. In spite of restrictions imposed by the Bengal Government and the Sikkim Darbar, Nepalese immigration did not cease largely due to the intrigues of the Khangsa Dewan, the Phodang Lama and the Chebu Lama who went out of their way to see that the policy was set aside.

The influx of Nepalese was fully exploited by the Dewan Namgyal faction who accused the British of interfering in Sikkim's internal affairs. To counteract Tibetan influence, Sir Ashley Eden obtained permission from the Indian Government to depute Sarat Chandra Das, Head Master of the Bhutia School in Darjeeling, and Lama Ugyen Gyatso to establish contact with the Panchen Lama at Shigatse, and also to visit Lhasa. Das was familiar with Tashilhunpo from a previous visit he had made in 1879 and on which occasion he had been well received. The reception this time was no less friendly, and the Panchen, on the point of visiting the capital, offered to take Das with him to Lhasa. Unfortunately the Lama died and Das went on alone to Lhasa, where, having failed to get prior permission for the visit, he was forced to remain in hiding. When the Tibetan Government became aware of Das's secret explorations, they ordered his arrest, but he managed to flee just in time. Das's exploits produced no positive political results, though his deception did serve to increase the Lhasa authorities' suspicions of British intentions.[176]

Das's journey to Tibet coincided with another crisis on the Tibet-Nepal frontier. Anti-Nepalese riots in Lhasa caused the Nepalese to demand a huge compensation for their loss.[177] The Tibetan authorities refused to pay and threatened, in turn, to cut off the subsidy of Rs 10,000 which they had been paying Nepal since the war of 1856. Whereupon the Nepalese began to prepare for war. The Chinese Amban was then forced to intervene and persuaded the Tibetans to come to terms and compensate Nepal to the tune of Rs 300,000 for the damage done to Nepalese property.[178] The main threat used by the Amban to induce the Tibetans to make peace was that the British would come to the aid of Nepal.

The Amban was right to suppose that the British would intervene on behalf of Nepal. The Nepalese Darbar had made no secret of their close friendship with the Indian Government and they remembered that, in the past, the British had withheld assistance to Tibet when the Gurkhas had invaded Shigatse.[179] While the end of the Tibet-Nepal crisis saved the Government of

India from active intervention, it did not save them from arousing suspicion in Tibetan eyes and from being considered as potential enemies of the Tibetan state. One outcome of the Nepalese crisis was increased tension along the Tibet-Bhutan border. This was followed in 1880, by the Tibetans making an assertion of suzerainty over Bhutan. The Bhutanese chiefs, 'who had grown greatly in independence from the north during many years of enjoyment of British subsidies', chose to resist the inference. Instead they began to make several inroads into Tibetan territory. In 1883, the Paro Penlop went so far as to attack and plunder Phari.[180] These incidents inevitably increased tension on the Sikkim-Tibet border as well. Moreover, the Tibetan Government's mistrust of British intentions decided them to introduce measures which would restrict trade at the frontier. To enquire into the causes of the stoppage, it was decided to send Colman Macaulay, Financial Secretary to Bengal, on a visit to Sikkim.[181]

The purpose of the journey, in Macaulay's view, was not merely to enquire into trade difficulties but to revive the Tibetan policy of Warren Hastings if at all possible. The fact that Sarat Chandra Das, on his recent visit to Tibet, had established friendly contacts at Tashilhunpo was an added advantage. Macaulay's brief was to discuss with the Maharaja of Sikkim the possibility of developing, through the Lachen valley in northern Sikkim, a trade route which would connect it with the province of Tsang in Tibet. He was also to endeavour, while in Sikkim and with the assistance of the Darbar, to establish friendly relations with the Tibetan authorities in the Chumbi valley. On 23 October 1884, Colman Macaulay arrived at Tumlong, the capital of Sikkim. Having been granted an audience with the Maharaja on the next day, Macaulay chose not to discuss the affairs of state with the ruler, but to do so afterwards with the Kangsa Dewan and the Phodang Lama, the 'Richelieu of Sikkim' as Macaulay described him. The question he discussed was the appointment by the Maharaja of a representative to administer the state during his absence in the Chumbi valley. Both men, Macaulay found, were averse to 'any arrangement which would stereotype the present system of an annual sojourn' at Chumbi by the Maharaja. After some prodding, they suggested that if Macaulay could persuade the ruler to reside permanently in his own territory it would be a great improvement to the present arrangement. In their opinion, the Maharaja's influence was weakened because of his residence in Tibet 'as a private individual' and that, as a result, he lost both the inclination and the opportunity of looking after the day to day administration of his state. If he was induced to reside in Sikkim permanently, 'he would be much better able to promote our [British] views in regard to the development of trade and of friendly relations with Tibet'.[182] Macaulay's opinion was that the Maharaja might, as an alternative, be asked to make his summer residence in the uplands of Lachen or Lachung. In this suggestion, he claimed, he had the full backing of the Dewan and his brother the Phodang Lama.

Macaulay had also taken the opportunity of consulting the two men regarding the stoppage of trade at Phari and found that neither of them appeared to think that the Nepalese were the cause of it. They blamed the

Tibetans, who, in their view, were averse to the general increase in trade. 'They [Tibetans] may cut their throats, but the people will trade.' As to the Lachen route, the Dewan and the Lama were not enthusiastic: 'wherever there is a high road, happiness disappears', and they saw the Sikkimese suffering from sickness spread by travellers. Having been assured by Macaulay that the British Government would finance the road and bridges, and that Sikkim would only have to supply labour, the two men readily agreed that since it was the desire of the British Government, 'the Darbar would loyally carry out their wishes'.[183]

When Macaulay met the Maharaja for the second time, he found him unwilling to accept the British Government's dictat not to reside at Chumbi. To temper the demand, Macaulay then offered a term of four or five years to be initially set for the experiment, during which time the Maharaja would try instead a residence in the Lachen highlands. The Maharaja was informed that a Council, consisting of the Kangsa Dewan, Purba Dewan, Kangsa Tungi, the Dewan's brother and a Tibetan Secretary was to be set up; since the Maharaja had agreed not to reside in the Chumbi valley, the need for a representative at Tumlong, in his absence, would no longer arise. 'I noticed that my friend the Phodang Lama, the ablest and most powerful of them all, was not mentioned, because he is a priest. He took this as a matter of course, but he did not hesitate to interpose his own remarks during the interview, his keen eye particularly brightening when the question of the Raja's residence at Choombi was mentioned'.[184] As to the question of trade, the Maharaja had sent a representative to Lhasa to discuss the stoppage but they had chosen not to reply. He intended to do all in his power to have the stoppage removed, and he accepted the need to keep up the Lachen route and the Jelep La road. In return, Macaulay gave the Maharaja to understand that any increase in his allowance was contingent upon his taking measures to improve the internal administration of his state, and above all to promote trade and friendly relations between India and Tibet.

Having visited Tumlong, Macaulay went on to the Sikkim-Tibet border. His report, on his return, was optimistic in the extreme as he detailed the enormous benefits to be derived from establishing closer relations with Tibet. He was confident that the Tibetans would welcome the import of Indian tea and British broadcloth which would come eventually to 'displace the Russian goods which now, from the facilities they enjoy, find their way into southern Mongolia and Tibet'. The Darjeeling route would serve a two-fold purpose: it would make it possible to sell at a lower price than those charged by the Nepalese, and at the same time remove their monopoly. In exchange, Tibet would export musk, gold and wool. 'The mineral wealth of Tibet has formed the basis alike of Indian fables and of Chinese proverbs. Indian fancy placed the home of the gods far away among the snows, on mountains glittering with gems and gold', Macaulay enthused. Unfortunately, all that stood in the way of his dream was Chinese and monastic opposition. 'There can be no doubt that, if these two elements were conciliated, the secular Government of Lhassa and the people at large would be glad to see trade and general intercourse established'.[185]

Macaulay saw no reason why the Chinese should not give permission for a mission into Tibet. It was to be stipulated that the admission of Europeans, except by consent in each case of the Tibetan Government and on passports issued by them, would be outside the scope of his mission. Once the passports had been obtained through China, then overtures should be made to the abbots of the three great Lhasa monasteries for their goodwill towards the mission. Should the Chinese refuse to allow a mission to proceed to Lhasa, then a smaller one was to be sent to Tashilhunpo where goodwill for the British Government had already been established since Das's visit. Finally, Macaulay was convinced of the importance of a route through Sikkim by the Lachen valley to Tibet. 'Immediately beyond it begins the wool country, and Tashi Lunpo itself is only four marches distant. It is very important that we should have a direct road to Tsang and its capital, independent of U and under Lhassa'.[186] Once the Maharaja of Sikkim had promised to give every help in the construction of this road and undertaken to maintain it on completion, Macaulay envisaged no obstacle standing in the way of a flourishing trade route.

On his return from the Sikkim-Tibet border, Macaulay was delighted to find that Sir Rivers Thompson, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, shared his optimism and wholeheartedly pressed for his schemes to be implemented. Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, did not share their enthusiasm. He anticipated complications arising in relation to China were the Indian Government to make a move in the direction of Tibet; there was little doubt that they would envisage it as an infringement of what they considered was their sovereign position there.[187] In fact, the Tsungli Yamen had informed Sir Nicholas O'Conor, the British Charge d'Affaires at Peking, that Tibet was not a dependency of China but 'an integral portion of the Chinese Empire', and that the Tibetan authorities at Tashilhunpo had no power to initiate a policy, let alone one that did not have the approval of the Lhasa Government.[188] It was clear that the Chinese did not intend to implement the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention, even if they had been able to; nor did O'Conor want to approach them on the question of Tibetan trade, which was in his view 'at best a poor trade with no prospect of increase'.[189]

Macaulay, however, was not so easily deterred and when, in the summer of 1885, he was home on leave he managed to convince Lord Randolph Churchill, Secretary of State for India,[190] of the advantages of sending a mission to Tibet. 'Our political influence in Central Asia would receive an enormous accession if, all misunderstanding and jealousy being removed, a British Envoy and the Chinese Imperial Commissioner were to meet at the Court of the Dalai Lama on cordial terms as the representatives of the two great Empires of Asia in alliance'.[191] Lord Randolph, duly impressed by Macaulay's arguments, agreed to send him first to Peking for passports, and from there to head a mission to Lhasa. Lord Dufferin saw difficulties ahead, particularly if the Tibetans decided to attack the mission, and the Indian Government were forced to undertake the vast expense involved in having to rescue it or avenge it by a campaign across the Himalaya. He asked that the

mission be postponed, but the India Office was not to be dissuaded and their view prevailed. Macaulay was instructed to leave England in August 1885 and, having picked up Sarat Chandra Das in Colombo, aim to arrive in Peking in October.[192]

Macaulay's instructions were that if he failed to gain admission to Lhasa, then he was to try Tashilhunpo; if this failed too, then he was to get a declaration from the Emperor of China to the effect that he disapproved of the obstacles placed in the way of Indo-Tibetan trade. Macaulay was not to discuss the entry to Tibet of Europeans, and to assure the Chinese that British subjects would only enter Tibet for trade purposes. If the question of trade could be settled in Peking, without reference to Tibet, then the mission to Lhasa was to be abandoned. In which case, Macaulay was to request that Indo-Tibetan trade should be duty free or subject to duty no higher than in force at the Treaty Ports in China, and that there should be no internal taxes on trade within Tibet itself. He was also to request that Indian traders should have free access to Tibet, and while there they should be afforded adequate protection; and finally, that the trading monopolies of the Lamas should be removed.[193]

On arrival in Peking, Macaulay and Das were to discover that the Yamen was not prepared to sanction the mission to Lhasa after all, nor to give them passports to go there. As O'Conor had feared, the reason for Macaulay's presence in Peking was well known, and in fact the Yamen had been aware for some time of British intentions to send a mission to Lhasa. Macaulay was not in the least deterred; on the contrary, he was quite convinced that he would soon be able to persuade O'Conor and the Yamen of the importance of the Tibetan project.[194] However, he soon found that the task was not as easy as he had once supposed. The Yamen offered two arguments against the proposed mission. First, the Tibetans would oppose it by force, and second, they did not have the power to impose their will on the Tibetan Government. O'Conor and Macaulay both insisted that the argument had no validity in the face of the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention which made it clear that the Chinese were responsible for granting passports for Tibet.[195] The Yamen, for their part, insisted that the Separate Article spoke of 'special circumstances', and in that category, the Tibetan question was classified. In any case, they would have to consult the Amban in Lhasa, who in turn would discuss the matter with the Tibetan Government, before granting passports for entry into Tibet.

O'Conor was of the opinion that passports would be granted eventually, but the real problem would be to ensure that they were respected in Tibet. He advised the Government of India not to delay but to despatch the mission into Tibet as soon as possible. Since this would probably be the last chance of sending a mission to Lhasa, the decision should be made to keep several members of the mission there for as long as possible. As the negotiations developed, O'Conor found that he had to make several concessions before the Yamen would even consider granting passports. He had to promise that no agreement would be made with the Tibetans without reference to China; that the proposed mission would be secular in nature.[196] In November 1885, the

passports were finally granted. O'Conor advised the Indian Government that the mission should be organised on a commercial basis rather than a political one, since it would excite less suspicion. He was insistent that there should be no delay in the mission's departure thereby giving the Chinese, as well as the Tibetans, time to find an excuse to stop it altogether.[197]

While the mission waited for permission in Peking, Sarat Chandra Das had met a Tibetan envoy sent by Lhasa to keep an eye on the negotiations in Peking, and had learnt that the concessions offered by the Yamen were no more than a sham, and would prove worthless in the face of Tibetan opposition to the mission. Das informed Macauley that his informant had led him to believe that the Tibetans would oppose, by force if necessary, any attempt by the mission to enter Tibet. Macaulay was determined to take himself and his mission to Tibet at all costs, and he chose to ignore Das's warning.[198]

After a series of delays, largely due to Lord Dufferin who continued to oppose the mission, Macaulay and his expedition assembled in Darjeeling in 1886. Instead of the commercial and scientific mission it was originally intended to be, it had grown into an expedition of considerable proportions. The size of the mission alarmed not only the Chinese but the Tibetans, and as the negotiations for its advance faltered, events quite outside Macaulay's control brought the venture to an end. Lord Dufferin, in the latter part of 1885, had undertaken the conquest of Upper Burma, and in January 1886 had officially annexed it. Dufferin had never shared Macaulay's belief in the political and commercial importance of the mission, and had not only opposed, but quite successfully managed to postpone its departure over a period of time. After the Burma campaign, Dufferin took advantage of another postponement to come to an agreement with China over Burma. Burma had traditionally close ties with China, and Dufferin proposed that concessions should be offered to China in relation to her claims of suzerainty over Burma. In return, the Chinese would guarantee improved conditions for Indian trade with Tibet.[199] Meanwhile, the Amban's report on the hostile Tibetan reaction to the proposed mission decided the Yamen to postpone giving their permission for Macaulay and his mission to advance. While Macaulay waited at Darjeeling, the Chinese offered O'Conor an immediate settlement in Burma in return for a permanent abandonment of the mission.[200] Dufferin agreed at once, and telegraphed the Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, to say that 'I would not hesitate a moment in sacrificing the Tibet mission for settlement'.[201]

By the Burma-Tibet Convention of July 1886,[202] the Government of India saw a means of getting out of embarrassing entanglements in Tibet, and establishing friendly relations with China. In the wider sphere of diplomatic necessity, to secure Chinese goodwill in the face of a possible Russian advance in Central Asia seemed a solid benefit rather than the nebulous benefits of Tibetan trade. The only justification for a military expedition into Tibet would have been an active threat by Russia in the region. But as the rivalry between Russia and Britain deepened, HMG had no doubts that a policy

which secured the friendship of China in the face of a Russian threat was well worth cultivating.

While the Macaulay mission idled in Darjeeling waiting for the moment to advance into Tibet, and the Yamen in Peking were busy discussing the terms on which the mission could be abandoned, the Tibetans decided to take matters into their own hands. News came to Darjeeling that Tibetan troop concentrations were forming in the Chumbi valley on the Sikkim border. Macaulay's first reaction was to suppose that it was a reception committee come to welcome his mission. But by 27 July it was apparent that the Tibetans had advanced thirteen miles into Sikkim territory having crossed over the Jelep La and where they fortified the town of Lingtu on the Darjeeling road. The Maharaja of Sikkim was at the time residing at his Chumbi estates, and appeared to support the Tibetan action. He maintained that the land the Tibetans occupied had traditionally always been theirs, and that they were merely reasserting their rights over the area. Although they had for many years allowed the Sikkim Darbar prescriptive rights over it, they had decided to resume control as a punishment for allowing the British access and the right to build roads in Sikkim, and above all for the Maharaja's failure to stop the Macaulay mission from advancing towards the frontier of Tibet. The Tibetans were convinced that 'the mission was the spearhead of an impending British invasion'.[203]

Tibetan claims to Sikkim territory served to alarm the Indian Government, particularly when it was found that the Maharaja wholeheartedly supported these claims. The Indian Government knew full well that the 1861 Treaty gave them no right whatsoever to interfere in the internal affairs of Sikkim, and they wondered what inducement could be offered to the Sikkimese to persuade them to eject the Tibetans. Two Articles of the 1861 Treaty were used to provide the answer. Article XIX forbade the Maharaja to cede or lease any territory belonging to Sikkim to another state without the Government of India's permission. And Article XX forbade the passage of troops of any other state through Sikkim territory without prior permission from the British Government. The Maharaja was reminded of his treaty obligations. The weakness of the Indian Government's argument lay in their ignorance of the nature of Tibetan claims to Sikkim territory and whether it was based on solid historical foundation. Lord Dufferin was averse to discussing the matter with the Chinese, who under the Burma-Tibet Convention of 1886 were the obvious authority for him to refer to. In his opinion, the Macaulay mission was misconceived from the start and he had no wish to lend a helping hand. When, therefore, Macaulay proposed that he should wait no longer but go up to the Tibetan border and summon the representatives of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet for a conference, the suggestion was turned down, without any hesitation, on the part of the Viceroy.

Nevertheless, the Bengal Government was not prepared to ignore the presence of Tibetan troops in the Chumbi valley, particularly when they were convinced that it was resulting in loss of prestige for the British Government; they were for treating it 'as a local police action'. The view was not shared by

Lord Dufferin who argued that the Tibetan presence on the frontier was the direct result of the presence of Macaulay's mission. He was adamant that the mission would have to be 'broken up completely and expeditiously', and persuaded the India Office of the correctness of his advice. They eventually conceded that 'If Mr Macaulay is sent away and kept quiet we will hear little more of this. The Tibetans are not aggressive'.[204]

The Lhasa Government had traditionally regarded Sikkim as a dependency of Tibet. They had no wish to deny the relationship nor did the Sikkim Maharaja wish to deprive himself of the benefits which accrued from his Tibetan heritage, particularly the considerable estates in the Chumbi valley. Moreover, the ruler spent a large portion of his time in Chumbi where he came under the influence of the banished Dewan Namgyal and his wife's relations. Tibetan influence was paramount in the Maharaja's political life as well. In fact when Maharaja Sidkeong Namgyal died in 1874, his younger brother Thutob Namgyal was crowned in Chumbi and not at Tumlong, at a ceremony attended by both lay and monastic officials from Lhasa, which also included the Chinese Amban.[205] As with past tradition, Thutob Namgyal married a Tibetan girl in 1881; time was to show that she was the chief advocate of the Tibetan point of view in the counsels of the Darbar and was spirited in her defence of Sikkim's traditional suzerain. It did not endear her to the Political Officer appointed by the British in 1889, who recognised that the Maharaja chose not to ignore her powerful advocacy. But in 1886 the Indian Government heard, with some consternation, that the Maharaja had affirmed his loyalty to Tibet and to China and had promised to do his utmost to prevent the British from encroaching further into his kingdom.[206] It was an event, if true, the Government of India were not prepared to ignore.

The Treaty of 1861 had, to all intents and purposes, changed the status of Sikkim into a protectorate of the British Government. The turn of events had alarmed the Tibetan authorities who expressed their displeasure at Sikkim's willingness to negotiate a treaty with their neighbour in the south, and they began to restrict grazing rights for the Sikkimese along the Sikkim-Tibet border. Apart from these restrictions, the Sikkim Darbar was fully aware of Tibetan and Chinese intervention in the affairs of the other hill state, Bhutan. In point of fact, the event which most affected the Maharaja's attitude to his Tibetan and Chinese neighbours was the intervention of a Sino-Tibetan force which had been sent to quell the insurrection of the Paro and Tongsa Penlops against the Deb Raja of Bhutan. On the request of the Deb Raja both the Penlops were brought to heel by the orders of the Chinese Amban; the Tongsa Penlop prudently making peace while the Paro Penlop, continuing in his defiance, was eventually forced to acknowledge defeat and thereupon committed suicide. These events convinced Maharaja Thutob Namgyal that it would be wise for him to make some sign of obeisance to Lhasa. The opportunity came when the Chinese Amban and the Tibetan authorities summoned a conference at Galing in the Chumbi valley. The occasion was the conferring on various Bhutanese chiefs a Chinese insignia of rank. Having arrived for the conference, the Sikkim Maharaja was reputed to have made a

declaration of submission to the Chinese and the Tibetans. The declaration which caused such offence in India stated that 'From the time of Chogel Penchoo Namguay [the first Raja of Sikhim], all our Rajas and other subjects have obeyed the orders of China . . . You have ordered us by strategy or force to stop the passage of the Rishi river between Sikhim and British territory; but we are small and the *Sarkar* [British Government] is great, and we may not succeed, and may then fall into the mouth of the tiger-lion. In such a crisis, if you, as our old friends, can make some other arrangements, even then in good and evil we will not leave the shelter of the feet of China and Tibet . . . We all, king and subjects, priests and laymen, honestly promise to prevent persons from crossing the boundary'.[207]

Had a Tibetanising Raja of Sikkim been the only element of danger that the Indian Government was called upon to face, they might 'with some loss of prestige in Eastern Asia, have permitted the tangle to unwind itself'. But the Raja's announcement of his change of allegiance and the presence of the Tibetan forces in Lingtu were elements the British Government could not hope to ignore. They understood that the Tibetan advance to Lingtu had been undertaken to prevent the Macaulay Mission from advancing into the Chumbi valley. At the same time they looked forward to the Maharaja of Sikkim fulfilling his treaty obligations to them by inducing the Tibetans to withdraw. They were shocked to find that he did not intend to fill the role of mediator. Instead he advised direct negotiations with Tibetan officials on the frontier. In the first instance, a Tibetan official arrived at Lingtu to persuade the mission to turn back. When this appeal failed, more Tibetan troops began to gather in the Chumbi valley, and in July, with the mission still not abandoned, they decided to fortify Lingtu. When finally the Tibetans heard that the Macaulay mission had been withdrawn, they promptly removed the bulk of their force from Sikkim, leaving behind a token representation at Lingtu.

However, in October 1886, the Chinese, under pressure from the British Minister in Peking, chose to rebuke the Tibetans for their opposition to the Macaulay mission which the Emperor had authorised. The rebuke decided the Tibetans to close the passes from Chumbi to Sikkim and, once again, to reinforce Lingtu. Through the Sikkim Darbar they put forward their terms: they did not intend to withdraw until the British had agreed not to send a mission to Tibet, and given an assurance that no European official would come beyond Lingtu. The Government of India's initial reaction was to consult the Chinese regarding Tibetan claims to authority along the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. At the same time, they were not prepared to allow the Tibetan challenge to go unanswered, particularly when it concerned the status of Sikkim, a British-protected territory.

Lord Dufferin's first priority lay in the settlement with China over the newly acquired territory of Burma. He feared that any intervention in the Tibetan occupation of Lingtu might result not only in the continuance of the stoppage of trade on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, but in the assertion of Chinese suzerainty over Sikkim. He went so far as to delay informing Sir John Walsham, British Minister in Peking, that the Tibetans had advanced as far as

Lingtu. When eventually he did so in January 1887, Dufferin added the rider that 'the withdrawal of the Tibetans should not be based on their being within the limits of Sikkim, nor even that Your Excellency should mention the fact that their position is in Sikkim; because any mention of the boundary might give rise to a specific assertion of China's suzerainty over Sikkim, which it is very desirable to avoid'.[208] For Dufferin still hoped that if the Tibetans were not actively threatened, they would withdraw of their own accord.

When, in May 1887, the Tibetans still showed no signs of moving out of Lingtu, the Government of India decided that the time had come to secure a new treaty with the Maharaja of Sikkim which would remove from him the freedom to reside in Tibetan territory and thereby defy Indian Government orders. Sir Rivers Thompson, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, was for removing the Maharaja's privileges which allowed him to levy transit duties on goods passing through Sikkim and also his right to reside in the Chumbi valley. He wanted the Maharaja to act as mediator in the dispute with the Tibetans and to deliver a warning that unless they were out of Lingtu by 1 October 1887, they would be forcibly ejected from the place. Thompson believed that the problem lay in the undemarcated Sikkim-Tibet border and he suggested that the Maharaja should depute a representative to demarcate the boundary in conjunction with British and Tibetan officials. In exchange for these various tasks and provided the Maharaja showed himself willing, the Government of India would consider an increase in his annual allowance from Rs 12,000 to Rs 18,000.

The Viceroy was quite prepared to accept the suggestion that a new treaty should be negotiated and that the Maharaja's visits to the Chumbi valley should be strictly curtailed, but he was not prepared to enter into direct negotiations with the Tibetans regarding the Sikkim-Tibet border. For he knew full well that any such approach would go against the British Government's agreement with the Chinese not to deal with Tibet except through them. In March 1887, the Maharaja was summoned to Darjeeling for the purpose of negotiating a new treaty, but it soon became clear that even the suspension of his subsidy was not going to induce him to leave the Chumbi valley.[209] Meanwhile, the Tibetans showed every sign of remaining on at Lingtu and were found levying taxes there. The Bengal Government, deeply critical of the Viceroy's policy of non-interference, saw it being interpreted by the Tibetans and the Sikkimese as a sign of weakness 'while the people of Sikkim, finding we do not stir a finger to help them, will gravitate towards Tibet and accept the policy imposed on them from there'.[210] Under criticism, Dufferin yielded and a second summons was sent to the Maharaja to appear at Darjeeling in October 1887; this time the summons carried with it a warning that unless he obeyed, the Kangsa Dewan and his brother, the Phodang Lama, would be appointed to administer the state in his absence. These two men had warned Sir Steuart Bayley, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, that the Maharaja intended to appoint a pro-Tibetan official, Yangthang Kazi, as his administrator.[211] So Bayley was not surprised to find the Maharaja refusing to comply yet again; this time, however, he was more specific and explained his

inability to conform to Indian Government wishes on the grounds that he was bound to China and Tibet by the terms of the agreement made at Galing where he had given his word not to cross over into British territory. He protested against the Bengal Government's threat to appoint their own administrators, and he demanded payment of the annual subsidy which had been suspended since 1886.

The Maharaja's letter and refusal was to have far-reaching effects not only for Sikkim but also for Tibet. The reason given for the refusal contained a definite statement of the Maharaja's submission to Tibet and China; before it had been rumour, now it was out in the open. By implication, the statement repudiated the Maharaja's treaty obligations to the Government of India. The Sikkim Treaty of 1861 had bound the Maharaja not to reside in the Chumbi valley for more than three months in a year; he had already been there for two years, and this despite repeated warnings from the Bengal Government that he was breaking the terms of his agreement and requesting him to return to his capital. Sir Steuart Bayley had long been convinced that 'the occupation of Lingtu is not an isolated measure of aggression taken by the local authorities on their own motion but a part of the general policy adopted by Tibet for controlling the affairs of Sikkim in a spirit hostile to the British Government'.[212] By now Dufferin was himself aware that his policy of non-interference over the Lingtu affair was arousing comment not only in India but also in England 'where the India Office and the Foreign Office continued to receive memorials from the Chambers of Commerce pointing out the value of the Tibet trade, regretting the abandonment of the Macaulay mission, and remarking that if the British did not hurry up and secure an opening in Tibet, they might well find themselves forestalled by another nation'.[213] Moreover, questions were also being asked in Parliament.[214] By October 1887, Lord Dufferin had decided that, as the Maharaja had still not appeared at Darjeeling, and nor had a reply been received to his query from China regarding Tibetan intentions, he was left with no alternative but to expel the Tibetans from Lingtu, by force if necessary. He informed Lord Walsham in Peking that, unless the Chinese had good grounds for objecting, he intended to go ahead with the expulsion with no further delay.[215]

Walsham had held his hand having been specifically asked to do so by Dufferin. However, on hearing that the Viceroy intended to go ahead with the expulsion of the Tibetans, he approached the Yamen to send orders to the Amban in Lhasa to instruct the Tibetans to withdraw from Lingtu.[216] When, on 17 October, the Yamen received a report from the Amban, it was to the effect that the Tibetans had indeed built a fort at Lingtu for the purpose of protecting their country, and anyway 'not only was the place not subject to India, but it was a long way from Darjeeling', and if the Viceroy insisted on sending a military expedition 'his act will certainly affect the friendly relations between our two countries'.[217] Requests from the Yamen to delay any action at Lingtu resulted in Dufferin agreeing, somewhat reluctantly, to postpone the venture until the following spring. He made it clear that the delay would not cause him to change his mind, unless the Tibetans vacated Lingtu.[218]

The Lingtu affair, 1888

In December a letter was despatched to the Lingtu garrison commander informing him that, unless he withdrew by March 1888, the British force would expel him forcibly. Throughout the winter of 1887–88, the Yamen and the Chinese Legation in London attempted in various ways to delay the expulsion of the Tibetans from Lingtu; they pointed out that the withdrawal should be secured 'by the pacific action of the suzerain power rather than by the Indian Government having recourse to arms', which would prove highly damaging to Chinese prestige in Lhasa.[219] Edward Goshen at the Peking Legation reported a conversation he had had with Li Hung-chang of the Yamen regarding the Tibetan question. 'The Yamen may promise what they like – but it is quite impossible in the present state of relations between China and Tibet for them to carry out their promise. People talk of China's influence in Tibet – but it is only nominal, as the Lamas are all powerful there, and the Yamen would only be able to carry out their promise by sending a large and costly expedition there, which it wouldn't suit them at all to do'.[220]

The decision to expel the Tibetans by force meant that it was essential first to find out the Sikkim Darbar's intentions. The Bengal Government deputed A W Paul, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, to visit Gangtok, the new capital of Sikkim, in November 1887. While there, Paul was to put pressure on the Darbar officials to induce the Maharaja to return to the state. In Gangtok he found that the pro-British faction of the Kangsa Dewan and the Phodang Lama were having difficulty maintaining their power base due to the Tibetan party led by Yangthang Kazi who was supported by the monks of Pemiongchi in north Sikkim. In general, Paul found that officials of the Sikkim Darbar, at least to his face, maintained that they were strictly neutral and fearful of the impending crisis, and particularly so in the absence of the Maharaja in Tibetan territory.[221]

It was clear to China that the crisis at Lingtu would go far to reveal that her claim to a paramount position in Tibet was in imminent danger of being eroded. If it was seen that the Imperial Decree had no influence in the counsels of the Lama hierarchy in Tibet, it would inevitably affect China's position in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. Events in Sikkim had proved beyond doubt that the Tibetans intended to maintain their rights on their own frontier, and their dominance in Sikkim affairs if at all possible. They had made it clear that their interests did not coincide with those of China, and the Yamen were forced to concede that they were powerless to enforce a Tibetan withdrawal from Lingtu. Moreover, the Tibetans had made every effort to prevent the Amban from visiting the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.[222] A new spirit of Tibetan independence was abroad; it had begun with the selection of the XIIIth Dalai Lama without recourse to the Golden Urn, and it appeared to have encouraged the Tibetans in the belief that they would soon be free from Chinese interference altogether.[223]

In March 1888 a force of 2,000 men took the field under Brigadier General Graham's command. A W Paul was attached to the expedition as Political

Officer. The force encountered little opposition, and on 21 March drove the Tibetan garrison out of Lingtu. In May, almost two months after their expulsion, the Tibetans made a surprise attack on the British position at Gnatong and nearly captured Sir Steuart Bayley, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, who was visiting the frontier. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss of Tibetan lives. The Bengal Government was of the view that the Tibetan attack justified an invasion of Tibet, but the Government of India insisted that the British force was not to enter Tibetan territory unless it was militarily important to do so.[224] In September, the Tibetans made a further attempt to take Gnatong but once again were beaten back. This time the attackers were pursued into the Chumbi valley and, for one day, in spite of orders to the contrary, British troops occupied the village of Chumbi in Tibetan territory.[225]

No sooner had the British force entered Chumbi, than the Amban announced that, despite Tibetan opposition, he was on his way down to the frontier to settle matters. The Tibetan expulsion appeared to have also influenced the Maharaja of Sikkim who finally agreed to come down to Darjeeling to discuss the affairs of his state.[226] The defeat produced in Sikkim a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the pro-Tibetan faction. They did not, of course, throw in their lot with the British; nor did Bengal officials hesitate to point out that their influence and the part played by the Maharaja during the Tibetan crisis had been far from satisfactory. He was accused of allowing his half-brother, Tinley Namgyal, to conspire against British interests, and by sending his Maharani to visit her parents in the Chumbi valley. The result was that an advance on Gangtok was deemed necessary '. . . owing to the mischievous activity of the Tibetan party at that place, and the collapse of the leading men in the British interest'. As Colonel Mitchell advanced on Gangtok with a small force, the Maharaja fled to Rinchinpung. The force then moved forward to Tumlong with Claude White, the Political Officer in attendance. Mitchell believed that 'As a political move there is no doubt that this marching of troops to the capital of Sikkim has had a beneficial effect'. All that now remained was to persuade the Maharaja to agree to return to the capital.[227] It was easier said than done, for when Colonel Graham's troops occupied Chumbi, they found only the Dowager Maharani in residence at the palace. 'The original idea in marching to Chumbi had been to loot and burn the Rajah's palace, but the Political Officer [Ney Elias] begged that this might be foregone and the Rajah be given another chance to come in'.[228] Word was left for the Maharaja to report in person at Gnatong during the next few days, 'or it would go badly with him'. On 2 October, the Maharaja presented himself at Gnatong, having left behind in Chumbi his eldest son, Tsodak Namgyal, and his half-brother, Tinley Namgyal. In the years ahead their presence in Tibetan territory was to cause the Maharaja many a headache, and was successfully exploited by Claude White to induce the Maharaja to be ever more conciliatory.

The Sikkim Convention, 1890; negotiations regarding trade, pasturage and frontiers, 1891–93

British success at Lingtu greatly alarmed the Chinese. They seriously considered seeking Russian help and sending Chinese troops to help the Tibetans. 'But moderate elements, helped, no doubt, by the strong advice of Sir Robert Hart and Sir Halliday Macartney, prevailed'.[229] The Chinese were advised that only by negotiating with the British could they retain any vestige of influence in Tibet. The Yamen then agreed to send the Lhasa Amban to the frontier. Sheng T'ai arrived at Gnatong on 21 December 1888, where he found Sir Mortimer Durand, the Indian Foreign Secretary, Ney Elias and A W Paul waiting for him. Durand had been instructed to accept an agreement only if it formally recognised the British position in Sikkim, and was entered into by both the Tibetans and the Chinese. No definition of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was to be discussed, nor was a formal trade agreement to be insisted upon.[230]

When eventually the Amban arrived, he refused to admit that the Tibetans had any right to discuss the dispute. Tibet was part of the Chinese Empire and its rights were those of China. Sikkim was a Tibetan dependency and therefore subordinate to China. Moreover, the Sikkim frontier itself was open to question since the Chinese had no intention of allowing foreign traders to visit Tibet across the Sikkim-Tibet border. In other words, the Chinese would continue to control Tibet, and would not allow a situation to develop which would put that control to the test. The Amban was prepared to accept the *de facto* British position in Sikkim, but he insisted on the preservation of the *de jure* dependence of Sikkim upon Tibet and China. The Maharaja was to continue to pay his traditional homage to the Amban and to retain the rank and insignia conferred on him by the Emperor of China.[231] These symbols of Sikkim's dependence on China were to be referred to as 'letters and presents' and were as follows: The Maharaja of Sikkim was to wear the hat and button of his Chinese rank; he was to send complimentary letters and presents to the Amban on his arrival at his post in the New Year; he was to send similar letters and presents to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas; and he was to pay his respects to certain Tibetan functionaries, both lay and spiritual.[232]

Durand was to note that the Amban showed little conciliation in his dealings with him, particularly since it was found that he was in secret communication with the rulers of Sikkim and Bhutan. He had summoned a Bhutanese delegation to meet him on the Tibet-Sikkim border, and he intended to go on to Rhenock on the Sikkim-India border with a Tibetan escort. Durand felt that he could not allow the Amban's plans to go unanswered, and, as a first step, he summoned the Maharaja of Sikkim back from his estates in Tibet, and threatened to impose a suspension of his subsidy until he had obliged.[233] He also made it clear to the Amban that the Chinese terms were totally unacceptable, and that the Indian Government could not stand by and allow a British feudatory to pay homage to China. On the pattern of the Burma Agreement of 1886, the Maharaja might be allowed to pay spiritual homage to the Dalai Lama, to wear the various Chinese insignias of rank out of courtesy, but

that this practice would cease on the death of the present Maharaja. To Durand, the danger lay in the Sikkim example being used to unsettle other frontier states. '. . . if we give way in respect to Sikkim, we must be prepared to do so, at some future time, not only with regard to Bhutan and Nepal, but with regard to any of the smaller Himalayan states which may have committed themselves. We might even have China claiming suzerain rights over 'Darjeeling and the Bhutan Dooars, which we acquired from her so-called feudatories'.[234] When he found that the Chinese were not prepared to give in on the question of the Maharaja paying homage, Durand decided to bring the discussions to an end, which he did on 10 January 1889.

In Durand's opinion there were two courses open to the Indian Government. They could present to the Amban terms on a 'take it or leave it' basis, or enforce on the Tibetans a settlement without reference to China. To achieve this, they would need to occupy the Chumbi valley up to Phari, a measure which would force the Tibetans to negotiate. Alternatively, they could make a declaration of their position in Sikkim, and threaten strong action if British rights in the state were again violated. A permanent official stationed at Gangtok, paid for out of the Sikkim subsidy, would ensure that the Maharaja held to his treaty obligations. If the trade question arose again, it could then be discussed directly with the Tibetans and without Chinese participation.[235]

The Chinese were quick to realise that, unless they secured an agreement at this juncture, they could not prevent direct Anglo-Tibetan discussions taking place without Chinese participation in the future. This was the opinion of Sir Robert Hart, Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs and he despatched his younger brother, James Hart, to assist the Amban in his discussions with Durand. Durand saw no reason for reopening the talks unless Hart had something new to offer, which, in Durand's opinion, he had not. Lord Lansdowne, who had succeeded Dufferin as Viceroy, agreed with Durand.[236] However, the Foreign Office in London, more concerned with the broader issues of Anglo-Chinese relations than with Sikkim, urged the Viceroy to consider the new Chinese proposals. In their view it was 'more prudent to keep the negotiations alive and to make some small concessions in regard to Sikkim, rather than to disturb our relations with the Chinese Government'. Lord Cross at the India Office eventually agreed, and Lansdowne was instructed to reopen talks.[237]

In April 1889, the talks reopened with A W Paul acting as the British delegate and James Hart representing the Chinese. The Chinese put forward proposals to the effect that the Sikkim-Tibet boundary was to remain as before; the British were to act on the Sikkim side in accordance with their treaty with the Maharaja, and the Maharaja was to continue to send presents and letters, as usual, to the Amban. China was to ensure that Tibetan troops did not cross into Sikkim territory, and the British were to respect the Tibetan frontier. Hart maintained that though Sikkim was a protected state, yet it had never been actually annexed by the British and therefore the Chinese could not ignore relations which formerly existed between Sikkim and Tibet, nor those which were in force until the present time. On the crucial question of letters

and presents, Hart was not prepared to budge. After another round of talks, Lord Lansdowne became convinced that further discussions would not solve the problem of Tibet, let alone define the status of Sikkim. Nor did he wish to entrust the matter to Sir John Walsham in Peking, where the Viceroy suspected that 'negotiations . . . would, we fear, end in the sacrifice of Indian interests, and do serious harm'.[238] It was the Foreign Office who were against breaking off the talks, for in their view an outright rejection of Chinese proposals would, at some future date, lead to their re-assertion 'in some unconvenient manner'. They were not, however, totally opposed to direct talks with the Tibetans, or taking action against them should the Tibetans seek to encroach on Sikkim territory.[239]

In November 1889, Hart submitted revised proposals. This time, the Chinese offered to recognise that Sikkim was a protected state but not annexed by the British, and that the tradition of letters and presents should, therefore, be allowed to go on as before. Lord Lansdowne found himself unable to accept an agreement which 'from one end of the Himalaya to the other would have weakened our influence. In India it is essential for the stability of our rule that we should permit no attempt at interference by Foreign Powers with any portion of the Empire'.[240] The Chinese, finding the Indian Government determined to stand firm over Sikkim, put forward a new set of proposals. This time, the Chinese were prepared to recognise India's sole protectorate over Sikkim 'accompanied by a formal assurance that this is held to mean that the external relations of the protected state will be solely conducted by India and that consequently the practice of presents and letters to the Tibetan Government will virtually cease'.[241] Lansdowne, on the basis of this formula, agreed to reopen negotiations; in his view the settlement defining the status of Sikkim had gone in Britain's favour.[242] In December 1889 the British finally agreed to present draft proposals to James Hart and the Amban.

Article I defined the Sikkim-Tibet frontier as the watershed between the Tista river in Sikkim and the Mochu river in Tibet and the rivers flowing northwards into Tibet; Article II admitted that the British had sole control over the internal and external affairs of Sikkim; Article III provided for a joint Anglo-Chinese guarantee of the frontier as defined, and left three questions for future settlement. These were the problem of trade across the Tibetan frontier (Article IV); the question of Tibetan grazing rights in Sikkim (Article V); and Article VI required to settle the method whereby communication between the Indian Government and the Tibetan authorities was to be conducted in future. Article VII laid down that within six months of its ratification, a joint Anglo-Chinese Commission was to be set up to discuss these outstanding questions. These proposals became the Sikkim-Tibet Convention which was signed in Darjeeling on 17 March 1890 by Lord Lansdowne and the Amban Sheng T'ai.[243]

The Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 settled the immediate problems arising from the Tibetan occupation of Lingtu since 1886 and the consequent Sikkim Expedition of 1888. It did not deal specifically with questions of trade, nor of future relations between the Government of India and the Tibetan

Government. Problems relating to trade only arose when the Indian Government, having obtained what they considered were favourable terms for the development of trade, tried to extract the maximum benefit from the circumstances. The Tibetan Government, not having been a signatory to the agreement, saw no reason to assist in developing a trade which would bring the British to the doors of Tibet, an event which they had resisted ever since Warren Hastings' day. The other flaw in the arrangement was the failure of China to admit that she was in no position to enforce the terms of the 1890 Convention on Tibet.

The Convention did, however, settle the status of Sikkim; she became, for all practical purposes, a state under the protection of the British Government. Furthermore, the Indian Government had secured the right to make such regulations as they saw fit concerning Sikkim's internal affairs and to administrative matters relating to the frontier, whether of trade or access; they also obtained sole control over Sikkim's foreign relations. Durand, the man most concerned with the final decisions regarding the 1890 Convention, saw 'Sikkim as part of the Indian Empire . . . It can have no dealings with foreign powers, in whose eyes India should be red from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin'.[244] The Chinese request that since the distinction between Sikkim and Tibet had, in the past, been somewhat undefined there should not be any abrupt change in the pastoral economy along the Sikkim-Tibet border without prior consultation, was readily agreed to by Durand. The Indian Government also accepted the Chinese proposal that there was to be no direct contact with the Tibetans, except through China.[245]

Throughout the next three years negotiations continued between Paul and Hart regarding pasturage, trade and communications on the Sikkim-Tibet border. Paul made it clear that his government would not be satisfied with the conditions of trade in Tibet until it was freed from restrictions of travel for British traders. He put forward the suggestion that, as a concession to the Chinese, the Indian Government would be prepared to accept the limitation of access to a single suitably placed mart. The place Paul had in mind was Phari, where the Tibetans taxed goods to and from Sikkim and Bhutan, its chief appeal being that it was situated far enough into Tibet so as to provide easy access, if necessary, not only to Lhasa and Shigatse, but also to Bhutan. A route from Sikkim through the Chumbi valley, which the Indian Government were entitled to demand under the provisions of the 1890 Convention, opened up prospects of an ever increasing trade right through to the Tibetan heartland. Paul was very insistent that Phari was the very least that he could ask for. The Chinese, however, would not agree to Phari since they knew full well that the Tibetans would reject out of hand a measure which would bring a British presence right into Tibetan territory. Hart, having referred the matter back to the Yamen, sent a reply to the Viceroy: 'China accepts whatever Tibet accepts, but, beyond compelling Tibet to keep the peace, considers it inexpedient, as being calculated to disturb peace and occasion animosity, to compel Tibet to make internal changes. Therefore, wherever Tibet opposes travelling or trading, China does not see her way to force their acceptance'.[246]

The Chinese offered instead Yatung in the Chumbi valley, a short distance from the Jelep La Pass and with direct access to north Sikkim. The offer was accepted, the Indian Government insistent that it was a temporary measure and that, in time, the Chinese would be brought round to remove their objections and offer Phari as well.

It was over the question of importing Indian tea into Tibet that the Chinese raised the most objection. 'Since the middle of the nineteenth century this subject has been discussed and by the 1890s its literature had attained an impressive volume but few planters . . . outside the districts of Darjeeling and British Bhutan took much interest in the Tibetan market, and it was possible . . . to survey various remedies for the ills then afflicting the Indian tea industry without once mentioning the word Tibet'.[247] But in the 1890s the Indian tea industry began to decline due to over-production and a drop in world prices. As a direct result, the Indian Tea Association began to urge the Indian Government to use their influence to open up the markets of Tibet for Indian tea.[248]

The Chinese argued that the Tibetans would never accept the import of Indian tea, particularly since the monopoly of the tea trade was in the hands of the great Tibetan monasteries. Nor did the Chinese feel that they could ignore the interests of the monasteries whose influence they recognised as being all important in the councils of the Tibetan Government. Moreover, the Chinese used the tea trade to finance much of their administration in Lhasa, and they saw no point in endangering their own exclusive market by opening 'to competition the one small country in the world where the consumption of China tea was still appreciated'.[249] When finally a compromise was reached, the Indian Government had agreed that Indian tea was not to be imported into Tibet for a five-year probationary period, and on the further understanding that all other goods, with the exception of arms, narcotics and intoxicants, should cross the Indo-Tibet border free of duty. At the end of five years the whole question of tariffs on trade between British-India and Tibet was to be re-examined. Tea would then be admitted at a duty not higher then that charged in England on China tea.

On 5 December 1893, the Regulations regarding Trade, Communications and Pasturage were appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890.[250] The signatories were A W Paul for the Indian Government, and James Hart and Ho Chang-jung for the Chinese; the Regulations were the result of three years of discussion.[251] The Chinese in Article I and II undertook to protect the lives and property of British subjects, and to provide a suitable residence for the British official who was to be appointed to supervise the working of the new mart, which was to come into operation on 1 May 1894; Article III stated that certain goods, such as armaments, intoxicants and narcotics were not to be imported into Tibet; in Article IV, trade in all other goods was to be free of duty for the first five years following the opening of the mart, after which period a tariff might be jointly decided upon if found to be desirable. During this period Indian tea was not to be imported into Tibet, but its importation was to be allowed on the expiry of the five-year term subject to a rate of duty

not exceeding that at which China tea was imported into England; Article V stated that all goods passing through the mart were to be registered at the customs station to be established there; in Article VI, the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer undertook to settle any disputes arising at Yatung through personal consultation; Articles VII and VIII undertook the transmission of despatches from the Indian Government to the Ambans; and Article IX empowered the Government of India to regulate, as it chose, the conditions under which Tibetans might graze their flocks and herds across the Sikkim-Tibet border.[252]

The negotiations which followed the Sikkim Expedition of 1888 were chiefly concerned with the status of Sikkim. However, British negotiators had more than Sikkim in mind, so that precedents established with regard to the small frontier kingdom of Sikkim could have a wider application when it came to the status of other protected states having a common border with Tibet, and who might, at some point, either claim or be claimed to form part of the Chinese Empire. As Lord Lansdowne wrote, 'We shall probably before long be engaged in other and far more important negotiations respecting the Pamirs, in which our interest and those of China will be in many respects identical . . . we are disposed to regard the arrangement which has now been arrived at . . . as of importance not so much on account of the commercial interests involved, but as an outward sign of neighbourly good-will prevailing between the two Empires'.[253] The Government of India were satisfied that they had gone a long way towards solving their problems with regard to Tibet and could look forward to a period of calm on the north-eastern frontier. They did not anticipate that Sikkim, having agreed to the 1890 Convention, would attempt to pledge her allegiance once again to Tibet or to China. Most particularly since an assurance had been given that any future dealings regarding the Tibetan frontier was to be with China alone and 'should be of a character to strengthen our relations with the government of that country'.[254]

The Government of India had thought fit to settle their future relations with Tibet through China and without reference to the Tibetans. The Tibetans were a party to neither the 1890 Convention nor the Trade Regulations which followed it; as a result, the Indian Government found themselves having to place increasing reliance on Chinese mediation, and discovering that they were dealing with a government which neither had the power nor the goodwill to be heard at Lhasa. Moreover, these events took place at approximately the same time that the XIIIth Dalai Lama, destined to rule over an independent Tibet, was in the process of taking over the reins of power in Lhasa. In the circumstances, it was unlikely that the Tibetan authorities would pay anything more than lip-service to the orders of the Chinese Amban. It followed that the Sikkim campaign and its consequences did nothing to reassure the Tibetans or the Sikkimese of the good intentions of the British Government. As a result, both the Tibetans and the Maharaja of Sikkim did their very best to deny the validity of a frontier which had been defined without their acceptance or participation. British and Chinese attempts to demarcate it or to encourage the trade mart at Yatung to flourish was hindered

in every possible way. In fact, both kingdoms attempted, in their separate ways, to return to their traditional allegiance one to the other.

Anglo Chinese negotiations; Maharaja Thutob Namgyal, 1894–99

During the final stages of the Anglo-Chinese negotiations regarding the status of Sikkim, the Bengal Government had decided to detain forcibly at Kurseong in the Darjeeling district Maharaja Thutob Namgyal and his family. The reason for the measure was that when summoned back from Chumbi to Gangtok in 1887, rather than do so, the Maharaja had made many an excuse and decided not to obey Indian Government orders. Since his disobedience was there for all to see, Lord Dufferin thought it prudent to remove him from the scene lest he upset the delicate negotiations which were in progress between the Indian Government and the Chinese. John Claude White had been appointed Political Officer Sikkim in 1889 after the hostilities against the Tibetans were over, and was entrusted with the task of breaking the news of his banishment to the Maharaja. 'They had come into opposition with the British Government and from an exaggerated idea of the importance of Tibet and China, and with no conception or understanding of our ways, they had run against a mighty power to their hurt and consequent suffering'.[255]

White's attitude to the Maharaja was to colour all his dealings with the Darbar. He found the Royal Family both 'amusing and pathetic' and he was 'heartily sorry for them both'. The many ills which the unfortunate Maharaja was forced to undergo from the day White made his appearance on the Sikkim scene sprang from the Political Officer's total disregard for the ruler's position or his wishes, and the assumption that Sikkim was his private fief. No sooner had the Maharaja been banished, than White set about reorganising the Sikkim administration. He appointed a Council consisting of the two brothers, the Khangsa Dewan and the Phodang Lama together with the Shew Dewan, men well versed in ways of accommodating British officials; they had after all done so ever since Edgar's mission to Sikkim in 1873. Furthermore, they were in total opposition to the ruler. Together with the Chebu Lama, they had shown themselves willing to encourage Nepalese immigration into Sikkim, for personal gain, and against the wishes of Maharaja Thutob Namgyal. Nor did they find it difficult to persuade White that the best means of raising revenue for the Sikkim Darbar was to encourage immigration. The land being sparsely populated, and in order to bring it under cultivation, White was willing to give 'land on favourable terms to Nepalese, who, as soon as they knew it was to be had, came freely in'.[256] White and his protégés were convinced that the ancient economy of Sikkim was both outmoded and unproductive. A start was made on the private estates of the Royal Family and the lands of the loyalist elements within the kingdom, which were soon liquidated and distributed among pro-British elements. A number of lessee landlords were created, subservient to the Council and White. Mass settlement of Nepalese and the deprivation of traditional lands held by the Bhutias, the Lepchas and the Tsongs proved to be the most effective method of destabilising the Maharaja's authority.[257]

The History of Sikkim relates the other side of the story. It states that when the Maharaja, under threat of being forcibly returned to Sikkim, agreed to come down to Gnatong for an interview with A W Paul, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, he was informed of the displeasure of the Indian Government and ordered to go instead to Darjeeling to offer his apologies, in person, to the British representative there. At the same time he was forbidden to return to his estates in the Chumbi valley. On hearing these terms, the Maharaja suggested that since the summer season was too far advanced for him to visit Darjeeling, he should be allowed to postpone the visit. Instead he should be permitted to visit Tromo (his estate in the Chumbi valley) once again and since 'the Chinese Amban of Lhassa named Rhin was coming down to negotiate a treaty between the Tibetans and the British, His Highness might be allowed to send the usual reception presents and then to go back into Sikkim'. If the British doubted his word, the Maharaja offered that his eldest son, Kumar Tsodak Namgyal, should return in advance to Gangtok. The offer was turned down, as was the request to visit Tromo. Not knowing what to expect when he returned to Gangtok, the Maharaja thought it prudent to leave the heir-apparent Tsodak Namgyal and his half-brother Tinley Namgyal in Chumbi.[258]

Having arrived at Gangtok, White's reaction to the Maharaja's delayed return was that he needed to be taught a lesson. He first sent the Khangsa Dewan and the Phodang Lama to upbraid the ruler: 'The upholding of the cause of the Tatsangs, and the three chief bodies of Tibet have involved Your Highness into great troubles'. This was followed by an interview with White, where the Maharaja was told in no uncertain terms that, in future, he must defer to the advice of the Phodang Lama and his brother, that he was not to keep any of his old courtiers, such as the Tatsang Lama, the Barmiok Kazi and the Yangthang Kazi in his service but to banish them to their own estates. And finally, the Council had passed a resolution demanding that the Maharani, still in residence in Chumbi, should return immediately and only then would an allowance of Rs 500 per month be given to him for household purposes. The Maharaja protested that his original allowance had been Rs 12,000 per annum, but White was adamant that he would get not a penny more.

Within days of this meeting, White asked the Maharaja to present himself at Kalimpong, and that he had a day in which to obey the summons. When the Maharaja protested, White's response was to surround the palace with his sentries; the next day the Maharaja was down in Kalimpong where a conference took place between him, the Chief Secretary of the Bengal Government, A W Paul and White. The Maharaja was told to send for his eldest son, Kumar Tsodak Namgyal, from the Chumbi valley, failing which both he and his Maharani would be removed to Calcutta. He was also asked to produce the *sanads* and the button of rank conferred on him by the Chinese Emperor, to list the presents or tributes which were sent annually by him to Tibet, and to explain the significance of these various gestures. The Maharaja explained that the gifts were a form of barter of necessary goods, 'a certain number of loads of madder rice bags, some broadcloths', and that in the New

Year 'the custom was to send fruits, plantains, oranges, etc, with complimentary greetings to the Dalai Lama as well as to the Chinese Amban'.[259] The explanation failed to impress the Bengal Government who then ordered the Maharaja to refrain forthwith from sending these customary gifts, and that, in future, the Indian Government would hold themselves responsible for treating with the Tibetan Government.

While the Maharaja was detained at Kalimpong, two members of the Council were despatched to Chumbi to bring back the eldest son. However, the Dowager Maharani (Gyalum) refused to give her consent on the grounds that since the Maharaja had been taken to Kalimpong 'without any certainty as to what might be done to him', she was not prepared to entrust her grandsons to the Shew Dewan without knowing what might be their fate. The Dewan having returned empty-handed, White found no difficulty in persuading the Indian Government that it was in the best interests of the state if the Maharaja was detained for a further period at Kalimpong. The interval, White pointed out, would give him and his tame Council time to reorganise the administration of Sikkim, without objections being raised on the part of the ruler.[260] By the time the Maharaja was permitted to return to Sikkim, three months having elapsed, he was to find that between White, the Dewans Khangsa and Shew and the Phodang Lama, much of the lands under his direct control and those of the leading men of Sikkim, had been transferred to the above members of Council.[261]

As the Maharaja journeyed towards the capital, he found himself totally ignored and discovered that the administration of the kingdom had passed into the hands of the Phodang Lama. Sensing that every attempt would be made by Council members to ignore his presence and to insult him, the Maharaja and Maharani took a detour 'to Nabay for some time'. While there, news came that one of the Maharaja's sons was seriously ill, and the Maharani promptly journeyed on to the Chumbi estates. There is every evidence to suggest that the message was sent under the orders of the Phodang Lama, who was instantly informed of the Maharani's movements by one of his spies. No doubt he hoped that the Maharaja would be duly punished by the Political Officer for infringing the terms of the 1890 Convention. Which he promptly was. 'On being brought to White's presence, who was then living in a bamboo hut close by the Palace site, His Highness found White and the Phodang Lama seated in chairs. A chair was placed for His Highness just near the door, and he was charged with having sent off Her Highness secretly to Tromo'. For his defiance, White had the Maharaja confined to a room on the top storey of his palace, with only one servant in attendance and soldiers occupying the rest of the palace. Food was forbidden until the Maharaja agreed to send for his two sons from the Chumbi estates, but this he refused to do. Two weeks later, White finding that the ruler would not bend to his will decided to release him, on condition that he agreed to live in a small make-shift hut but not in the palace itself.[262]

Shortly afterwards, Sir Steuart Bayley, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, was paying a visit to Tumlong and summoned the Maharaja to join him there.

When they met, the Maharaja complained of the treatment meted out to him by White and his Council and maintained that he had not infringed any of the Indian Government rules. The reply was not reassuring; Sir Steuart did not offer to discipline White but demanded instead an assurance from the Maharaja that he would agree not to visit Tromo again, nor to hold any communication with the Tibetans. The Maharaja then asked to be favoured with a joint order to this effect from the three governments concerned, the Chinese, the Tibetan and the British, only then would he feel himself 'quite safe and free' from harassment. He wanted his allowance to be increased to a reasonable sum and that he should be permitted to go to Lachen or Lachung for the summer months if Chumbi was now out of bounds for him and his family. Both requests were turned down by Bayley, the argument being that when both his sons and the Maharani were back in Sikkim, the increase in his annual allowance would be reconsidered. As to the question of his summer residence, no decision could be made while the Anglo-Tibetan negotiations were still in the balance.[263]

In February 1891, a year after the signing of the Sikkim Convention, the Maharaja was given permission to return to Tumlong, with his movements strictly curtailed to three of his palaces at Tumlong, Gangtok and Rabdentse. He chose Rabdentse with the express intention of avoiding the minatory presence of White. Within months, White had persuaded the Council to demand the Maharaja's return to Gangtok; he did so in contravention of the Bengal Government's orders. In fact, he paid the Maharaja a visit at Rabdentse in October 1891, where he impressed upon the ruler the need to return to Gangtok and to secure the return of the princes from Chumbi. The Maharaja made it clear that since White had seen to it that 'he had no concern with the State's administration, he saw no reason why he should live at Gangtok'. Furthermore, the Lieutenant Governor had allowed him the choice of any of his three palaces in Sikkim, and he had chosen to live at Rabdentse. As for the princes, A W Paul, when at Gnatong in 1889, had permitted them to visit Chumbi, so long as the Maharaja remained in Sikkim, and he had no wish to break with that tradition.

Having returned to Gangtok empty-handed, White looked around for ways in which to force the Maharaja to do his bidding. A means was found in the Council's ruling which allowed the Maharaja 1,000 attendants a month, out of which a certain number served him for seven days at a time. The Maharaja was accused of 'pressing people into forced labour' and warned that he would be punished if the practice did not cease forthwith.[264] Once again the Maharaja appealed to the Bengal Government, pointing to the Sikkim Council and White's harassment of him and his officials. The petition was returned for comment to White, who then accused the Maharaja of 'unmannerly behaviour' and threatened, through the Khangsa Dewan, to 'make it impossible for the Maharaja and the Kazis to live in Sikkim'.[265] He was summoned back to Gangtok under threat of 'a company of soldiers' being sent to forcibly return him.

The Maharaja, sensing that if he was forcibly returned to Gangtok and left

to the tender mercies of White and his Council his plight would be worse than before, decided to flee. He summoned the Maharani, and with her and their second son, the Avatar Kumar Sidkeong Namgyal and small daughter, the Maharaja began his journey. No sooner had White heard of the Maharaja's flight than he confiscated his private property and had it auctioned at Pemiongchi with the help of the Shew Dewan. The proceeds of which were then divided between the Council members and White.[266]

The Maharaja's journey was hazardous, to say the least; he nearly lost his daughter through cholera, and many of his ordinary followers decamped. Progress was slow and tedious due to weather conditions, the snow obliterating the various well-known routes. Having lost their way, the Maharaja and his suite eventually crossed over into Nepal. When he reached the Walong pass on the Nepal-Tibet frontier, the Maharaja was stopped by a Tibetan official who told him that he had orders from the Tibetan authorities not to allow him and his party to cross the Tibetan boundary. The Maharaja's final destination was probably Tibet, although the manner of his arrival indicates that he had truly lost the way; it is possible that if the Tibetan Government had had some prior warning, they might indeed have given him sanctuary. But as it was, the Maharaja, with his traditional allegiance to Tibet, found the refusal 'a very senseless and cruel thing for the Tibetan Government to do'.[267] The Tibetans, for their part, no doubt found it difficult to forgive Sikkim for bringing the British into contact with them, and were particularly wary since the Lingtu hostilities of offending their neighbour in the south and giving them cause to find an excuse to invade Tibetan territory.

Within days of his arrival at Walong, the Nepalese had arrested the Maharaja and decided to return him to the good offices of White. At the Nepal-Sikkim border he was handed over to Lama Ugyen Gyatso, the Deputy Superintendant of Police in Darjeeling. Here, White visited the Maharaja and informed him that he was to be installed at the Ging monastery where only a limited number of attendants and three ponies would be allowed him; all his other followers were to return to their estates in Sikkim. His second son, the Avatar Kumar, was to be kept at Raja Tenduk's house for the purposes of education, and the Maharaja's allowance was to be reduced to Rs 150 per month. 'Rai Bahadur Lama Ugyen Gyatso was to procure a daily sufficiency of provisions which were to be sent to the Maharaja's establishment daily'. The Maharaja compalined that 'not a pice in cash was given to Their Highnesses'.[268] To teach the Maharaja's supporters a lesson, the Council, at White's insistence, confiscated the estates of the pro-Tibetan Yangthang Kazi and the Barmiok Kazi for their misdeeds in accompanying the Maharaja on his peregrinations. They went so far as to rough-house the Yangthang Kazi who died from his injuries. And if that was not enough, the Council inflicted the final insult by seeing to it that 'the order which condemned the poor deceased Kazi was signed by a seal bearing the following inscription: Thutob Namgyal, Sikkim Maharaja, Mangalam'.[269]

Sir Charles Elliott, now Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, had no doubts that the Maharaja's flight was not a sudden decision but that he had taken his

measures with great cunning and departed over a rarely used snow-covered pass. Having forcibly brought him back, 'The matter need not trouble us. If the Chinese think it will lead to the annexation of Sikkim, they will probably compel him to return. Otherwise, I should recommend lying quiet, and, if we can induce his eldest or second son to come in, we will educate him at the Bhutia school, and in due time set him up in his father's place.[270]

The decision to intern the Maharaja at Ging monastery, was in Sir Charles Elliott's view a just punishment for his grave disobedience and the trouble he had caused by his escapade. White and Raja Tenduk were, in turn, instructed to pressurise the Maharaja and to urge him to bring back his heir from Chumbi, with the added incentive that an increase in his personal allowance would only be granted through his eldest son. The Maharaja's reply indicated that he did not intend to help the British to supersede him. His reply was categorical, 'that if the father be unfit to be the ruler, the son cannot be one. That as long as Highness's self lived, though he may not be as wise as the rulers of vast kingdoms and Empires, yet he felt himself quite equal to the rulership of such a petty kingdom as Sikkim of which he is the living and lawful ruler'.[271] Moreover, in the Maharaja's opinion the question of suzerainty over Sikkim remained undecided. Until the Chinese, the Tibetans and the British had come to a clear understanding as to who was the suzerain power, he had no intention of abdicating in favour of his son nor had the British Government the right to force him to do so. To insist that the Maharaja do their bidding was a policy that neither the Bengal Government nor White were prepared to forego. But, by now, Sir Charles Elliott was finding difficulty in knowing quite how to put pressure on the Maharaja. 'If we were to say he should be deposed for a year or two as a punishment, he would reply that makes no difference to me. I refused to attend your Council or to take part in ruling before, and I shall be no worse off now. If we say we will stop your allowance, he will say that concerns my friends in Chumbi, not me; they got all the surplus after my food was paid for, and I shall still be fed, and want no more. It is hard to know how to deal with such a savage'.[272]

The perpetual harassment the Maharaja was forced to undergo while he was incarcerated at Ging monastery formed a letter of complaint to Sir Charles Elliott. He gave an example of White's parsimony in relation to his simple needs. 'Once it happened that His Highness bought a maund of charcoal for use in the kitchen as the fuel supplied was wood, the Saheb came down upon His Highness at once with the question as to where he had got money to buy charcoal from'.[273] The Maharaja made it clear that he was no longer prepared to deal with White whom he regarded as a personal enemy. This time Sir Charles Elliott took note of the objection and sent instructions to Mr Nolan, Commissioner at Darjeeling, to negotiate with the Maharaja and to impress upon him the need to bring back his eldest son to Sikkim. The Maharaja refused yet again on the grounds that he was the legitimate ruler of Sikkim as long as he lived; nor was he prepared to relinquish the throne because White wished him to do so. The Bengal Government's suggestion that his second son should, in the circumstances, be considered his heir was no

more acceptable than their wish to supplant him by his eldest son. Furthermore, the Maharaja pointed out repeatedly that his second son was an Incarnate Lama and could not be brought up by anyone other than the monks. As such, neither the people of Sikkim nor himself were prepared to agree to his son breaking his vows or to taking up the duties of ruling Sikkim for which he was totally unsuited. Finding the Maharaja adamant in his refusal, Nolan saw no alternative but to recommend that the Maharaja be deposed for a period of three years. In July 1893, the Maharaja and his family were ordered down to Kurseong, where for the next two years they were kept in close confinement. The management of Sikkim was placed under the supervision of White and the Sikkim Council. The Bengal Government hoped that, at the end of three years, the Maharaja would have had time to reflect that it was in his family's interests to co-operate with the Indian Government. When eventually he was persuaded of this, his decision would indicate whether to restore him to Sikkim or instal his second son on the throne.

No sooner had the Maharaja been deposed than the Council, with White's encouragement, wrote to Tsodak Namgyal at Chumbi asking him to return to Sikkim and warning him that unless he obeyed he might lose his right to the succession altogether. The invitation was declined on the grounds that he would not return without his father's permission, nor could he leave before his education had been completed. On receiving this reply, White instructed the Phodang Lama to explain to Mr Nolan at Darjeeling that no special dispensation would be required in the case of Sidkeong Namgyal, since he had not, as yet, taken his final vows at the monastery. The ruse did not convince Nolan, nor did he think that there was an urgent need to resolve the succession issue, particularly since the Maharaja might yet be persuaded to obey Indian Government orders.[274]

In April 1894, Nolan arrived at Kurseong for the express purpose of explaining to the Maharaja the reasons for his incarceration and to pressure him into sending for his eldest son. He accused the Maharaja of unhelpfulness and putting obstacles in the way during the British campaign against the Tibetans; that his flight from Rabdentse had been an unfriendly act; that he had persistently refused to act in accordance with Indian Government orders by not getting the elder Kumar back from Tibet, and that his complaints against White had caused wide-spread disbelief in the minds of the Indian Government.[275] The Maharaja defended his actions; he explained that the unexpected forward movement of troops, under White's orders, had filled him with suspicion and rather than be taken prisoner he had decided to flee. Moreover, White's insistence that none of the Sikkimese should offer their Maharaja the traditional gifts, nor allow him to buy necessary stores for his household had left him with no alternative but to remove himself from these insulting conditions. The Maharaja, as proof, produced White's original letter. But Nolan was not interested in disciplining White. On the contrary, he demanded from the Maharaja an apology, in writing, to be submitted to the Indian Government, and that without further delay his eldest son was to be brought down from the Chumbi valley to Sikkim.

Early in 1895, Maharaja Thutob Namgyal had decided to accept the Government of India's terms and requested to be restored to his throne. In April 1895, Sir Charles Elliott visited Gangtok and informed White and the Sikkim Council of the Maharaja's decision. As was to be expected, the Council and White opposed the Maharaja's return and asked that he should be permanently deposed in favour of his second son. Neither Sir Charles Elliott nor Mr Nolan were prepared to support White's recommendation, and it was decided to allow the Maharaja to take up office under certain conditions.[276] These were that Kumar Tsodak Namgyal should return to Sikkim, and that the Maharaja would have to accept the new constitution set up for Sikkim, in his absence, by White. The Maharaja agreed to abide by both conditions. He wrote to his eldest son under Nolan's dictation: 'The British Government have again and again requested me to bring you down to Sikkim. And now the Commissioner, Mr Nolan, as representative of the government, has assured me with the promise of the government's restoring us back to our land and people with our former power. Therefore, you my son Tsodak Namgyal must come to Sikkim as soon as possible'.[277] The letter having been handed over to Nolan, Maharaja Thutob Namgyal and his Maharani were permitted, by slow stages, to return to Sikkim. The first stage in the journey was Darjeeling, where the Maharaja was granted an allowance of Rs 500 for clothing, but his request for a pony, his having died, was refused on the grounds that it could only be paid for out of Sikkim Darbar revenue and this would not be forthcoming until he was back in his capital. In October 1895, the Maharaja, after an absence of two years, was back in Gangtok.

The provisions of the new constitution which the Maharaja had bound himself to accept were as follows: the administration of Sikkim was to be controlled by a Council of leading monks and laymen presided over by the Maharaja, to whom all decisions were to be referred while he was present in Gangtok. In his absence, all decisions were to be submitted to him on his return. If the Maharaja differed on any point with the Council, then the matter was to be referred to the Political Officer, and if he chose to support the Maharaja, then the Council were bound over to agree. In any disagreement between the Maharaja and the Council, the Political Officer had the casting vote. All decisions of the Council were to be carried out in the joint names of the Maharaja and the Council. All decisions made since 1889 were not to be changed by the Maharaja without first obtaining the permission of the Political Officer. The Maharaja was to be given a monthly allowance of Rs 1,000, and he was not to raise any sort of cash or kind from his *raiyats*[278] or to accept anything from the *raiyats* without payment. The Maharaja was to agree to pay his household servants in cash; an allowance was to be made for the Maharaja's sister from the Sikkim State fund, a similar allowance to his second son while he was studying. Thereafter, the Council was to be responsible for fixing a proper allowance for him from the state fund. All repairs for the palace were to be done out of Sikkim State money, and finally these arrangements were to hold good until the Government of India thought proper to restore absolute power to the Maharaja.[279]

The Maharaja having returned to Sikkim, the Indian Government turned its attention once more to the question of succession. White, with his usual antipathy to the Maharaja, asked that Sidkeong Namgyal should be appointed immediately as successor to the Sikkim throne. Sir Charles Elliott disagreed, particularly since he saw the sensibilities of a Buddhist state being affected if an Avatar Lama was forcibly removed from his calling. He did, however, suggest that Sidkeong Namgyal should be placed under the tutelage of Sarat Chandra Das at Darjeeling, while a further attempt was made to persuade Tsodak Namgyal to return to Gangtok. In April 1896, back came the reply from the Kumar that the boundary dispute on the Sikkim-Tibet border precluded him from crossing the frontier. Neither White nor Nolan believed a word of it, and the latter advised the Government of India that the succession of Tsodak Namgyal to the throne would be undesirable on various counts, the chief of which being that his family's natural allegiance to Tibet as well as the Tibetan influence during the formative years of his life, would work in favour of Tibet. White went further; he considered him to be ignorant of conditions within Sikkim as well as of the language, and that this deficiency would work to the detriment of the Sikkim administration. Sir Alexander Mackenzie, the new Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, agreed with neither Nolan nor White; he recommended that the succession issue should be deferred until the death of Maharaja Thutob Namgyal. In the meantime, he wanted no reply sent to the elder son, but for the Maharaja to be informed of his decision.[280]

Shortly after the decision was taken not to proceed against Tsodak Namgyal, the Bengal Government got word that he was living on an estate called Taring, near Gyantse on the Lhasa road. White feared that his presence so near the Sikkim border would weaken the claims of his own charge, the second son. In the light of this information, the question of succession was revived once again by White. Kumar Sidkeong Namgyal had now attained the age of nineteen years, and in White's opinion it was high time that the succession was decided in his favour. Moreover, it was pointed out that he had been educated under the personal guidance of the Political Officer. Nolan agreed with White that a 'de-nationalised exile' was the last thing the Sikkim Darbar needed, particularly at a time when problems affecting the Sikkim-Tibet border were on the increase, with both the Tibetans and Chinese having found every excuse to put off demarcating it. Nevertheless, Sir Alexander Mackenzie was still not convinced, and suggested that another chance should be given to Tsodak Namgyal, with a rider that if he did not return within a prescribed time, he would be debarred from the succession altogether.

While the Bengal Government were involved in the question of succession to the Sikkim throne, Lord Curzon had replaced Lord Elgin as Viceroy in 1899.[281] The new Viceroy brought with him 'strong preconceptions about the correct conduct of British policy in Central Asia'.[282] One of these preconceptions was concerned with a more vigorous policy towards Tibet. On arrival in India, Curzon found that the Indian Government's negotiations regarding the exchange of Giaogong for improved trading facilities at Yatung had ground to

a halt. The man appointed by Lord Curzon to negotiate was John Claude White. The fact that he urged a radical change in policy towards Tibet and whole-heartedly shared Curzon's suspicion of Russia recommended him to the new Viceroy far more than did the 'wait and see' policy of Sir Alexander Mackenzie. He therefore had no difficulty in overruling Mackenzie on the grounds that the elder son had surrendered his claim to the succession by his unwillingness to return. In February 1899, the Viceroy officially recognised Sidkeong Namgyal as successor to Maharaja Thutob Namgyal. At the same time, Tsodak Namgyal was banned from entering Sikkim altogether.[283]

The appointment of Sidkeong Namgyal, in direct opposition to the Darbar's wishes, was the second occasion on which the Government of India had decided to put aside the heir-apparent because they suspected him of having pro-Tibetan proclivities. Sir John Edgar had imposed Maharaja Thutob Namgyal on the Darbar in 1874, and it was now White's turn to appoint a successor, with the connivance of a tame Council. The arrival of Lord Curzon found White's dominance in Sikkim affairs complete. The Maharaja's continuing objection to the appointment of the second son as his successor, based on the argument that the rules of Buddhism bound an avatar or incarnation to a life of celibacy and religious contemplation, White found no difficulty in disregarding, let alone the protests of the monastery from whose confines he had forcibly detached the Prince. The administration of Sikkim obeyed White's every command, the Council not moving without his say-so. The Indian Government's agreement with the Maharaja that all measures affecting the state were to be submitted to him for approval, White arranged that the directive was disregarded by the Council.

In 1901, Sir John Woodburn, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, paid a visit to Gangtok, and the Maharaja took the opportunity to put his grievances before him. The Maharaja's main objections this time centred round the influx of Nepalese immigrants into Sikkim for which he blamed the Khangsa Dewan, his brother the Phodang Lama, and the policies instituted by White. Lepcha and Bhutia land owners had been deprived of their holdings which had been distributed by Council members amongst the Newaris for their 'evil and selfish aims'. Furthermore, the people of Sikkim now regarded their Maharaja as 'a mere pensioner, to whom they need not pay any regard or respect'. He asked Sir John Woodburn to 'restore the full administrative powers of realising revenues, administering justice, and attending to the outer and inner duties of the State to myself in full'. The Governor did not think it fit to go so far but to allow the Maharaja, in future, to address the Bengal Government direct without recourse to White and the Council 'regarding the external or internal affairs of Sikkim and that the Lieutenant Governor himself would do the same'.[284] It was also agreed that a further increment of Rs 500 a month would be sanctioned for the Maharaja's benefit in spite of White's objections. Unfortunately, Sir John Woodburn died on his way back to Calcutta, and before representations could be made to the Government of India for restoring the Maharaja to his full administrative powers. However, the complex negotiations taking place on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier worked in the Darbar's

favour and the Maharaja was to find the Bengal Government less punitive in their attitude towards him.

The 1890 Convention had come about as a direct result of the Tibetan advance to Lingtu; it had enabled the British to use the 1861 Treaty with Sikkim to accuse the Tibetans of interfering in the affairs of a state virtually under British protection and they had gone to war with Tibet. The result was that both the 1890 Convention and the 1893 Regulations which followed the hostilities were designed to define the status of Sikkim and to regulate the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. The Government of India were optimistic that all obstacles to border trade had been removed as far as possible and that the trade mart at Yatung would finally show signs of improvement. Both agreements, however, were Anglo-Chinese in concept and execution and denied the Tibetans the right to negotiate on issues concerning the Tibetan frontier; nor was provision made for Tibetan participation in any discussions which might arise in the future from them. The absence of direct Anglo-Tibetan relations would have been of little significance if the Chinese had been able to effectively control Tibet and persuade the authorities there to co-operate in the working of the trade mart. The agreements may have acknowledged that Tibet was indisputably part of the Chinese Empire, but it was soon found that any influence that China claimed to have in Lhasa was of the bare minimum. Moreover, the Tibetans denied that agreements made by the Chinese on their behalf had any relevance for them. As a result, from the moment that Yatung was opened in 1894 to Indo-Tibetan trade, British officials began to complain about the activities of the Tibetans, their lack of co-operation and the many obstacles put in the way of the functioning of the trade mart.

It was White who was sent up to supervise the opening of the Yatung mart in May 1894. He was to complain that the Tibetans had built a wall across the only road which led into Tibet from Yatung; that the Chinese customs officer sent to supervise the mart on behalf of his government had been unable to come further than Yatung, and that Tibetan traders were denied access to the trade mart altogether. They were stopped at Phari, at the head of the Chumbi valley, by Tibetan officials who charged a 10% *ad valorem* duty on all goods passing southwards, and that the passage of goods was itself in the hands of the inhabitants of the Chumbi valley, who only took orders from the Lhasa authorities.[285] White was in favour of abandoning Yatung, of closing the Jelep La Pass and developing an alternative route through northern Sikkim by way of the Lachen valley. He pointed to the fact that not only had the 1890 Convention and the 1893 Regulations failed to solve the problem of frontier trade, but that the Tibetans had chosen to establish a military post at Giaogong in northern Sikkim as a direct result of these measures.[286]

The Government of India, for the time being, turned down White's recommendations regarding Yatung. They recognised that 'the utmost patience is necessary in dealing with the Tibetans, and having regard to the short time which has elapsed since the date fixed for opening the Yatung mart, the Governor General in Council would prefer to make nothing of the nature of a complaint to the Chinese Government at the present stage'.[287] To prevent

future violations taking place, it was proposed that the Sikkim-Tibet frontier should be demarcated on the ground by a joint Anglo-Chinese Commission.[288] However, it soon became evident to the Indian Government that the Tibetans did not intend to acknowledge the validity of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier as laid down in the 1890 Convention. Nor were the Chinese showing any enthusiasm for setting up a commission designed to demarcate the boundary. They claimed that it was Tibet's refusal to provide transport that was holding up the arrival of the Chinese Commission. Major Tu, the Chinese Commissioner at the frontier, urged White to postpone demarcation and to give the Tibetans a chance to turn up, but found White deaf to all persuasion. He feared that the proposed demarcation could only result in a revival by the Tibetans of their traditional claims over Sikkim, and he was not going to allow that to happen. Despite protests from the Chinese Commissioner at Yatung, and without any official sanction from the Indian Government, White decided, on his own initiative, to put up boundary pillars on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier.[289] It was only after the demarcation was complete that White chose to inform the Chinese Amban Kwie Hwan, that his letter had arrived too late for him to postpone the process.[290]

There now remained the problem of the disputed northern border where Tibetan encroachments had taken place. The Bengal Government were for White proceeding to the area to demarcate on his own without Chinese participation; if the Tibetans attempted to resist, they were to be ejected by force if necessary.[291] In their view, the 1890 Convention had incorporated the Tista and its watershed within Sikkim territory and therefore Giaogong was part of Sikkim. The Tibetan presence at Giaogong, whatever their historical claims to the area might have been, was a challenge to the validity of the 1890 Convention and an encroachment on the Sikkim border. The Government of India, however, cautioned restraint and instructed White to take no further action without the participation of Chinese officials.[292] Throughout 1895, White found various reasons to complain about the activities of Tibetan officials on the frontier; they had deliberately knocked down and removed the boundary pillars that he had erected on the Jelep La Pass as well as those at the Donkhya La and Doko Passes. He insisted that the action was a deliberate act on the Tibetan's part and demanded an apology from the Amban. When Lord Elgin again counselled restraint, White produced other arguments in support of a more forceful policy towards the Tibetans. He was certain that the Ambans had no control over the situation in Tibet, and that 'the only dissentients are the Lamas of the three monasteries Serra, Despung and Gadun, who are passively thwarting the Amban in his endeavour to bring about an understanding on the question of the demarcation'.[293] On the other hand, Tibetan opposition would collapse if they found the British Government in earnest about having the boundary laid down. White found that he had the full backing of Philip Nolan and Sir Charles Elliott in Bengal; they agreed that the chances of the Chinese enforcing the 1890 Convention on the Tibetans were slim and the only alternative left to the British was to drive the Tibetans from Giaogong and restore the area to the Sikkim Darbar.[294]

Lord Elgin, however, was under no illusions that he would be treading on thin ice when it came to an undemarcated frontier if he followed White and the Bengal officials' advice. 'There are grounds for believing that the Tibetans possess reasonable claims in the extreme north of Sikkim to a tract of land which is excluded from Tibet by the boundary line laid down in the Convention. The tract in question is of no value to Sikkim'. He asked the Secretary of State whether he would agree to his intimating the Indian Government's willingness to meet the Tibetans' claim and allow him to address the Chinese Resident with a proposal for a joint enquiry.[295] In the Viceroy's opinion, if the grievances could be removed it would in itself give an impetus to trade on the border. Elgin suggested to the Amban that, in return for a sympathetic hearing of the Tibetan claim to Giaogong, the Tibetans should be persuaded to co-operate rather than obstruct trade at Yatung. He also offered to send Claude White up to the frontier to examine, in conjunction with Chinese and Tibetan representatives, any evidence which the Tibetans might wish to bring forward in respect 'to these lands near Giaogong'.[296] The response was but half-hearted and many an excuse was found not to meet the Viceroy half-way.

The Bengal Government was far more vociferous in its protests regarding Chinese procrastination about the border talks, but they found in Lord Elgin a willingness to give the benefit of the doubt to the Amban. However, he was to wait two years before receiving a satisfactory response to his request, the Chinese continuing to find various excuses not to turn up; they had dispensed with the services of the old Amban and until his replacement arrived they could not proceed with the demarcation. Early in 1898, the new Amban, Wen Hai, arrived in Lhasa and proposed that the Tibetans should first be permitted to examine the disputed frontier so that they would have no excuse for 'holding back or reverting to old arguments'.[297] The Viceroy agreed to a further delay, only to find that the Amban did not envisage British participation in the demarcation of the frontier after all. 'I have now succeeded in directing their steps aright as it were, in that they agree to joining Chinese officers on an inspecting tour, the understanding being that after the members of the Commission have severally examined the frontier line, British officers will then be informed, and directed to take part in a further joint inspection'.[298]

The original intention of the Indian Government had been to negotiate, with the Chinese, the transfer of a sizeable area of northern Sikkim in exchange for an equivalent in trading facilities for merchants from India at Yatung. By the end of 1898, it had become clear that the plan to exchange Giaogong for trading facilities at Yatung was not going to work, for the Tibetans refused point blank to see any connection between Giaogong and Yatung. They were prepared to discuss trade at Yatung only after the frontier had been restored to them. Noting that the Chinese were unable to get the Tibetans to change their minds, White then proposed two measures: first, that in exchange for recognition of Tibetan rights to Giaogong, the Tibetans should agree to the removal of the trade mart to Phari on the way to Lhasa. Phari would operate under the same conditions as those which had been in

force at Yatung. Second, that direct Anglo-Tibetan negotiations should take place, without the mediation of the Chinese. Lord Elgin, had he not already left India, would probably have turned down these radical proposals, but Lord Curzon was now at the helm of affairs and he readily accepted White's recommendations. These modifications were transmitted to the Amban by Lord Curzon in March 1899; and, before the year was out, they had become the official policy of the Government of India. 'The readiness of my predecessor and myself to reconsider the boundary question affords proof of our good-will towards Tibet. Concession in respect to the frontier lands near Giaogong can, however, only be agreed on a proper footing, and to secure this it is essential that natives of British India should have access to and be permitted to trade freely at Phari. Phari is the nearest point in Tibet at which a real market can be looked for, and I cannot agree that a change from Yatung to any point nearer to it than Phari would be a satisfactory solution of the question'.[299]

Curzon's proposals to the Amban involved the surrender by the Tibetans to long-established rights in the region and in particular to Phari, a frontier outpost having the added advantage of providing access to the Chumbi valley. The valley itself had close connections with Sikkim, the Maharaja having vast estates at Tromo. Moreover, Phari was under the general control of the Phari Dzongpons, yet the inhabitants of the area, the Tromos, enjoyed a large measure of autonomy mainly due to the rights accorded to the Sikkim Maharaja by the Tibetan authorities.[300] In other words, Curzon's proposal to establish the town as a general trade mart, where the British Government could claim exclusive rights, the Tibetans were not prepared to consider. In their opinion, the 1890 Convention may have defined Giaogong as being within Sikkim territory, yet the Tibetan Government had had no part in the agreement, let alone its various terms. Nor had the Chinese the right to cede to a foreign power territory belonging to Tibet. The Viceroy was to find that the Dalai Lama and his advisers shared a suspicion that the British had designs on Tibet itself. Added to which was the attitude of White, with his refusal to accept Tibetan evidence of the ownership of Giaogong, his arrogance when discussing border questions with Tibetan representatives, and the absorption of Sikkim into a British dependency, all of which confirmed them in their belief that Tibet was next on the agenda. Nor was White's insistence on frontier demarcation, for which no provision had been made in the 1890 Convention, likely to impress the authorites in Lhasa of British goodwill.

As the century drew to a close, Lord Curzon was insistent that every indication pointed to Russian emissaries having ready access to the Tibetan authorities and that Russian merchants freely traded at the various trade marts. In marked contrast was the Indian Government's failure to establish even trading facilities, let alone direct contact with Lhasa, or to safeguard its interests against Russian designs on Tibet. Before Curzon's arrival, the real issues which confronted the Indian Government had been frontier disputes over trading facilities; after Curzon 'they became inextricably involved with the much wider question of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. Curzon used the

three boundary pillars, the Tibetan encroachments at Giaogong and the obstructions imposed on trade at Yatung, as well as every insult real or imagined, which British officers had received from Chinese or Tibetan functionaries, as weapons in his armoury for that epic struggle'.[301]

Curzon's Tibetan policy and Sikkim, 1900–03

Basic to Curzon's belief was that nowhere along the Indian glacis should hostile influences be permitted to obtain a foothold; on the contrary, British authority should be 'unmistakeably and indeed ostentatiously asserted'.[302] The policy should be to persuade Tibet to ally herself with Britain rather than with Russia. He wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord George Hamilton, explaining his intentions: 'In as much as we have no hostile designs against Tibet; as we are in a position to give them something on the frontier to which they attach great importance and we none; and as the relations that we desire to establish with them are almost exclusively those of trade, I do not think it ought to be impossible if I could get into communication with the Tibetan Government, to come to terms'.[303] To demonstrate the moderation of Indian demands, Curzon was prepared to offer that the trade mart at Phari was not to be open to Europeans save to the British officer in charge of frontier trade, and then only on Tibetan willingness to permit him to establish direct relations with the Dalai Lama. This last measure was vital to Indian interests, particularly since 'the Lamas there have found out the weakness of China', and since the insistence on dealing with Tibet through China had proved 'most ignominious' and was 'an admitted farce', and Curzon saw no other alternative open to him in the circumstances.[304]

Meanwhile, finding the Tibetans and the Chinese still refusing to discuss the demarcation of the boundary, the Bengal Government decided to send C R Marindin, Commissioner at Rajshahi, to Gangtok to see if he could secure the services of the Sikkim Maharaja as a mediator in the dispute. He knew that the Maharani's family was highly placed in the government of Lhasa and he hoped to persuade her to use her influence at the Tibetan court. In an interview with the ruler, Marindin suggested 'that as there is a custom of queens making peace, it would be desirable if Her Highness the Maharani would try to make peace between the British Government and the Tibetan Government'. The main points of difference, she was informed, lay in Tibet stating that Giaogong was the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, while the British claim was the 'ridge of hills, the watershed of the rivers flowing towards Sikkim'; the other problem was the refusal by the Tibetans to open 'the trade route towards Tromo'. On asking what accommodation would be made from the British side, Marindin stated that if the Tibetans agreed to a 'boundary along the top of the ridges separating the sources of the rivers flowing north towards Tibet and south towards Sikkim' then the British would be prepared to compensate the Tibetan Government by a financial settlement. They would, however, expect free trade to function right up to Gyantse or Lhasa, or failing that up to Phari.

The Maharaja and Maharani pointed out to Marindin that they saw no prospect of the Tibetan Government agreeing to open free trade up to Phari. They might, however, be persuaded to open free trade 'so far as Rinchengang (Tromo) as a beginning, and they might in time, when they got impressed with the power and greatness of the British Government . . . make the desired concessions'. In the meantime, if Marindin was prepared to consider their offer, they intended to send a private letter to the Maharani's high-placed relatives at Lhasa to get their opinion; only then would they address officially 'the Kashag Lhangyay'.[305] To safeguard themselves against any future accusations by the Tibetan authorities, they also asked that since it was 'a matter connected with big States and Governments', would Marindin put down, in writing, the Indian Government's wishes. He agreed and placed the terms before them; these were that direct communication with the Dalai Lama was desired and that 'any letter coming or any representative coming, will be received by His Excellency the Viceroy direct without the necessity of passing through the usual stages and channels of various secretaries and officials; that if the Dalai Lama replied then the Sikkim Darbar would be permitted to effect a peaceful solution, and finally that the members of the Maharaja's family in Tibet were to use their influence to bring about a successful conclusion'.[306]

Whether by design or not, the Sikkim Maharaja did not furnish Marindin with a satisfactory reply from the Tibetan Government. He claimed that the death of his two sisters had put the matter right out of his mind, that by the time the letter was discovered, White was out on tour and when they did manage to present it to him he was quite put out. 'He said that the letter, even if sent to Government, would simply displease it by the unfortunate delay . . . If he had so much as hinted that another essay would be acceptable or serviceable, Their Highnesses were willing to make another attempt, but as he preserved strict silence on the point, they thought any further meddling would be considered as officiousness'.[307] With this reply, Marindin had to be content; he recognised that the Maharaja had no wish to unsettle, still further, his relations with the Tibetan authorities.

While Commissioner Marindin was securing the good offices of the Maharaja of Sikkim as one channel of communication with the Lhasa authorities, the Bengal Government suggested that the Viceroy should consider using the services of Kazi Ugyen, the Bhutanese *vakil* in Darjeeling. In their view there was more to recommend him than in the Sikkim Darbar whose offers of assistance were highly suspect in the light of their open allegiance to Tibet. Kazi Ugyen not only had an entrée to the Tibetan authorities but his loyalty to the British, Bengal considered, was ensured by the fact of his possessing much land in the Darjeeling district and where, if necessary, pressure could be brought to bear on him.[308] He was instructed to write to the Dalai Lama to find our whether the ruler was prepared to 'send an influential Tibetan quickly to negotiate with this Government, so that it may not get angry'. The Tibetan reply put the blame on the Ambans, 'when they first came here, [Ambans] made an arrangement forbidding us to correspond direct with your Government. I can send a man, but think that if it is done

without the consent of Chinese they will be displeased . . . it is advisable not to send one now'.[309]

Once again, in December 1899, Kazi Ugyen was instructed to write to the Dalai Lama urging him to 'make haste and settle'. 'The British Government are able to make a good arrangement with you, and you should send over one of your men; such an arrangement will ensure you against any encroachment of either China or Russia'.[310] The reply when it came merely stated that the Dalai Lama was waiting for the new Amban to arrive when he would see what influence he could bring to bear upon him. The direct approach having failed, the British Resident in Kashmir, Sir Adelbert Talbot, suggested that his assistant, Captain R L Kennion, might try to enter into negotiations with the Garpons at Gartok. In July 1900, the suggestion was approved. Captain Kennion was to go up to Gartok and, while there, to try and negotiate with the joint governors of western Tibet, known as the Urkhus of Gartok;[311] his task was to persuade them to assist 'the Government of India in establishing direct communication with the Dalai Lama and the Grand Council at Lhasa'.[312]

Curzon's letter to the Dalai Lama was carried by Captain Kennion and delivered personally to the Urkhus of Gartok, who undertook to forward it to Lhasa. The Viceroy assured the Tibetan ruler that the British Government had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. 'But they are anxious that Tibet should feel confidence in their friendship and should be free from encroachment from any other quarter. I need not remind Your Holiness that the regulations which were agreed to for the provision of increased facilities for trade have been attended with no fruitful result, and that the settlement of a small question regarding the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet has been long and unnecessarily delayed'.[313] Six months later the letter, with the seals unbroken, was returned accompanied by a letter from the Urkhus, explaining that they had not dared to send the letter on, as to do so would have been contrary to Tibetan regulations.[314] Kennion was of the opinion that the refusal was Lhasa's way of denying responsibility for having refused to accept the letter; that the letter had been sent on and fully understood, he had no doubt.

Before deciding what further steps to take to place relations with Tibet on a more satisfactory footing, Curzon thought fit to make one more effort to procure the delivery of a letter to the Dalai Lama personally. It was found that Kazi Ugyen was on the point of setting out for Lhasa with the nucleus of a zoo, 'two elephants and a leopard', for the Dalai Lama, and it was decided to entrust him with another communication from the Viceroy to the Tibetan ruler with express instructions that, this time, he was to deliver it 'personally into the hands of His Highness'. The Vakil should be instructed to observe the strictest secrecy as to the object of his mission, and may be told that he will be rewarded according to the degree to which these instructions are observed and to the results achieved'.[315] To the Dalai Lama, Lord Curzon had this to say: 'I desire to take this opportunity of reminding Your Holiness that the Government of India have been most patient and forbearing in the matter of the boundary which was settled by a treaty between Great Britain and China eleven years ago, but which the Tibetans have hitherto failed to observe'. He went on to

warn that if the Tibetan Government had no wish to promote better understanding between themselves and the Indian Government then his government reserved the right to take such steps as may seem necessary and proper to enforce the terms of the Treaty, and to ensure that the trade regulations were observed.[316]

In October 1901, Kazi Ugyen returned from Lhasa with the Viceroy's letter unopened and its seals intact. He reported that the Dalai Lama had refused to accept it on the grounds that he was bound by agreement not to enter into any correspondence with foreign governments without first consulting the Tibetan Council and the Chinese Amban.[317] The latter had yet to be appointed and, in any case, would take some time to arrive in Lhasa. Meanwhile, he was unable to break the terms of his agreement with China.

The failure of the Tibetans to agree to bring themselves into direct relations with the British Government, Curzon believed could only be resolved by initially bringing pressure to bear on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. The proposal was that White should tour along the frontier, as he had every right to do by the terms of the 1890 Convention, erecting boundary pillars wherever necessary or desirable. The measure would exclude the Tibetans from the grazing grounds at Giaogong or elsewhere on the Sikkim side of the border, or wherever else they may be found in illicit occupation. Alternatively, White should take from them 'such fees as it may be decided to impose'. For his purposes, the Political Officer would require a small escort which would consist of one company of Gurkhas with a second company in reserve. Should the Tibetans choose to resist or adopt an attitude of permanent hostility across the border, then it might be found necessary to occupy the Chumbi valley and hold it until such time as the Tibetans had signified their willingness to come to terms. Curzon was prepared to concede that the Tibetan Government's policy of isolation was, from their own point of view, not difficult to comprehend. 'But it is not compatible either with proximity to the territories of a great civilised power at whose hands the Tibetan Government enjoys the fullest opportunities both for intercourse and trade, or with due respect for the treaty stipulations into which the Chinese Government has entered on its behalf'.[318] To Curzon it was essential that no time should be lost before these barriers were broken down with a view to a wider and more serious significance.

The India Office viewed Curzon's proposals with extreme reserve; they knew that they would inevitably provoke the Tibetans into providing the Viceroy with an excuse to send a mission to Lhasa. In consequence, they required Curzon to make certain modifications. No fresh boundary pillars were to be erected; there was to be no question of occupation of the Chumbi valley, for the action would bring into question Chinese territorial claims, and 'thus throw the question of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier into the arena of international diplomacy'. They saw no objection to excluding the Tibetans from Giaogong, and towards this end it was proposed that White should 'take the opportunity, if possible, to march up to and along the water-parting on the Giaogong plateau which according to the Treaty forms the boundary'.[319] He was not to be allowed to impose fees for grazing purposes for it was recognised

that it had long been the practice of the Sikkimese and the Tibetans to graze their cattle free of charge. Since it was not the design of the Indian Government to derive considerable revenue from the practice, but to levy a tax in token of suzerainty and possession, the India Office wanted the present system to continue to stand. Otherwise, if taxes were levied on Tibetans who brought their herds into Sikkim, the Tibetans would retaliate by levying fees from Sikkim graziers in Tibet and they visualised endless disputes arising which would soon swamp the Political Officer's administration in Sikkim.[320]

In June 1902, White, with an escort of one hundred troops under the command of Major Iggulden, went up to Giaogong and expelled the Tibetans, with little difficulty, from the hill tract. The Tibetan Government sent the Shigatse Depon, accompanied by Dhurkay Sardar of Yatung, to discuss the question of the boundary. White was categorical in his refusal to have any dealings with Dhurkay Sardar, a man he had always refused to see in any capacity on account of his known bad character, and he saw no reason to depart from his usual custom, even though 'it was alleged he had been sent by the authorities at Lhasa'. As for the other officials, White maintained that they did not show proper credentials, at least none which he was prepared to accept.[321] On the other hand, he informed the Shigatse Depon that, if properly empowered delegates with written credentials arrived from the Dalai Lama, he might be willing to reconsider his decision.[322] The Chinese had decided to send Ho Huang-hsi, and the Chinese Customs Officer at Yatung, Captain Parr, 'to act conjointly with' the Tibetan officials in their discussions with White. From the Chinese officials, White had been instructed to obtain permission to trade in Tibet and to propose that facilities enjoyed by the Sikkimese 'should also be demanded for British subjects who should be allowed to buy land and build houses at Phari and other places on trade routes'.[323] He was also to request that a British agent should be allowed to reside at Phari or Gyantse, or both; regarding the question of duty on Indian tea, White was to try and arrange for no charge to be levied for the time being, at least not until the rate had been finally settled between the Governments of India and China.

White and Marindin did their best to convince the Indian Government that their aim should be to try and achieve their objectives by negotiation with Chinese officials and by ignoring the Dalai Lama's refusal to move in the direction of negotiation as a matter of no consequence. The recent events at Giaogong had strengthened the British position, and there was every hope that the Chinese would force the Tibetans to meet the Indian Government on trade matters, particularly when it was explained to them that the concession would rest on the surrender to Tibet of the territory between Giaogong and the Treaty frontier. So far as the wishes of the Maharaja of Sikkim were concerned, Marindin assured the Indian Government that he would put no obstacles in the way and willingly surrender 'this bit of territory if it would result in improving the relations of our government with Tibet. The people have suffered for some years by being deprived of free access to Tibet, and the State would gain by the removal of such restrictions'.[324] Meanwhile, the

Maharaja was showing every sign of not agreeing to Marindin's interpretation of events. On the contrary, he complained that both his and his subjects' free access to Tibet had been curtailed entirely due to the orders of White and the Bengal Government. In his opinion, the problem could not be laid at the door of the Tibetan Government.

While Marindin was assuring the Indian Government of Sikkim's willingness to cede their territory, Maharaja Thutob Namgyal was writing to the Lhasa authorities complaining that the Darbar had been ordered to make a cart road from Rungpo bazaar to Gangtok and another one for ponies from Gangtok to Chumbi over the Nathu La Pass. Although he strongly objected to these measures, particularly since the cost of the roads was having to be met out of the revenue of the Sikkim Darbar, yet he was unable, due to the 1890 Agreement, to withstand British pressure. He warned the Tibetans that the 'British are making a road from Rungpo upwards with great expedition and its purpose in so doing is to settle the question of the trade route between Tibet and India'. He urged the Kashag to come to an immediate settlement about the trade route for 'This Government is a powerful and a great one which Tibet will find difficult to cope with in case of war'. The Tibetan reply was far from conciliatory. They claimed that they had been patient and long-suffering 'but the English have so often attacked and annoyed us, and even recently some Sahebs have crossed over the boundary in Khambajong side forcibly, exulting in their might'.[325] This time they were resolved to expel them from Tibetan territory.

In the meantime Curzon, alarmed by rumours of various treaties which Russia was said to be making with Tibet, was urging HMG to recognise that the Russians were in the process of establishing a protectorate over Tibet. For Curzon, these rumours were but one aspect of the crisis; the other more important sign being the visits of Dorjieff to Czar Nicholas II bearing with him tokens of esteem and friendship from the Dalai Lama. By 1902, Curzon was convinced that Dorjieff was after all a Russian agent of some importance, and no amount of assurances from the Russian Government that his missions had no political significance whatever could persuade him to the contrary. At the same time, the Viceroy was more than inclined to believe rumours emanating from China regarding a Sino-Russian treaty over Tibet, and which was said to have been signed at Lhasa on 27 February 1913 by the Amban and a Russian representative. The treaty was said to contain eight Articles, all dealing with Russian mining rights in Tibet, and which gave the Chinese the right to be consulted on every venture the Russians proposed to initiate in Tibet. Moreover, the treaty was to remain valid in the face of protests from other foreign powers. It was known in London that the Russo-Chinese Bank was engaged in financing the exploitation of Mongolian gold, and banking houses in the city were more than willing and interested in taking counter-action. In 1899, they approached the India Office for help in securing permits to prospect for gold and they hired Sir Thomas Holdich to lead a survey party to Tibet.[326] Lord Curzon opposed the scheme and the permits were refused; interest, however, was revived again at the time of the Younghusband Expedition in 1904.[327]

By the end of 1902, the India Office, the Foreign Office and the Viceroy were all in agreement that reports of Russo-Chinese treaties could no longer be ignored if Indian interests were to be preserved. Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office wanted diplomatic representations to be made both to the Chinese and the Russians, making it clear that Britain would not tolerate an alteration in the status of Tibet. When Sir Ernest Satow, the British Minister in Peking, approached the Chinese, they denied categorically that any alteration in the status of Tibet was contemplated; the Russians did likewise and counter-accused the British of having designs on Tibet themselves, and pointed to the evidence 'that British troops were being sent to Tibet to protect the construction of a line of railway'.[328] The India Office agreed with Curzon that 'a policy and a plan' for Tibet was urgently needed; they suggested that the Nepalese might be used to demand from Tibet an assurance that it would not permit Russian troops to enter the country. Sir William Lee-Warner in a *Note on Tibet* expressed the view that the Tibet-Nepalese Treaty of 1856 called on the Nepalese, in return for the Tibetan subsidy, to assist 'if the troops of any other Raja invade that country'; on this pretext, the Nepalese could very well enquire of their representative in Lhasa as to whether the Russians had established relations with the Dalai Lama. If so, it could be pointed out to the Nepal Darbar that the Russian presence in Lhasa would directly affect Nepalese interests.[329] For the present, Lee-Warner's scheme was adopted by the India Office as its solution to the Tibetan problem.

The War Office alone agreed with Lord Curzon that a mission to Lhasa was the best possible solution to the problem of Russia in Tibet. While it was improbable that Russia would ever invade India from Tibet, yet the prospect of Russian agents functioning in Lhasa would affect the Indian Government's relations with the other Himalayan states. For Curzon too, the only solution worth considering was a mission to Lhasa which would culminate in an Anglo-Tibetan treaty containing various safeguards which would ultimately protect British interests in the region. Lee-Warner's suggestion of using the Nepalese to threaten the Tibetans, Curzon visualised creating another Afghanistan on India's northern border; nor was he prepared to allow the Nepalese Darbar to deal with Tibet on behalf of India.[330] In a long despatch dated 8 January 1903, Curzon set out his arguments for despatching a mission to Lhasa.[331]

The logic of Curzon's various arguments was not lost on the India Office, who almost overnight agreed that Nepalese mediation, which merely a fortnight before they had eagerly espoused, was, on reflection, of little value. They accepted Curzon's conclusion that Russian influence in Tibet was a fact which would, in time, come to erode Britain's interests in the region. Moreover, Curzon had pointed to the failure of the Chinese representative, Ho, to come down from Lhasa to Yatung as evidence of Chinese reluctance to be responsible for the affairs of Tibet. It was evident that the Russians had told the Chinese not to negotiate with the British 'or to allow us to come to close quarters with the Tibetans'. Unless the British Government took steps to counteract the influence immediately 'we shall rue the day for years to

come'.[332] Hamilton agreed that unless Britain acted in Tibet in time, 'it seems to me perfectly hopeless for Great Britain to attempt to arrest Russia's progress in any part of Asia'.[333] He did, however, caution restraint and pointed out to Curzon that if he was determined to take a mission to Lhasa there would have to be 'a good international case for the course of action you suggest' so as to convince the British Cabinet.[334] Without a sound argument, Hamilton knew, the Cabinet would probably hesitate and delay, until it was too late to send an expedition during the year.

On 19 February 1930, Lord George Hamilton put the Viceroy's case to the Cabinet, and found the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, both unable to accept the reasoning behind the despatch. In their opinion, if the Tibetan question was allowed to get away from the diplomatic level, it would merely lead to a further round of claims from each side for compensating advantages. Lansdowne was for telling the Russians that if they established an agent in Lhasa, the British Government intended to press for equal rights. In any case, so long as diplomatic discussions were in progress, a British mission to Lhasa was out of the question. The Cabinet, in effect, rejected Curzon's proposals for the time being. When Hamilton informed Curzon of the fact, he encouraged him to go on with negotiations on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and to insist on the presence, at these talks, of properly accredited Tibetan representatives.[335] Curzon was assured that, in the meantime, Lord Lansdowne was continuing to have discussions with the Russian Ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, regarding his government's intentions towards Tibet.

By April 1903, Lansdowne and Benckendorff had agreed to exchange denials of their intent to alter the status of Tibet. The former, however, had managed to extract from Benckendorff Russian acceptance of the fact that the British, being possessors of a common frontier with Tibet, had the right to ensure that the Tibetans respected their treaty obligations to them, and to do so by force if necessary. 'I added that it seemed to me that in cases of this kind, where an uncivilized country adjoined the possessions of a civilized Power, it was inevitable that the latter should exercise a certain amount of local predominance. Such a predominance, as I had before explained to him, belonged to us in Tibet'.[336] While Lansdowne was pursuing his efforts through diplomacy in trying to prevent Russian influence from penetrating through to Lhasa, the Indian Government was being urged to base its policy on the issues of frontier demarcation and trans-border trade.

Curzon, however, was not content to give up the idea of a Tibet mission without a struggle. He saw no reason to change his mind; he did, however, accept that the Cabinet would not sanction a mission on the basis of his present arguments. On the other hand he was inclined to see that the standstill negotiations on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier might provide an opportunity 'for asserting our political influence in Tibet for the future, on the basis of extended trade operations'.[337] In April 1903, the Amban gave Curzon the opening he was looking for; he offered that the Deputy appointed by Curzon 'can either come to Yatung or the Chinese Deputies will proceed to Sikkim or such other

place as may be decided upon by Your Excellency'.[338] The Amban, no doubt, meant Darjeeling or some other town in British India, but Curzon chose to interpret the phrase to mean somewhere in Tibet. He proposed that the talks should take place at the Tibetan town of 'Khambajong'.[339] The town, in Curzon's opinion, was particularly suitable since it was inside Tibet and not far from Giaogong. Furthermore, communications through Sikkim linked Khamba Dzong to British India, and it had the added advantage of being within the territory of the Panchen Lama who had traditionally shown himself to be well disposed towards the British Government. Taking the opportunity to push the venue for talks forward into Tibetan territory was a sign that Curzon was no longer prepared to accept either Yatung or Phari and he intended to insist upon opening a new trade mart at Gyantse, where he hoped that the Chinese authorites would agree to have a British Agent. He was in no doubt that a British representative at Lhasa was the best possible security, but Curzon assumed that HMG would be unwilling to press this claim, and it was in the light of this expected refusal that he proposed Gyantse. The Tibetan and Chinese authorities were to be made to understand clearly that every facility was to be given to the British representative for direct contact with the Tibetan Government, and if he was denied communication, the Indian Government would not hesitate to move him forward to Lhasa, with or without permission.[340]

The Cabinet was no more sympathetic to Curzon's schemes 'for asserting our political influence in Tibet for the future on the foundation of extended trade operations' than they had been to his earlier plan to send an immediate mission to Lhasa. They refused, therefore, to sanction an advance beyond Khamba Dzong without a further review of the whole question in London. Somewhat reluctantly they agreed to the removal of the trade mart to Gyantse, although they made it clear that there was to be no question of establishing a British Agent there. Curzon was warned that 'HMG are unwilling to be committed, by threats accompanying the proposals which may be made, to any definite course of compulsion to be undertaken in the future'.[341]

Sikkim and the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa, 1903–05

The man appointed to lead the mission was Major Francis Younghusband, Resident at Indore. He was Curzon's personal choice and he recommended him to the Secretary of State for his 'judgment and discretion' and above all for 'his great Asiatic experience'.[342] One of his party was to be John Claude White, Political Officer in Sikkim, as Joint Commissioner and an armed escort of about two hundred men. It was clear to Younghusband that what the Viceroy had in mind was a treaty with the Tibetans, preferably with Chinese adhesion. As he understood it, the treaty would guarantee the continuance of British influence in Tibet with the appointment of a British Resident in Lhasa, with an escort. The Chumbi valley would be occupied permanently thus removing, at one stroke, difficulties with the Sikkim Darbar and 'sustained

intervention in Tibetan affairs'. The Commissioner agreed with Curzon that there was no point in imposing a treaty, and then pulling out of Tibet in the hopes that the agreement would suffice to keep the Russians from interfering in Tibetan affairs in the future. 'My point is that, with no one to keep the Tibetans straight at head-quarters, they may begin a hostile and Russophile policy again the moment our backs are turned. Forts may be rebuilt. Dorjieffs may multiply. Trade may be prohibited. Our man (if we have one) sitting in Gyantse will be quite powerless: for of one thing we may be sure – that no government that we can contemplate for a long time to come will send another mission or another expedition to Lhasa'.[343]

Until 1903, the affairs of Sikkim had been administered by the Political Officer through the agency of the Bengal Government. In June 1903, Curzon decided to place the Political Officer in Sikkim, during the course of the Tibet Frontier Mission's advance to Lhasa, under the direct control of the Government of India in all matters relating to Tibet and frontier negotiations. Points of administration relating to the internal affairs of Sikkim, together with the Maharaja's relations with the Indian Government, were to be administered, as before, by the Bengal Government. When Younghusband returned to India from Tibet following the signing of the Lhasa Convention of 7 September 1904,[344] the Government of India decided to let the administrative arrangement continue until decisions affecting the Chumbi valley, the trade route to Tibet and the Sikkim-Tibet boundary had been finally settled.[345]

On his way to Tibet, Younghusband stopped off at Gangtok where he collected White, Captain O'Connor, the Maharaj Kumar Sidkeong Namgyal and the Rhenock Kazi. The Indian Government were already acquainted with the Maharaja's second son for White had refused to allow the Maharaja himself to attend the Delhi Darbar in honour of the coronation of King Edward VII in 1902, and had insisted on taking the Maharaj Kumar instead. White's objection, the *History of Sikkim* explains, was to the Maharaja never having 'visited the plains and not being used to European etiquette and customs and would not do very well for the occasion'.[346] The Maharaja was in considerable doubt as to White's real reason for selecting his son rather than himself. In fact he feared that his non-attendence at the Darbar would be used as an excuse to deprive him of 'his *gaddi*'.[347] In his anxiety to explain himself, he asked White to 'exonerate me before the Government and I will submit our address to the government through yourself. You must see that my powers are not transferred to others'.[348]

When, therefore, Younghusband arrived in Sikkim in July 1903, the Indian Government, abetted by White, thought it wise to use the Maharaj Kumar to help them in their negotiations on the frontier. At the same time, the Maharaja was persuaded by Younghusband to write to the Tibetan frontier officials urging them to 'allow the trade mart at Yatung to be pushed at least as far as Rinchengong in Tromo'. To agree, the Maharaja wrote, would mean that Tibet could 'reasonably demand a permanent treaty that will not seek to push it [trade mart] further'. Moreover, the Maharaja hoped that if he were able to

help resolve peacefully the present critis between Tibet and India, his full powers would be restored to him. The Tibetan reply to the Maharaja accused the British of invading and trespassing on Tibetan territory and saw no hope of a peaceful resolution. The Maharaja then addressed himself to the Dalai Lama: 'The Government is very powerful and I am very anxious about the safety of our sacred Faith and Church, which might suffer great injuries from them in future. Even if Your Holiness be relying upon the Russians for aid, they will not be in a position to render timely aid'. He saw the danger of British troops proceeding on towards Shigatse or Gyantse, and 'if the matter is not concluded there, then they will proceed right up to Lhasa, in which case it will be a serious matter'.[349]

The Dalai Lama's reply held out little hope of peace. He pointed out that throughout their troubles with the British, they had chosen to ignore Tibetan representatives and made it a point to deal only with the Chinese. They had first trespassed unlawfully towards Khamba Dzong and had now taken possession of Phari Dzong. 'We have thus far borne patiently with their affronts, because they are strong and we are weak. But henceforth, if they continue to act as they have done all along, we wili be compelled to retaliate step for step, just as they do to us. In the common cause of the Universal Truth of the Jina, Tibet is resolved to fight for it'. He asked the Maharaja to intercede on his behalf and to try and persuade the British mission to return to Yatung where the Chinese and Tibetan representatives would be waiting to settle terms for peace. As for the boundaries, the Dalai Lama maintained that they would have to be settled in accordance with the terms of the treaty 'enacted in the name of the Chinese Emperor, the 59th of the Chenlung Dynasty'. He also had a word to say about Curzon's accusations regarding Russia: '. . . we know that they are in manners, customs, caste and creed just the same as the British, and we have no idea of forming such an uncongenial alliance (as that of the yak and the pony).[350]

Throughout the mission's advance, the Sikkim Darbar was pressed into making roads and laying bridges from Rungpo via Lachen and Lachung and on towards Khamba Dzong. A further road from Gangtok over the Nathu La Pass right on to Chumbithang and Shashima was personally supervised under the direction of Sidkeong Namgyal, who, however unwilling, had no option but to do White's bidding. The Maharaja complained that 'Everyone in Sikkim, including the Maharaja, the Kazis and Ticcadars had to be up and alert at their work. No one was allowed to flag and all had to suffer the intense cold, drenching rain and danger for the whole time up to 1904 until at last it ended. And all this was done in the service of the British Government'.[351] It was a far cry from the days when Maharaja Thutob Namgyal had chosen to defy the Political Officer and refused to acquiesce in British plans for Sikkim. Now he found not only himself but also his son having to assist in an act of war against the state's traditional suzerain, Tibet. China was weak and, without its help and military backing, the Maharaja recognised that Tibet would be unable to withstand British pressure. The unwilling acceptance by the Royal Family and the people of Sikkim in decisions which affected their ancient allegiance was

indicative of the position of Sikkim as a protectorate after the 1890 Convention, and also of the extent of British imperial power in the states on the Himalayan periphery.

As the months went by, the Sikkim Darbar found itself committed increasingly to a war in which their old friends the Tibetans suffered many a reverse. The massacre at Guru in March 1904, where 700 Tibetans lost their lives after they had agreed to give up their arms, decided the Maharaja to plead, once again, with the Dalai Lama to come to terms so that he would not be forced to make a humiliating peace. In fact he argued that the British had 'not the least intention of depriving Tibet of even an inch of land: upon that they are ready to sign a bond. But they insist on having free trade and friendly interchange of correspondence'. The reply, when it came, stated that the establishment of trade marts and the opening of new routes into Tibetan territory was something that the people of Tibet would not tolerate. 'And since European imports are coming in from India right up to Lhasa there is no reason why they should insist on establishing trade marts for that purpose because it is the same whether they have marts or not, their things come in all the same'. In the Dalai Lama's opinion, the British were bent on 'over-reaching' the Tibetans 'by actual acts of lawlessness and unprovoked aggression', and he was left with no alternative but to defend Tibet.[352]

The Lhasa Convention of 1904, a document of nine Articles, recognised in Article 1 the Sikkim-Tibet frontier as laid down in 1890; it also resolved for the Indian Government Tibetan claims to suzerainty over Sikkim. The Tibetan Government accepted the *de jure* status of Sikkim as a protected state under the Government of India and agreed to deal with her accordingly.[353] At the close of the Younghusband Mission, the Bengal Government represented the unsatisfactory nature of dual control in matters affecting Sikkim. As a result, it was decided on 1 April 1906 to formally transfer the control of the Sikkim State to the Government of India. The question of administration of the Chumbi valley, White suggested should be directly under the Political Officer in Sikkim. 'Continuity is especially required for the successful working of these marts in the Chumbi valley and Gyantse, and this can only be attained by placing them under the control of one authority . . . this charge should not be broken up, and should include Sikkim, Chumbi, Bhutan and the trade agency at Gyantse'.[354] The suggestion was accepted by the Indian Government and, with Colonel Younghusband's approval, Captain O'Connor was appointed to the post to act under the Political Officer's jurisdiction.

Maharaj Kumar Sidkeong Namgyal: administration of Sikkim, 1906–14

To show their appreciation of Maharaja Thutob Namgyal's assistance during the Tibet Mission, the Government of India invited him and his family to visit Calcutta in November 1905 on the occasion of the visit of the Prince and

Princess of Wales. The Maharaja, finding the various occasions 'admirable examples of regal hospitality', and the reception accorded to him by the Prince of Wales as friendly as possible, decided that the occasion provided an excellent opportunity to put forward certain proposals which, if routed through White, would probably be turned down. He asked the Viceroy whether he might be allowed to 'carry on the administrative work of Sikkim' by himself and without consultation with either White or his tame Council; also now that cordial relations had been established between himself and the Indian Government, might he be permitted to see members of his family who still resided in the Chumbi valley. The Maharani also used her powers of persuasion on Sir Louis Dane, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India; she proposed that the Maharaja should be granted his traditional right to exercise full powers in Sikkim affairs.[355]

Shortly after his return to Gangtok from Calcutta, the Maharaja submitted a formal petition asking that his eldest son Tsodak Namgyal and his half-brother Tinley Namgyal should be granted permission to return to Sikkim. The Indian Government, acting on White's advice, refused permission. Finding that his brother was not going to be allowed to visit the state, Sidkeong Namgyal then sought permission to visit Tromo himself. Surprisingly, White supported the proposal but on condition that he personally accompanied the Maharaj Kumar to the Chumbi valley. The suggestion was rejected out of hand by Lord Curzon who considered it 'most undesirable that the Kumar should have any opportunity of meeting his brother whom he has not seen since childhood, over whose head he has been placed and with whom he cannot possibly have any fraternal relations'.[356] Nor did the Viceroy approve of White putting himself forward as a companion, for in his view 'White was much too fond of leading the young Kumar hither and thither', and he did not intend to encourage him in the practice.

The History of Sikkim relates that after the Maharaja and Maharani had been received by the Prince of Wales, White's attitude to them underwent a complete change. 'From that time a really sincere and cordial feeling of friendly sympathy was established between Their Highnesses and the Political Officer'.[357] Part of this change of heart was, no doubt, due to White's open sponsorship of the heir-apparent and the fact that the Maharaja was no longer a force to be reckoned with in Sikkim affairs. In August 1905, encouraged by White, the Maharaj Kumar proposed to the Indian Government that he should be allowed to visit England for educational purposes. 'Government have selected me to succeed my father on the *gaddi* and have taught me that my first duty is to my country and my people, and I fully realize the greatness of the trust which one day will be mine. I do not feel prepared to undertake this trust'.[358] Receiving no reply at first, in March 1906 the Maharaj Kumar, together with White, addressed the Government of India once again. This time, White suggested that he should accompany Sidkeong Namgyal to England so as to see that all suitable arrangement were made for him. It was White's opinion that nothing but good would come out of removing the Maharaj Kumar 'for a time from the baneful influence and the sordid intrigues

of the palace'. The experience would make him more independent, more confident of himself. Moreover, the prince was himself conscious of his lack of experience and a spell in England, in the company of men of 'good education', would fit him for the task of governing his state in a creditable manner.[359]

The initial reaction of the Government of India was not favourable, particularly since the suggestion was made with what they considered was White's insistence. They asked that the Maharaja and the Council should first give their formal consent before they would be prepared to consider the question. 'An education in India has sufficed for many Chiefs in India who are at present ruling their States with credit to themselves and satisfaction to their people, and it may be urged that a similar education should be sufficient for the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim'.[360] The Maharaja, when approached, gave his consent: '. . . it is very desirable that the Kumar should see such great and powerful nations and learn something of their wise and good usages and customs, which will contribute to the benefit of Sikkim'.[361] In the circumstances, the Viceroy, Lord Minto, found no reason to object and sanctioned the visit to England for educational purposes.[362]

Having spent two years at Pembroke College, Oxford, the Maharaj Kumar desired to extend his tour of Europe to include America, Japan and China. He set out his itinerary painstakingly giving reasons for wanting to visit each place. When it came to Japan, Sidkeong Namgyal explained that he hoped to secure a Japanese wife from amongst the nobility there. The Viceroy saw no objection to his seeking a consort, although he considered that there might be the risk of a large number of Japanese trying to accompany the lady and 'that Japan might use Sikkim as a starting point for Tibet'. To minimise this, the Maharaj Kumar was to be warned that such a marriage would not be permitted 'to impair the plenary rights of the British Government to regulate and limit the entry of aliens in Sikkim and to control the movements of such persons entering the State'.[363] Permission having been granted, the Maharaj Kumar set out on his tour in the company of O'Connor, now a Major, whose acquaintance he had first made during the Younghusband Expedition to Tibet.[364]

Before Sidkeong Namgyal left England for his tour of the Far East, word came from Sikkim that White was about to be retired. Surprisingly, an empassioned plea went out from the heir-apparent to Lord Morley, the Secretary of State, begging that White's services might be spared to the Sikkim State for a little while longer. 'Mr White has the full confidence of HH the Maharajah as well as the Maharani', and his departure would deprive him personally of a wise counsellor when eventually he returned to Sikkim. There were many reforms which he intended to introduce, none of which would be possible without the help and advice of John Claude White.[365] There is no evidence to suggest that the Maharaja shared his son's confidence or enthusiasm for the Political Officer who had been the bane of his life from the moment he set foot in Sikkim. Evidently, the years spent under the personal tutelage of White and his protégé, Raja Tenduk, had brought about a complete change in the future Maharaja's attitude. The request, however, was turned down.

The Dalai Lama, as the Younghusband Mission moved forward towards Lhasa, had decided to take refuge in China. When Sidkeong Namgyal arrived in China, he found the Tibetan ruler in residence at the Yellow Temple in Peking. He expressed the wish for an audience with the Dalai Lama and Major O'Connor asked Sir John Jordan, British Minister in Peking, whether there were any objections to the visit. Having been assured that the Maharaj Kumar's visit was unofficial and that he would avoid discussing political issues, Jordan gave his consent. At the same time, Jordan made a point of assuring the Chinese Government and the Russian Minister in Peking that the visit was being made 'by the Maharaj Kumar, who is himself a reincarnation of a Buddhist Saint, merely as a matter of religious duty to the Spiritual Head of the Buddhist faith'.[366] The audience was not totally devoid of political overtones. O'Connor's memorandum states that the Dalai Lama was confident regarding his influence over the Tibetan people, but was nervous of his relations with the Chinese. 'He quite realises the necessity of working in harmony with China but says that good relations depend very much upon the character and disposition of the Chinese Amban'. He appeared to have friendly sentiments towards Great Britain, and intended to preserve the Treaty provisions of the Lhasa Convention of 1904, so long as Britain entertained no desire for territorial or other extension into Tibet. O'Connor found the Dalai Lama particularly anxious to know details of the reception that the Panchen Lama had received during his visit to Calcutta in 1906; and whether he had managed 'to gain any influence over Buddhists or Buddhist sympathisers in India'. He expected to meet the Panchen at Nagchuka on his way back to Lhasa, and expressed most friendly sentiments with regard to the Maharaj Kumar personally. He hoped that the Prince would correspond with him privately so as 'to enlighten him as far as possible regarding foreign manners and customs'.[367]

During his visit to Peking, O'Connor took the opportunity of bringing Sir Richmond Ritchie, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, up to date on Russian involvement in Tibetan affairs. The Russian Minister in Peking, M Korostovetz, had informed Dorjieff, with whom he was in daily communication, that Russian interests in Tibet had ceased altogether, and that since Russia and England were, under the 1907 Convention, agreed as to desirability of abstaining from interference in Tibetan affairs, the Dalai Lama would have to reconcile himself to Chinese authority. The high point of O'Connor's visit came when Korostovetz invited him to meet Dorjieff one evening, after dark. 'It was an amusing anti-climax to all our Tibetan schemes – our Mission, our military expedition, the fighting, slaughter, destruction of property, heart-burnings, and hard work. Here we were sitting quietly round a table in the Russian Legation at Peking – the Russian Minister, Dorjieff, the sinister figure who loomed so large in Central Asian politics a few years ago, and nearly set three great powers by the ears, and poor I who was caught up in great events and used for a time – chatting amicably over the dry bones of a dead policy'. As O'Connor discussed in depth Tibetan affairs with Dorjieff, the latter made it clear that he heartily disliked the Chinese, but as Tibet was unable to stand

alone, there was, for the present, no alternative but to put up with the Amban's dictation. From these conversations O'Connor came to realise that Dorjieff was still the Dalai Lama's chief adviser and his views continued to command respect with the Russians; in O'Connor's opinion he continued to be a force to be reckoned with in Central Asian politics. When it came to the future of Tibet it would depend entirely on whether the Chinese could maintain their influence there. 'There can be no doubt, that there is a strong anti-Chinese party in the country who, after the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa, will make trouble if they can find an excuse or if China is too weak to prevent them. Whereas, if China is strong she can, of course, reduce them to insignificance'.[368]

In 1908, White having departed from Sikkim, Charles Bell was appointed Political Officer. In his report for 1908–09, Bell recounts that on his return from China and Japan, the Maharaj Kumar was appointed Vice-President of the State Council and placed in charge of the departments of education and forests, in addition to being given the religious control of the monasteries. The Maharaja's eldest son, Tsodak Namgyal, who eight years previously had been disinherited by the Indian Government, was at the urgent request of both the Maharaja and his brother allowed to pay a visit to Sikkim. Whereas before, Maharaja Thutob Namgyal had persistently refused to attend Council meetings under Claude White's administration, Bell was reporting that the Maharaja now insisted on being present on each occasion and participated in the proceedings. Before White's departure, he had made provision for an European forest officer to be appointed; in deference to the Maharaja's wishes, the appointment was rescinded and the work allocated to the Maharaj Kumar who was to function under the supervision of the Political Officer.

At the request of the Maharaja and the Sikkim Council, the Government of India appointed Charles Bell to prosecute or defend cases on behalf of the Sikkim State, and to forbid outside lawyers to plead in any Sikkim court. In October 1908, it was decided that *marwaris*[369] should not be permitted to settle in Sikkim, except at the bazaars of Gangtok, Rhenock and Rungpo, without permission first being given by the Political Officer. The resolution was brought forward largely under the influence of Bell who had found that, during his service in the Darjeeling district, the *marwaris* were unable to get cultivators into their debt without first settling amongst them. Bell intended to avoid such a situation from arising in Sikkim. When it came to the military force in the state, there only existed the Pioneer Corps and a small police contingent, eight of whom were employed at Yatung under the orders of the British Trade Agent, their cost being met out of imperial revenue. Questions of extradition were dealt with by the Political Officer. In August 1908 an incident occurred when two Tibetans were arrested on charges of murder at Gangtok, and the Chinese claimed their extradition under Article xv of the Burma-China Frontier and Trade Convention of 1894.[369a] The Government of India refused the request on the ground that the Convention 'did not apply and that no right to demand extradition had been established'.[370]

With the arrival of Charles Bell, government policy towards Sikkim

underwent a change. Bell, unlike White, considered that the Political Officer's role was not to impose upon the ruler legislation which he found wholly unacceptable and which 'in matters of this kind we should limit ourselves to essential reforms and those in the necessity of which the Maharaja and his people can be induced to believe'. It was a far cry from White's days when, in the words of Younghusband, 'he would treat the Sikkimese as if he was a little God'.[371] Soon after his arrival, Bell found that he was put in the position of a marriage broker on behalf of the young Maharaj Kumar. Although he pleaded his cause, he found the Maharaja adamant in his refusal to give permission for his son to marry. He continued to base his refusal on Sidkeong Namgyal being an Incarnate Lama, who was under vows of celibacy and whose role in life was essentially a monastic one. Bell believed that the Maharaja's objections could not be sustained, particularly since his recognition by the Indian Government and the Sikkim Darbar as the future ruler was well understood and accepted by the Maharaja; in fact it was his 'characteristic Tibetan obstinacy' that he could change the course of government that stood in the way. In Bell's opinion, the guiding spirit in the opposition to the Maharaj Kumar stemmed from the Maharani who wished her own son to succeed to the *gaddi*. 'In this as in other matters both the Maharaja and the members of the Durbar follow her lead'.[372] In 1913, the Maharaj Kumar agreed to make an alliance, somewhat reluctantly since his first choice was still a Japanese lady of noble birth, with a member of the ex-Royal Family of Burma.[373] The old Maharaja, true to form, continued to oppose any marriage alliance for his son; in the end his views were to prevail.

In February 1907, the Viceroy had written to Lord Morley at the India Office setting out his views on whether the political control of Sikkim should continue to rest with the Government of India or be transferred back to the Bengal Government. Although direct control had been assumed by the Indian Government as a result of the Younghusband Mission, Minto believed that the reasons put forward then were just as cogent now. Since the main trade route bound for Tibet passed through Sikkim, and since the state had close ties with Tibet, the Viceroy deemed it of the highest importance that its political relations should be under the direct control of the Indian Government, at least until such time as relations with the Tibetans had been placed upon a more definite and satisfactory footing, and until trade was safely established. Up until the present, questions regarding the internal administration of the Sikkim State had rested with the Political Officer who was directly answerable to the Bengal Government. Since Sikkim's relations with Tibet and the maintenance of the trade route through the state would still have to be submitted for Government of India orders, Minto saw little reason for changing the line of command. He accepted that all routine work concerning the Trade Agency at Gyantse and of the officer stationed to supervise it would continue to be intercepted by the Political Officer in Sikkim. As a tentative measure, the Viceroy was prepared to introduce a system of direct relations between the Trade Agent and the Government of India, so long as the post was held by Captain O'Connor, an officer in whose discretion he had complete

confidence. O'Connor would submit to the Indian Government all communications which had a political aspect, forwarding, at the same time, copies to the Political Officer in Sikkim; he, in turn, would address the Government of India whenever he thought necessary. The arrangement would have to be reconsidered when a less experienced officer than O'Connor was placed in charge of the Trade Agency.[374]

The arguments put forward by the Viceroy for not restoring the political control of Sikkim to the local government concerned did not appear convincing to the Secretary of State. He saw every advantage in associating the local authorities with the conduct of affairs in Sikkim. Whenever necessary, arrangements could be made for reports from the Indian Agents on the frontier to be 'sent under flying seal through the Political Officer in Sikkim'. In other words, Lord Morley saw no reason to alter his opinion that the Foreign Department of the Government of India should be relieved of the direct control of Sikkim. He was, however, prepared to postpone the transfer until Claude White retired from the service.[375]

The question of responsibility for the affairs of Sikkim was to be directly affected by Chinese forward policy in Tibet. In January 1910, China affirmed her determination to establish 'the shadowy rights' she had always claimed, in theory, to possess over Mongolia and Tibet. The claim came to affect the states on the periphery of India's northern border. In April of that year, HMG instructed their Minister in Peking, Mr Max Müller, to warn Prince Ch'ing of the Wai-wu-pu that the British Government could not 'allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepaul or of the two smaller states of Bhutan and Sikkim, and that they are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States'.[376] Prince Ch'ing's reply set out the Chinese position: the Nepalese were 'properly (or originally) feudatories of China, and Bhutan and Sikkim are both States in friendly relations with China'. He saw no reason why the reorganisation of the internal government of Tibet should affect China's relations with the states in any way.[377] The reply merely reiterated what had been said before and Max Müller was instructed to require the Wai-wu-pu to be more specific regarding the integrity of the three Himalayan states. In October 1910, a note from the Wai-wu-pu stated that the 'Chinese Government observe that Nepal has forwarded tribute to Peking for years past, and from long ago submitted to vassalage of China. Bhutan likewise is a vassal State of China, and cannot be regarded on the same footing as Sikkim, which in accordance with treaty is under the protection of Great Britain'.[378]

In January 1911, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister in Peking, informed Prince Ch'ing that any attempt by the Chinese Government to exercise influence over states so remote from the sphere of direct Chinese interests, and in such close treaty relations with the Indian Government as Nepal and Bhutan, or indeed under the protection of that government as in the case of Sikkim, would not be tolerated.[379] Once again Prince Ch'ing outlined the Chinese position. Both Nepal and Bhutan were vassal states of China as had been clearly proved by correspondence existing between the Resident in Tibet

and Bhutan and Nepal. 'In view of the fact that Sikkim is clearly expressed in a treaty with Great Britain and China to be under British protection', the Chinese Government were prepared to accept that status. However, there could be no question that Nepal or Bhutan could be defined as being on the same footing as Sikkim.[380] In reply, the British Government refused outright to recognise Chinese claims to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, and warned that they would resist any attempt by the Chinese Government to impose their authority or interfere with either of these two states.[381]

In Sikkim itself, Charles Bell was insistent that the Chinese should have no direct contact with the Maharaja, who had, in the past, declared his subservience to the Chinese Emperor.[382] He did not consider that there was an immediate possibility of the Maharaja making an overture to China, the administration being largely in the hands of the Maharaj Kumar since his return from England in 1908. In February 1914, Maharaja Thutob Namgyal died, and the succession passed to the second son, Sidkeong Namgyal, without any sign of a dispute emanating from his elder brother at Tromo. Sidkeong Namgyal had been recognised as heir to the throne by the Government of India in 1899, and the Viceroy saw no reason not to approve and confirm the succession.[383] He was destined to rule for a mere ten months before dying in somewhat suspicious circumstances on 5 December 1914.[384]

During his travels and his short spell at Oxford the new Maharaja had not only been the recipient of a more modern education than any of his predecessors, but had been influenced into thinking that he could bring the feudal conditions existing in Sikkim into line with modern administration. No sooner had he returned and taken over specific areas of administration, than he attempted to put through certain land reforms as part of his plan to modernise the state. In his opinion, the revenue of Sikkim was wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the state due to the monopoly on trade and land exercised by the Kazis (feudal landlords) and the monasteries. Both sections of the landholding hierarchy were opposed to Sidkeong Namgyal's modernising land reforms which, they knew, were calculated to reduce their traditional privileges. Their objection to the Prince's notion of them discharging their social responsibilities to the poor and dispossessed was second only to their disapproval of his new-fangled ideas. This radical heterodoxy, which neither the Kazis nor monks had ever thought to hear from their Maharaja, disaffected many of them. In December 1914, the Maharaja fell ill and a British physician was summoned to treat him. He is said to have 'administered a heavy transfusion of brandy and put him under a number of blankets: at the same time a fire was kept beneath his bed. Death came in the hour'.[385] With him went his reforming zeal and revolutionary ideas, well before any of them had time to effect the privileges of the traditionalists.

Maharaja Tashi Namgyal, 1914–40

On Sidkeong Namgyal's death, the succession passed to his younger half-brother Tashi Namgyal, who had been born at Kurseong in 1893 during

Maharaja Thutob Namgyal's detention there under the orders of Sir Charles Elliott, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. During his reign Sikkim's relations with the Government of India entered their most peaceful phase. At the time of his succession, the young Maharaja was not considered fit, due to his extreme youth and lack of experience, to exercise full ruling powers. It was therefore decided to place him under the tutelage of Charles Bell, the Political Officer. While under Bell's charge, he was gradually allowed to exercise his powers over the departments of education, monasteries and forests and a year later, took overall responsibility for excise, income tax, police and jails. In June 1917, Bell recommended that the Maharaja should be given full administrative powers, in view of the fact that 'this step will appeal most strongly to the Tibetan Government and the Bhutan Darbar, and will therefore be of lasting political advantage in our relations with those countries, both of which, by race and religion, are in close affinity with the smaller State of Sikkim'.[386] Having accepted Bell's recommendation, the Government of India thought it politically desirable to grant to the Maharaja the subsidy of Rs 12,000 which had been paid to his predecessor. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, having agreed that 'it would be equitable' to restore the subsidy, wanted it made clear to the ruler that it was being granted as 'an act of grace and subject to resumption in the event of disloyalty or undesirable conduct on the part of the Chief'.[387]

Having assumed full administrative responsibility, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal began to put through a number of social and economic reforms. Among them, a judicial court was set up in 1916 for the first time, and empowered to act under an independent judiciary without reference to the Sikkim Council. This measure put an end to the old practice of combining executive and judicial powers in the hands of the all powerful Kazis, who for centuries had acted as landlords and judiciary in their separate districts. Task or forced labour was abolished and the system of taxation, relating to *zamindari*[388] was introduced.[389]

In 1935, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal found himself having to face constitutional changes in regard to Sikkim's relations with the Indian Government. The Government of India Act of 1935 bound Sikkim to the Constitution of India as an Indian State. An Indian State under the 1935 Act was defined as 'any territory, not being part of British India, which His Majesty recognizes as being such a state, whether described as a State, an Estate, a *Jagir*[390] or otherwise'. The main charcteristic of an Indian State from the viewpoint of international law was that it had no separate external relations whatsoever.[391] In the case of Sikkim, the Political Officer was in charge of Sikkim's external relations with the Indian Government. Just before the 1935 Act came into force, Maharaj Kumar Palden Thondup Namgyal led an official delegation to Delhi for discussions with the Chamber of Princes, a body representing the Princely States of India in their relations with the Government of India. Sikkim's strategic position, bounded as she was on three sides by foreign territory and only on one side by British India, had been acknowledged in the various treaties that the British had negotiated with the state. The 1935 Act

accepted this special position and the Political Officer was permitted to continue to conduct Sikkim's political relations. The presence of the Political Officer in Sikkim itself enabled him to keep a watching brief on the neighbouring states on India's northern border; in the case of Sikkim, her familial ties with Tibet were kept under close scrutiny.

While the Government of India Act was defining Sikkim as a Princely State in 1935, encroachments from Tibet took place on the Sikkim border. Tibetan officials claimed that the Tibetan frontier was not on the great Himalayan range, but extended as far as Giaogong, some five or six miles to the south of the Donkhya La Pass. Representatives of the Dzongpon of Khamba Dzong went so far as to put up Tibetan mile-posts on the Kangra La Pass up to Giaogong so as to substantiate their claim. The Sikkim Darbar complained to Mr Williamson, the Political Officer in Sikkim; having informed the Indian Government of the fact, Williamson instructed his assistant Rai Bahadur Norbu Dhondup in Lhasa to discuss the matter with the Tibetan authorities.[392] The explanation given was that it was not clear to the Tibetan authorities where the boundary actually lay. In Tibet 'the prevailing custom about boundaries is either that they should be a range of snowy mountains or hill tops or rivers and that it is not the custom to have the boundary on flat ground'. Norbu Dhondup pointed out that whatever may have been the case in the remote past, the boundary was now as laid down in Article 1 of the 1890 Treaty between Great Britain and China, and thereafter confirmed in Article 1 of the Lhasa Convention of 1904. The Tibetans finally agreed to Norbu Dhondup's interpretation and he was able to obtain written confirmation of the fact from the authorities.[393]

Indian independence: Sikkim's Standstill Agreement, 1946–48

In 1941, when the reorganisation of the old Political Department of the Government of India took place, it was decided to leave Sikkim affairs in the hands of the Political Department. In 1945, the question came up again as to whether it was more appropriate for the External Department to deal with Sikkim. There were two schools of thought in the India Office; one suggested that as a frontier state, important because of its connections with Tibet, it should be the concern of the External Department, rather as Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier were. The other saw no reason why the internal affairs of Sikkim should be handled by the External Department, particularly since the state's affairs were no longer affected by Tibet. It was their opinion that the Political Officer or Resident should continue to address the Political Department in India.[394] The second view prevailed. In May 1946, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, declared that under the new constitution of India, Britain would cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy in relation to the Indian States. 'The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successive government or governments in British India, or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them'.[395] There was general recognition by both the Government of India and

the Constituent Assembly, which was responsible for drafting the new Constitution of India, that Sikkim was in a special category, particularly affecting its external relations.

Recognising this, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal wrote to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, who had brought the Cabinet Mission to Delhi to discuss the transfer of power, setting out the problems affecting Sikkim as he saw them. In his view, Sikkim was an Indian State under the 1935 Constitution, but in reality she was not Indian, except politically. Sikkim's ties socially and religiously were with Tibet, and the people of Sikkim recognised the Dalai Lama as the spiritual Head of State. Moreover, the 1861 Treaty with British India had given Sikkim the right to levy duty on all goods passing in or out of Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal, though the State had abstained from utilising this right in the immediate past. He hoped that 'no decision directly affecting Sikkim will be taken without due consideration of the position of Sikkim as a border State and without giving the Sikkim representative an opportunity of setting forth the peculiarities of the case before the Cabinet Ministers'.[396] The Maharaja was assured that the *Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy*, presented by the Cabinet Delegation to the Chamber of Princes, would provide an answer to the Maharaja's questions.[397]

A J Hopkinson, Political Officer in Sikkim at the time, thought the Cabinet Delegation's reply was less than adequate. He pointed to the fact that the paramountcy memorandum itself did not touch on the most important and peculiar aspect of Sikkim's case, which was that the state was surrounded on three sides by foreign territory and that, in view of this peculiarity, it would require special consideration.[398] The India Office's response to the plea was not reassuring; they saw no alternative but for Sikkim, long established as an Indian State, to negotiate its future position with the Indian Union like any other state under paramountcy. As for the spiritual relationship of the inhabitants of Sikkim to the Dalai Lama, the India Office could not see its relevance, particularly since Sikkim had no political relationship with the Tibetan Government. There was always the possibility that 'one, of course, could develop if the Indian Union acquiesced'.[399] Although theoretically Sikkim was expected to bargain itself into the Union of India, the recognition of so small a separate unit was in itself problematical and especially since there was no other Indian State with which it could make common cause. Added to which, independent India had still to evolve a policy towards its north-eastern frontier and to any complications which might arise there in the future. All in all, the India Office visualised the Indian Government having no alternative but to consider maintaining the northern pricipalities in virtual independence of India as buffer and, as far as possible, client states. 'There may be greater advantage in according Sikkim a more independent status than in seeking to absorb Sikkim and Bhutan in the Indian Union'. There was some doubt in the India Office's mind whether the special conditions attached to Sikkim could be realistically or practically recognised by the Indian Union, let alone their capacity to honour past treaty rights.[400]

Before the transfer of power, the Maharaja, having received no further

assurances regarding Sikkim's position in relation to the Indian Union, wrote to Lord Louis Mountbatten and submitted a memorandum on the question of his state.[401] The problem to which the memorandum most specifically addressed itself was the cession of Darjeeling and the Sikkim *Terai*. It was a subject, the Maharaja explained, of prolonged correspondence with the Governor General under the East India Company and had been the cause of much resentment by his predecessors. His aim in submitting the memorandum now was to enable the Viceroy to understand Sikkim's historical claim in respect of Darjeeling from Lord Bentinck's minute of June 1830 to the legal position at the end of British paramountcy in India. He hoped that Lord Mountbatten would consider setting up some form of arbitration for settlement of the case and for interim arrangements in the meantime.

The gist of the argument centred round Raja Tsugphud Namgyal's deed of cession of March 1835 granting Darjeeling to the East India Company. The deed did not purport to grant to the Company the rights of sovereignty in respect of Darjeeling. The right could only have been given by express stipulation, and that his predessor had never agreed to do. It followed, therefore, that the powers of sovereignty, exercised by the British Government in respect of the Darjeeling area, were not derived from the deed of grant, but by the exercise of paramountcy. Since the British Government had acquired these rights by virtue of being the paramount power in India, it allowed that there could be no other source to which these rights and powers could be ascribed. The Maharaja went further: on the logic of the above assumption, the rights and powers regarding Darjeeling would revert to the ruler of Sikkim on the lapse of paramountcy. The grant itself was personal to the British Government, and would cease to have any validity in law once British authority had been terminated in India.

Under international law, personal rights and obligations of a state could not devolve on a successor state unless there was an express stipulation in the treaty to this effect. The Independence of India Act of 1947 had made this position quite clear. The Maharaja specfically asked that on the lapse of paramountcy, all rights and powers of sovereignty exercised by the British Government in the Darjeeling district should automatically revert to the ruler of Sikkim; and that the deed of grant in respect of Darjeeling should, on the termination of British authority in India, cease to be operative, the rights of property being revested in the ruler of Sikkim. 'It is, therefore, imperatively necessary that before the transfer of power takes place, possession of the territories in question should be retroceded to the Successor Government of India and the Government of Sikkim'.[402] The India Office saw no possibility of the memorandum being considered by the Secretary of State for India. The time had passed for that; it called for a decision by the successor Indian Government. On the other hand, the memorandum could conceivably come up for consideration during Treaty negotiations, but they did not intend specially to mark it for that purpose.[403]

Recognition that Sikkim had a special position was accorded on 22 January 1947 when the Constituent Assembly adopted a resolution moved by

Jawaharlal Nehru, then Vice President of the Viceroy's Executive Council, that 'this Assembly resolves that the committee constituted by its resolutions of 21 December 1946 (to confer with the negotiating committee set up by the Chamber of Princes and with other representatives of Indian States for certain specified purposes) shall in addition have power to confer with such persons as the committee thinks fit for the purpose of examining the special problem of Bhutan and Sikkim and to report to the Assembly the result of such examination'.[404] Nehru knew full well that a committee set up for the express purpose of discussing terms with Indian Princes would have no authority to enter into discussions with Sikkim and Bhutan. Added powers were, therefore, ascribed to the committee; it was to negotiate with 'territories which are not Indian States, specially Bhutan and Sikkim' and it was to have special authority to meet representatives of Sikkim and Bhutan and discuss any special problem that may arise.

At a crucial meeting on 16 July 1947, Maharaj Kumar Palden Thondup Namgyal with Rai Bahadur Tashi Dahdul Densapa[405] and Roop Narain, an Indian judge who had served Sikkim for the past twenty years, met V P Menon, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan and Harishwar Dayal of the States and External Affairs Department.[406] Roop Narain argued that Sikkim's geo-political location and cultural affinities called for parity with Bhutan. To which assertion, Menon admitted that the Maharaja's position was different from that of any other Indian ruler. He hoped that the Darbar would see its way to entering into an agreement regarding defence, external affairs and communications, although he accepted that there was no obligation on the ruler's part to join the Indian Union.

On 25 July, Lord Louis Mountbatten had a meeting with the Princes of India. As a result of the meeting, A J Hopkinson was instructed to inform the Maharaja that, in the interests of India and Sikkim, the existing posts concerned with Sikkim's political relations would continue to be maintained under the control of the External Affairs Department in Delhi. It was pointed out that the presence of an officer at Gangtok, simultaneously responsible for relations with Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan, was the best guarantee for the kingdom's special position to continue to be recognised. The Indian Government hoped that, in the circumstances, the Sikkim authorities would agree to the continuance of a post equivalent to that of Political Officer who would have overall supervision of posts in Tibet as well. The intention was to maintain the post permanently, and in consequence the other subordinate and ministerial staff were also to be retained. The Darbar was asked whether they had any objection to the Indian Government retaining the Gangtok Residency.[407]

Seven months after Menon's clarification that India did not seek to claim sovereign rights in Sikkim, the Maharaja decided to enter into a Standstill Agreement on 27 February 1948.[408] The Agreement stated that 'all agreements, relations and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern existing between the Crown and the Sikkim State on 14 August 1947' would continue, pending the conclusion of a new agreement or treaty.

Matters of common concern were signified as pertaining to currency, coinage, customs, postal channels, telegraph communications, external affairs and defence measures. On 1 April 1948, the Sikkim Darbar accepted that a representative of the External Affairs Ministry would be responsible for the conduct of relations with Sikkim and Bhutan, as well as for relations with Tibet.[409] Harishwar Dayal was appointed to the post.

Post-independence, and annexation of Sikkim, 1949–75

Negotiations for the final treaty with Sikkim continued under somewhat strained circumstances. The problems facing the Maharaja in 1947 were directly concerned with the emergence in Sikkim politics of three main political parties. They were the Praja Sudharak Samaj, led by Tashi Tsering, a clerk, formerly in the British Residency; the Rajya Praja Sammelan representing the Nepalese element; and the Praja Mandal, founded by Kazi Lendhup Dorji.[410] The main interest of all three parties was the overthrow of Bhutiya-Lepcha control, which meant the authority of the Kazis in particular. On 5 December 1947, the three parties met in Gangtok for the purpose of demanding the abolition of lessee-landlords, an interim government with parliamentary representation, and the kingdom's accession to India.[411] The merger of the three parties resulted in Tashi Tsering becoming President. His first act was to demand the immediate affiliation of his party with the All-India States People's Conference which operated in India's Princely States; thereafter he threatened to withhold rent from landlords, and taxes due to the Sikkim Darbar.

The Maharaja promptly summoned the various leaders to the palace on 9 December 1947 and told them that union with India was out of the question. He would, however, agree to curb the power of the landlords and abolish the system of land tenure if they agreed to co-operate. He also promised to look into economic grievances and to reorganise the State Council to include ten prominent citizens, lamas and retired darbar officials. The State Congress, which had raised the merger demand, readily accepted the Maharaja's offer. Its three nominees represented Sikkim's three communities. Raghubir Prasad, a Nepalese, Captain Dimik Singh, one of the very few Lepchas to have been promoted to an army commission, and Sonam Tsering representing the Bhutiyas. 'With goodwill, the experiment would have defused the crisis and laid a sound basis for participative governance. But rapprochement between the ruler and his subjects did not suit the Residency'.[412]

The result was that public disturbances erupted in the capital, despite the Maharaja having agreed to expand the Council. Tashi Tsering was the first to go back on his word, followed by Raghubir Prasad who yielded to Nepalese pressure, then Dimik Singh. Sonam Tsering was the last to go and was accused thereafter of betraying the people's cause. To increase pressure on the Maharaja, the State Congress organised strikes and demonstrations, mobs having been collected from outlying districts and brought into the capital.

'Drunken brawling, street-corner orgies, and a constant repertoire of offensive songs blaring out of wayside loudspeakers marked the campaign for civil liberties'. As tension mounted, the Maharaja first accused Harishwar Dayal of encouraging the mobsters and then imposed a curfew on Gangtok. Six leading politicians were jailed for breaking the peace and a warrant was issued for Tashi Tsering's arrest. No sooner had Dayal heard of the warrant, then he threatened to annex Sikkim if the warrant was executed. He also demanded the release of the other politicians.[413]

Following these disturbances, Tashi Tsering and his aide, Chandra Das Rai, travelled to Delhi in December 1948 where they were warmly received by the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and by Dr Balakrishna Keskar, Deputy Minister for External Affairs. The latter went so far as to inform the Constituent Assembly in Delhi that the Sikkim Rajya Praja Sammelan was demanding a merger with India in view of the 'conflict between the State Congress of Sikkim and the Maharaja and the inability of the latter to control the disorder'.[414] While Delhi was showing the ruler to be incompetent, Harishwar Dayal in Gangtok was pressurising the Maharaja to agree to appoint a ministry. Finally, the ruler gave in and a Cabinet was sworn in with Tashi Tsering as Sikkim's first and, as it happened, only Prime Minister on 9 May 1949.

Given the circumstances in which the Chief Minister was imposed on the Sikkim Darbar, it was not surprising that relations between the palace and Tashi Tsering soon began to deteriorate. The new Minister had no experience whatsoever of administration and looked to the Political Officer for guidance. In consequence, the Maharaja suspected Harishwar Dayal's hand in many of the demands which Tashi Tsering made on him. The end result was that, within weeks of the Cabinet being sworn in, Dr Keskar arrived in Gangtok to 'help the Political Officer maintain law and order, should the need for this arise'. Keskar brought with him an offer to take over the administration and emphasised the need for negotiating a new treaty. The Maharaja was informed that Delhi was proposing to appoint a Dewan to administer the state for the express purpose of keeping law and order. To sweeten the pill, the Government of India proposed to dissolve the Tsering Ministry. However, if the administration showed any signs of breaking down before the new Dewan arrived, then the Political Officer was to be entrusted with the task.[415]

The Maharaja, left with no alternative but to agree, wrote to Dayal on 6 June 1948 asking him to take over the administration of the state pending the appointment of a Dewan. Tashi Tsering and his Cabinet were summarily dismissed and though he complained that the Indian Government should have supported his administration, he was forced to accept the inevitable, his support having primarily come from the very government that had now removed him.[416] In Delhi, the official press note gave out that the Indian Government had been constrained to take the step in the interests of law and order, and furthermore it was at the special request of the Maharaja that a Dewan was being despatched to Gangtok. A mere half-truth to say the least, as was the pious hope 'that the present emergency arrangement may be

terminated in the near future so that political evolution in Sikkim may take an even and peaceful course'.[417]

Harishwar Dayal took over the administration immediately. His role in the affairs of Sikkim did not endear him to the palace, let alone the politicians whom he first encouraged and then brought down; they were not slow to accuse him of duplicity. As a result, he was soon replaced by John Lall, ICS, who became the first Dewan of Sikkim on 11 August 1949. Delhi had been most insistent that the measure was temporary and that the Maharaja was only being asked to 'delegate all powers necessary for carrying on the administration until normal conditions were restored'.[418] In the event, the role of the Dewan lasted for 23 years 'after which there was a brief respite of only ten months before history was repeated even more drastically to justify a worse usurpation'.[419]

The Indian press denounced India's 'fascist policy' in taking over the administration of Sikkim which they characterised as 'on a par with her policy towards Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Chandernagore'. In a conversation with Mr Shattock at the British High Commission, Harishwar Dayal justified his decision to bring Indian administration into Sikkim.[421] In his view, the state 'was very much of a pyramidal hierarchy ranging from the feudal landlords to the Maharaja'. During the last few years, the State Congress had carried on an agitation against the landlords and had brought them to their knees. Seeing that the feudal machine was being rapidly undermined, the Maharaj Kumar, who, in Dayal's opinion, was the real ruler of Sikkim, took up the cudgels on behalf of the landlords against the State Congress. From then on, the struggle began to be one between the State Congress and the Maharaj Kumar. This led to frequent demonstrations in Gangtok against the Maharaj Kumar, and went so far as to take place in the palace grounds itself. In the circumstances, the Indian Government had no alternative but to intervene, which they had done. Dayal was insistent that the agitation itself was almost entirely amongst the Sikkimese themselves, the Nepalese and Indian *marwaris* having generally stayed aloof. It was not the Indian Government's intention to merge Sikkim into the neighbouring districts of Darjeeling. He envisaged that, in due course, the Dewan would be assisted by a Council of Ministers and the State would come to be ruled on 'the pattern of those other states which are retaining their separate entity, with the Maharaja as a constitutional figurehead'.

Shattock appears to have believed that it was only when the ruling house was on the point of being overthrown that the Indian Government had come to its rescue. On the other hand, India's sympathy to State Congress movements may have led her to condone the Sikkim Congress agitation, but they had not 'directly encouraged the development of a situation which made it necessary for them to intervene'. In Shattock's view, the major factor which had influenced Delhi to intervene in the internal administration of the state was communist infiltration from Tibet.[422]

It now only remained to negotiate a treaty with Sikkim which would justify India's protectorate over the state. On 5 December 1950, the Indo-Sikkim

Treaty was signed at Gangtok by Maharaja Tashi Namgyal and Harishwar Dayal as India's plenipotentiary.[423] There were thirteen Articles to the Treaty. Article II defined Sikkim as a protectorate of India, and India undertook responsibility for Sikkim's external affairs, defence and communications. Sikkim was to be allowed to enjoy autonomy, subject to ultimate responsibility being vested in the Government of India for the maintenance of good administration, law and order. All previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim, which were at present in force, were to be cancelled.

In Chief Justice Hidayatullah of the Indian Supreme Court's opinion, the Treaty was unequal to say the least. He cited nine clauses which pointed to the true indication of Sikkim's sovereign status. The use of the term treaty; the fact that India and Sikkim were named as consenting states in the preamble; the Indian Government's appointment of a plenipotentiary; the need for the Maharaja to examine and accept Harishwar Dayal's credentials; the cancellation of earlier treaties; the use of customary legal language; the extradition clause; the appointment of an Indian representative in Gangtok; and finally the provision for ratification of the treaty. Hidayatullah argued that India's claim to sovereignty could not be justified in view of the fact that the treaty itself was proof that a sovereign kingdom had voluntarily agreed to entrust some of its administrative functions to the Government of India. Nor could India put forward previous claims, based on earlier conventions, since Article I of the 1950 Treaty explicitly stated that 'all previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim' had been formally cancelled.[424] In fact, if Sikkim had been recognised, as Sir Olaf Caroe, Indian Foreign Secretary, had suggested in 1947 as a dependency of India, then the 1950 Treaty could not 'be contemplated unless each contracting party has a distinct sovereign international personality'.[425]

The India Office viewed the sequence of events with considerable suspicion. One view was that the Indian Government had classed Sikkim with Nepal as an area of communist activity, and since the Indian Congress had never been strong in Sikkim they had decided to use the State Congress as an instrument to effect their influence there. Sir Algernon Rumbold's opinion was somewhat different. Sikkim had not acceded to India and, therefore, the action of the Indian Government was a considerable extension of the 'theory of intervention' which they had developed already in relation to other acceding States. 'In so far as they take their stand on the Standstill Agreement, it is relevant that Kashmir had a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, but not with India. Consequently, if the Standstill Agreement gives India a right to intervene in Sikkim, Pakistan would have a right to intervene in Kashmir.[426] The logic of Rumbold's argument was legally irrefutable, yet the British High Commission in Delhi saw no reason to protest to the Indian Government that the 1948 Standstill Agreement had been violated, and that they could not justify 'their action simply on the statement that they [Indian Government] could not allow disorder to prevail'.[427] Or that it was on the advice of their representative, Harishwar Dayal, that India had chosen to act as she had done.

Since the role of the Political Officer is crucial to the fate of Sikkim after

Indian independence, a brief survey of their influence in the kingdom is given here. From Claude White in 1899 to Sardar Gurbachan Singh in 1975, official policy very often reflected their respective prejudices. Claude White was a prime example of this. When he assumed charge of Sikkim in 1899, his responsibilities extended far beyond the kingdom itself. He was also responsible for relations with Bhutan, to see that her chiefs kept their promises to the Government of India. Another of his tasks was to supervise the workings of the trade marts at Yatung and Gyantse, and to keep a watching brief on the activities of the Chinese Amban on the frontier. As a natural extension of this role, White was expected to try and influence the officials of the Dalai Lama's government. Being the first incumbent of the post, the Government of India depended on him to define the limits of his job without recourse to precedent. This study has revealed that White thought nothing of insulting Maharaja Thutob Namgyal and his family, of recommending the need to dispossess his eldest son so as to detach the Darbar from its traditional suzerain Tibet, and bring it more into line with British policy. He imposed on the state a Council of the ruler's opponents and meddled with impunity in petty matters relating to the Maharaja's household. Neither the Bengal Government nor Lord Curzon saw the need to enquire too closely into White's rule so long as Sikkim provided a listening post for Tibet. The policy itself stressed the need to extend British influence into Tibet, and as far as possible to prevent any other power from establishing a foothold there. Moreover, the Indian Government had no doubt that the Sikkim ruler, if need be, could easily be brought to book by White.

By the time Charles Bell, Basil Gould and A J Hopkinson had assumed their respective roles as Political Officers, the pattern of administration had undergone a distinct change. From the time of the Tibet Mission, the Political Officer was directly accountable to the Government of India and not to Bengal. Unlike White, he was not cast in the role of kingmaker, nor was he in charge of the internal affairs of the kingdom, although Sikkim's external relations continued to remain part of his portfolio. When it came to questions of subsidy and of succession, the Indian Government made it a point to look to him for advice. Official policy, in fact, continued to reflect the Political Officer's views, but not his prejudices.

Shortly after appointing its first Political Officer in Sikkim, the National Indian Government was forced to curtail his many duties. He was no longer supervising the functioning of the various trade marts, for Nehru had decided to relinquish these assets to China; he had also readily agreed to withdraw the military escorts from Yatung and Gyantse and surrender all property there. The post and telegraph services, together with the staging bungalows became, post-independence, the property of the Chinese Government. During Harishwar Dayal's term of office, responsibility for Bhutan remained his, but in 1971 that too was separated from his successor's authority. All that remained in the Political Officer's jurisdiction was the small kingdom of Sikkim. The reduced responsibility appears not to have diminished Dayal's, nor those that followed him, sense of self-importance in the affairs of Sikkim; on the contrary, it

increased it. The Chogyal[428] complained that imperial mores should have ended with the 1950 Treaty, and that the Indian representative should have shown himself to be an envoy of a friendly neighbour and 'not a proconsul inspired by outmoded notions of paramountcy'. Experience was soon to teach him that the Indian Political Officers went out of their way to emulate White's minatory legacy. 'Sikkimese courtiers with a grouse against the palace were more than welcome to take their grievances to the Political Officer. He was also widely recognised as the patron of the kingdom's growing Nepalese population. Disgruntled politicians relied on his sage advice. The King too was sometimes forced to make his way up the hill to explain himself or plead for leniency'.[429]

The result was that each successive Political Officer managed to offend the Sikkim Darbar. One controversy followed another. The Political Officer laid the blame at the Chogyal's door, accusing him of over-sensitivity and deceit, while his superiors in Delhi carefully fostered the notion that the ruler's only preoccupation was to extract financial concessions out of the Indian Government. 'It was the only way that they could destroy the credit the Chogyal enjoyed with Nehru'.[430] Unfortunately for the Chogyal, India's new representatives were conditioned to believe that a self-governing republic could have no use for an out-dated monarchy: it was an insuperable flaw in the relationship. Furthermore, the Chogyal knew full well that some of the Political Officers had gone out of their way to recommend Sikkim's absorption into India.[431] Another of the accusations levelled at the Chogyal was his pro-Chinese sympathies, an accusation with little substance since his natural and familial ties were with Tibet and she had been colonised by China in 1951. Moreover, as India and China continued to search for a formula to their difficulties, they each accused the other of undue influence in Sikkim affairs. India accused China of attempting to establish strong points of aggression while talking of peace and friendship, and China insisted that India was using Sikkim as a base for intrusions into Chinese territory.

These difficulties finally forced the Chogyal to search for ways in which to distance himself from New Delhi. He suggested a review of the 1950 Treaty, though he clearly recognised that the defence of India was the defence of Sikkim. The only concession the Indian Government were prepared to grant related to the Indo-Sikkim boundary which, in the future was to be treated as an international line, and all maps published in India were to incorporate this change. Review of the 1950 Treaty was turned down. 'The government in Delhi saw no reason to show tact in its dealings with the young and intelligent Chogyal'.[432] The result was to produce in Sikkim itself a distinct anti-India feeling, which the Indian Government were able to exploit when the time came to accuse the Darbar of providing fertile soil for Peking's propaganda. If Curzon had seen the Himalayan regions of Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam as an inner defence line for India, protected by a Tibetan buffer region, Communist China viewed the Himalaya as its outer line of defence, necessary for the protection of Tibet. In India, the argument led to the belief that 'Peking . . . sees the Himalayan states as irredentist regions to be regained

as soon as possible, also assigns to them an offensive role. They can be future bases for the subversion of India'.[433] It was a convenient stick to beat the Chogyal with. And the Indian Government did.

As China consolidated her hold over Tibet, she repeatedly claimed suzerainty over Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal, as indeed she had done many times during British rule in India. These statements, followed by cartographical claims to vast tracts of cis-Himalyan territory, alarmed the Indian Government. In 1959 the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, spelled out his country's policy with regard to the northern principalities of Sikkim and Bhutan. 'I would like, however, to take this opportunity to make clear once again that China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other, and has always respected the proper relations between them and India'.[434] India noted that Chou En-lai did not differentiate between the two kingdoms, nor did he appear to acknowledge India's right to speak on their behalf. Nehru thought it necessary to warn the Chinese Premier, rather as Lords Curzon and Minto had done before him. 'We have publicly, and rightly, undertaken certain responsibilities for the defence of Sikkim and Bhutan, if they are attacked. It is very necessary for us to understand that if anything happens on their borders, then it is the same thing as an interference with the border of India'.[435]

Following on these exchanges, the Indian Government came to the conclusion that Chinese refusal to accept Sikkim's status as a protectorate of India was proof of the Chogyal's complicity with Peking. In July 1963, China accused the Indian army of trespassing beyond the Nathu La Pass and of erecting barbed-wire fences in Chumbi. Relations between India and China steadily worsened, and mutual recriminations took the place of the much-vaunted slogan, 'peaceful co-existence'. As the crisis deepened, the Chogyal decided to make his position clear. He announced that 'Sikkim stands firmly by the side of India in prosperity and adversity and this has been amply demonstrated by the unstinted support we have given to the Government of India in this hour of crisis'.[436] Unfortunately for the Chogyal, China in September 1963 issued a statement accusing India of repeatedly violating Chinese territory from their base in Sikkim, and also of trying to undermine the 'friendly and good-neighbourly relations existing between China and Sikkim'. It was an accusation which, in the wake of the 1962 Indo-China war, India found difficult to tolerate. Much was made in Delhi of the ruler's disloyalty and of the fact that the Chogyal was being encouraged to act by China without recourse to India.

When, therefore, in December 1963, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal died and China's Chairman Liu Shao Chi promptly despatched a telegram to the new ruler offering his condolences, Nehru's sense of outrage was reflected in his rebuke to the Chinese Government. He accused them of acting in contravention of normal diplomatic courtesies by choosing to address the Chogyal direct 'instead of forwarding it to this government for onward transmission. The Government of China is well aware that the external relations of Sikkim are entirely the responsibility of the Government of India and that any

communication, either formal or informal, from the Government of China to the Government of Sikkim or its ruler, should be channelled through the Indian Government'.[437] The Chinese chose to ignore Nehru's outburst. In fact, in April 1965, when the Chogyal was crowned at Gangtok, Liu Shao Chi repeated the gesture by sending another of his congratulatory telegrams for the occasion and addressing it personally to the new ruler. Delhi was by now convinced that these messages were emanating from Peking with the active encouragement of the Chogyal himself.

Sikkim, in actual fact, was incidental to the Sino-Indian problem, but the Indian Government chose to make their relations with the kingdom dependent on their relations with China. They feared that if they recognised Sikkim as an independent state, the Chinese might not only wish to establish direct relations with it, but, worse still, attempt to set up an embassy in Gangtok. It is inconceivable, with the memory of the 1962 war still fresh, that the Chogyal would have considered a move towards China; to have done so would have brought instant annexation. Nevertheless, these fears impelled the Political Officer to look closely into the Chogyal's activities and particularly those of his American wife, Hope Cooke. The aim was to focus discontent in the persons of the Chogyal and the Gyalmo by exposing the unsatisfactory role they played in the affairs of the kingdom. There was no lack of political malcontents in Sikkim, not least of whom was Kazi Lendhup Dorji, his European wife Kazini Elisa-Maria Langford-Rae and their protégé, Nar Bahadur Khatiawara.[438] The three were to spearhead a relentless campaign to bring down the Sikkim ruler.

In May 1967, the Chogyal, finding his relations with India's representatives growing steadily more acrimonious, approached the Indian Government once again to revise the 1950 Treaty, with particular regard to certain administrative arrangements. He made it clear that, although he appreciated India's interest in Sikkim, he was looking for changes which would release the Darbar from having to employ Indian Dewans and he wished to replace them with Sikkim nationals. While the Chogyal searched for ways to take the pressure off his administration, his wife chose that moment to publish an article on Sikkim's landholding rights and the Darjeeling grant of 1865. The article disputed the legality of India's possession of Darjeeling, 'the gift of a certain tract for a certain purpose does not imply the transfer of sovereign rights'. The Gyalmo went on to explain that the gift of Darjeeling to the East India Company was 'in the traditional context of a grant for usufructage only; ultimate jurisdiction, authority and the right to resume the land being implicitly retained'. In other words, all owners were tenants in a system of centralised indivisible landholding and which did not permit transfer of Sikkim land in perpetuity.[439]

Although New Delhi's public response was mild in the extreme, Indira Gandhi, who had just succeeded to the Prime Ministership, assured the Lok Sabha [Lower House] that 'there has been no demand from any responsible quarter in Sikkim laying claim over the Darjeeling district', she, nevertheless, immediately despatched T N Kaul, the Indian Foreign Secretary, to Gangtok.

He was instructed to sound the Chogyal as to whether he would be prepared to agree to a form of association with India. The model, Kaul explained, would be 'to have a democratic autonomous Sikkim as long as defence, communications and security remained with us, and remove the incongruous and ugly appellation of 'protectorate' from the treaty'.[440] The Chogyal's response was to offer further discussions on the question and to state that 'we have chosen to throw our lot in with the south. We share the ideology that you follow. But that does not mean merger with India'. His reluctance to agree to 'association' was backed up by a statement from three Executive Councillors in Sikkim claiming that since Sikkim had signed the treaty with India, it was 'within her sovereign rights to demand its revision as one of the signatories . . . Every country has the inherent right to exist and maintain its separate identity and to review its treaty obligations in the wake of the changing circumstances.[441] New Delhi was furious and instructed the Political Officer to ensure that the Darbar repudiated the Sikkim Councillors' views. Under pressure, the Chogyal gave in; the gesture neither endeared him to India which continued suspicious of his motives, nor to the three party leaders who had spoken out in Sikkim's defence and felt that they had been abandoned by the ruler.

Shortly afterwards, the Chogyal was invited to come to India on an official visit. The visit was cordial enough and in May 1968, Mrs Gandhi repaid the gesture by paying a return visit to Sikkim where she promised that a Presidential State visit was in the offing and would take place in 1970. No doubt, India felt it was necessary in the face of the Chinese presence on the borders to ensure that the Chogyal was kept satisfied. Inducements in the form of generous foreign exchange privileges were said to have been offered; no questions were to be asked about the Chogyal's family tours abroad, whether in Europe or Hong Kong. In future the Residency was to be named India House and the Indian Government had no objection to recognising the customary Sikkimese titles for the Royal Family of Chogyal, Gyalmo, Gyalum and Sidlon. The strategy failed to impress Palden Thondup Namgyal, the XIIth consecrated Chogyal of Sikkim. Just as Thutob Namgyal had failed to live up to John Claude White's expectations, nor was his descendent prepared to be bought off by financial advantages for himself or his family. His only aim was to fend off the merger of Sikkim with India.

The increased pressure from India decided the Chogyal to seek legal advice from Sir Humphrey Waldock, an eminent constitutional lawyer of All Soul's College, Oxford, and who was to become President of the International Court of Justice. Waldock advised that Kaul's ambiguous phrase and wish to remove the word 'protectorate' and substitute 'permanent association' would mean that India had a cast-iron case for annexation. On his advice, the Chogyal offered instead an amended version of Kaul's offer: 'Sikkim in full sovereign rights enters into a permanent association with the Government of India and entrusts to them the rights and responsibilities stipulated in this treaty hereunder'.[442]

When Kaul questioned the phrase 'in full sovereign rights', the Chogyal drew his attention to the 1817 Treaty of Titalya which recognised his

dynasty's rule over Sikkim 'in full sovereignty'. Kaul's next move was to offer the Chogyal freedom to operate his own post and telegraph services; that Sikkim would be permitted to join the Colombo Plan six months later, and various other international bodies at staggered intervals. All of which, on Waldock's advice, the Chogyal turned down. He offered instead to accept Kaul's draft, on the proviso that the Indian Government unconditionally endorsed a letter from the Darbar. It stated that 'though separate, Sikkim and India shall continue to be in close association . . . that Sikkim and India shall continue the association between their two countries within the framework of the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations'.[443]

Mrs Gandhi refused to consider the Chogyal's alternative for she recognised that any international association would inevitably bring enquiry into India's affairs and pressure into Sikkim. Once again, Kaul was sent up to Gangtok to reason with the ruler and to dissuade him from pressing his claim. He was to be assured that Indian membership of the United Nations meant that she intended to uphold the charter of that august organisation; that the Chogyal could follow Bhutan into a number of United Nations' agencies; that Kazi Lendhup Dorji, the ever-present thorn in the Chogyal's flesh, would be removed from the scene and that limitless foreign exchange awaited him, once he agreed to New Delhi's terms. The Chogyal refused all blandishments, and merely repeated his wish that India should recognise Sikkim's separate existence.

The stalemate that resulted brought an end to all communication between Delhi and Gangtok. Not that India's intent to bring Sikkim into closer political alignment was forgotten. The exercise would, however, need democratic acceptance and some semblance of legality. 'Both imperatives suggested a local accomplice who could be built up as the people's representative and thrust into the limelight as an alternative to the Darbar. Indian intelligence had not wasted its time; New Delhi had all the information it needed. The obvious candidate was waiting in the wings in Kalimpong'.[444] It was, of course, Kazi Lendhup Dorji. He readily obliged a grateful Indian Government and Kayatyani Shankar Bajpai, the Political Officer, by discrediting the Chogyal personally; thereafter it only needed general unrest in the kingdom to bring down the Namgyal dynasty.

The Kazi struck first at the Chogyal. In an article entitled *Sikkim at the Crossroads* he accused the ruler of absolutism and warned him that 'there can be no king without a people'; he demanded reforms and denounced the Darbar's treatment of its subjects. The Chogyal demanded an apology which the Kazi, at first, refused to give. Bajpai then stepped in and offered to extract an apology from the Kazi but only on condition that the Chogyal withdrew his indictment against the Kazi. The Chogyal agreed, only to find that Lendhup Dorji and his henchman, Nar Bahadur Khatiawara, instigated a series of demonstrations where communal representation was used to fuel disorder amongst the various factions. Police stations were burned down, loyal officials beaten up, the country's few armouries were looted and wireless equipment and petrol was seized. Those who resisted were thrown into prison. The traditional home of the Densapa family at Barmiok, with its

priceless treasures, was razed to the ground. Athing La, the premier Lepcha Kazi of Sikkim, was personally man-handled.[445] Sikkim's National Party threatened to bring down their men from the Bhutiya-Lepcha strongholds of the north to offer resistance to Kazi and Khatiawara's mobs. The Indian Army, which had stood by when the opposition had terrorised the countryside, now, on the orders of Bajpai, threw a barrier across north Sikkim. However, they found that the Chogyal was not prepared to bring himself to sanction what he termed 'a communal holocaust' and refused to give his backing to the Sikkim National Party's suggestion.

The unsettled conditions gave Bajpai an opening to pressurise the Chogyal into agreeing that the General Officer Commanding the 17th Mountain Division should take over in order to bring the situation under control. He then presented draft upon draft to the palace requesting the Chogyal to abide by Indian advice, to seek Delhi's protection both for himself and his family, and to agree to commit the Darbar to carry out extensive political changes. At the same time, the ruler was asked to withdraw all charges against the demonstrators, condone violations of the law, allow an Indian judge to investigate election complaints, and order fresh elections within twelve months rather than permit the Sikkim Council to serve out its full term. Initially, each draft was turned down by the Chogyal. The result was a stepping up of the disturbances; surrounded in his palace, he was left with no alternative but to yield to pressure from the Political Officer. In April 1973, the Chogyal signed Bajpai's various drafts and handed over the administration of Sikkim to the Political Officer.[446]

Bajpai informed reporters that the transfer was temporary and that India 'intended to assist the Darbar also for a long-term solution of other problems, including political ones, in consonance with the spirit of the age'. His first move belied his words for he permitted 'a massive body of potentially turbulent men' to arrive back into Gangtok. Questioned about his motives in inviting the invasion, Bajpai explained that demonstrations were a legitimate form of protest which could not be stopped by force, and anyway he preferred 'persuasion'. 'But the only form of persuasion visible was the hospitality of Indian troops who set up camp for the demonstrators in the Paljor stadium and undertook to provide them with food and water'.[447] Simultaneously, Bajpai ordered the Sikkim Guards into the palace grounds from where they watched helplessly while the town was ransacked. The Sikkim police likewise met the same fate, and were confined to barracks; with every encouragement the unruly mobs were allowed free access right up to the palace gates, there to shout abuse at the Chogyal and the Gyalmo.

The administration having already fallen into Bajpai's hands, Mrs Gandhi sent her Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh, to prepare the way for a merger. His arrival was the cue for Lendhup Dorji, briefed by K S Bajpai, to present a fourteen point demand to the Foreign Secretary. The main points were new citizenship rules, an elected Advisory Council to assist the Indian administrator, eviction of all Tibetans, agrarian reforms, inquiry into the distribution of Indian aid, investigation of police conduct during the disturbances, exonera-

tion of all demonstrators and a demand for the 1950 Treaty to be annulled together with a new treaty of personal friendship between the peoples of India and Sikkim to be negotiated. The presentation of the charter decided Lendhup Dorji and his faction to call off the agitation for the time being. In May 1973, the Chogyal agreed to convene an all-party conference to discuss constitutional changes. And Kewal Singh brought B S Das of the Uttar Pradesh Police to relieve Bajpai of the additional duties imposed by these changes. Das's instructions were to compel the Chogyal to yield to New Delhi's earlier demands and, if he did not accept, to threaten to annex the kingdom.

On 8 May 1973, the Chogyal finally agreed to come to terms with the demands of the Indian Government.[448] The agreement reiterated Sikkim's dependent status and India's responsibility for defence, territorial integrity and foreign relations. It also extended India's supervision into Sikkim's internal affairs. The Chogyal was to agree to instal a fully responsible government with a democratic constitution, to guarantee fundamental rights, to establish the rule of law and an independent judiciary, to give legislative and executive powers to the elected representatives of the people, to introduce a system of elections based on adult suffrage, and to strengthen Indo-Sikkim co-operation. India had gained the right to undertake the administration of the state, and the Chogyal had ceased to be treated as the final power in the land. His authority over the palace and the Sikkim Guards continued to be recognised, but the authority itself was circumscribed in accordance with the constitution India had in mind. The role of the Chogyal, in the administrative complex, remained undefined. In sharp contrast, B S Das became the Chief Executive, Speaker and Chief Minister, presiding over both the Assembly and the Executive Council of Sikkim. Since the Chief Executive took his decisions either on his own cognisance or in consultation with Delhi, and both were hostile to the ruler, the result was to deny the Darbar the right of appeal to a neutral authority.[449]

All that now remained was to merge Sikkim, in the manner of the Princely States of India, into the Indian Dominion. The 1973 Agreement negotiated by Kewal Singh guaranteed Sikkim's separate existence; to remove the guarantee required a fresh agreement and India knew full well that the Chogyal would not be persuaded to merge his kingdom into India. The only alternative would be to discredit the ruler and allow the Chief Executive to plead his unsuitability as head of state. An opportunity to do so occurred in February 1975 when King Birendra of Nepal invited the Chogyal to his coronation. The invitation was sent direct to the palace, the palace promptly informed the Political Officer, by now Bepin Behari Lal,[450] and India gave its permission for the visit to take place. Once in Kathmandu, the storm broke over the Chogyal's head. An audience with King Birendra, a private meeting with Earl Mountbatten and Senator Charles Percy of the United States, and a chance encounter with China's Vice Premier Chen Hsi-Lien, confirmed India in the belief that the Chogyal was in the process of appealing to the United Nations. It was an opportunity not to be missed and India promptly accused the Chogyal of treachery.

Simultaneously, in Gangtok itself, Kazi Lendhup Dorji and the Nepalese faction were mobilised into whipping up public anger against the Chogyal and demanding his removal. As the Chogyal prepared to return to Gangtok an incident occurred at the bridge across the Rungpo river, separating Sikkim from India, which provided B B Lal with an excuse to organise a personal attack on the ruler. The road was blocked by a truck and a jeep, deliberately placed there by members of the Sikkim Youth Congress under the leadership of Ram Chandra Poudyal and Santosh Kumar Rai. Since the Bengal Police were not permitted to cross into the kingdom, Captains Yongda and Chhettri, who were accompanying the Chogyal, climbed out of their jeeps to clear the way. They were promptly attacked by Poudyal and members of his gang brandishing knives and sticks. In the skirmish that ensued Poudyal's arm was slashed. Both he and Lal accused Captain Yongda of inflicting the wound, even though there was every evidence to suggest that the Chogyal's guards were neither carrying knives nor staves. Much was made of the incident by Kazi Lendhup Dorji and the Nepalese contingent, both factions demanding the Chogyal's head and for the Sikkim Guards to be disbanded.[451] Although Lal was not prepared to depose the ruler for the time being, he gave orders for Captain Yongda's arrest. It was a move calculated to strike at the palace: for the Chogyal the net was closing in.

When Yongda's case came to court, Judge Tarachand Hariomal found that there was no case to answer, due to lack of evidence, and instructed the police to release the Captain on bail. The independent decision infuriated B B Lal, but Tarachand Hariomal was someone who believed in the separation of powers. 'It has to be conceded that no nation can prosper or progress without an independent judiciary with the rule of law as a basic and fundamental feature'.[452] Lal had no intention of allowing Hariomal's decision to stand in the way; he claimed that the Judicial Department of the State was part and parcel of his authority and demanded that papers relating to the Yongda case should be passed on to him. The judge objected and said that the practice was to send all papers to the Chogyal as head of state. The Chogyal, in turn, complained to Mrs Gandhi; the only response she gave was that all departments were under the Chief Executive and that the judge would have to submit to him. Having received Delhi's assurance, Lal personally saw to it that Judge Tarachand Hariomal was refused permission to visit the palace and, in fact, was instructed to leave Sikkim.[453]

The judiciary having been muzzled, Lal set in motion, with the help of his friends in the opposition, a further campaign to discredit the Chogyal and his heir. He was accused of stealing nearly Rs 2 million, of exporting priceless antiques out of the kingdom, of trying to raise funds for his retirement in the United States of America and of financing a counter-insurgency in Sikkim. The legacy of John Claude White was not forgotten and Lal drastically reduced the palace budget so that the Chogyal was at his wits end wondering how to raise funds for the education of his children abroad. Nor did Crown Prince Tenzing fare any better. He was accused of attempting to secrete an explosive device into Kazi Lendhup Dorji's house. 'Now we have a direct indication of

your son's intentions which will, if remaining unchecked, most certainly lead to consequences which the Government of India does not desire'.[454] The explosive device turned out to be a felt-tipped pen but the Chief Executive saw no reason to withdraw the accusation. On the contrary, the Chogyal was warned that his son was not to be permitted to use the Sikkim Guards on any visits he chose to pay, whether to the Chief Minister's house or elsewhere.

By now the Chogyal was more or less a prisoner in his palace. Having cornered him, B B Lal was able to despatch many a note to the ruler, each one couched in increasingly intemperate tones, the accusations bearing, the Chogyal protested, no resemblance to the truth. The final act, when it came, was a direct result of Crown Prince Tenzing's last minute attempt to mobilise the Sikkim legislators to act before it was too late and Sikkim, as a separate entity, had ceased to exist. He managed to persuade the Agriculture Minister, Krishna Chandra, to get Kazi Lendhup Dorji and other legislators to write to Mrs Gandhi requesting that the three portfolios of Home, Finance and Establishment, at present in the hands of the Chief Executive, should, in accordance with the Agreement of 8 May 1973, be the responsibility of the Chief Minister, Kazi Lendhup Dorji. That Lal, in the interests of the administration and consonent with the dignity and prestige of the Sikkimese people, should be designated as adviser to the Government of Sikkim and no more. The resolution also asked for the immediate removal of the three Indian officials brought to Sikkim by B S Das, and whose entry into the state had taken place without the consent of the Sikkim authorities. That those officers at present on deputation to the Government of Sikkim should not be allowed further extensions, nor were they to be replaced by other Indian officials. That the High Court Judge and the Central Court Judge should be sent on deputation from the Government of India, and that the present incumbents should be relieved of their duties forthwith. And finally, that the Sikkim Congress welcomed the Chogyal's wish for a dialogue with the Chief Minister, Kazi Lendhup Dorji.[455]

Lal, somewhat as Captain Lloyd had done over the Darjeeling grant, either coerced or bribed one of the legislators but nevertheless managed to secure the document before anyone could sign it. Kazi Lendhup Dorji was threatened with the loss of his job, as were the others. They looked to the Chief Minister for a lead but found that he had readily succumbed to the Chief Executive's threats. The 12 March manifesto was rigorously suppressed and newspapers were led to believe that a party revolt had been successfully crushed. Lal had a field day accusing the Chogyal of complicity in the affair. The Crown Prince's abortive attempt to influence events, to lay his faith in men who had consistently opposed his father and openly collaborated with the Indian Government, merely hastened the end. Three weeks later the Indian Army struck.

All the Sikkim Assembly members were rounded up and made to repudiate the manifesto. The annexation of Sikkim on 9 April brought bloodshed in its wake. It claimed the life of the Chogyal's military aide, Captain Basant Kumar Chhettri. As Khatiawara's mobs whipped up support for Lal's measures,

arson, loot and murder in the outlying townships marked the merger of the kingdom. Organised demonstrations took place outside the palace where the Chogyal and his family were kept under heavy guard. Lal and the Political Officer, Gurbachan Singh, attempted, through various dubious means, to persuade the Chogyal to leave his home. All their wiles did not move him. 'I was born in this house and I will die here', was all the reply they got. As Gurbachan Singh was leaving the palace, the Chogyal turned to him and 'with a sparkle of his old humour, added: And do let the mob in, Your Excellency'.[456] He did, however, warn Lal that since his own Sikkim Guards had been removed by India House orders, the responsibility for palace security rested with the Chief Executive.

Within seventy-two hours of the annexation a referendum was instituted by orders of the Chief Executive. The people were asked to vote for or against a merger with India. The measure, the *Hindustan Times* considered, was of questionable constitutional validity. 'The only justification for all this can be the argument of revolutionary legality. But if the will of the people had to find expression outside and beyond the assembly, there was no need to diminish its sanctity by staging a mock referendum. And this in the India of Gandhi and Nehru'.[457] The Chogyal wrote to Indira Gandhi accusing her appointee, B B Lal, of encouraging an illegal and unconstitutional act. He also accused her government of bringing 'about under force of arms permissive hooliganism against all canons of democratic and constitutional practice'. He pointed to the Indian Election Commission's brief for conducting the referendum, which it was not competent to do particularly since the issue affected Sikkim's status. 'In view of this unconstitutional and undemocratic and illegal action by those who have assumed all powers arbitrarily, particularly the Chief Executive, a civil servant appointee acting as if he were the head of state and the head of government, would request being released from house arrest and immediate meeting with Your Excellency'.[458] Mrs Gandhi, the chief architect of the merger of Sikkim, chose to remain silent.

On 21 April 1975, Yeshwantrao Chavan, India's External Affairs Minister, introduced in the Lok Sabha a Constitution Bill to convert Sikkim into India's twenty-second state. The Bill was hurriedly rushed through and on 26 April 1975 the Association of Sikkim with the Union of India Constitution (38th Amendment) Bill was ratified by the Lok Sabha.[459] Not a voice was raised in the Indian Parliament, no political party questioned the legality of the measure. The curtain had finally come down on the once sovereign kingdom of Sikkim.

Notes

1. *The invasion of Nepal*, John Pemble (Oxford, 1971), pp. 10–12.
2. *Himalayan village. A study of the Lepchas of Sikkim*, Geoffrey Gorer (London, 1967), pp. 235–237.
3. IOR: *H/606*, Home Miscellaneous, pp. 577–603.
4. IOR: *H/515*, pp. 543–47.
5. IOR: *MSS Eur D 497*, Hodgson Collection, Vol 1, pp. 25–51.
6. IOR: *H/118*, 5 Dec 1774, pp. 371–73.
7. *See* pp. 4–5.

8. *An account of an embassy to the court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, Cpt Samuel Turner (London, 1800), pp.xiii–iv.
9. IOR: *H/173*, 3 Feb 1783, pp.695–702.
10. IOR: *H/219*, 16 Mar 1768–2 Mar 1784, pp.325–522.
11. IOR: *H/608*, p.33.
12. *An account of the kingdom of Nepaul*, William Kirkpatrick (London, 1811), pp.339–80; Pemble, *op cit*, pp.67–68.
13. IOR: *H/608*, pp.35–36.
14. *A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries*, Charles Umpherston Aitchison, vol XIV, pt III, no I (Calcutta, 1929), pp.56–57.
15. Fn. no 21, p.142.
16. IOR: *H/395*, pp.402–42.
17. Kirkpatrick, *op cit*, p.372.
18. *The private record of an Indian Governor-Generalship: the correspondence of Sir John Shore . . . with Henry Dundas, 1793–1798*, ed. Holden Furber (Harvard, 1933), 7 Feb 1795, pp.64–65.
19. IOR: *F/4/9*, Boards Collection, No 720, Lumsden to Shore, 22 Jan 1796.
20. Fn. no 38, p.371.
21. *Damodar Panre:* For 20 years after Prithvi Narayan Shah's death, until the coming of age of his grandson in 1795, a Chetri family of noble extraction, called Panre, replaced the monarchy as the authority within the state of Nepal. Damodar Panre, Prime Minister during the Regency, carried on the work of Prithvi Narayan Shah, consolidating and extending the Gurkha empire. He fell from power in 1803, and was executed under the orders of the new Prime Minister, Bhim Sen Thapa.
22. IOR: *H/515*, 30 Jun 1801–22 Mar 1802, pp.293–300 and 30 Jun 1802, pp.289–90.
23. IOR: *F/4/162*, no 2804, Knox's instruction, 31 Oct 1801.
24. *Ibid*, Bengal Secret Consultation, 30 Jun 1802.
25. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV pt III, p.45.
26. *Sal:* Shorea robusta, a tree yielding timber and dammar resin.
27. *Moffusil:* interior or up-country district.
28. *Zamindar:* landholder who pays revenue directly to government rather than to an immediate superior.
29. IOR: *F/4/403*, no 10124, Mar 1812–Feb 1914.
30. Pemble, *op cit*, pp.46–47.
31. *Thanas:* police outposts or stations.
32. Fn. no 40, p.371.
33. IOR: *H/646*, pp.747–63, Report by Dr Buchanan.
34. *Summary of the administration of the Indian Government*, Marquess of Hastings (Edinburgh, 1825), p.13.
35. For events leading up to the Gurkha War, *see Nepal and the East India Company*, B D Sanwal (London, 1965), pp.115–43; *The land of the Gurkhas*, William Brook Northey (Cambridge, 1937), pp.51–62; *History of the political and military transactions of British India*, Henry Thoby Prinsep (London, 1820); Pemble, *op cit*, pp.30–53.
36. IOR: *V/27/230/30 Papers respecting the Nepaul War* (London, East India Company, 1824), Moorcroft's memorandum, 15 Sep 1814, pp.85–86.
37. *Coss:* Kos equivalent to 2½ miles.
38. *Papers respecting the Nepaul War, op cit*, Draft petition to the Emperor of China by the Rajah of Nepaul, enclosed in Lord Moira's letter, 22 May 1815, pp.556–57.
39. *Ibid*, Buchanan to Adam, 9 Aug 1814, p.45.
40. *Ibid*, Report on Siccim by Dr Buchanan, enc no 3 in Bengal Secret Letter no 66, 27 Dec 1814, pp.267–69.
41. *Nepaul and China*, E H Parker, The imperial and Asiatic quarterly review, vol VII, nos 13 and 14 (Jan-Apr 1899), pp.64–82.
42. *Papers respecting the Nepaul War, op cit*, Adam to Scott, 2 Nov 1814, p.266.
43. *Ibid*, Latter to Adam, 4 Jan 1815, includes translation of the Raja of Sikkim's letter, pp.390–93.
44. *Ibid*, Secret Letter from Lord Moira, 2 Aug 1815, p.721. 'Before Mr Scott was enabled to act on my instruction, the management of the negociation, thus accidentally begun with him [Latter], was transferred to that officer, as will be more particularly stated in the sequel'.

45. *Ibid*, p.722.
46. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, pt III, no 3, pp.62–64.
47. *Papers respecting the Nepaul War, op cit*, Adam to Bradshaw, 5 Jun 1815, pp.783–84.
48. *Ibid*, p.785. 'The fort of Naggree was closely blockaded by the troops of the Rajah of Siccim . . . The supposed value of it consists in its importance in securing a good frontier to the Rajah of Siccim . . . On this account, also, the cession of the pass of Naggarcote, and the country between that pass and Naggree, is desired by the Governor General'.
49. IOR: *F/4/552*, no 13,383, Gardner to Adam, 19, 27–28 Aug 1816.
50. *Ibid*, Adam to Gardner, 14 Sep 1816.
51. *Ibid*, Moira to Amherst, 14 Sep 1816.
52. *Papers respecting the Nepaul War, op cit*, Lord Moira to Chairman, East India Company, 6 Aug 1816, p.996.
53. *Ibid*, Adam to Latter, 13 Jan 1816, pp.926–28.
54. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II, no 1 (Calcutta, 1931), pp.58–59.
55. Prinsep, *op cit*, vol I, p.207.
56. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II, no 1, p.58.
57. *The private journals of the Marquess of Hastings*, ed. Marchioness of Bute (London, 1925), vol II, p.146.
58. IOR: *F/4/685*, no 18893, Raja assigned a portion of the lowlands acquired under the Treaty of Segauli, Apr 1817.
59. *Sanad:* a royal ordinance or mandate.
60. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II, no 1 (Calcutta, 1931), p.60.
61. IOR: *L/P&S/6/2*, Political Letter from India, no 202, 8 May 1829, p.985.
62. *Ibid*, no 14, 31 Dec 1832, p.1348.
63. *Ibid*, no 3, 4 Mar 1835, p.1150.
64. *Dorje-ling*, Henry Vincent Bayley (Calcutta, 1838), pp.3–4.
65. IOR: *L/P&S/6/2*, Political Letter from India, no 17, 9 Oct 1830, pp.1070–71.
66. *Ibid*, no 33, 28 Sep 1835, p.1726.
67. *Ibid*, no 14, 6 Apr 1835, p.1610.
68. Bayley, *op cit*, p.4; *Darjeeling, past and present*, E C Dozey (Darjeeling, 1917), p.2.
69. IOR: *L/P&S/6/2*, Political Letter from India, no 29, 13 Jul 1835, p.1680. Debgaon had been part of Sikkim territory before it was wrested from her by Nepal. By the Treaty of Segauli in 1816, it was ceded to the Company, who, in turn, ceded it to the Raja of Jalpaiguri in 1828.
70. *Gazetteer of the Darjeeling district*, Lewis Sidney Steward O'Malley (Calcutta, 1907), p.20.
71. Kummo Pradhan had been the agent of the Sikkim Darbar in the Morung. He had been appointed to the post on the recommendation of David Scott, Magistrate of Rangpur. Having embezzled the Morung revenue he took refuge in British territory from where he continued to instigate the Lepchas and their headmen to defy the Raja.
72. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, History of Sikkim*, compiled by Their Highnesses the Maharaja Thutob Namgyal and Maharani Yeshés Dolma of Sikkim, 1908 (typescript), pp.116–19.
73. IOR: *F/4/1612* no 64,812, Feb 1836 and *F/4/1728* no 69,861.
74. IOR: *L/P&S/6/3*, Political Letter from India, no 8, 29 Feb 1836, p.1801. There is no clear indication how the deed managed to fall into Lloyd's hands. It is merely surmise to suggest that the Sikkim officials were either coerced or bribed by Lloyd.
75. *Vakil:* agent or lawyer.
76. *Ibid*, no 5, 15 Feb 1836, p.1782.
77. *Ibid*, no 39, 13 Jul 1835, p.1680.
78. IOR: *L/P&S/6/4*, Political Letter from India, no 63, 21 Aug 1839, pp.69–70.
79. IOR: *L/P&S/6/3*, Political Letter from India, no 11, 10 Jul 1834, p.1517.
80. *Ibid*, 8 Feb 1836. The presents consisted of a double barrelled gun, one rifle, 20 yards of broad cloth, two shawls. This, for the time being, was the sum total of the compensation given for the transfer of Darjeeling.
81. Bayley, *op cit*, pp.53–54.
82. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p.123.
83. *Ibid*, pp.124–25. 'The next day being the 14th and full moon day, the Maharaja performed the periodical puja [prayers] of Kuvera . . . the Paro Penlop sent his Zimpon Paljor with his Garpon and a large party of his armed retainers to take the Jong by force, and to kill the Maharaja and his party'.
84. O'Malley, *op cit*, p.23.

85. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp. 126–27.
86. Dozey, *op cit*, p. 3. Campbell was a member of the Indian Medical Service and had been Assistant Resident in Nepal. He was to hold the post of Superintendent of Darjeeling for twenty-two years.
87. IOR: *L/P&S/6/4*, Political Letter from India, no. 39, 5 Jun 1840, pp. 148–49.
88. IOR: *P/127/42*, Bengal Political Letter, no 101, 2 Mar 1840.
89. *Ibid*, no 71, 22 Dec 1831, p. 356.
90. IOR: *P/127/44*, Bengal Political Letter, no 101, 9 Sep 1841.
91. IOR: *L/P&S/6/4*, Political Letter from India, no 17, 18 Apr 1842, p. 385.
92. *Ibid*, no 25, 7 Sep 1846, pp. 706–07.
93. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p. 129. 'It having become a great market the slaves and menial classes from Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal all took refuge there. The Sikkim people . . . used to pursue their slaves and kidnap them back from Darjeeling, and criminals from Darjeeling sought refuge in Sikkim. These things soon brought about ill feeling. The Sikkim Darbar wrote several times to Doctor Campbell and tried to obtain the extradition of the runaway slaves from Darjeeling, but he would not listen to this proposal'.
94. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*, Foreign Letter from India, no 9, 7 Feb 1848, p. 796.
95. *Journal of a trip to Sikim in December 1848*, Archibald Campbell, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol xviii, pt 1 (Jan-Jun 1849), p. 483.
96. *Sikkim: a short political history*, Lal Bahadur Basnet (New Delhi, 1974), p. 37.
97. Campbell, *op cit*, p. 502.
98. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p. 129.
99. *Himalayan journals*, Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker, 2 vols (London, 1834), vol ii, p. 5. Hooker and Campbell thought of the Chebu Lama not only as their friend but '. . . as the only man of intelligence about the Rajah's court, and the one whose services as vakeel were particularly wanted at Darjeeling'. Referred to in the *History of Sikkim* as Tseepa Aden or Cheeba Lama; Hooker speaks of him as Tchebu Lama.
100. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p. 131.
101. Fn. no 87, p. 373.
102. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*. Foreign Letter from India, no 9, 7 Feb 1848, p. 796.
103. Campbell, *op cit*, p. 484.
104. *Ibid*, pp. 495–96.
105. Campbell, *op cit*, p. 521.
106. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*. Foreign Letter from Bengal, no 3, 6 Mar 1849, p. 895.
107. Hooker, *op cit*, p. 147.
108. *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*, Alastair Lamb (London, 1960), p. 94.
109. IOR: *F/4/2484*, no 139,963, Campbell's diary for 25 Sep 1849.
110. Hooker, *op cit*, vol ii, p. 223.
111. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*, Foreign Letter from India, no 33, 9 Jul 1849, p. 932.
112. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p. 132.
113. IOR: *L/MIL/17/13/16*, Frontier and overseas expeditions from India (Simla, 1907), vol IV, pp. 128–29.
114. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*, Political Letter from India, no 28, 30 Jul 1851.
115. Hooker, *op cit*, p. 241.
116. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*. Political Letter from India, no 10, 7 Mar 1851, p. 1028.
117. *Ibid*, no 23, 7 Aug 1851, p. 1073.
118. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p. 133.
119. IOR: *L/P&S/6/5*, Foreign Letter from India, no 56, 31 Jul 1853, p. 1227.
120. *The gazetteer of Sikkim*, Sir Herbert Hope Risley (Calcutta 1894), p. iv.
121. *Despatches relating to the Sikkim Expedition*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1862, xl, 214, Campbell to Seton-Karr, 20 Dec 1860, pp. 7–8.
122. IOR: *L/MIL/17/13/16*, Frontier and overseas expeditions, vol iv, pp. 40–41.
123. *Papers relating to Sikkim, op cit*, Campbell to Seton-Karr, 2 Feb 1861, pp. 16–18.
124. *Ibid*, Wood to Canning, 23 Mar 1861, p. 3.
125. *Ibid*, Young to Eden, 28 Dec 1860, pp. 4–7.
126. *Ibid*, Eden to Seton-Karr, 22 Jan 1861, p. 11.
127. *Ibid*, Eden to Sikkimputtee Rajah, 25 Jan 1861, p. 13.
128. *Ibid*, Eden to Seton-Karr, 17 Feb 1861, p. 26.
129. *Ibid*, Eden to Seton-Karr, 28 Feb 1861, p. 33. 'The Namguay Dewan has also written to them privately, requesting them to use their influence with me to obtain a commutation of the order for his apprehension to the payment of a

heavy fine. The reply which he will receive will, I trust, have the desired effect of driving him altogether away from the Raja'.
130. *Ibid*, Eden to Seton-Karr, 7 Feb 1861, p.20.
131. *Ibid*, Campbell to Fitzgerald, 12 Feb 1861, p.23.
132. *Ibid*, Eden to Seton-Karr, 12 Feb 1861, p.22.
133. *Ibid*, Eden to Bengal, 17 Feb 1861, p.27. Campbell claimed Rs 10,836 as compensation.
134. *Ibid*, Eden to Bengal, 26 Feb 1861, p.32.
135. *Ibid*, Eden to Bengal, 14 Mar 1861, pp.37–38.
136. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II, no 3, (Calcutta, 1931), pp.61–65.
137. *Ibid*, Eden to Bengal, 29 Mar 1861, p.40.
138. *Ibid*, Eden to Bengal, 8 Apr 1861, pp.47–52.
139. *Ibid*, Wood to Canning, 16 Jul 1861, p.55.
140. IOR: *L/P&S/6/456*, Political Letter from India, no 53, 16 Jun 1862, pp.494–95.
141. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II (Calcutta, 1931), p.53.
142. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78*, *op cit*, pp.134–35.
143. O'Malley, *op cit*, p.28.
144. Lamb, *op cit*, pp.114–15.
145. Treaty of Tientsin, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1858, lxvi, C 2755, p.285.
146. PRO: *FO 228/299*, Bruce to India, 13 Jul 1861.
147. Lamb, *op cit*, pp.116–17. Smyth concluded 'that with the proper passports he could have gone where he liked in Tibet, even to Lhasa. Smyth, in fact, had put his finger on a vicious circle of diplomacy which was destined to vex the Indian Government until 1886, when certain fallacies were revealed'.
148. *The Mishmi hills*, Thomas Thorneville Cooper (London, 1873).
149. IOR: *L/P&S/6/569*, vol 111, no 33, Eden to India, 15 Nov 1869.
150. IOR: *L/P&S/6/575*, vol 117, no 48, Eden to India, 19 Jan 1870.
151. IOR: *L/P&S/6/457*, Political Letter from India, no 92, 19 Jan 1970.
152. PRO: *FO 228/497*, India to Peking, 20 Sep 1970.
153. PRO: *FO 228/497*, Wade to India, 10 Nov 1870. The Amban 'is always a Manchu or Mongol, never a Chinese, and is nowadays certainly a needy man to whom a sum of money in our eyes of no great amount would be an important consideration. All that he receives from his own government is the pay of his proper office, probably from £500 to £1,000 a year, which in these times he most probably does not draw'.
154. PRO: *FO 17/603*, IO to FO, 30 Nov 1871.
155. IOR: *L/P&S/6/451*, Political Despatch to India, vol 14, nos 8147 and 47, 6 Dec 1871 and 27 Apr 1871.
156. George Douglas Campbell, 8th Duke of Argyll (1823–1900); Secretary of State for India, 1868–74.
157. *Account of a visit to the eastern and northern frontiers of independent Sikkim*, William Thomas Blanford, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol XL pt II, pp.367–415.
158. IOR: *L/P&S/5/265*, vol 7, Lawrence to India, 10 Sep 1870, p.659.
159. IOR: *L/P&S/5/273*, vol 15, Secret Letter from India, Jun-Sep 1873.
160. *Ibid*, Edgar to Bengal, 13 and 16 Aug 1973.
161. *Report on a visit to Sikhim and the Thibetan frontier*, John Ware Edgar (Calcutta, 1874), p.9.
162. *Ibid*, pp.15–19.
163. *Tsungli Yamen:* Office in General Charge of Affairs concerning all Foreign Nations. This office continued to handle Chinese Foreign Affairs until replaced by the Wai-wu-pu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1901.
164. Edgar, *op cit*, pp.85–91.
165. IOR: *L/P&S/7/1*, Political Letter from India, no 3165, 24 Aug 1874, pp.4–5.
166. *Ibid*, no 238P in enc no 5, 25 Jan 1875.
167. Lamb, *op cit*, pp.140–41.
168. IOR: *L/P&S/7/2*, Political Letter from India, no 28, Feb 1875.
169. *Chefoo Convention*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1876, lxxii, C 4735, pp.67–75.

170. IOR: *L/P&S/3/207*, vol 20, Political Home Correspondence, Wade to Derby, 14 Jul 1877, p. 171.
171. O'Malley, *op cit*, p. 130.
172. IOR: *L/P&S/6/457*, Political Letter to India, no 150, 15 Jul 1869, p. 1610.
173. Risley, *op cit*, p. vi.
174. IOR: *MSS Eur 78*, *op cit*, p. 144.
175. *Ibid*, p. 150.
176. *Narrative of a journey to Lhasa in 1881–1882*, Sarat Chandra Das (Calcutta, 1885), pp. 78–84. *See also Journey to Lhasa*, Sarat Chandra Das, ed. William Woodville Rockhill (London, 1904).
177. Lamb, *op cit*, pp. 153–54, for causes leading up to the dispute.
178. PRO: *FO 17/968*, IO to FO, 11 Jan 1884; and *FO 17/986*, O'Conor to Viceroy, 24 Nov 1885.
179. IOR: *L/P&S/7/44*, Secret Letter from India, no 101, 19 Jun 1885, p. 827.
180. IOR: *L/P&S/20/D129*, Report on a mission to Sikkim and the Tibetan frontier, Colman Macaulay (Calcutta, 1885), p. 74.
181. *Ibid*, pp. 57–73.
182. *Ibid*, p. 10.
183. *Ibid*, pp. 11–12.
184. *Ibid*, p. 14.
185. *Ibid*, p. 98.
186. *Ibid*, p. 104. The Maharaja had agreed to the improvement of the road only on the understanding that it would result in an increase in his allowance.
187. IOR: *L/P&S/3/256*, vol 69, Dufferin to Kimberley, 14 Jun 1885.
188. IOR: *L/P&S/3/262*, vol 75, O'Conor to Dufferin, 2 May 1885.
189. IOR: *L/P&S/3/263*. vol 76, IO memo, 1 Dec 1884.
190. Lord Randolph Henry Spencer Churchill (1849–94), Secretary of State for India, Jan 1885-Feb 1886.
191. PRO: *FO 17/1002*, Memo by Macaulay, 16 Jul 1885.
192. IOR: *L/P&S/3/262*, vol 75, Memo by Sir Owen Tudor Burne, 22 Jul 1885.
193. IOR: *L/P&S/3/264*, vol 77, Macaulay to Burne, 21 Aug 1885.
194. PRO: *FO 228/813*, Durand to O'Conor, 24 Aug 1885.
195. IOR: *L/P&S/3/266*, vol 79, Macaulay to Burne, 13 Oct 1885.
196. PRO: *FO 17/985*, no 433, O'Conor to Viceroy, 29 Oct 1885.
197. PRO: *FO 17/986*, O'Conor to Viceroy, 30 Nov 1885.
198. *Indian pandits in the land of snows*, Sarat Chandras Das (Calcutta, 1893), pp. vii-viii.
199. PRO: *FO 17/1062*, IO to FO, 24 Apr 1886.
200. PRO: *FO 17/1063*, no 178, Minute by O'Conor, 31 May 1886.
201. *Ibid*, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 Jun 1886.
202. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt IV, no 8 (Calcutta, 1931), pp. 244–52.
203. IOR: *L/P&S/7/48*, Foreign Letter from India, no 180, 11 Oct 1886.
204. *Ibid*, Minute by IO, 11 Oct 1886.
205. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78*, *op cit*, pp. 165–67.
206. *Sikkim and Bhutan*, John Claude White (London, 1909), p. 24.
207. Risley, *op cit*, p. viii.
208. PRO: *FO 17/1054*, India Foreign Letter, no 15, 1 Feb 1887.
209. PRO: *FO 17/1056*, India Foreign Letter, no 73, 3 Jun 1887.
210. IOR: *L/P&S/7/50*, Political and Secret Letter from India, no 252, 24 May 1887.
211. *India and Sikkim*, Pucha Ragunadha Rao (Delhi, 1972), p. 88.
212. IOR: *L/P&S/7/52*, Secret Letter from India, no 1, 24 Sep 1887.
213. Lamb, *op cit*, p. 182.
214. PRO: *FO 17/1054*, Gerald Balfour and R Lethbridge in the House of Commons, 7 Mar 1887 and 2 May 1887.
215. PRO: *FO 17/1043*, Dufferin to Walsham, 7 Oct 1887.
216. PRO: *FO 17/1043*, Minute by Walsham, no 77, 12 Nov 1887.
217. PRO: *FO 17/1043*, Yamen to Walsham, 17 Oct 1887.
218. *Ibid*, Dufferin to Walsham, 29 Oct 1887e.
219. PRO: *FO 17/1108*, Memo by Sir Halliday Macartney, 12 May 1888.
220. PRO: *FO 17/1056*, Goshen to Currie, 8 Dec 1887.
221. IOR: *L/P&S/7/52*, Secret Letter from India, no 188C, 10 Feb 1888.
222. PRO: *FO 17/1108*, India Foreign Letter, no 128, 21 Jul 1888.
223. *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, Charles Bell (London, 1846), p. 46.

224. IOR: *L/MIL/7/14639*, Field Operations, no 70, 30 Apr 1888.
225. IOR: *L/MIL/7/9620*, Field Operations, no 218, 2 Nov 1888.
226. IOR: *L/MIL/7/14640*, Viceroy to Secretary of State, no 50, 27 Sep 1888.
227. IOR: *L/MIL/17/13/16, op cit*, p.61.
228. *The 3rd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in the Sikkim expedition of 1888*, Captain Herbert Augustus Iggulden (London, 1900), p.92.
229. Lamb, *op cit*, p.187.
230. PRO: *FO 17/1109*, India Foreign Letter, no 3, 8 Jan 1889.
231. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/2*, Lansdowne Collection, Lansdowne to Cross, 8 Jan 1889.
232. PRO: *FO 17/1109*, Memo by Durand, 1 Jan 1889.
233. IOR: *L/P&S/7/56*, Political and Secret Letter from India, no 28, 12 Feb 1889.
234. *Ibid.*
235. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/2*, Lansdowne to Cross, 15 Jan 1889.
236. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/2*, Lansdowne to Cross, 13 Mar 1889.
237. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/38*, Cross to Lansdowne, 29 Apr 1889.
238. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/2*, Lansdowne to Cross, 28 Jun 1889.
239. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/38*, Cross to Lansdowne, 6 Jun 1889.
240. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/2*, Lansdowne to Cross, 23 Aug 1889.
241. PRO: *FO 17/1109*, Telegram from Walsham, no 28, 9 Nov 1889.
242. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/2*. Lansdowne to Cross, 10 Dec 1889.
243. *Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1894, xcvi, C 6208, p.151.
244. IOR: *L/P&S/7/57*, Political and Secret Letter from India, no 111, 21 May 1889.
245. PRO: *FO 17/1168*, India Foreign Letter, no 134, 4 Jul 1893 in 10 Aug 1893.
246. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/21*, Hart to Lansdowne, 21 Sep 1891.
247. Lamb, *op cit*, pp.198–200.
248. O'Malley. *op cit*, p.36.
249. PRO: *FO 17/1168*, India Foreign Letter, no 134, 4 July 1893.
250. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt II, no 5 (Calcutta, 1931), pp.67–69.
251. *Papers relting to Tibet*, Parlimentary Papers (HoC), 1904, lxvii, Cd 1920, nos 8–10, 2 Nov 1892–11 Aug 1893, pp.8–20.
252. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, enc annexure 1 and 2 in no 12, 21 Feb 1894, pp.20–23.
253. PRO: *FO 17/1168*, India Foreign Letter, no 134, IO to Fo, 10 Aug 1893.
254. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/21*, Lansdowne to Hart, 6 Oct 1891.
255. White, *op cit*, p.26.
256. *Ibid*, p.27.
257. *Sikkim: a concise chronicle*, Sikkim Government (Gangtok, 1963), pp.15–16.
258. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp.203–04.
259. *Ibid*, pp.210–11.
260. IOR: *L/P&S/7/67*, Political and Secret Letter from India, nos 241–45, Jul 1892.
261. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p.213.
262. *Ibid*, pp.214–15.
263. *Ibid*, p.216.
264. *Ibid*, p.219.
265. *Ibid*, pp.220–21.
266. *Ibid*, p.222.
267. *Ibid*, p.225.
268. *Ibid*, p.228.
269. *Ibid*, p.229.
270. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/22*, Elliott to Lansdowne, 22 Apr 1892.
271. *Ibid*, pp.230–31.
272. IOR: *MSS Eur D 558/22*, Elliott to Lansdowne, 7 Jun 1892.
273. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p.229.
274. IOR: *P/5724*, India Foreign Proceeding, no 105, quoted in a letter from Bengal to India, 16 Jan 1899, p.65.
275. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp.234–35.
276. IOR: *P/4816*, India Foreign Proceeding, no 462, 2 Aug 1895.
277. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78*, op cit, p.240.
278. *Raiyats:* dependents, subjects.
279. IOR: *P/5724*, India Foreign Proceeding, no 94, 6 Jul 1899, p.99.
280. IOR: *P/2784*, India Foreign Proceeding, no 69, October 1896.
281. Curzon, George Nathaniel (1859–1925), created 1st Marquess 1921; Viceroy of India 1899–1905. Bruce, Victor Alexander, 9th Earl of Elgin (1849–1917), Viceroy of India 1894–99.
282. Lamb, *op cit*, p.219.

283. IOR: *P/5724*, India Foreign Proceeding, no 106, 21 Feb 1899, p.45.
284. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp.256–57.
285. *Papers relating to Tibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1904, lxvii, Cd 1920, annexure 2 in no 13, White to Nolan, 9 Jun 1894, pp.28–30.
286. *Ibid*, enc 1 in no 13, Bengal to India, 25 Jun 1894, pp.26–27.
287. *Ibid*, enc 2 in no 13, India to Bengal, 9 Aug 1894, p.31.
288. *Ibid*, annexure, Viceroy to Amban, 9 Aug 1894, p.32.
289. *Ibid*, annexure 2 in no 13, White to Nolan, 19 May 1895, p.38.
290. *Ibid*, annexure 4 in no 13, White to Amban, 19 May 1895, p.38.
291. *Ibid*, enc 8 in no 13, Bengal to India, 20 May 1895, p.36.
292. *Ibid*, enc 10 in no 13, India to Bengal, 30 May 1895, p.39.
293. *Ibid*, annexure 2 in no 14, White to Nolan, 6 Jul 1895, pp.45–46.
294. *Ibid*, annexure in no 18, Nolan to Bengal, 24 Nov 1895, pp.57–58.
295. *Ibid*, no 16, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 Feb 1896, p.52.
296. *Ibid*, enc 4 in no 18, Viceroy to Amban, 4 May 1896, pp.59–60.
297. *Ibid*, annexure 3 in no 26, Amban to Viceroy, 11 Mar 1898, pp.76–77.
298. *Ibid*, Amban to Viceroy, 11 Aug 1898, pp.78–79.
299. *Ibid*, annexure in no 26, Curzon to Amban, 25 Mar 1899, p.99.
300. *Tibet, past and present*, Sir Charles Bell (Oxford, 1924), pp.73–81.
301. Lamb, *op cit*, p.238.
302. *The life of Lord Curzon*, Earl of Ronaldshay, 3 vols (London, 1927), vii, p.275.
303. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/1*, vol XIII, Hamilton Collection, Curzon to Hamilton, 23 Mar 1899.
304. *Ibid*, 24 May 1899.
305. *Kashag:* Tibetan Council.
306. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp.257–59.
307. *Ibid*, p.260.
308. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 29, Curzon to Hamilton, 26 Oct 1899, pp.102–03.
309. *Ibid*, annexure in no 37, Extract of a letter from White, 1 Dec 1899, p.119.
310. *Ibid*, annexure in no 37, White to Marindin, 20 Mar 1900, p.120.
311. *Ibid*, no 37, India to Hamilton, 25 Jul 1901, p.118.
312. *Ibid*, enc 3 in no 37, Cunningham to Talbot, 25 Jul 1900, p.120.
313. *Ibid*, annexure in no 37, Curzon to the Dalai Lama, 11 Aug 1900, pp.120–21.
314. *Ibid*, enc 4 in no 37, India to Bengal, 8 Jun 1901, p.121.
315. *Ibid.*
316. *Ibid*, annexure in no 37, Curzon to the Dalai Lama, 8 Jun 1901, pp.121–22.
317. *Ibid*, enc 3 in no 44, Bengal to India, 31 Oct 1901, pp.129–130.
318. *Ibid*, no 44, Curzon to Hamilton, 13 Feb 1902, pp.125–27.
319. *Ibid*, enc 4 in no 47, India to Bengal, 21 May 1902, p.137.
320. *Ibid*, enc 2 in no 47, Bengal to India, 23 Apr 1902, p.136.
321. *Ibid*, annexure 1 in no 66, White's report on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, 15 Aug 1902, pp.167–70.
322. *Ibid*, annexure in no 66, White to Marindin, 11 Jul 1902, p.158.
323. *Ibid*, enc 10 in no 66, India to Bengal, 29 Aug 1902, p.162.
324. *Ibid*, annexure 2 in no 66, Marindin to Bengal, 23 Aug 1902, pp.164–65.
325. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp.261–62.
326. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/1*, Hamilton Collection, Hamilton to Curzon, 8 Jun 1899.
327. IOR: *MSS Eur D 508*, Hamilton Collection, Hamilton to Curzon, 18 Apr 1899.
328. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 58, Lansdowne to Hardinge, 22 Oct 1902, p.146.
329. IOR: *L/P&S/18/B 138*, Note on Tibet, Sir William Lee-Warner, 5 Sep 1902.
330. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/12*, Curzon to Hamilton, 1 Jan 1903.
331. PRO: *FO 17/1745*, India Foreign Letter, 8 Jan 1903. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 66, Curzon to Hamilton, 8 Jan 1903, pp.150–56. Many of the enclosures with the despatch have been omitted from this extract, but are included in *FO 17/1745*.
332. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/12*, Curzon to Hamilton, 13 Nov 1902.
333. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/5*, Hamilton to Curzon, 13 Feb 1903.
334. *Ibid.* Hamilton to Curzon, 28 Jan 1903.
335. *Ibid*, Hamilton to Curzon, 20 Feb 1903.

336. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 83, Lansdowne to Scott, 8 Apr 1903, p.187; no 73, Lansdowne to Scott, 18 Feb 1903, pp.181–82; no 72, Lansdowne to Scott, 11 Feb 1903, p.180.
337. IOR: *MSS Eur C 126/5*, Hamilton to Curzon, 28 May 1903.
338. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, annexure in no 99, Amban Yu to Curzon, 6 Apr 1903, p.196.
339. *Ibid*, no 86, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 Apr 1903, p.189. *Khambajong:* referred to in this study as Khamba Dzong.
340. *Papers relating to Tibet, op cit*, no 89, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 May 1903, p.190.
341. *Ibid*, no 95, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 28 May 1903, p.193.
342. *Ibid*, no 89, Curzon to Hamilton, 7 May 1903, p.190.
343. IOR: *MSS Eur E 233/37*, Ampthill Collection, Curzon to Ampthill, 19 Jul 1904.
344. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, pt II, no 1, pp.22–25.
345. IOR: *P/7392*, India Foreign Proceeding, no 3, Aug 1905.
346. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p.260.
347. *Gaddi:* throne or sovereign power.
348. *Ibid*, p.261.
349. *Ibid*, pp.262–65.
350. *Ibid*, p.266.
351. *Ibid*, p.291.
352. *Ibid*, pp.268–69.
353. Aitchison, op cit, vol XII, pt II, p.56.
354. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part VI, 1905, White to India, 30 Dec 1904, p.20. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8688 (Apr 1906).
355. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, pp.274–76. 'Mr White too tried his best to impress Their Highnesses with the sense of obligation they were under to the government for having been granted the chance of seeing such sights . . . upon Their Highnesses getting back they would have to exercise their own powers and do everything themselves, and that he would render such help as they would stand in need of'.
356. Quoted in Rao, *op cit*, p.121.
357. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78, op cit*, p.276.
358. IOR: *L/P&S/10/92*, no 1485a, Sidkeong Namgyal to White, 23 Aug 1905.
359. *Ibid*, White to India, 20 Mar 1906.
360. *Ibid*, no 1676, Holland to White, 31 May 1906.
361. *Ibid*, enc 3 in no 1712, Maharaja of Sikkim to White, 6 Jul 1906.
362. *Ibid*, no 1712, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 Sep 1906.
363. *Ibid*, no 379, Dane to Ritchie, 7 Feb 1907.
364. *Ibid*, no 411, Sidkeong Namgyal to Wyllie, 19 Jan 1908.
365. *Ibid*, no 3378, Sidkeong Namgyal to Morley, 4 Jul 1908.
366. *Ibid*, no 2945, Jordan to Grey, 2 Dec 1908.
367. *Ibid*, Memorandum of an interview between the Dalai Lama and the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, 25 Nov 1908.
368. *Ibid*, no 2826, Extract from private letter, O'Connor to Ritchie, 1 Dec 1908.
369. *Marwaris:* Properly a man of the Marwar of Jodhpur in Rajasthan: used in India as synonymous with *Banya* or trader and money-lender.
369a. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt IV, no VIII, pp.244–52.
370. *Ibid*, no 1289, Administration report of the Sikkim State, 1908–09 (Calcutta, 1909), pp.1–3. Charles Bell reports that the Maharaja and the leading Kazis and lamas were writing a *History of Sikkim* which Kazi Dawasamdup, Head Master of the Bhutia School in Darjeeling, was translating into English. As we have seen in this study, it is one of the main sources for the Sikkim Darbar's interpretation of events.
371. IOR: *MSS Eur F 197/145*, Younghusband Collection, Younghusband to his father, 19 Jul 1903, p.21.
372. IOR: *L/P&S/10/92*, no 2030, Bell to India, 5 Oct 1908.
373. *Ibid*, no 2584, Burma to India, 21 May 1913.
374. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, no 474, Minto to Morley, 21 Feb 1907.
375. *Ibid*, Morley to Minto, 3 May 1907.

376. IOR: *L/P&S/10/223*, no 3427, Max Müller to Prince Ch'ing, 11 Apr 1901.
377. *Ibid*, Prince Ch'ing to Max Müller, 18 Apr 1910.
378. *Ibid*, no 4294, Note from Wai-wu-pu, 28 Oct 1910.
379. *Ibid*, no 3296, Jordan to Prince Ch'ing, 17 Jan 1911.
380. *Ibid*, no 15160, Prince Ch'ing to Jordan, 31 Mar 1911.
381. *Ibid*, no 3488, Grey to Jordan, 8 May 1911.
382. IOR: *L/P&S/11/72*, P 529, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 Feb 1914.
383. *Ibid*, P 747, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 Feb 1914.
384. *Ibid*, P 4765, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 Dec 1914.
385. *Sikkim, a short political history*, Lal Bahadur Basnet, p.64. Basnet says that the Maharaja's reforming ideas had displeased not only the feudal landlords but also Charles Bell. He was reputed not to have got on with Bell. 'His death was as much a relief to the Political Officer as it was to the Kazis and monks'.
386. IOR: *L/P&S/11/72*, P 3086, Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 15 Jun 1917.
387. *Ibid*, P 529, Montagu to Chelmsford, 7 Sep 1917.
388. *Zamindari*: landholding system on the basis of paying revenue to the government direct and not to any immediate superior.
389. *Sikkim and Bhutan*, Vincent Herbert Coelho (Delhi, 1972), pp.24–25.
390. *Jagir*: literally place-holding. A hereditary assignment of land and of its rent as annuity.
391. *India's constitution in the making*, Sir Benegal Rau (London, 1964), p.396.
392. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4183*, PZ 1903, Williamson to Caroe, 6 Feb 1935.
393. *Ibid*, PZ 5000, Williamson to Caroe, 13 Jun 1935, with translation of written document.
394. IOR: *L/P&S/13/1499*, IO minutes, 20–24 Oct 1945.
395. IOR: *L/P&S/5/357*, Memorandum on states' treaties and paramountcy presented by the Cabinet Mission, 12 May 1946, pp.279–80.
396. IOR: *L/P&S/13/1449*, P 1041, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal to Pethick-Lawrence, 10 May 1946.
397. *Ibid*, Cabinet Delegation to Maharaja Tashi Namgyal, 26 May 1946.
398. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2222*, DO 21/2-P, Hopkinson to Crichton, 6 Jun 1946.
399. *Ibid*, Minute by Donaldson, 8 Aug 1946.
400. *Ibid*, Minute by Patrick, 10 Aug 1946.
401. IOR: *L/P&S/13/1449*, P 1253, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal to Mountbatten, 1 Aug 1947.
402. *Ibid*, Memorandum of the Government of Sikkim in respect of Darjeeling, 1 Aug 1947.
403. *Ibid*, Minute by IO, 21 Aug 1947.
404. Cited in Coelho, *op cit*, pp.25–26.
405. Rai Bahadur Tashi Dahdul Densapa of Barmiok is the premier Lepcha Kazi in Sikkim. His honorific of Athing-la gives him precedence over all other noblemen in the State. He is also chief of the Barfunga – 'flowing from on high' – clan which traces its semi-divine lineage to Thekong-tak, the Lepcha ruler. The modern surname of Densapa is derived from Den-chap or Regent because a member of the family once governed in the place of a Chogyal during the latter's absence in Tibet.
406. V P Menon, Reforms Commissioner and from July 1947 Secretary to the Indian States Committee; Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Indian Political Service, Joint Secretary, External Affairs Department, 1947–48.
407. *Ibid*, Ext 7470, India to Sikkim, 23 Jul 1947.
408. *Sikkim: the story of its integration with India*, Pucha Raghunadha Rao (New Delhi, 1978), pp.13–14.
409. *Ibid*, P 9087, Extract from High Commission report, 22 Jun 1948.
410. Kazi Lendhup Dorji Khangsarpa of Chakung, to give him his full title, was to become Chief Minister of Sikkim with the active assistance of the various Indian Political Officers. His personal animosity to Palden Thondup Namgyal when he became the Chogyal was a great help to New Delhi when the time came for them to annex the kingdom.

411. *Smash and grab: annexation of Sikkim*, Sunanda K Datta-Ray (New Delhi, 1984), pp.53–57, for events leading up to the 1950 Treaty. This is the most detailed and comprehensive study of Sikkim after 1947. The author has had access to the late Chogyal's archives as well as to those of the Sikkim Darbar. Moreover, he was present at many of the momentous events which overtook the small kingdom of Sikkim following India's independence.
412. *Ibid*, p.55.
413. IOR: *L/P&S/13/1499*, no 1160, Press release, 8 Jun 1949.
414. *Ibid*, Extract from *The Times*, 10 Mar 1949.
415. *Ibid*, Ext 7277, High Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 8 Jan 1949.
416. *Ibid*, Report by Reuters, 1 Aug 1949.
417. *Ibid*, P 487, Ministry of External Affairs, 7 Jun 1949.
418. *Ibid*, P 14211, High Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 20 Jun 1949.
419. Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.58.
420. IOR: *L/P&S/13/1449*, P 14321, High Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 18 Jun 1949.
421. *Ibid*, Ext 8090, Conversation between J S H Shattock and Harishwar Dayal, 25 Aug 1949.
422. *Ibid*. *See* also Datta-Ray, *op cit*, pp.45–66 for sequence of events from Sikkim Darbar archives.
423. Coelho, *op cit*, pp.115–17. Treaty cited in Appendix II.
424. *Opinion on the matter of the Chogyal of Sikkim and the 35th Amendment of the Constitution of India*, Mohammed Hidayatullah (unpublished, 1974), cited in Datta-Ray, *op cit*, pp.59–60.
425. *Opinion on the effect in international law of the 1950 Peace Treaty between India and Sikkim*, Sir Humphrey Waldock (unpublished, 1966), cited in Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.60.
426. IOR: *L/P&S/13/1449*, Minute by Rumbold, 11 Jun 1949.
427. *Ibid*, Minute by Turnbull, 13 Jun 1949.
428. The title Chogyal literally means Dharma Raja. It was first conferred on Phuntsog Namgyal in 1642 when he was invested with both spiritual and temporal authority. Palden Thondup Namgyal decided to take the title on his accession to the throne in December 1963.
429. Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.66.
430. *Ibid*, pp.67–69.
431. *Ibid*, pp.78–79. 'The Chogyal knew that Jagat Mehta and Bahadur Singh had recommended Sikkim's absorption. The Foreign Affairs Committee in New Delhi turned down the proposal only because the ground had not been prepared and outright annexation would have provoked worldwide criticism'.
432. *Himalayan frontiers*, Dorothy Woodman (London, 1969), pp.314–15.
433. *A history of Sino-Tibetan relations: hostile coexistence*, John Rowland (van Nostrand, 1967), pp.74–75.
434. *Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the government of India and China*: white paper [No I], (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1959), Chou En-lai to Nehru, 8 Sep 1959, p.30.
435. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations*, [v I], (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1961), 12 Sep 1959, p.154.
436. Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.89.
437. *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations*, [v II], (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 1964), 28 Dec 1963.
438. For details of Kazi Lendhup Dorji's career and that of his wife, *see* Datta-Ray, *op cit*, pp.110–22. Nar Baharur Khatiawara was a Nepalese peasant boy from Gyalzing whom the Kazini adopted, educated and imbued with singular hatred for the Namgyal dynasty. Khatiawara was to become the Sikkim Youth Congress President and personally led the mobs which concentrated their fury on the Chogyal. Eventually, he was to fall out with his benefactors, the Kazi and Kazini.
439. *Ibid*, cited on p.136.
440. *Diplomacy in peace and war: recollections and reflections*, T N Kaul (New Delhi, 1979), pp.88–90.
441. Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.138.
442. *Ibid*, cited on p.151.
443. *Ibid*, cited on p.154.
444. *Ibid*, p.155.

445. *Ibid*, p.184.
446. *Ibid*, p.185.
447. *Ibid*, p.189.
448. *Ibid*, p.200.
449. *Ibid*, pp.203–204.
450. Bepin Behari Lal Mathur, appointed Chief Executive in September 1974. 'The new Chief Executive was . . . nagging, fault-finding, inclined to be rude even to the Chogyal, bullying in his attitude to Kazi and other politicians, and offensively domineering with civil service subordinates. He lived frugally and did not entertain . . . but demanded that Sikkimese officials run domestic errands for him, and for his son and daughter in India, that would have been unthinkable under the Darbar . . . Above all else he was Mrs Gandhi's hatchet man'.
451. *Ibid*, pp.272–74.
452. Note to Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Shanti Bhusan entitled *Now it can be told*, Tarachand Hariomal (unpublished, 15 Apr 1977), cited in Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.275.
453. *Ibid*, p.280.
454. *Ibid*, p.289.
455. *Ibid*, pp.292–93.
456. *Ibid*, p.306.
457. 'A merger is arranged', *Hindustan Times*, 15 Apr 1975.
458. The Chogyal to Indira Gandhi, 15 Apr 1975, cited in Datta-Ray, *op cit*, p.316.
459. Rao, *op cit*, Appendix XIII, pp.127–31.

Bhutan and the East India Company: first contacts, 1766–92

The earliest recollection by an Englishman of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is by Ralph Fitch during his travels in north eastern India during the year 1585. He left a journal in which he mentions a country called 'Boutanner . . . 4 dais journey from Couche'.[1] It is not certain whether Fitch ever arrived in Bhutan itself, but, in passing, he marks out for special mention the species of horses called Tangun, which provides a clue of sorts as to his whereabouts. The Tangun or *rta mgan* to give them their Tibetan spelling, were reputed, Fitch claims, to have got their name 'from Tangust'han, the general appelation of the assemblage of mountains that constitutes Bootan Proper'.[2] He found them, even then, of some special significance, as indeed they were more than a century and a half later when these highly prized beasts were mentioned in Article 11 of the 1774 Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty as part of the annual tribute paid by Bhutan to Cooch Behar.

The first mention of the East India Company's involvement with the Bhutanese is through James Rennell, the young Surveyor General of Bengal, who was sent up by Lord Clive[3] to survey 'the Countries that border' on Bengal. Writing to his old friend the Reverend Burrington, Vicar of Chudleigh in Devon, Rennell explains in simple detail the political alliances, as he sees them, of the adjacent countries, one of which is Bhutan. 'Assam is supposed to join the Empire of China on the west and the Baramputrey River to have its source in that Empire. Cashar and Aracan are distinct Kingdoms. Thibet or Bhutan is reckoned to great Tartary'.[4] Shortly after writing thus, Rennell was to find himself involved in the Company's dispute with Bhutan.

The political situation in Cooch Behar in 1765 found the Bhutanese disputing the succession to the Cooch Behar *gaddi* or throne. Within a year, the dispute had brought the East India Company into direct confrontation with the Bhutanese. The infant Raja, who was under the protection of the Bhutanese, was assassinated at the instigation of Ramanand Gosain, which gave rise to a conflict between the Nazir Deo, the hereditary Commander-in-Chief of Cooch Behar and the Bhutanese.[5] Responding to an appeal for help from Nazir Deo, a detachment of Company troops under Lieutenant Morrison was sent to help the beleaguered Cooch Beharis against the Bhutanese and their *sannyasi*[6] allies. James Rennell, who was in the vicinity surveying the territory for the Bengal Government 'near the Frontiers of Boutan or Thibet (the Southern Part of great Tartary)', came upon a tribe of *Faqirs*[7] plundering some of the provinces belonging to Bengal. Hearing that Company soldiers were on their way to quell the insurrection, Rennell decided to join them. During the course of the engagement, he was seriously wounded, 'One stroke of a sabre had cut my right shoulder bone through, and laid me open for near a foot down the back cutting thro' or wounding several of the ribs. At my left elbow the muscular part was taken off the breadth of a hand; I had besides a stab in the same arm and a large cut on the hand which deprived me of the use of my forefinger'.[8]

Although Rennell never fully recovered from his wounds, it did not prevent

him from continuing his exhaustive surveys for the Bengal Government. In fact, Lord Clive had come to appreciate the qualities of his dedicated Surveyor General and decided that it was unwise to allow him to venture into northern climes without the help of a military escort. Accompanied by a detachment of soldiers, September 1767 found Rennell, once again, travelling through Cooch Behar towards the Brahmaputra valley and reporting back that he was in the process of journeying towards 'the western limits of the Chinese Empire'. Two months later, however, Rennell appears to have changed course and wrote home to Burrington informing him that he was now travelling not south-eastwards but towards the foothills of the Himalaya. 'I am now in the midst of my Journey to Thibet. Being got into a more Northern Climate and in the neighbourhood of the Mountains, I breathe a cool and healthy Air'.[9] How far Rennell actually managed to penetrate into Tibet is not quite clear, but his journals do indicate that he got as far as Angduphodrang in Central Bhutan, where he was obliged to turn back swiftly with his 'strong detachment' having found the Bhutanese and their army ready to oppose his progress. 'I very nearly fell into a ambuscade which they had laid for me, but escaped with the loss of one, one man dangerously wounded. I was obliged to retreat a considerable way thro' an Enemy's Countrey perpetually harassed by their detachments, and crossed a deep River in my way'.[10]

Rennell's journeys into Bhutan did not go unchallenged and his presence there, with a detachment of Company troops, naturally excited Bhutanese suspicions. The abortive Kinloch expedition against the Gurkhas in 1767 and the subsequent seizure by the Company of portions of the Nepal *terai*[11] as compensation for the loss sustained during the expedition, merely confirmed for the Bhutanese the Company's hostile intent towards their kingdom. Moreover in 1767, a new Deb Raja had come to power in Bhutan and by 1770, having consolidated his position in the kingdom itself, had embarked upon a series of armed raids into neighbouring territories. Encouraged by the success of these raids, the Bhutanese then sent a force into the neighbouring state of Sikkim which reached as far as the Tista river. 'Scouts and advanced patrols and skirmishing parties came up as far as Mangbru and Barphung in Sikkim'.[12] These armed raids into Sikkim and Cooch Behar began to affect trans-Himalayan trade and resulted in increased tension along the north eastern frontier of the Company's possessions in Bengal.

The area most effected was Cooch Behar where traditionally a Bhutan representative, with a detachment of Bhutanese troops, was usually present and was frequently found interfering in the internal affairs of the state. With the arrival of the East India Company in Bengal, the Bhutanese intensified their efforts to maintain Cooch Behar as a buffer between Company possessions and the hills; the policy requiring strict control over the Cooch Behar ruler himself. In pursuit of this control, in 1770 the Bhutanese abducted Raja Dharendra Narayan's son and his mother and held them in protective custody. When finally the Nazir Deo secured their release in October 1771, the Bhutanese found themselves deprived of the necessary weapon which enabled them to put pressure on the Raja. Whereupon, they kidnapped Raja

Dharendra Narayan himself and carried him off to Bhutan. They then confirmed the Dewan Deo, Brijendra Narayan, on the throne and against the wishes of the Nazir Deo. Finding his protests ignored by the Bhutanese, Nazir Deo appealed to Warren Hastings in Bengal for help in restoring the Raja of Cooch Behar to his *gaddi*.

The importance of the 1772 crisis was that it provided Hastings with an opportunity to further the Company's aims of extending its influence, both in relation to trade and diplomacy, over a far wider area than had been contemplated in Lord Clive's day. In agreeing to help Cooch Behar, in return for the acceptance of British protection, Warren Hastings saw his policy as a natural progression from the one which James Rennell had been associated with since 1766. It also offered an opportunity to fulfil the wishes of the Court of Directors in London. 'We desire you will obtain the best intelligence you can whether trade can be opened with Nepaul, and whether cloth and other European commodities may not find their way then to Thibet, Lhassa and the western parts of China'.[13]

Whereas before contact with the Bhutanese had been sporadic and hostile, regular Anglo-Bhutanese relations, no less turbulent, began under Warren Hastings[14] in the latter half of the eighteenth century. By the time the Company took over Bengal in 1764 their interest in the trading possibilities of the northern kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan had increased substantially. In 1770, the famine in Bengal caused enormous financial losses in both the export of grain and in the cotton industry on which the economy of the province depended. By the time Hastings began his administration of Bengal in 1772, the dwindling financial resources of the Company were posing a threat to its influence.[15] It was a local crisis which turned Hastings' diplomacy towards the Himalaya; the primary consideration was trade, but no doubt conditions in Bengal also influenced Hastings in his resolution to invade Bhutan over the Cooch Behar dispute.

The Gurkha conquest of Nepal in 1769 resulted in the closure of the old trade route between India and Tibet by way of that country. The Company, anxious to revive trade, set out to find new routes to replace those which went through Nepal. Bhutan's location in the eastern corner of the Himalaya and its proximity to the Chumbi valley with its direct access to southern Tibet made it an obvious alternative to Nepal. In letters of 10 April and 3 May 1771, the Court of Directors instructed the Governor of Bengal to explore the prospects of Bhutan and Assam as future markets for extending the trade of Bengal.[16]

The opportunity came in 1772 when a quarrel arose between two claimants to the throne of Cooch Behar, one claimant seeking the aid of the Bhutan Government, while the other appealed to Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal. In the ensuing war, British forces under the command of Captain Jones drove the Bhutanese out of Cooch Behar and captured the forts of Daling, Chichacotta and Buxa.[17] The Bhutanese defeat alarmed the Gurkhas and they promptly despatched an embassy to Tashilhunpo warning the Panchen Lama of the dangers to Tibet if the British occupied Bhutan. The Panchen Lama did not relish the prospect of the East India Company taking

over a Tibetan dependency and wrote to Hastings on behalf of the Bhutanese.[18] Hastings badly needed facilities for opening up trans-Himalayan trade and saw the chance of implementing his scheme through Tashilhunpo. His reply to the Panchen Lama was conciliatory and, in line with this policy, Hastings decided to treat the Bhutanese 'with much leniency and forbearance'. The peace that followed was obtained through the intervention of the Panchen Lama and the King of Nepal[19]. Following on this, a treaty was negotiated between the Deb Raja of Bhutan and the East India Company on 25 April 1774.[20] Under its terms all lands belonging to the Deb Raja, which had been appropriated during the war with Cooch Behar, were relinquished; annual tribute was demanded from the Deb Raja of five Tangun horses, being the traditional acknowledgement paid to the Cooch Behar Raja; the Deb Raja was required to deliver up Dharendra Narayan, Raja of Cooch Behar, and his brother the Dewan Deo; and trade was to be re-established, the Bhutanese, as in the past, continuing to function as carrying agents.

The intervention of the East India Company heralded a number of British missions which were variously led by George Bogle in 1774, Alexander Hamilton in 1776–77, and Captain Samuel Turner in 1783.[21] The main object of these missions was to open trade communications with Tassisudon,[22] the winter capital of Bhutan, and through it, if possible, with Lhasa and other parts of Tibet. The Bhutanese regarded the Company's intrusion into the Himalayan region with a great deal of suspicion. They were well aware that, in a brief period of time, the East India Company, from a trading institution, had established itself as an expanding imperial power in India. Bogle's mission was to serve as a commercial reconnaissance, and he hoped to persuade the Bhutanese authorities of the great advantages which would accrue to them if they only agreed to become a centre for trans-Himalayan trade. His instructions were to secure a treaty of 'amity and commerce' with Tibet and 'to open a mutual and equal communication of trade' between Nepal and Bengal. He was to enquire into the resources of Tibet and study their trade markets. Thirdly, Bogle was to look into the relations between Tibet and China and in the hopes of influencing the former to help bring about an improvement in British trade and diplomacy with the latter. Finally, Bogle was to find out all he could about the people, politics, manners and morals of Tibet 'for the satisfaction of the personal curiosity of Warren Hastings'.[23]

In actual fact, Bogle's missions did very little to open up an alternative trade route through Bhutan. Neither the limited facilities which Bogle secured from the Deb Raja for British merchandise passing through Bhutan, nor Hastings' attempts to encourage Bhutanese merchants to visit Rangpur in Bengal annually, went far towards establishing a flourishing trade centre for the Company's goods. The Bhutan Government was not persuaded that trade with Bengal was in its interests, and many an obstacle was put in the way of merchants crossing Bhutanese territory to and from Tibet and into India. The Deb Raja was equally unresponsive and made a point of asking Bogle to leave Bhutan. As a result, Bogle's attempts to secure the Raja's permission to allow Englishmen to travel in Bhutan on Company business was also turned down.

The mission's main achievement was to get permission for British merchandise to come into Bhutan through non-European agents. Any attempt to force a settlement without Bhutanese consent, Bogle reported, would get the Company no further in their final objective of establishing trade with China and Tibet.[24]

In November 1775, Alexander Hamilton, Assistant-Surgeon to the Company, who had accompanied Bogle on the first mission, was sent on a second embassy to Tibet. His aim was to try and establish trading links with Tibet through Bhutan, and while in that country to look into the claims of the Deb Raja to the districts of Ambari Falakata and Julpesh, which had been attached to the Cooch Behar Darbar after the war. Hamilton found in favour of Bhutan; one reason for doing so was the hope that the restitution of these districts would induce the Bhutan authorities to levy a favourable transit duty on British goods passing through the country.[25] While trying to establish conditions favourable for trade in Bhutan, Hamilton discovered that not only were no merchants coming through from Tibet, but that he was experiencing great difficulty in opening up communications with Tashilhunpo: '. . . from the particular situation of affairs at Tashilhunpo and the unreasonable jealousy of the Lassa government, the expectations I had formed of visiting Thibet are now at an end'.[26] The situation had not changed when Hamilton paid another visit to Bhutan in 1776; he failed once again to interest Bhutan or Shigatse in his schemes for establishing trade marts with direct access to the markets of China.

Hastings did not entirely abandon hope, particularly since he sincerely believed that a succession of missions would eventually persuade the Lhasa authorities of the benefits of trade with the Company in India. Accordingly, in 1779, Bogle was sent to Shigatse for a second time, not so much in the immediate hope of improving Indo-Tibetan trade than to exploit the relationship existing between the Panchen Lama and the Emperor of China. Unfortunately, the Panchen Lama died in China in 1780, and the following year Bogle, whose friendship with the Panchen had given Hastings to hope that intervention by Tashilhunpo would open the door to Lhasa, also died. Thus, Hastings was deprived of the one man with the most experience of Tibet, but, in spite of this loss, his policy towards the Himalayan states did not radically change.

In 1783 an opportunity appeared and Hastings, quick to seize it, despatched Captain Samuel Turner to Tashilhunpo.[27] This was the installation of the new Incarnation of the Panchen Lama, for which ceremony Turner was despatched to Shigatse and entrusted to carry the good wishes of the Company. While on the way, his other task was to cede the district of Ambari Falakata and Julpesh to Bhutan, which since the disturbances of 1774 had been held by the Baikantpur *zamindar*.[28] Turner's visit to Bhutan convinced him that the Bhutanese continued to acknowledge the validity of the 1774 Regulations negotiated by Bogle, and he saw no reason for drawing up a further agreement unless trade was established on a new footing. His mission appeared to strengthen Indo-Bhutanese relations, and after a stay of three months, Turner

began his journey to Tibet, travelling the same route as that taken by Bogle nine years previously.

On Turner's return from Tibet, Hastings acted on his advice and an advertisement was circulated inviting Indian merchants to join an 'adventure' in trade with Tibet through Bhutan. In 1785 the 'adventure' took place according to plan, and from it a reasonably profitable trade resulted.[29] However, Turner's other attempt to secure concessions from the Bhutan authorities to trade directly with Tibet proved unsuccessful. By the time the merchants returned to India to report the success of their venture, Hastings had already left for England. A decade was to pass before the Bhutan route began to show any sort of promise. Under Warren Hastings, British influence had penetrated further into the Himalayan areas, into Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet, than it was to again until the opening years of the twentieth century when it saw the energetic policy of Lord Curzon. The departure of Warren Hastings in 1785 from India was to usher in a new trend in the Company's policy towards Bhutan.[30]

Bhutan, the Gurkhas and the Indo-Nepalese War, 1793–1816

In 1788 the Gurkhas invaded the Panchen Lama's territory and occupied several points across the Tibetan border. It is possible that, checked in their designs on Sikkim and Bhutan by the establishment of British relations with Tashilhunpo, the Gurkhas directed their expansionist fervour further north towards Tibet. The Tibetans had no adequate force with which to oppose the Gurkhas and, remembering the promise of friendship which had been made by Hastings' two envoys, they appealed to the British for help against the invader. Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General,[31] did not intend to get involved in a Himalayan war or take any action which might be construed as hostile by the Gurkhas. He was less interested in maintaining good relations with Tashilhunpo or in trans-Himalayan trade than he was in establishing a British representative in Peking.[32] In consequence, his reply to Tashilhunpo merely promised that he would give no assistance to the Gurkhas; at the same time neither was he prepared to give any active help to the Tibetans. The result of this response to the Tibetans' call for assistance was to suggest to the authorities at Tashilhunpo that the Company's friendship towards Tibet was not as disinterested as Bogle and Turner might have suggested.

The Gurkhas invaded Tibet for the second time in 1792, and this time Lhasa appealed to the Chinese. The Emperor's response was immediate and he sent an imperial army which decisively defeated the Gurkhas and they were obliged to come to terms. The British were to find that their diplomacy during the Tibet-Nepalese war inevitably went against Company interests, in particular its hopes of establishing trade relations with Tibet and the neighbouring states of Bhutan and Sikkim. In fact, all passes to Tibet were closed to British merchandise. Moreover, the crisis had brought about a decisive change in the political alignment of the Himalayan states. Interest in the lands beyond India's northern borders did not cease but hopes of

commercial 'adventures' of the sort Hastings had in mind, or of attempting to use Bhutan as a staging-post for Tibetan trade and for that of China, were lost for the time being. In relation to Bhutan the next two decades were to mark a series of disputes between it and the East India Company.

The Treaty of 1774 soured Anglo-Bhutanese relations from the outset. The Bhutanese particularly resented Article VI, which called for the extradition of offenders from India who had sought refuge in Bhutan, and Article VII which forbade the Bhutanese authorities from prosecuting any inhabitant of the Company's territories without prior approval from local British officials. In their view, the terms were an intrusion into the internal affairs of Bhutan and they consistently refused to comply with the Company's demands. In return, Company officials complained that the Bhutanese insistence on offering asylum to offenders meant that they perpetrated crimes in Indian territory with impunity.[33]

Other points of disagreement arose over the conflicting claims of Bhutan and Cooch Behar on the frontier of Maraghat which, under the 1774 Treaty, was acknowledged as belonging to Bhutan. The Raja of Cooch Behar claimed twelve villages and three *hats*[34] which went under the name of Gird Maraghat, and he appealed to the Company for assistance in possessing the disputed land.[35] The enquiry set up under the Commissioner of Cooch Behar found in favour of Cooch Behar and the Bhutanese were asked to withdraw their officers from Maraghat.[36] Inevitably, they rejected the findings of the enquiry insisting that the land was traditionally Bhutanese, and continued to occupy Maraghat. It was not until 1811 that, under threat of military action by the Company on behalf of the protected state, the Bhutanese agreed to withdraw, and the property passed to the Cooch Behar Darbar.[37]

By 1803 relations between the East India Company and the Gurkhas had become so strained that Lord Wellesley,[38] in the following year, dissolved existing treaties with Nepal in the hopes that he could avoid having anything to do with that turbulent country.[39] But this was not to be, for the geography of the Himalaya alone determined that the states along the northern range could not remain in isolation from those of the south. The Gurkhas, excluded from Tibet in 1792, began to encroach on a number of small states bordering the hills which were under British protection. In consequence, the area encroached upon provided a refuge for escaped criminals from British territory which, in its turn, gave rise to frequent incidents along the border between Nepal and the British-controlled frontier. By 1813, Lord Moira, the Governor General,[40] having found that all attempts to negotiate proved fruitless, went to war with Nepal.

The progress of the war, in the initial stages, proved far from satisfactory from the British point of view as the well-disciplined Gurkha forces inflicted a series of reverses on Company troops. The crucial question that faced Lord Moira in 1814 was what would be the attitude of China to the war between Nepal and the Company? There was every reason to expect that she would come to the aid of the Gurkhas, particularly since the 1792 Treaty between China and Nepal had left the latter a tributary of China. Lord Moira's fears

received further confirmation when, in March 1815, the British captured the draft of an appeal from the Nepalese Raja to the Emperor of China requesting immediate help in their struggle against the British. '. . . the English, after obtaining possession of Nepal, will advance . . . for the purpose of conquering Lassa . . . I beseech you . . . to lose no time in sending assistance'.[41] It was the sort of argument, Moira felt, that might seem plausible to a Chinese official. Nor was it beyond the realms of possibility that Bhutan, to out-flank the British, might conclude an alliance with the Gurkhas. In his view it was vital to allay Chinese suspicions, and to reassure the Himalayan states of the peaceful intentions of the Company.

On 29 November 1914, Lord Moira wrote to the Deb Raja warning him not to try to oppose British troops on his section of the frontier, nor to give passage to Nepalese troops through Bhutan, and, if at all possible, to oppose them.[42] David Scott, who had taken over Bogle's old post of Magistrate of Rangpur, was instructed to try to establish contact with Lhasa, either through Sikkim or Bhutan. In January 1815, Scott sought permission from the Bhutanese authorities to send an agent to their capital and from there to Lhasa. The Bhutanese were willing enough to receive the mission, but the envoy sent by Scott, Kishen Kant Bose, failed to get to Tibet.[43] In his discussions with the Bhutanese authorities, Bose discovered that there was some truth in the rumour that they had considered coming to an arrangement with Nepal during the war. He also feared that the Bhutanese were contemplating giving active assistance to the Raja of Cooch Behar in his attempts to remove his state from the protection of the Bengal Government; in exchange Bhutan, rumour had it, would get back the Maraghat land. The source of the Bhutanese discontent lay in their belief that Maraghat was rightfully theirs, and had been acquired by Cooch Behar with the connivance of Company officials. Nothing less than the transfer of the territory back to Bhutan would convince them of the Company's goodwill. Acting on Bose's report, the Bengal Government gave instructions for the boundary dispute to be reinvestigated.[44] Scott, by now Commissioner of Cooch Behar, set up the enquiry and his decision went against that of 1809, the Maraghat land passing back to Bhutan.[45] Prior to the Indo-Nepalese war, Company officials had totally rejected Bhutanese claims to the Maraghat territory; now, as a reward for Bhutan's neutrality during the war with Nepal, and in the hopes that she would in future refrain from intervention in the affairs of a protected state, Maraghat was ceded back to Bhutan.

The Assam Duars and Indo-Bhutanese relations, 1825–38

The end of the Indo-Nepalese War saw the British fully occupied extending their hold on the Indian sub-continent. The commercial value of the hill states of Kumaon and Garhwal had been brought to Lord Moira's notice during the course of the Gurkha War; the conclusion of the war removed any objection that might have previously existed to the development of a trade route through these two states. No longer did Lord Moira fear to alarm the Chinese

and thereby precipitate their intervention on the side of Nepal. In the same way relations with Sikkim, first developed out of the wartime necessity of finding a route to Nepal, were further extended immediately after the war. The objective was to prevent Gurkha expansion into the Himalayan fringe and to surround Nepal by territory under British control or protection.

Subsequent to the visit of Kishen Kant Bose, little reason had existed for opening up diplomatic relations with Bhutan except as a trade route to Tibet. However, in 1826, the whole pattern of Anglo-Bhutanese relations underwent a change. For, after the first Burmese War of 1825–26, the King of Ava, by the Peace of Yandabo of 24 February 1826,[46] agreed to withdraw from Assam, which then became virtually a British protectorate. It formed a landmark in British policy towards Bhutan. The acquisition of Kumaon and Garhwal meant that British territory now marched with that of Tibet. In the east, Sikkim provided a corridor of nominally protected British territory up to the Tibetan frontier. The annexation of Assam resulted in an extension of British territory right up to the Bhutan border. The most direct consequence for the Company and Bhutan was that the Indo-Bhutanese border became the scene of endless boundary disputes, and marked the pattern of relationship for many years to come.

Bhutan in 1826 had long ceased to play an important part in the Company's attempts to develop trade relations across the Himalaya. For when Bhutan, in 1792, along with her neighbour Tibet, closed her doors to merchants from the Company's possessions, her relations with the British began to deteriorate. A direct cause of the worsening relations was attributable to British occupation of Assam, which merely provided occasions for Indo-Bhutanese friction on the joint border. The frontier, from Kashmir to Assam, which lies at the base of the lower range of the Himalaya, is known on the Indian side as the *Terai*. In Bhutan and Assam this low-lying area is known as the Duars.[47] Here, the mountain rivers of Bhutan meet the plains of Bengal and Assam, and these lowlands form a natural boundary between the hill states and the Indian plains. It was the boundary itself which became the root cause of the problem. Up to this time, the Bhutanese had been the sole arbiters of the way in which the Duars were administered. Traditionally, the Bhutanese had come down into the Duar tracts in the cold season; for the rest of the year these territories were in the hands of plainsmen whom the Bhutanese regarded as their tributaries. In fact, the first conflict between Bhutan and the Company had arisen over the ownership of Duar territory, and the cause of that conflict, encroachments into the Duars, was still present.

Since Anglo-Bhutanese relations from 1826 were for the main part concerned with the Duars, a brief description of the tract, known respectively as the Assam and Bengal Duars, is given here. These Duars, or passes, varied in breadth from ten to twelve miles, their length extending from the Dhansiri river in Assam in the east to the Tista river, or the frontier of the Darjeeling district in the west. There were eighteen Duars in all and they took their names from the different passes in the hills which led to Bhutan. Of these passes, eleven touched upon the northern frontier of Bengal, between the rivers Tista

and Manas, and were called the Bengal Duars.[48] The remaining seven lay between the rivers Manas and Dhansiri, and were known as the Assam Duars.[49]

At the time of the annexation of Assam, Bhutan had sovereign control over the Bengal Duars which were administered accordingly by the Bhutanese Dzongpons.[50] The local administration was in the hands of the Bengalis, Assamese and Kacharis who, in their turn, were appointed by *sanad*[51] of the Deb Raja of Bhutan. In the case of the Assam Duars, the Bhutanese were not in complete control. These Duars were controlled by the Ahoms[52] who, often unable to maintain law and order in the area, were led to purchase security by making over their Duars to the Bhutanese in consideration of an annual payment of yak tails, ponies, musk, gold-dust, etc.[53] When the British occupied Lower Assam, they confirmed the agreements made by the Ahom rulers with the Bhutan Government. The arrangements were highly complicated and had in them the seeds of a future conflict, particularly since Company officials refused to participate in or accept the age-old, traditional methods of barter and exchange.[54] Payment by Bhutan, in the case of the Duars, had always been in kind, and they found that Company officials frequently contested its value. This, in turn, led to interminable and lengthy disputes and consequent arrears by the Bhutanese who withheld payment until the matter had been settled to their satisfaction.[55]

Argument also surrounded the tenure and management of the Duars themselves. Five of the Kamrup Duars, namely Ghurkhalla, Banska, Chappagoorie, Chappa Khamar and Bijni, were held exclusively by Bhutan and were subject to no interference in their management by the Company. Two of the Durrung Duars, Booree Goomah and Kalling were, however, held under joint tenure which meant that the British occupied them from July to November each year, the Bhutanese holding them for the rest of the year. As usual, the annual payment was in kind; the Bhutanese contending that the officials appointed to receive the payment on the frontier frequently changed the original articles and substituted others of inferior value. The Bengal Government then accused the Bhutanese of over-valuing and since the barter seldom realised its expected worth, the tribute continued to fall short of the required payment. Bengal officials pressed hard for clearance of these arrears, often under threat of military action, but when pressed too hard, the Bhutanese frequently responded by plundering the frontier settlements.[56]

The first incursion by the Bhutanese occurred in October 1828 into the district of Durrung by the Doompa Raja of Booree Goomah Duar. He managed to carry off a number of Bhutanese, together with an Indian subject. While the case was under investigation, the Doompa Raja attacked a frontier outpost, killing some Indian *sepoys*[57] and, once again, abducting a number of Bhutanese men and women. David Scott, Agent to the Governor General, wrote to the Bhutan Government demanding the return of the captives and the surrender of the Doompa Raja. The Bhutanese chose not to reply, whereupon a party of Indian troops moved in, released the prisoners and attached the Booree Goomah Duar.[58] Bengal retained possession of the Duar until 1831

when, for the first time, the Deb Raja wrote asking for the restoration of the Duar, and implying that the cause of the upset, the Doompa Raja, was now dead. The Bengal Government saw no reason to grant any immediate concession or reparation. It was not until July 1834, having obtained first-hand evidence of the death of the principal associates whose activities had led to the attachment of the Duar, that the Bhutanese were permitted to re-occupy the Duar on payment of a fine of Rs 2,000.[59]

Not a full year had elapsed when, on 28 May 1835, the Bhutanese attacked the Bijni Duar and the usual abductions took place. At the same time, the principal officer in charge of the Bijni Duar refused to pay the current tribute or to make arrangements to liquidate the balance outstanding from previous years. Complaints were made to the Deb Raja, to which, in the time-honoured tradition, no reply was forthcoming. This time the Bengal Government raised an additional corps, the Assam Sebundy Corps,[60] for the specific purpose of protecting the Duar frontier. As a result, shortly afterwards the Bijni Duar was attached. The attachment of the Duar did not stop the depradations from continuing and on 16 November 1835, the Bhutanese moved from the Kalling Duar into the Durrung district. This time, Captain Mathie advanced to the frontier of Kalling Duar along with a detachment of the Assam Sebundy Corps and where the promptness of his action so frightened Ghumbeer Wazir, the Chief Officer of the Duar, that he delivered up a number of offenders. He also gave a written undertaking forfeiting the Kalling Duar itself.

A few months later, the Bhutanese attached the district of north Kamrup having attacked it from the Banska Duar. The Bengal Government's demand for the surrender of the culprits and recompense for looted property met with the usual denial and, on 14 February 1836, Captain Bogle, Magistrate of Kamrup, decided to attach the Banska Duar.[61] The Raja of Dewangiri, having given sanctuary to the Bhutanese official responsible for the outrage, refused to surrender him, but was later forced to do so when a Sebundy Corps detachment routed his forces. Bogle felt that the time had come to approach the Deb Raja direct; a letter was despatched informing him of the continuing incursions by his subjects into British territory, and of the circumstances that had necessitated the attachment of the Duar.[62]

As a result, the Bhutanese authorities were finally aroused to take some action at the loss of their most valuable possession, the Banska Duar. Many of the offenders were duly surrendered, and on 10 May 1836, four Zinkaffs,[63] deputed by the Dharma Raja, the Deb Raja and the Tongsa Penlop,[64] arrived at Gauhati in Assam to discuss the annexation of the Duar and related matters. They denied that the Bhutan Government had received the various communications addressed to them. They asked that all arrears should be taken out of the revenue from the Duar, but that the Banska Duar itself should be returned to Bhutan. The conditions attached to the return of the Duar were not initially acceptable to the Zinkaffs, but one of them went back to Dewangiri and returned bearing the seal of the Dharma Raja's father, which he then proceeded to attach to an *Iqramama*[65] on 2 June 1836. By it, the Bhutanese

were obliged to put down dacoity; to deliver up offenders on receipt of warrants from the British magistrates; and in the event of Bhutanese officers failing to arrest the offenders, the Indian police were to be allowed access to the Duars. Agreement was also secured regarding the payment of the annual Duar tribute which was to be made over to the Collectors of Kamrup and Durrung; in case of default, the Bengal Government were given the right to attach the Duar until the arrears had been fully paid up. Although the Banska Duar was restored to Bhutan under the Zinkaff's seal, the agreement was not ratified by the Deb Raja himself. The obvious consequence of this proceeding was that the Deb Raja denied the Zinkaff's authority to enter into an agreement on his behalf and particularly since no permission had been previously sought nor any given which sanctioned the transaction. Sir Ashley Eden, Secretary to the Bengal Government, believed that this 'misjudged forbearance' on the part of the Bengal Government in relation to Bhutan could be attributed to the 'extraordinary misapprehension which seems to have prevailed, that any active measures on our part would be pursued at the imminent risk of a war with China'. In his view no such danger threatened, particularly since the existence of Bhutan was unknown to China.[66]

The Pemberton Mission, 1838

The problems of the Duars were tackled by the various Agents to the Governor General on the north-east frontier, and it was they who gave new direction to British policy towards Bhutan.[67] It was their solution that, when the Bhutanese made depredations into Indian territory and failed thereafter to restore either property or deliver up the culprits, the temporary occupation of a Duar would soon bring the Bhutanese to heel. The measure, more often than not, had the effect of starving the Bhutanese into compliance; it did not, however, provide a permanent solution to the problem. British Agents, at the time, had to rely on very imperfect data regarding conditions of government within Bhutan itself. In 1834, Thomas Robertson, Agent on the North-East Frontier, recommended that the only satisfactory solution to the differences afflicting the border areas was to send a deputation to Bhutan for the purpose of establishing direct contact with the authorities there.

It was not until 27 June 1836 that Robertson, by now a Member of the Supreme Council, got his way and it was agreed that Captain Pemberton should be despatched on a mission to the Deb Raja. Once there, Pemberton was to try, if at all possible, to secure permission from the Bhutanese, or direct from Lhasa if necessary, to proceed to Tibet.[68] The terms of reference he carried with him were fourfold. Firstly, he was to establish diplomatic relations with the Bhutan Government; secondly, to effect an adjustment of the tribute payable for the Duars in order to diminish the persistent conflict in the area; thirdly, to persuade the Bhutanese to make over the management of the Assam Duars in lieu of an annual payment; and finally, to settle the terms relating to commercial links which, despite the Treaty of 1774, had remained virtually suspended. He was also to reassure the Bhutanese authorities that the Bengal

Government's primary concern was to improve relations between the two governments, and not simply to benefit financially from the cession of the Duars. If his terms failed to get a favourable response from the Bhutanese, Pemberton was then to urge them to accept commutation of the tribute, in exchange for a tract of land or a fixed and regular sum of money. He was to explain to the Bhutan Government the difficulties experienced by British officials, particularly when Bhutanese subjects made inroads into Indian territory, and to encourage them to reform the administration of their frontier districts. While in the capital, Pemberton was to enquire into the political constitution of Bhutan, not only as to its internal administration but its affiliations with other external powers such as Tibet, Nepal and China and the extent to which such influences might affect Bhutan's policy towards the East India Company. Finally, he was to make an attempt to get permission to make his way 'to the Dalai Lama and the Rajah of Thibet'.[69]

Pemberton, accompanied by William Griffiths, a famous botanist, and an escort of twenty-five soldiers left Gauhati for Bhutan on 21 December 1837. He appears to have believed that 'the more circuitous the route by which we might be conveyed the more ample would be the opportunity afforded of affecting many important objects of the Mission'.[70] Accordingly, he entered the country via the Banska Duar and Dewangiri. At each point, he was detained by the Zinkaffs and advised to return to the frontier and re-enter Bhutan by the Buxa Duar, the route previously taken by the Bogle and Turner missions. He resisted each suggestion, and though the Bhutanese put many an obstacle in his way, Pemberton overcame all of them and found himself on 23 January 1838 on his way to Punakha, the winter capital of Bhutan. Difficulties, both of terrain and weather, and the refusal by the Bhutanese to co-operate, found him firstly marooned at Dewangiri and thereafter facing added complications with regard to transport and other facilities. At each step, Pemberton was told he was not welcome in Bhutan; it did not deter him, nor did he relent, but the various obstructions put in the way meant that it took him three months, rather than three weeks to reach Punakha.[71]

On 25 April 1838, Pemberton submitted a draft treaty to the Deb Raja, to the considerable surprise of the Bhutanese who were unaware that the object of his embassy was to negotiate a new agreement. The terms of the draft treaty required an unrestricted intercourse between the subjects of Bhutan and British India; the extradition of offenders, both Bhutanese and Indian, wanted by the Bengal Government in connection with crimes committed in the Assam Duars; and the right of the Indian police to enter the Duars in search of offenders, if Bhutanese officials failed to apprehend the culprits. The Bhutan Government was asked to pay the Duar tribute in cash and not in kind, the payment to be made directly to the Collectors of Kamrup and Durrung by the Zinkaffs. If a Duar failed to pay its yearly tribute, the Bengal Government would have the right to take possession of it until the arrears had been fully paid up. For their part, the Bhutanese authorities were to depute officials to assist in defining and demarcating, by mutual agreement, the disputed boundaries of the Assam Duars. Finally, accredited agents of Bhutan would be

required to reside permanently, one at Gauhati in Assam and the other at Rangpur in Bengal, in order to prevent the Zinkaffs suppressing correspondence which came up from the plains for the Bhutan authorities.

There was little hope, given the unfriendly relations existing between the two sides, that the Bhutan Government would give favourable consideration to Pemberton's demands, let alone agree to enter into a treaty expressly designed to recognise British rights in the Duars. The result was that the rulers of Bhutan rejected it outright. The Tongsa Penlop, whose interests would have been directly affected if an arrangement had been agreed upon on the lines suggested by Pemberton, was the most vehement opponent of the agreement. The punctual payment of tribute for the Assam Duars was a measure he was not going to accept at any price.[72] As might have been expected in the circumstances, Pemberton found that he had not the slightest chance of getting through to Lhasa. Nor were the Bhutanese prepared to act as a posting box for letters meant for the Tibetan Government.[73]

Pemberton had no alternative but to withdraw the mission, which he did on 9 May 1838. He was to ascribe his failure to the purely nominal power of the Deb Raja, and the effective antagonism of the Tongsa Penlop towards any agreement with the British. The country was suffering, Pemberton claimed, from the effects of a recent revolution; the new Deb Raja, having recently succeeded to the office by the deposition of his predecessor, scarcely held any real power, and, what was more, the deposed Deb Raja was in possession of the capital, Tassisudon. The Paro Penlop, who governed the Bengal Duars, and the Tongsa Penlop, responsible for the Assam Duars, were established in positions of virtual independence. Moreover, the latter had strengthened his authority by inducing the priesthood to recognise his son as the incarnation of the Dharma Raja.[74] The more obvious reason for Pemberton's failure was his insistence that the payment of tribute should be in Cooch Behar currency (Narainee rupees), and not in Bhutanese money, an argument which had been going on ever since the Company first began its interference in the management of the Duars.[75] Having seen the rapid rise of British power in India, mainly at the expense of the Indian princes, the Bhutanese rulers regarded Pemberton's terms as the first step towards establishing a protectorate over their kingdom.[76]

The mission was not, however, entirely devoid of results. The circuitous route taken by Pemberton enabled him to study the geography of eastern and northern Bhutan, to gain valuable information regarding routes from Bhutan into Tibet, and to have a better understanding of the political relations which Bhutan had with Tibet and China. On his return, Pemberton gave out that though the Duars were the most valuable part of Bhutan's territory, yet their permanent annexation would remove the strongest weapon British officials had to control Bhutan. Since most of the incursions into Indian territory occurred from the Duars under the jurisdiction of the Tongsa Penlop, the solution lay in annexing the Duars in his possession. If effectively managed, this would minimise Bhutanese depredations into Indian territory. The obvious answer to the problems besetting the Indo-Bhutanese frontier was the

appointment of a permanent resident in the Bhutanese capital, with the dual responsibility of watching over British interests and counteracting the many external influences from the north, whether be Tibetan or Chinese. In Pemberton's view the Deb Raja was strongly opposed to any form of British representation in Bhutan, yet he would readily agree to it provided it meant the restoration of the Duars.[77]

Pemberton was to conclude that the Russians had political as well as commercial ambitions at Lhasa. He saw the danger of Russia, having established herself in Tibet, attempting to extend her diplomatic influence into the neighbouring kingdoms on India's borders. In his opinion, 'Russia may at this moment be moving in Lassa the wires which agitate Nipal'. As the Bengal Government saw it these wires could no less unsettle Bhutan and Sikkim, let alone the newly acquired territory of Assam. These sensitive areas, with their direct access to Tibet and to China, could provide Russia with a trading monopoly, and trading merchants had, before now, been known to turn into political agents. Prompted by these fears, British policy along the Himalayan fringe came to be based on the general principle that the independent hill kingdoms should be deprived of whatever areas they controlled in the foothills, the assumption being that the foothills constituted a natural boundary and provided an essential buffer between India and the northern principalities. The areas themselves were a rich source of revenue, and the rulers, deprived of their exclusive pickings, would be forced to turn to their imperial neighbour in the south. At the same time, the measure would serve the additional purpose of keeping Russia, if she was so tempted, from extending her influence into India's borders.

The change in the political status of Assam affected British attitudes to the Inner Line areas, and nowhere was this more evident than in the battle that waged for possession of the Duars. Many of the regional officials in Bhutan were reluctant to surrender their remunerative privileges, and the Tongsa Penlop was no exception. He found that the Bengal Government's attempts to secure the Duars meant that he was forced to pay a nominal tribute to retain them. Whenever the more powerful Penlops could, they defaulted on the payment and claimed their traditional rights to the area. Prior to Pemberton's mission, the British had appeared reluctant to pursue a forward policy towards Bhutan since it was assumed that Bhutan's natural allegiance to Tibet might involve them in hostilities not only with Tibet but also with China. However, on Pemberton's return from Bhutan, he was able to allay that fear.[78]

The undue emphasis placed on Bhutan's traditional allegiance to Tibet failed to give the true picture. It certainly misled the early East India Company explorers to believe that relations with Bhutan could be regulated through Lhasa. At times, Bhutan was to be the intermediary between the final goal of Lhasa, at others Tibet was to be used to control the truculent tribes of her dependency. The Bengal Government's concept of the patron-client theory did not, in practice, fit the relationship which in reality existed between Tibet and Bhutan. In fact, Bhutan's relations with Tibet, in much of the early period, were marked by intermittent hostilities. Several Tibetan invasions of Bhutan

had taken place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, aimed at asserting Tibetan authority, but they had all failed. The Tibetan forces never quite managed to operate for more than a few months in Bhutanese territory. 'Indeed these attempts by Tibetan officials to intervene in Bhutanese politics are quite instructive in one sense, for only on one occasion in recorded history did the Tibetan-supported factions emerge triumphant'.[79]

When it came to China, it was also assumed by Bengal that Peking's alleged suzerainty over Tibet extended these rights to Bhutan. The reality was again very different. Relations between China and Bhutan did not exist prior to the arrival of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa in the late eighteenth century, and no Bhutanese missions, previously or thereafter, were sent to Peking. The arrival of Chinese influence in Lhasa after the Nepalese war of 1792 inevitably presented Bhutan with the problem of a Tibet backed by Chinese military support. In fact, the problem of Chinese influence in Lhasa proved secondary compared to the one that Bhutan faced when British rule arrived in India. It was to jeopardise Bhutanese influence and control in the plains of Assam and eastern Bengal, and the disputes that developed were to plague relations between Bhutan and Bengal for much of the nineteenth century.

Annexation of the Assam Duars, 1839–63

The failure of Pemberton's mission to establish British influence in Bhutan was a watershed in relations between the two governments. The Bengal Government shelved the policy of moderation and negotiation and replaced it by various coercive measures guaranteed to bring about confrontation. The annexation of the Assam Duars became the first objective, particularly since it was found that they were eminently suitable for the cultivation of tea, and the fertile land, largely neglected under Bhutanese management, would, if properly cultivated, yield enormous wealth. Moreover, their attachment would provide an effective weapon against the Bhutanese themselves, for 'if we possess the Duars, the source of their subsistence, the Bhutan Government would in a short time become entirely dependent on us'.[80]

Two grievances were used to challenge the Bhutanese, namely the depredations on the frontier and the withholding of the Duar tribute. Major Jenkins, who occupied the North-East Frontier Agency, had long been an advocate of establishing a permanent British agent in Bhutan. In his view, nothing short of this measure would guarantee the Bhutanese's good behaviour; in the meantime he intended to stop them from following the objectionable habit of levying tribute in the Duar area, and withholding the tribute whenever possible. The Bhutanese rejected Jenkins' authority to question these long established rights, which they had secured in the early eighteenth century from the ruling Ahom authority in Assam during its decline. Sensing the weakness, they had forced a succession of weak Ahom rulers to make various concessions in the form of ceding certain territory outright and in others granting them revenue rights. These revenues had ever since then been shared under a form of joint administration.

Jenkins intended to overlook these rights and recommended to the Bengal Government the annexation of all the Duars, a measure calculated to force the Bhutanese to co-operate. Alternatively, he suggested the annexation of at least two of the Duars, Kalling and Booree-Goomah, until the tribute had been fully paid up. Bengal was having none of it, and merely instructed him to write to the Deb Raja demanding the surrender of persons abducted into Bhutan and the payment of tribute still in arrears.[81] But Jenkins had made up his mind that, unless a prompt and satisfactory reply was forthcoming from the Deb Raja, he proposed to ignore his instructions and attach the Duars anyway. The Bhutanese chose not to reply and in October 1839 the Kalling and Booree-Goomah Duars were annexed. Jenkins, justifying his action, insisted that Bhutanese oppression of the local population had left him with no alternative. Representations from the Bhutan Government went unheeded, and finally, in a despatch dated 1 May 1841, the Court of Directors in London gave their approval for the Bengal Government 'to exercise its power over the Assam Duars'.[82] It was not just a matter of policy that had sanctioned the annexation but the belief that the tenure on which the Duars were held by the Bhutanese for a certain portion of each year gave them no title whatsoever to claim them as their own territory. 'The right of supremacy had remained with the rulers of Assam, by whom the use of the Doars for certain months of the year had been granted as the price of their forbearance from plundering; and all that the Bootias had any pretension to was an equivalent for the value of the Doars to them previous to their resumption'.[83]

The Bhutan Government refused to accept the annexation or the offer of compensation for the Duars. On 21 May 1841, the Deb and Dharma Rajas wrote to Jenkins explaining that civil war in Bhutan had made it difficult for them to administer Bhutan, let alone supervise the administration in the Duars; they asked that a Bengal official should be deputed to Bhutan to discuss matters relating to the restoration of the Duars. Lord Auckland, the Governor General[84] was opposed to the idea; instead he warned the two Rajas that violations on the Indian frontier would not go unpunished, and that he would have no compunction in ordering the occupation of the other Assam Duars.[85] On the basis of Jenkins' report, describing the wretched state of the Duar administration and the continued migration of the population into Indian territory, Auckland ordered the remaining Assam Duars to be permanently annexed. As compensation, the Bhutan Government was to receive one-third of the net revenue from the Duars.[86]

The occupation of the Assam Duars, coinciding as it did with more urgent problems facing the British in India, such as the Afghan War, the annexation of Sind and the Sikh Wars, found the Bengal Government reluctant to extend its jurisdiction into Bhutanese territory. Lord Dalhousie[87] was at the helm of affairs in India, and though his energetic tenure of office marked a steady growth in imperial power, especially at the expense of the Princely States, yet in relation to Bhutan he chose to follow a policy of non-interference. An instance of this policy was to be seen in Jenkins' request that the Dharma Raja, having been deprived of his authority by the Penlops of Bhutan,[88] should be

allowed to put himself under British protection was firmly turned down. Lord Auckland, a few years previously, would have welcomed the proposal, but Dalhousie saw no political advantage in permitting his administration to get involved in the affairs of a northern principality with no direct relevance to the affairs of India. Moreover, the financial interests of the Bengal Government had already been secured by the annexation of the Assam Duars. Accordingly, Jenkins was informed that the Bengal Government had no wish to interfere in the affairs of Bhutan.[89]

Following the annexation, the Bhutan authorities made periodic attempts to get back the Duars, and to reopen the question of adequate compensation. In March 1855, an uncle of the Dharma Raja, accompanied by the Dewangiri Raja, arrived at Gauhati demanding an increase in the compensation for the Assam Duars from Rs 10,000 to Rs 15,000.[90] They argued that the amount allocated to them had never been agreed upon, but had been arbitrarily fixed by Major Jenkins. Jenkins refused to discuss their grievance, and on their return journey to Dewangiri they committed several robberies in the Banska Duar. The net result was that all passes from the hills to the Duars were cut off. Jenkins wrote to the Deb Raja demanding the surrender of the Dewangiri Raja and his brother, the Tongsa Penlop, before he would agree to reopen the passes. This time, the Deb Raja took action and removed the Dewangiri Raja from office and imposed a large fine on the Tongsa Penlop. No sooner had the offenders been punished, than the passes were reopened, and the Bengal Government limited its demand to the recovery of an equivalent in money for the stolen property. The value was deducted from the Bhutanese share of the Duar revenue.

The Tongsa Penlop saw no reason to accept the fine imposed on him without a protest and wrote demanding the payment of half his fine by the Deb Raja and the surrender of Bhutanese subjects who had been seized by local British officers. He also accused Jenkins of misrepresenting the true facts. The Bengal Government responded by restating their position and declaring that payment of the Duar revenue share would be withheld until all offenders had been surrendered by the Tongsa.[91] He was also warned that a recurrence of such incursions into Indian territory would result in the occupation of the Bengal Duars as well, and this time on the understanding that the occupation would be permanent. Pressure was then put on the Deb Raja to restrain his insubordinate chiefs. 'The Deb Rajah must share in the penalty due to the delinquencies of those who own his authority, and for whose acts of aggression on British territory he must be considered responsible'.[92] Although the Bengal Government considered that Jenkins had exceeded his instructions by insisting that the payment of the Duar revenue was dependent on the offenders being delivered up, 'it was not deemed necessary or advisable that any steps should be taken to correct it'.[93]

Frontier disputes, 1856–59

Although ostensible British policy was of non-interference in Bhutan's

internal affairs, yet the constant disputes between local Company officials and the Bhutanese on the frontier enabled the British to intervene in the internal administration of the kingdom. The Bhutan Government's insistence that they were the rightful authority in the Duars found the Bengal Government sharply contesting the assertion and insisting that they also had the right to a say in the way the Duars were administered when it affected British interests on the Indian border. Each time the Bhutanese made an incursion into British territory, they found an equally aggressive response from the Bengal officials. The policy was to alternate threats with demands; on occasions the Bhutanese refused to respond, at other times they put forward counter-proposals regarding compensation for the Duars.

An incident occurred in April 1856 which illustrates the attitudes of the two sides. Arung Singh, hereditary *zamindar* of the Goomah Duar in Bhutanese territory, took refuge in India in order to avoid his financial obligations to the Bhutan Darbar. To force him to render his just dues, the Bhutanese carried him off into Bhutan. To Jenkins' demands for his return and punishment of those who had abducted him, the Bhutanese turned a deaf ear. The stalemate that resulted brought in Sir Francis Halliday, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal who, having looked into the matter, found that Jenkins, by openly giving his patronage to Arung Singh, had provoked the incident. As a result of his findings, Halliday recommended that a friendly approach, in the first instance, be made to the Deb and Dharma Rajas requesting an explanation.[94] He was overruled by Lord Dalhousie, who was determined to take a stronger line: he demanded an apology and punishment of the offenders, and warned that if these conditions were not fulfilled, the next step would be the permanent annexation of the Bengal Duars.[95]

Dalhousie's ultimatum had an immediate effect and the Bengal Government received letters from the Dharma and Deb Rajas and the Tongsa Penlop apologising for their previous misconduct. Jenkins, surprisingly, was appeased and, whereas before he had persistently refused to compromise, he now sought permission to correspond with the Tongsa Penlop. He recommended a rise in the Bhutanese share of the Duar revenue from Rs 10,000 to Rs 12,000, and that an officer should be deputed to Bhutan in order to promote better understanding between the two governments. His request was refused and he was reminded that the problem of Arung Singh remained unresolved and that the Bengal Government were still waiting for an explanation.[96] When the Deb Raja finally submitted his explanation, Bengal found it far from convincing. He maintained that since Arung Singh was a servant of the Bhutan Darbar there could be no question of him being abducted by his own government; he also reminded Bengal that their own officials had committed serious breaches into Bhutanese territory without once attempting to restore the *status quo*.[97]

The deadlock that resulted, Jenkins believed, could only be resolved by annexation of the Bengal Duars. Before deciding what steps to take, the Bengal Government thought it was necessary to discover where authority in Bhutan actually lay and whether the jurisdiction of the different subordinate

chiefs along the frontier was a consideration of some importance. Jenkins was particularly concerned regarding the Tongsa Penlop's jurisdiction, since by his actions he had shown himself not only to be independent but not responsible to the central authority in Bhutan. 'The boundary of the Tongso Pillo's jurisdiction is, according to Colonel Jenkins, the Monass River; east of this the Tongso Pillo governs more or less authoritatively, and east of this lie the Doars which we have already taken into our hands, and from the revenues of which we pay an annual allowance to the Bootan Government. West of it, in the districts bordering upon Gowalparra and Rungpore, Colonel Jenkins believes the Government to be more directly in the hands of the Deb Rajah; and it is to a place in these districts, Balka Doar, 30 or 40 miles west of the Monass, that Arung Sing was carried'.[98] Since their knowledge of the kingdom was so imperfect, the Bengal Government decided that it was time to obtain some definite information regarding the internal affairs of Bhutan.

Sir Francis Halliday was paying another visit to the Bhutan frontier in January 1857 and was able to provide some information. He found that, under normal circumstances, the central authority in Bhutan exercised effective control over the subordinate provincial governors or *Soubahs*,[99] but that the degree of control varied with the state of parties at court. Of late it had been weakened by contentions for the office of Deb Raja. The Deb Raja had recently died, and been succeeded by a new ruler with the consent of the Dharma Raja, which was considered to be favourable to the cause of good order on the frontier. On the basis of this information, Halliday recommended that, for the present, no move should be made towards annexation. He asked that payments made to the Tongsa Penlop, out of the revenue of the Assam Duars, should continue, for its stoppage would only result in further confrontation. One more request should be made to the Dharma and Deb Rajas for the return of Arung Singh, with a warning that unless they delivered him up, the annexation of Ambari Falakata and Julpesh would be open to the Bengal Government.[100] Halliday's recommendations were restricted by Lord Dalhousie's insistence that nothing should hamper the Bengal Government in determining when and how it should act if the Bhutanese, as past experience had led them to expect, refused their demands.[101] The Bhutanese decision not to respond at all played into Dalhousie's hands; Halliday's moderating influence was set aside and the attachment of the Duars was to go ahead. However, the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857 prevented the execution of Dalhousie's instructions and the Bhutanese were left in possession, for the time being, of the Bengal Duars.

Annexation of Ambari Falakata, 1860

The direct assumption of authority by the Crown in 1858 brought no significant change in British policy towards India. Measures and policies adopted by British officials before the revolt of 1857 continued largely in force thereafter.[102] This was no less true in respect of official thinking towards Bhutan. The adoption of punitive sanctions, recommended before 1857 in

case Bhutan refused to comply with British demands, were endorsed after the mutiny by the Government of India.

In April 1859 the Bengal Government decided to try once again to elicit a response from the Bhutanese chiefs before deciding to take action against them. A long list of aggressions committed by the Bhutanese in the Duar area was submitted to the Governor General in Council. The continued imprisonment of Arung Singh figured prominently in the list of complaints as well as the Deb Raja's delaying tactics regarding his release.[103] In December 1859, Jenkins was informed that Arung Singh had died in captivity. On hearing the news, the Bengal Government decided to delay no longer but to take possession of Ambari Falakata; they also informed the Deb Raja that the territory would not be returned until full reparation had been made and the remaining Cooch Behar subjects surrendered forthwith.[104] Jenkins was opposed to what he considered was the Bengal Government's ill-informed leniency. He took matters into his own hands and secured permanent possession of the territory, at the same time threatening to seize further territory unless the Bhutanese complied with British demands. Nor did he consider it necessary to write to the Deb Raja, warning him of the occupation of the district, as he had been ordered to do. When the Bengal Government came to hear of it, they believed that Jenkins had exceeded his instructions, but since they had no intention of weakening his authority 'by disavowing what had been done, His Excellency in Council wished it to be understood that Government was not committed to a line of retributive coercion by going on to seize other lands'.[105] Jenkins' defence was that the occupation of the Duars would provide against any future disturbance occurring on the frontiers of Rangpur, Cooch Behar and Goalpara; to add weight to his argument he pointed to the case of the Assam Duars where, by allowing the Bhutanese a share of the revenue, they had abstained from any further violence which might have caused that share to be withheld. He hoped that the Bengal Government would agree to attach the Bengal Duars and apply the same measures to them. The Governor General, Lord Canning was not, for the present, prepared to endorse the proposal.[106]

In 1861, Captain Henry Hopkinson succeeded Jenkins as Agent on the North-East Frontier. The succession brought little change in the Indian Government's policy towards Bhutan, although the methods adopted were a shade more conciliatory. Where Jenkins had refused outright to make over the revenue from Ambari Falakata to Bhutan, Hopkinson qualified the refusal by making it conditional on the release of Cooch Behar subjects abducted from Indian territory. However, Hopkinson's correspondence on the subject with the Bhutanese authorities made little or no headway, and he found that dacoities in British and Cooch Behar territory continued as before. He came to believe that the Deb Raja was unable to meet his demands 'inasmuch as his authority was usurped by the frontier Governors, and their authority was again usurped by the local Soubahs, so that it was extremely doubtful whether our remonstrances ever reached the Deb Raja'.[107] Within months of his appointment, Hopkinson found himself endorsing the hard-line policy advocated by his predecessor. He now agreed that the only solution lay in

occupying the Bengal Duars under the same terms as the Assam Duars. Failing that the deputation of a mission to the Deb and Dharma Rajas would at least ensure that British Government views were made known to the two supreme authorities in the kingdom, particularly since there was enough evidence to prove that their functionaries had been in the habit of answering in the name of the Deb Raja. As Hopkinson saw it, a successful mission might terminate in the establishment of a permanent Agent at the Bhutanese Court, and 'such an Agency would be the best instrument for paving the way for friendly intercourse with Lhasa'.[108]

The Government of India ruled out the first suggestion, but were prepared to consider sending a mission to Bhutan. The advantage of a mission would be to provide an opportunity for acquiring first-hand information and, at the same time, explaining to the Bhutan authorities the consequences of openly defying the British Government. As a first step, a special messenger was to be despatched to the two Rajas announcing their intention of deputing an envoy. In July 1862, Hopkinson entrusted Mokundo Singh with a letter to the Deb and Dharma Rajas asking them to select a route for a British mission to Bhutan.[109] By November 1862, when after several months Mokundo Singh had still not returned, the Bengal Government assumed that either the letter or its reply had miscarried, and proposed that the mission should wait no longer and instead proceed to Bhutan via Darjeeling and Dalimkote, leaving to the Bhutan Government nothing beyond the choice of receiving or refusing to receive the mission.[110] The Government of India overruled the suggestion; having agreed to leave the selection of the route to Bhutan, it was their intention to await the return of the special messenger. When Mokundo Singh eventually returned in December 1862, he brought with him a reply from the Deb Raja alone. He reported that the Bhutan Government were greatly incensed by Cooch Behar's aggressions on Bhutanese territory, for which they partially held the British Government responsible. The Deb Raja expressed himself ready to receive an Agent from the Governor General to discuss the Assam Duars, but before doing so he wanted an assurance regarding the Ambari Falakata rent. On the other hand, Mokundo Singh had found the Dharma Raja averse to any envoy being sent to Bhutan and, in consequence, the Bhutan Darbar had agreed to send Zinkaffs to adjust the various disputes, but only when the weather permitted.[111]

It was left to the Bengal Government to put pressure on the Government of India to ignore the Deb Raja's evasive reply and to agree to send a mission to Bhutan via Darjeeling. The decision went against Bengal yet again; they were instructed to wait for the arrival of the Zinkaffs who would, no doubt, communicate the exact wishes of their masters. The Viceroy, Lord Elgin was particularly anxious not to raise a new question since he was far from convinced 'that the faults, as between the British residents on the Bootanese frontier and their neighbours, are by no means all on one side'.[112] Months passed and nothing more was heard of the Zinkaffs, nor were officers of the usual rank sent to receive Bhutan's share of the Assam Duar revenue. Once more the Bengal Government pressed for the despatch

of a mission from Darjeeling. To this the Government of India finally agreed.[113]

Eden's Mission to Bhutan, and its effects, 1863–64

Ashley Eden was appointed envoy to Bhutan in August 1863. His first duty was to explain to the Bhutan Government, in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, the circumstances which had rendered it necessary for the British Government to occupy Ambari Falakata. He was to emphasise that his government had no intention of occupying territory any longer than the Bhutan Government, by refusing compliance, rendered such occupation necessary. At the same time, the explanation was to be accompanied by a demand for the surrender of all captives held in Bhutan and the restoration of property carried off from British territory, including that of the Rajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar. Unless these demands were fully met, the British Government would not relinquish possession of Ambari Falakata. 'But if the Bootan Government manifest a desire to do substantial justice you will inform the Deb and Dhurm Rajas that, while retaining the management of the district, the British Government will pay an annual sum equal to one-third of the net revenues, in the same manner as is done with the Assam Dooars'. Wherever aggression occurred on the part of British subjects or the inhabitants of Cooch Behar, proof would be required and such redress given as the circumstances of the case called for. Eden was to seek a satisfactory arrangement for the rendition of criminals by both governments respectively; the Bhutan Government was to be made fully aware of the position of the protected states of Cooch Behar and Sikkim, and warned that any aggression committed against them would be viewed as an unfriendly act towards the British Government. He was to endeavour to secure free commerce between the subjects of Bhutan and India, and protection for travellers and merchants. During his travels, Eden was to obtain all the information available respecting the nature, population and resources of the country. To assist him in these endeavours, officers with special scientific attainments were to be attached to the mission. Above all, Eden was to secure the results of his mission in the form of a treaty.[114]

Eden took with him a draft treaty and instructions to reduce to written record any agreement negotiated with the Bhutan Government.[115] In the event of the Bhutan Government refusing to accede to the main terms of the treaty, Eden was to withdraw from Bhutan, informing the authorities there that their failure to complete the agreement would find the British Government prepared to annex Ambari Falakata permanently. There was to be no final decision regarding an agent in Bhutan until the results of the mission were known, but Eden tactfully was to sound the Bhutan Government as to whether such an appointment would be acceptable to them. He was to refrain from exerting pressure on the Bhutanese, particularly if there was the danger that it might negate the objects of the mission. A sum of Rs 10,000 was allocated to Eden for presents for the Deb and Dharma Rajas and the

subordinate Penlops, and these gifts were to be presented, with his credentials, before the start of negotiations.[116]

Besides Eden, the mission consisted of a military officer, an assistant to the envoy, a medical officer and the Chebu Lama.[117] In November 1863, the mission arrived in Darjeeling where Eden found himself marooned for more than a month, partly due to the Bhutanese refusal to receive the mission and partly to internal unrest in Bhutan itself. Eden reported that the Punakha Dzongpon[118] and the Tongsa Penlop had between them deposed the Deb Raja and, to all intents and purposes, the former had succeeded in claiming the Deb Raja's throne. The whole country was in a state of anarchy and confusion, and he feared that the Deb Raja's inability to control his subordinate chiefs would be used as an excuse for not receiving the mission. So long as the Deb Raja was not himself opposed to the mission, Eden believed that other difficulties could be dealt with. In view of a substantive government having been established, and the not unlikely desire of the new Deb Raja to cultivate an understanding with the British Government in order to strengthen his position, Eden was authorised to proceed forward into Bhutan.[119]

No sooner did the Bhutanese officials at the frontier realise that Eden intended to continue his journey into Bhutan, despite the Darbar's opposition, than they began putting every obstacle in his way. He began his journey without '. . . any sort of friendly communication from the Darbar, and not only without its assistance, but in spite of every obstruction, short of actual declared opposition, which suggested itself to the minds both of the supreme authorities and of every petty official who crossed our path'.[120] It was only the Chebu Lama's intervention that secured Eden enough porters to start off the mission on 1 January 1864. When the mission reached Dalimkote on 12 January, Eden had high hopes of a warm welcome from the Dalimkote Soubah, whose dependence on the Ambari Falakata revenue would, Eden was convinced, bring him out in favour of British intervention. However, the flogging of coolies who had deserted the mission and Eden's refusal to accede to the Soubah's request for their release found him stranded at Dalimkote. Before moving on, Eden was forced to abandon his tents, most of his baggage and about half of his escort because of the Soubah's opposition to lend a hand.[121]

It was clear from the outset that the Bhutanese had no intention of receiving him if they could help it. Eden, on the other hand, was determined to press on to the Bhutanese capital, where he was sure that a friendly reception awaited him and a government infinitely more willing to comply with British demands than the petty officials who were busy obstructing his advance. On arrival at Sipchoo, ten miles from Dalimkote, he found that news had travelled fast and the local Bhutanese officials refused to supply the mission either with porters or with food. Two courses remained open to Eden: either to cut his losses and return to India, or to leave behind most of his escort and his baggage and proceed to the Bhutanese court. In his opinion, Bhutanese tactics, obvious in the extreme, were merely there to discourage him, but no more. For, after all, the court had not openly refused to receive the mission; infact 'the Darbar

were most careful to impress upon me that they had not declined to receive me'.

As Eden insisted on moving his mission on to the small village of Saybee, he found the Zinkaffs waiting for him. They had brought with them two letters addressed to the Dalimkote Soubah. The first instructed the Soubah to settle differences regarding the frontier with Eden, without bringing in the Bhutanese Government's attitude to the mission. The second letter prescribed severe punishment for the Soubah for allowing the mission to advance into Bhutanese territory at all, and ordered him to persuade Eden to return to India. To the Soubah's entreaties, Eden turned a deaf ear; he informed him that he was intent on continuing the journey to Punakha and nothing would stop him from doing so.[122]

The mission left Saybee for Ha on 10 February 1864. By the time Eden reached Ha, the terrible weather conditions and difficult terrain had cost the mission, already heavily under-staffed, the lives of two of its porters. He also faced the unwelcome task of meeting the Chief Officer of the Paro Penlop and two special Commissioners sent by the Deb Raja to dissuade him from continuing his journey further into Bhutan. Weather conditions prevented their arrival, which Eden took to be a positive advantage, providing him with an opportunity to move the mission forward so as to meet the delegation on the other side of the Chula Pass. The Chief Officer's instructions were to return the mission to the frontier and there to re-assess the frontier boundaries and receive charge of the Assam Duars from Eden. Only after this had been done would Eden's request to proceed to Punakha be considered. Eden was furious; he threatened to proceed to Punakha without permission if need be. He insisted that if he was forced to return to Darjeeling he would report the Bhutan Government's unwillingness to receive the British Government's envoy. When the mission eventually arrived at Paro, without permission, Eden's reception was exceptionally hostile. Every difficulty was put in the way so as to prevent him proceeding on to the winter capital. Neither food nor porterage nor permission was forthcoming.[123]

For sixteen days the mission waited at Paro in the hopes of obtaining permission. While they waited, the Paro Penlop sent for the Chebu Lama and threatened him in 'unmeasured terms' for bringing the mission into Bhutan. They wanted Eden to discuss matters with the Paro Penlop and to go no further. Eden again declined the offer, maintaining that his discussions could only be with the supreme authority in Bhutan and with no one else.[124] On 10 March he decided to wait no longer for permission and set off on the final lap of his journey to Punakha. As he marched on, messengers arrived from the Darbar requesting him to return to Paro where senior members of the Bhutan Government would await him to discuss matters. Deaf to all persuasion, Eden carried on and five days later arrived at Punakha.

Although Eden had sent men on to announce his arrival, no one was there to receive him. The only notice taken of his arrival was a message asking the mission not to approach by the main road, 'but go down the side of the hill, and come in by a back road'. Once again the Bhutanese summoned the Chebu

Lama and abused him for his role in helping the mission into Bhutan. Two days were to elapse before Eden was granted an interview with the Amlah, or Council of Bhutan. Contrary to expectation, he found that none of the customary friendly ceremonies were observed, and the visit was one of mere formality. The Tongsa Penlop acted as spokesman for the Bhutan Government.

During the interview, the Bhutanese insisted that they would conduct negotiations only through the Chebu Lama. This Eden readily agreed to. His first move was to send them the draft treaty.[125] Under Article II, the Bhutanese were to agree to restore, within six months from the date of ratification of the treaty, all property plundered and to surrender all British subjects, as well as subjects of the Chiefs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar; Article III stipulated that when the Bhutan Government had surrendered all property and captives referred to in Article II, the British would agree to withdraw from Ambari Falakata and make it over to Bhutan. If the Bhutanese preferred, the alternative would be for them to accept an annual payment for Ambari Falakata and allow the British to occupy it permanently. Article IV agreed that, where British subjects had committed outrages in Bhutanese territory, the British Government, on being furnished with information regarding these acts, would agree to redress the wrong. In Article V, the British Government agreed to surrender all Bhutanese subjects provided the Bhutan Government put in writing the various crimes of which they were accused. By Article VI, the Bhutan Government was to agree to surrender British subjects accused of crimes who may have taken refuge in Bhutanese territory, and those having committed crimes in British territory, who had then fled to Bhutan. Under Article VII, the Bhutan Government was to agree to refer to arbitration all disputes against the Rajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar to the British Government, and to abide by their decision. The British Government, in turn, would insist on the observance of the decision by the Rajas of Cooch Behar and Sikkim. Under Article VIII, the Bhutan Government was to agree to the appointment of a British agent, and to special envoys which the British may find necessary to send to Bhutan from time to time. And finally, Article IX specified that there should be free trade and commerce between the two governments. No duties were to be levied on Bhutanese goods nor on British goods. Bhutanese subjects, residing in British territories and vice versa, would have equal justice in each other's territory.

Eden's demand for an audience with the Deb Raja was not granted until 20 March, when he found, much to his indignation, that he was not to be received inside the palace but in a small tent where the Amlah were gathered to hear his requests. Eden and members of the mission were ordered to 'sit on mats in the sun' and once again the Tongsa Penlop spoke on behalf of the Deb and Dharma Rajas. The discussion opened with the Tongsa Penlop proposing that the Assam Duars should be restored to him as soon as the treaty was signed, and that the whole of the revenue collected from them since the date of the resumption should be paid over to him by the British Agent in Assam. The sum was calculated to be in the region of three lakhs of rupees per annum.

Eden was adamant that the question of the Assam Duars was not under discussion and threatened the Amlah with the loss of other parts of their territory unless they complied with British demands. 'I pointed out that their conduct in agreeing to a treaty, continually urging me to have it copied and signed, and then at the last moment rejecting it, was quite incomprehensible, and I again and again explained to them that my powers were confined to the draft that I had already submitted'. Threats which had proved effective in Eden's dealings with local Bhutanese officials, utterly failed to impress the Tongsa Penlop. Infuriated by Eden's high-handed manner, he crumpled up the draft treaty, with the warning that he would regain possession of the Assam Duars, by force if necessary.[126]

Eden, in a Despatch, was to justify his behaviour by maintaining that the other Bhutanese chiefs were prepared to comply with British demands, and it was only the Tongsa Penlop who had proved recalcitrant. However, when next he met the Deb Raja and the other chiefs, the Tongsa Penlop repeated his demands and Eden found that not a voice was raised to contradict him.[127] On Eden's insistence that he would not accede to the Penlop's terms, he was publicly insulted and derided in front of the Bhutanese court.[128] Given the situation, he was left with no alternative but to swallow the insults and to agree to sign an agreement, by which the Government of India would restore the Assam Duars to Bhutan, deliver all Bhutanese slaves and political offenders to the Darbar, and agree not to encroach upon Bhutan territory.

On 29 March 1864, Eden was summoned to the presence of the Deb and Dharma Rajas to sign the agreement. The Tongsa Penlop produced three copies of the agreement. 'None of them were signed by anyone on behalf of the Booteah Government: the seal of a late Dhurma Rajah, and one purporting to be that of the Deb Rajah, had been affixed to one copy, but not to the others, and this even was not done in our presence'.[129] Eden signed and sealed two copies, and the Chebu Lama did the same. Eden added the words 'under compulsion' on each copy to prevent them being sent down to Assam and there being made use of before he had had time to communicate his side of the story to government. The Bhutanese appeared to have been unaware of the significance of these words and for them the treaty, as they claimed later, had been signed with all the necessary formalities of a voluntary agreement. They were to maintain that Eden had given no evidence of having signed the treaty under duress. Before departing on his ill-fated mission, Eden had been ordered not to accept gifts from the Bhutan Darbar except on a satisfactory conclusion of the mission; he chose to ignore his orders, and returned bearing those very gifts.

On his return, Eden informed his government of the failure of his mission. In his opinion, the treatment meted out to him and to the mission had proved beyond a doubt that the Bhutanese were incapable of living on terms of friendship with the British Government. A punitive policy had been determined upon in 1857, and only suspended on account of the breaking out of the mutiny; the time was ripe, Eden recommended, to implement that policy. 'The friendship of this Government has been deliberately rejected, and we have now no option as to the course we must pursue'.[130]

Sir John Lawrence, the Governor General, mildly censured Eden for his conduct. He believed that Eden had made no attempt to take stock of the situation for it was clear from the outset that the Bhutanese had no intention of receiving him and had done much to deter him from marching forward. Moreover, with a people such as the Bhutanese, for an envoy to go into the country at all would have required him to move with a force which would command respect. In Eden's case, he had 'lost his cattle, and his coolies were knocked up', and he should not, Lawrence thought, have risked the mission as he had done.[131] Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State, agreed that Eden's behaviour had lacked 'sound discretion' and that it would have been wiser to give up the mission after it arrived at Paro.

The Bhutanese made clear to Eden their objections to British Government policy regarding the Duars. Each annexation, followed as it was by financial demands which the Bhutan authorities invariably contested, gave rise to frequent depredations on the frontier. The fact that Eden went to secure the acceptance, by a treaty, of that very policy to which the Bhutanese had given every evidence that they had no intention of adhering unless the Assam Duars were returned unconditionally, ensured from the start the failure of the mission. On Eden's return, Sir John Lawrence repudiated the agreement since it had been signed under compulsion. He pledged his government to a policy of retribution, a policy which was to result in the Bhutan War.

The Anglo-Bhutan War and the 1865 Treaty, 1864–66

Eden's failure in Bhutan decided the Government of India to institute certain measures which would secure their rights in the whole of the Duar area and, at the same time, contain the Bhutanese on the border. It was evident that negotiations were not going to succeed if it meant Bhutan agreeing to dual responsibility in the Duars. Sir John Lawrence thought the best plan would be to punish the leading men of Bhutan in the hopes of neutralising their officials on the frontier. 'It is certain that when the rains are over, and the Bootanese have a respite from their own feuds, they will endeavour to renew their raids, if it were only to force us to pay them their share of the rent of the lands we hold on the Border'.[132] That being so, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal was to cease all payments for the Duars and other lands forthwith and suspend all communication with the Bhutanese authorities. Expeditions up the passes were to be organised with the view to attacking and punishing the chiefs responsible for allowing plunderers to issue from their lands or those who continued to give refuge to them.

Sir Charles Wood at the India Office considered the Indian Government's measures and the proposals drawn up by Eden. Eden's memorandum put forward three alternatives: the permanent occupation of the whole country; the temporary occupation of Bhutan, to be followed by withdrawal having destroyed all forts and having let 'the people see and feel our power'; or the permanent occupation of the Duars and Julpesh. Wood was against either the permanent or temporary occupation of Bhutan.[133] He saw no prospect of

establishing ordinary relations as 'exist between independent States' due to the unsettled state of affairs in Bhutan itself; nor did he believe that the appearance of an English force in the vicinity of the kingdom would solve the problem, but make it more difficult 'unless we were prepared to set up and establish in the Government of the country some of the more friendly or more powerful of the chiefs'. This, in effect, would practically result in another form of annexation, the disadvantages of which would far outweigh the advantages. In the first instance, the occupation of all the Duars was recommended by Wood, for he saw that 'It places us in a most advantageous position to deal with any Government which may be established, or with the chiefs by whose sanction or connivance the inroads of the plundering bands into the low country have been encouraged'.[134]

The Bengal Government began by withholding payment of Bhutan's share of the Duar revenue, and followed it by suspending all communication with the Bhutanese authorities. The police force on the frontier was strengthened and the civil and military authorites were advised that, in the event of outrages of a serious character occurring, expeditions were to be undertaken against the Bhutanese. 'The past history of this frontier proves very clearly that small bodies of our troops, led by officers of intelligence and energy, could readily in this way overawe the Bootanese, and secure the border'.[135] Following on these measures, the Viceroy wrote to the Deb and Dharma Rajas repudiating the agreement signed by Eden at Punakha. He also informed them that the district of Ambari Falakata, so far held in rent from the Bhutan Government, would henceforth be permanently annexed. The Bhutanese share of the revenue from the Assam Duars, amounting to Rs 10,000, would be forfeited. If all subjects of the British Crown, including those of Cooch Behar and Sikkim, were not surrendered forthwith, the Government of India would take whatever measures were called for to enforce these demands.[136]

Sir Cecil Beadon, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, made his first move by occupying all the passes on the frontier which bordered on Bhutan. He envisaged quite considerable benefits resulting from the occupation such as opening up a direct route to Sikkim and Tibet, at last freed from Bhutanese interference. The cultivation of tea would begin to yield a sizeable revenue free from Bhutanese inroads. For the present the Bengal Duars had been providing a revenue of Rs 100,000 per annum; Beadon estimated that, if properly administered, the revenue could exceed Rs 400,000. Out of this, the Bhutanese should be offered in the first instance Rs 24,000, with the promise of an increase to Rs 50,000, if and when they gave an undertaking to keep the peace.

While the Bengal Government waited for a reply from Bhutan, they made extensive preparations by mapping out the Himalayan ranges and valleys which formed the kingdom of Bhutan. Captain Godwin Austen, who had been employed on deputation with Eden's mission to Bhutan, was entrusted with the task. His survey report, accompanied by a map of western Bhutan, contained extensive notes on the government, religion and, above all, routes, not only into Bhutan but also those which led directly to Lhasa; these, he

claimed, he had managed to obtain from 'native sources'.[137] E H J Lance, Assistant Commissioner of Cooch Behar, submitted a memorandum on the Duars of Bhutan outlining in detail their jurisdiction, their revenue capabilities and their relative strategic importance.[138] All this information it was hoped would come in useful when operations began against Bhutan, as now seemed certain. By the time the Dharma Raja had replied to the demands of the Government of India, he found them in no mood to listen to his protestations. He explained that when Eden had signed the agreement, he had not complained of ill-treatment nor had he refused to sign. In his view, Eden's version did not accord with the facts. He offered to send an envoy of his own to sort out the problems relating to the Duar revenue, or if that was not acceptable to the Indian Government, '. . . send me an envoy, with full power to agree to everything, in December next, and we can then settle the wishes of both parties'.[139] The Viceroy interpreted Bhutan's response as a time-wasting ploy, to encourage hope when it was evident that they had no intention of complying with British demands. He called attention to the fact that the Deb Raja, in whose name all communications to the British Government were usually addressed, had carefully avoided replying, whilst that of the Dharma Raja brought no positive suggestions and consequently was of an extremely unsatisfactory character.[140]

Sir John Lawrence saw no other possibility but to enforce the Government of India's demands and to do so by securing effective control of the passes from Dewangiri in the east to Dalimkote in the west. The security of the Indian line of the frontier was to be the first priority; to put this into effect, the posts selected were to command the passes into the plains but were not to be pushed further northwards into 'indisputable Bhutanese territory'. The main essential was the occupation of the Bengal Duars with as little encroachment on mountain territory as possible. Even if the Bhutan Government, however reluctantly or late, were to agree to the Government of India's demands, the Viceroy did not contemplate the restoration of the Bengal Duars to Bhutan. Since the annexation of the Duars would press heavily on the limited means of the Bhutan Government, the Viceroy was not averse to allowing the Bhutanese a moderate and fixed grant from the surplus revenue of the Duars, but only on condition if effective steps were taken to liberate British subjects, to restore plundered property, and to observe treaty obligations. It was hoped that by these measures 'the periodical payment of such a grant direct into the coffers of the Bootan rulers would materially strengthen their hands and increase our influence'.[141] In due course of time the advantages to be derived from a freer intercourse with India, would be apparent to the Deb and Dharma Rajas and lead them to see the unwisdom of their ways and 'to entertain more amicable relations with the British Government'.

On 12 November 1864, a Proclamation went forth from the Viceroy. In Bhutan, it was to be issued only when British troops entered the Bengal Duars.[142] The demand was for the Bhutan Government to surrender all the Bengal Duars and the hill territory on the left bank of the Tista river, up to such points on the watershed of the lower range of hills as the British

Commissioner laid down. The Bhutanese were to give up the two documents extorted from Eden, and send a chief of suitable rank to make apologies for their flagrant misconduct to the British envoy. The Bhutanese were to surrender all captives still detained in Bhutan against their will, and they were to agree to enter into a treaty of friendship and fair dealing for the future. If the Bhutan Government were prepared to treat on these conditions, the British Government would be willing to give them an annual grant of not less than Rs 25,000, to be increased with reference to the prosperity of the tract, to Rs 50,000. The grant was to depend entirely on the will and pleasure of the British Government and the proper behaviour of the Bhutanese. The tract to be permanently annexed would include the forts of 'Dallingkot, Pasakha, and Dewangiri, as may be necessary to command the passes'. A British military force would proceed to occupy the tract. The boundary between 'the territories of the Queen of England and those of Bootan will be surveyed and marked off, and the authority of the Government of Bootan within this boundary, will cease forever'.

The progress of the Bhutan War can be summarised into five well-marked stages: the occupation of the Bengal Duars by the British forces, the retaliatory attack by the Bhutanese, the British counter-attack, the invasion of Bhutan, and the last campaign of the Tongsa Penlop. The British advance began in the last week of November 1864. The British forces were under the command of Brigadier-General Malcaster and Brigadier-General Dunsford.[143] The plan of operations was to occupy the four strategically important places in the Duars, namely Dewangiri, Sidlee, Buxa and Dalimkote. When operations first began, superior arms, planning and troop concentrations allowed the British force to sweep through to the Bhutanese strongholds. At Dalimkote they were strongly resisted by the ill-equipped Bhutanese, but for the most part opposition was not of a consistent nature so as to prevent the Duars falling into British hands. By January 1865, the military occupation of the Bengal Duars was complete and British troops were able to withdraw, leaving the annexed territory in the hands of the civil authorities and a small contingent of troops.

The Deb Raja and the Tongsa Penlop were not prepared to accept the annexation without protest. They wrote jointly to the British officer commanding Dewangiri asking him to vacate the place or face forcible eviction by their troops.[144] On receiving a negative response, the Tongsa Penlop on 30 January 1865 put his threat into action, swept down into Dewangiri and attacked the British contingent. By 4 February, British troops were totally surrounded and their lines of communication with the plains cut off. Captain Cunliffe, in charge of Dewangiri, had no option but to retreat, which he did leaving behind arms and ammunition, and many wounded.[145] Similar attacks occurred all along the Duar frontier, and for a time the British ranks were in complete disarray. Generals Malcaster and Dunsford were replaced by Brigadier-General Tombs and Brigadier-General Frazer-Tytler to help stem the tide of British defeats. Sir Charles Wood accused Sir Cecil Beadon of having been over-optimistic in his general assessment of Bhutan's capabilities.[146]

British reverses during the early stages of the war encouraged the Bhutanese to believe that they stood a good chance of expelling the British altogether from Bhutan. The Deb Raja put in an early bid, demanding compensation for the losses his men had suffered during the war, as a pre-requisite for making peace. The Government of India had no intention of agreeing to his demands, and decided to take immediate steps to reinforce the remaining posts still in their possession and to recapture those they had been forced to evacuate. It was not until March 1865 that the British force was able to deliver its counter-attack.

The plan of operation was delayed due to differences of opinion regarding the best moment to begin the recapture of Dewangiri. Henry Hopkinson, Agent to the Governor General and Commissioner of Assam, wanted to postpone the operation until the following winter; Sir Cecil Beadon favoured an immediate attack so as to provide a leverage in any future negotiations with the Deb Raja. While the British argued about the best moment to attack, overtures for peace were being made from the Bhutanese side. The Paro Penlop wrote on 22 January 1865 deploring the unprovoked attack on Bhutan, but also asking for negotiations and a peaceful settlement of differences. A few weeks later on 17 February, the Dalimkote Soubah, together with other Soubahs, arrived unofficially, or so they claimed, at Balla to meet Colonel Haughton, the Political Agent. They had come to seek a solution and also to ascertain British intentions.[147] Haughton believed that the Bhutanese overture was merely another ruse, aimed at gaining time while they re-grouped their forces. He recommended that preparations for renewing hostilities should go forward immediately.

On 15 March 1865, General Tytler attacked Balla and occupied it. A week later he took the other two Bhutanese strongholds of Buxa and Chamurchi and subsequently re-entered Dewangiri, capturing it on 2 April.[148] With the fall of Dewangiri to British troops there followed a lull in hostilities, which was to last throughout the summer of 1865. During this time, the Bhutanese authorities sent various envoys to negotiate for the return of their territory. To all of which, the Government of India turned a deaf ear. 'They have accordingly made overtures for peace more than once, but the basis on which they are willing to treat, viz., the surrender of the Bengal Dooars, being inadmissable, these overtures have come to nothing. It is the general opinion that they are really in no wise desirous of coming to terms on any other conditions'.[149]

In spite of the Viceroy's strong response, he was not keen on continuing the war since it was proving a heavy drain on both men and resources. Originally it had been anticipated that comparatively small garrisons, some of them merely police, would suffice for the security of the hill forts, but the reverse had been found necessary. In fact a considerable body of police had been required to guard the plains, while the number of troops held in reserve had also been found to be greater than anticipated. The question of expenditure, due to the nature of the operations, had shown no signs of lessening. After full consideration of these difficulties, it was Sir John Lawrence's opinion that the

only solution was to despatch an expedition into the interior of Bhutan, in order to force the Bhutanese into submission. 'We must either undertake such an expedition, or confine ourselves to the present system, with its cost of life and money, attended with no counterbalancing results'. The Secretary of State gave his consent to the proposal with the proviso that it would be more advantageous to strike a blow at the Tongsa Penlop rather than at the Deb or the Dharma Rajas.[150]

Throughout the summer of 1865 various overtures, some persuasive, others more intimidating, were made to the Deb and Dharma Rajas in the hopes that they would see sense and come to terms, thus avoiding a British advance to Punakha.[151] While they attempted to negotiate, the British made preparations to move the expedition forward by the construction of roads to the Buxa ridge and beyond. On 4 October 1865 the order was given for the advance to begin via Buxa and Dewangiri.[152] The Bhutanese forces were no match for the superior British troops; the successful outcome of the military operations against the Bhutanese forced the Deb Raja to seek a negotiated settlement. The terms offered were those issued in the Proclamation of 12 November 1864,[153] where it had been emphasised 'that nothing short of your absolute submission and the acceptance of the terms therein laid down will avert hostilities'.[154] On 6 November 1865 the four conditions which had been laid down by the Government of India as prerequisites to peace were accepted by the Deb Raja.

The treaty of peace which followed was signed on 11 November 1865.[155] It came to be known as the Treaty of Sinchula, although referred to by the Bhutanese as the Ten-Article Treaty of Rawa Pani.[156] It was a landmark in the history of Bhutan's relations with British India. From then on, the Bhutanese resigned themselves to the necessity of coming to terms with their adversary in India. The full effect of the Treaty was to withdraw from Bhutan the whole of the sub-Himalayan tract of the Bengal Duars and to make the Bhutan Government dependent on merely a portion of the revenue. '. . . by thus allowing the chiefs of Bhootan some portion of the income arising from the Dooars, we possess a powerful guarantee for their good behaviour, and are simply carrying out a policy which has proved eminently successful in many instances in Central India and in the Punjab, and which has been adopted with good results even in Bengal'.[157] The hostile operations mounted during the seizure of Dalimkote, Dewangiri, Balla and the heights of Buxa ridge together with their successful outcome had a salutary effect on the Bhutanese authorities. Except for one further occasion, the constant dissension which had hitherto marked Anglo-Bhutanese relations was to cease altogether.

The Treaty went far beyond the four points for peace originally offered before the offensive began against Bhutan. Article I aimed at establishing perpetual peace and friendship between the two governments; by Article II, the Bhutan Government agreed to cede the whole of the tract known as the 18 Duars, bordering on the districts of Rangpur, Cooch Behar and Assam, together with the district of Ambari Falakata and the hill territory on the left bank of the Tista, and up to such points as might be laid down by the British

Commissioner appointed for the purpose; under Article III, the Bhutanese agreed to surrender all British subjects, as well as Cooch Behar and Sikkim subjects, detained in Bhutan; by Article IV, the Bhutan Government agreed to receive an annual allowance from the British Government under specified conditions: Rs 25,000 on the fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty, Rs 35,000 on the 10 January following the first payment, Rs 45,000 on the following 10 January, and Rs 50,000 on every succeeding 10 January; Article V permitted the British Government to suspend payment of the compensation in the event of misconduct on the part of the Bhutanese; under Article VI, the Bhutan Government agreed to surrender British subjects accused of any crimes specified in Article V, who took refuge in Bhutanese territory, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, having commited crimes in British territory, should flee into Bhutanese territory; Article VII referred arbitration of all disputes against the Rajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar to the British Government and thereafter the Bhutan Government was to abide by their decision; Article VIII stipulated that if the British Government found it necessary to appoint an agent in Bhutan, the Bhutanese Government would receive him. They would also agree to receive special envoys which the British Government might find necessary to depute to Bhutan; and Article IX agreed to allow free trade and commerce to exist between the two governments. No duties were to be levied on Bhutanese goods imported into British territory or on British goods imported into Bhutan. Bhutanese subjects residing in British territory were to have equal justice with British subjects residing in Bhutan.

The Deb Raja initially refused to ratify the Treaty until Article II and Article IX had been withdrawn. Both clauses dealt with the question of Indo-Bhutanese boundaries, the latter clause going so far as to permit access into Bhutanese territory under the guise of free trade. He also refused to accept that a British Commissioner should be appointed to mark the boundary. In his view, permission to allow subjects of the two governments to come and go as they pleased across the frontier would result 'in a breach of the peace'. 'I have therefore struck out the whole of the 9th Article, and hope that the trade will only be transacted on the frontier'.[158] Under threat of renewed hostilities, the Deb Raja finally gave in and ratified the Treaty 'without reservation' in December 1865.[159]

In 1841, the British had annexed the Duar territory along the Assam-Bhutan border. By the Treaty of Sinchula they were able to annex permanently the Bengal Duars as well. This transaction alone lost the Bhutanese 220 miles of border territory and a major source of their revenue. The Duars were subsequently to become one of the main tea-growing areas of India and to acquire great economic importance. The terms of the 1865 Treaty permitted the British Government to establish a protectorate of sorts over Bhutan by assuming responsibility for Bhutan's external relations with the states of the Indian sub-continent. The agreement made no mention of Tibeto-Bhutanese or Sino-Bhutanese relations; the Government of India appears to have assumed that these would continue as before.

One last authority in Bhutan refused to accept the imperial edict and

continued to stand out against British power. It was the Tongsa Penlop. He chose to ignore British demands that guns captured by his troops during the retreat from Dewangiri should be returned. Nor was he prepared to deliver up the treaty 'extorted at Poonakha under your superintendence from Mr Eden'. He argued that since he did not subscribe to the terms of the treaty negotiated with the Deb Raja, the British had no authority to compel him to hand back the captured guns or the treaty. He demanded, instead, separate negotiations and a separate share of the allowance made to the Deb Raja. There was no question in the Viceroy's mind that the Tongsa Penlop should not be allowed to defy the British Government's demands and directed 'the two British armies now above Buxa and Dewangiri to that point where the guns may now be'.[160] On 4 February 1866, an expedition marched out of Dewangiri to quell the Tongsa Penlop's insurrection.[161] The expedition was more in the form of a raid rather than a regular campaign, and the Tongsa's forces, surprised by the speed of the operations, were forced to admit defeat and surrendered in February 1866.[162]

Anglo-Bhutanese relations: demarcation of the Indo-Bhutan frontier, 1867–72

In the Government of India's view the operations of 1864–65 had brought about a tranquil frontier with the added bonus that the peoples of Sikkim and Cooch Behar could now look forward to being protected from the 'misconduct of the Booteah rulers'. For the Bhutanese it was a severe set-back, the only consolation being that the British had not insisted on any form of permanent representation in Bhutan. The result of which was that they were in no position to interfere in internal Bhutanese politics, nor were they averse to Bhutan maintaining an isolationist stance, so long as it did not interfere in any way with British commercial interests in the Duars. The 1865 Treaty did, however, bring Bhutan's trading interests into conflict with those of the Government of India. The fact that the Bhutanese authorities were in no position, due to the terms of the recent Treaty, to impose restrictions or taxes on incoming goods from India merely confirmed Bhutan's suspicion that her place in the wider imperialist design was in the category of a protected Princely State.

It was not long thereafter that an incident occurred which brought into focus the Bhutan Government's reluctance to accept Article IX of the Sinchula Treaty. The Deb Raja himself had protested against it and it was obvious that the Bhutanese were not going to allow free trade across the frontier if they could possibly help it. As a result, the authorities closed the main artery leading into the interior of Bhutan at Chuka Bridge.[163] As soon as Colonel Haughton, Commissioner of Cooch Behar, came to know that the road had been closed to outside use, he wrote off to remonstrate against the closure and pointed out that the measure went against the terms of the Sinchula Treaty. The Bhutanese chose not to reply. Haughton advised the Government of India

to withhold the annual subsidy until an explanation had been given and an assurance offered that the road would be reopened and not arbitrarily closed in the future. On his advice, the annual subsidy was withheld.[164]

The removal of the subsidy hit the Bhutanese chiefs financially hard and it was not long before they sent an officer for discussions only to find that Haughton found his rank unsuitable. Article IV of the 1865 Treaty had provided for an officer of specific rank to be deputed to receive the subsidy. The Deb and Dharma Rajas insisted that the officer they had sent was their accredited representative, but for Haughton nothing 'below the rank of Jungpen' would do. When finally a Dzongpon did arrive for discussions at Buxa on 8 February 1868, a further complication had arisen. Haughton now maintained that payment of the subsidy could only take place at Darjeeling, and then only after a satisfactory explanation had been given regarding the closure of the road.[165] To Bhutanese protests that such arrangements were not part of the 1865 Agreement, Haughton turned a deaf ear. He insisted that the road at Chuka Bridge would first have to be reopened before the question of subsidy could be considered. It was not until October 1868 that Haughton, having been assured that the bridge was finally open, agreed for the subsidy to be paid.[166]

Within Bhutan itself, the rivalries which had existed amongst the subordinate chiefs of the kingdom long before the conflict with the British arose, surfaced once again. In the 1869 civil war, the Tongsa and Paro Penlops together with the Dzongpon of Punakha rebelled against the Deb Raja and the Wangdiphodrang Dzongpon. While they battled for supremacy, both sides approached the British for help in their struggle with each other. The Government of India stood firm and refused to intervene in the internal affairs of the state. By now a curious change had taken place in the Tongsa Penlop's attitude to the British. In the past, he had often provoked a conflict with them but, following his defeat in 1865, he appeared to have realised that his own future and that of Bhutan would be best served if he remained on good terms with the Government of India.[167] By the time he emerged victorious from the last civil war in Bhutan in 1889, the British Government were able to count on him to use his influence during their hostilities with Tibet, and for him to accept their guiding hand when China's overtures seemed most pressing. In return, he saw to it that Bhutan's relations with the British were in no way endangered, and that fellow chiefs remained 'thoroughly amicable' towards them.[168]

The policy of non-intervention adopted by the Government of India, while sustaining the use of the subsidy, had been elaborated upon by the Secretary of State after the Bhutan War. He had approved the policy of cash payment by the Indian Government on the grounds that the measure would force the Bhutanese into accepting an enduring peace on the frontier or alternatively facing bankruptcy. At the same time, it would afford protection to the inhabitants of the frontier. He did not think it 'desirable to impoverish Bhutan by absorbing the entire revenue of the Duar, for it would deprive the Government of the means of enforcing its authority over its chiefs and

functionaries. Moreover, by non-payment of the stipulated sums in the event of any infraction of the terms of the treaty or commission of acts hostile to the peace and security of the frontier, you will hold in your hands a material guarantee for the good conduct of the Bhutan Government and for the due observance of the treaty'.[169]

Although the main aim of British policy was to keep out of involvement in Bhutan's internal affairs, frontier officials, on the other hand, pressed for a permanent channel of communication to be established with the Bhutan Government. It was their opinion that unless a sustained attempt was made to get the Bhutanese to observe the terms of the 1865 Treaty, the Darbar would continue to default. Haughton wanted a Bhutanese Agent to be appointed in India to whom the Government of India would make a sumptuary allowance, both for his residence and expenditure. He nominated his personal interpreter, Fentook, for the post recommending him for his knowledge of Bhutanese affairs and for the fact that he had been closely involved in negotiations between Haughton and the Bhutan authorities since 1864. The Bhutanese readily fell in with the suggestion and the Bengal Government sanctioned his appointment in June 1870.[170] The Indian Government were not entirely happy with the appointment, since it meant that a British appointee was responsible for Bhutanese affairs on the frontier; they had to wait until 1876 when Bhutan appointed its own national to the office of Bhutan Agent.

The appointment of Fentook solved one problem at the very least; it meant that the Government of India could now deal directly with the Deb Raja, and safely ignore the overtures made by the various Penlops asking to depute their agents separately. Attempts to establish such dealings arose in 1868 when the Paro Penlop attempted to depute his agent to Dhumsong to look after his personal interests there.[171] Haughton was for accepting the proposal, but was overruled by the Government of India. In their view, the Penlop's representative could not act for the Bhutan Government, particularly since the Deb Raja was the sole dispenser of the annual subsidy and that measure had already been accorded official recognition. When, in 1882, the Tongsa Penlop this time laid claim to a share of the subsidy, offering in exchange two Bhutanese offenders sought by the Bengal Government, he was informed that all communications to the Indian Government must be channelled through the Deb Raja.[172]

While the Government of India supported the Deb Raja against the demands of the Penlops and the Dzongpons, it also held him responsible for the actions of his subordinate chiefs, their officials and for the activities of his subjects on the frontier. Article VI of the 1865 Treaty, which specified the surrender of British and Bhutanese offenders under pain of loss of subsidy, was summarily brought into use whenever a disagreement arose. In 1874, the Government of India accused the Bhutanese of allowing dacoities to be committed in India and put forward a demand for Rs 1,000 by way of compensation. The Bhutan Government offered to look into the matter and report back in due course; but, instead, found that the Viceroy had authorised the Commissioner of Cooch Behar to deduct the money from the annual payment.[173] The ultimate

financial control of the subsidy provided the Indian Government with an effective weapon; no longer did it pay the Bhutan Darbar to ignore its subjects' misdemeanours or to prevaricate.

The root of much of the dissension on the border lay in the undemarcated Indo-Bhutanese frontier. During the Bhutan War the prime objective had been the annexation of all the Duars, and as a result little or no attention had been given to establishing anything more than a strategic frontier. It remained 'undefined and of uncertain character'. It found both local British officials, and their opposite numbers in Bhutan, unwilling to hand over persons responsible for offences committed in their respective areas. The Deb Raja wrote repeatedly to the British authorities complaining that criminals from India were involved in stealing men and cattle and thereafter selling them back to the Bhutanese people.[174] By 1867, the Bhutan Government, finding themselves constantly under threat of not only having the subsidy withheld but facing bankruptcy as well, came to realise that it was essential to secure a permanent definition to a boundary between Bhutan and British-India.

The Treaty of 1865 had ceded to the British Government the tract known as the 18 Duars, which bordered on the districts of Rangpur, Cooch Behar and Assam, together with the *talooka*[175] of Ambari Falakata and the hill country on the left bank of the Tista river. The rest of the boundary between Bhutan and eastern Bengal and Assam remained undemarcated. At the time of the treaty General Tytler and Colonels Bruce and Agnew had set out in a memorandum their views on the precise line of boundary to be followed on the frontier. They recommended '. . . that the boundary line be drawn so as to include within British territory the mountain tract which lies between the rivers Teesta and Jhaldaka, and extends northward as far as the frontiers of Sikkim and Thibet. We are of the opinion that, besides this, no part of the hill territory of Bootan should be annexed, except so much as is requisite for the establishment of our military frontier posts'.[176]

The work of surveying the boundary between Bhutan and India began in 1867. Colonel Haughton, Chief Commissioner of the Division, laid down the guidelines for the Indian Survey Department. No territory which could be called a hill tract was to be included, but all lands in the plains were to be demarcated, so far as was practicable; the boundary was to include the tribal people of the Duars but was to exclude all Bhutanese cultivators. Differences of opinion arose between the Bengal Government and the Government of India regarding the interpretation of the actual boundary alignment. Bengal contended that the Assam Duars, annexed in 1841, had not been demarcated and that those in Cooch Behar had merely been included in a survey of 1867. The Government of India overruled Bengal's quibble over the Assam Duars and recognised that the boundary alignment as set out by the 1865 Treaty was the correct one.

Differences of interpretation also arose between Sir William Grey, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, and Colonel Agnew, Commissioner of Assam, relating to the extent of the demarcation already carried out. Agnew argued that the boundary had been settled in 1866; the Bengal Government, however,

pointed to current Bhutanese claims to Dewangiri as proof that British administration had not been established in the area. In their view a distinction existed between the Assam Duars, annexed in 1841, and those of Cooch Behar, ceded in 1865. The latter had been actually demarcated on the ground during the 1867–68 survey, while the former had not been demarcated at all. The 1865 correspondence had merely stated 'a direction along the foot of the hills', which could in no sense be taken as a distinct boundary definition.

The Government of India's insistence that no distinction had been made between the 18 Duars at the time of their annexation in 1865 went far towards refuting Bengal's interpretation that some of these Duars had been obtained in 1841. It was now laid down that the Indo-Bhutanese boundary was to follow the line defined in 1865, although, if necessary, the lower areas in the Bhutan hills could be attached for purposes of security and permanence of the Indo-Bhutanese frontier. To include more territory into India would merely impoverish the Bhutan Government and give rise to disputes on the frontier yet again.[177] The obvious solution lay in demarcating the remainder of the boundary as soon as possible.

In September 1872, Major Graham, Deputy Commissioner of Durrung, was appointed Boundary Commissioner. He was to act in conjunction with a representative of the Bhutan Government.[178] When the Deb Raja was approached to appoint an official to assist in the demarcation, they found him opposed to anything more than a readjustment of the boundary. Any demarcation in the hills of Bhutan he was not prepared to sanction or to participate in.[179] As a result, the work of demarcating the Assam-Bhutan boundary was carried out by Major Graham alone and settled unilaterally in 1872–73. Dewangiri and the tract of land lying between the rivers Deea and Matunga were marked off in the north by the erection of pillars, and all of it was declared Indian territory.[180]

While Graham was demarcating the boundary of Dewangiri, he came across a Zinkaff collecting taxes from the people of the area. On enquiry, it was found that he had been appointed by the Tongsa Penlop. Once again the Deb Raja was warned by Bengal that the 1865 Agreement held him responsible for the Tongsa Penlop, and unless the Zinkaff's activities ceased forthwith, the subsidy would be withdrawn until satisfaction had been secured. The question of Dewangiri highlights the problem of the Indo-Bhutan frontier. Dewangiri had been attached in 1865 after the Bhutan war, yet the Bengal Government had done nothing to establish British administration in the area. Even before Graham had come across the Zinkaff, the annual visits by the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup to collect government taxes had revealed the inhabitants' reluctance to submit to his demands, particularly when they found that no benefits accrued to themselves. In fact, the Commissioner had discovered the Bhutanese collecting separate taxes from the inhabitants and also from the indigenous labour which worked the forests on the borders of Kamrup. When approached, neither the Bhutanese authority nor the local inhabitants had any wish to change the system to suit British administration.

By these border alignments the aim was to give as permanent a character as possible to the Indo-Bhutanese boundary. It was hoped that when differences arose, they would be settled either by outright acquisition of land by one side or the other, or by reference to boundaries laid down in 1867–68, and again in 1872–73. For instance, when in 1887 it was proposed to ask the Bhutan Government to cede a piece of land on the boundary between Bhutan and the Jalpaiguri border, the Bengal Government was unable to question the correctness of the boundary since its demarcation had already been accepted by the Government of India. Instead negotiations were allowed with the Bhutan authorities as to the terms on which the land could be purchased. Rs 10,000 was to secure the area.[181] The only other boundary change resulted in 1892, when the old boundary between Bhutan and Jalpaiguri was delimited for the first time.[182] By these well-defined boundary limits, the Indian Government hoped to avoid differences which had hitherto bedevilled frontier relations. They were able to reassure Bhutan that they did not intend to interfere in her internal affairs and, since the frontier had been settled to their satisfaction, they would not intrude within her boundary limits either. The various changes, both external and internal, which the 1865 Treaty had brought about in Bhutan, was well suited to the British concept of a buffer state: a buffer zone with its own autonomous government to which they owed little or no responsibility, but over which they exercised considerable influence in respect to foreign relations and trade.

Neutrality in relation to Bhutan's internal affairs, 1873–98

During the years between 1866 and 1898, Bhutan was riven with three civil wars. The first was in 1868–69, the second in 1877 and the third in 1884–85. During these recurring internecine wars, the Government of India followed a policy of non-intervention, in spite of repeated appeals for help by the various factions concerned. The first conflict arose as a result of a dispute between the Wangdiphodrang Dzongpon and the Puna Dzongpon. The former appealed to the Deputy Commissioner of Goalpara for assistance, and true to Bengal Government tradition, his request was turned down. When in 1869 the authorities found the Bhutanese Agent at Buxa recruiting Nepalese subjects and purchasing ammunition to support the conflict in Bhutan, he was ordered to leave India immediately. Local British officials were instructed to prevent Bhutanese political refugees from seeking asylum in Indian territory, or permitting them to reside anywhere near the Bhutan frontier. At the same time, the Government of India were not totally averse to Colonel Haughton acting as arbitrator in the dispute, provided the two sides agreed beforehand to abide by his decision. The suggestion, however, did not have the approval of the Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll,[183] who insisted that Indian Government policy should be to observe strict neutrality in all matters concerning Bhutan's internal affairs.[184]

In 1877, the second civil war broke out in Bhutan when the Punakha

Dzongpon raised the standard of revolt against the Deb Raja. After months of strife, the rebellion was crushed and the Paro Penlop with the Punakha Dzongpon fled into Indian territory. The Deb Raja wrote to the British authorities demanding the return of the two chiefs and, at the same time, reminding them of their treaty obligations to him not to give refuge to fugitives from justice from Bhutan. He also mentioned his meeting in 1875 at Buxa with Sir Richard Temple, then Lieutenant Governor of Bengal who had assured him of help in the event of a rebellion in Bhutan. Sir Ashley Eden, however, had now become Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, and he firmly refused to involve his government in Bhutan's internal affairs. Rather, he invoked the 1865 Treaty whereby only criminal offenders were to be surrendered to the Bhutan Government and he did not think that the Paro Penlop and the Punakha Dzongpon fell into that category. He proposed to allow the two chiefs to stay in India provided they gave an assurance that they would not use Indian territory for subversive activities against the Bhutan State. For the next two years, the Bhutanese rebels were permitted to reside at Darjeeling. During this time, the Bengal Government gave them financial help in return for an undertaking not to have any communication with the insurgents in Bhutan.[185] There is no evidence to suggest that they actually held them to that undertaking. However, at the end of that time, a change in political affairs and the management of Bhutan permitted their return.

The third civil war broke out in October 1884. The two factions consisted of the Deb Raja, the Thimphu Dzongpon and the Punakha Dzongpon on one side, while on the other were ranged the Tongsa and Paro Penlops and various other local Dzongpons. The ostensible cause of the dispute was the Tongsa Penlop's complaint that his share of the British subsidy had been withheld by the Thimphu Dzongpon. To secure the subsidy, the Tongsa Penlop captured Simtokha Dzong, the Thimphu Dzongpon's stronghold, in May 1885. A fortnight later the contending parties held a meeting to consider terms; while the meeting was in progress the Tongsa Penlop's adherents attacked the opposing party, killing some of the Thimphu Dzongpon's men and wounding the Punakha Dzongpon himself. The Thimphu Dzongpon and his followers fled to Tibet and appealed to the Tibetans and the Chinese Amban, who promptly summoned a conference at Phari to investigate the causes of the dispute. Both Penlops refused to attend. A Sino-Tibetan force then assembled on the Bhutanese border, and the Tongsa Penlop decided to make his peace. Not so the Paro Penlop, who continued to defy the Chinese until he was surrounded, and promptly committed suicide. The Chinese believed that by their intervention, Bhutan was restored 'under our bit and bridle' and 'the preying designs of grasping people [the British] were put a stop to, so that it became possible to restore tranquillity and content upon the border lands and so strengthen our frontier line'.[186]

By the time the civil war had ended the Tongsa Penlop had managed to secure his position and emerged as the undisputed ruler of Bhutan. The end of the war also saw the resignation of the Deb Raja and the tussle that arose for his successor. The Tongsa Penlop seized the moment and to consolidate his

position against his political rivals decided to fill the vacancy of Deb Raja with his personal nominee. Initially, the decision went against his candidate, whereupon the Tongsa seized the Deb Raja's seal thereby denying to the selection the ultimate recognition; it meant that the Darbar was left with no alternative but to keep the office in abeyance. Within a month the selection process was brought forward again, and this time he was able to fill the vacancy with his nominee, Yangpi Lopon Pam Sangye Dorji.[187]

Throughout the years of conflict within Bhutan itself, the Government of India firmly held to its policy of non-interference in the state's internal affairs. The conflict itself, however, brought forward the emergence of Tibetan and Chinese involvement. The Indian Government could not ignore Chinese interference in Bhutan, especially when frontier officials were providing proof that the steady increase in Chinese influence was resulting in border incidents. On the other hand, they recognised that the Chinese Amban had been invited to intervene by the Deb Raja himself and, consequently, were in no position to forbid the invitation. Nor did the Indian Government have a free hand with the Secretary of State in London, dependent as he was in his decisions regarding China on the broader spectrum of British foreign policy in Europe. In 1886, Whitehall feared that they might end up at war with Russia, and would then need to appease China in the hopes of securing her as an ally against Russian expansionism in Central Asia. Moreover, there was also the question of Indo-Tibetan trade to consider, which, in their view, could not hope to flourish without Chinese co-operation.[188]

As India debated whether to intervene in Bhutan or not, another conference was convened in early 1886 by the Amban and the Tibetans and which was held in the Chumbi valley. The occasion was the conferring on various Bhutanese chiefs 'the Chinese insignia of rank, a symbol of Chinese supremacy'. The direct outcome of this meeting was, more than anything, to sway the Maharaja of Sikkim towards China and Tibet.[189] It appeared to have left the Bhutanese unmoved; in fact it proved to be the last occasion on which China was to try and intervene in Bhutan, for the eventual emergence of the Tongsa Penlop as supreme ruler found him closely allied with the British in India. From there on, the Indian Government saw to it that any further Chinese moves towards Bhutan, and there were some, were dealt with by the Political Officer in Sikkim and not by the Bhutan Darbar.

The Macaulay Mission and Bhutan, 1885–86

During 1885, the Bengal Government made strenuous efforts to promote Indo-Tibetan trade. Colman Macaulay, Financial Secretary to the Bengal Government, had visions of reviving the Tibetan policy of Warren Hastings. He had managed, during a visit to London, to persuade Lord Randolph Churchill, the Secretary of State, to agree to send a mission to Tibet for the purpose.[190] The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, was totally opposed to the venture since he believed that neither were the Bhutanese willing to give free passage to the mission, nor the Tibetans prepared to encourage trade relations. In

contrast, both Colman Macaulay and Whitehall laboured under the misapprehension that the embargo to visit Tibet was imposed by China, an impression which had been particularly fostered by the terms of the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention of 1876,[191] which stated that the Chinese would undertake to admit and protect any mission that made its way to Tibet. In fact, various attempts were made through the British Legation in Peking to secure approval for Macaulay to take himself and his mission to Tibet, but without effect. In early 1886, as Macaulay prepared to depart for Lhasa, he urged the Government of India to pay the Bhutan subsidy at Kophu, on the Sikkim side of the Jelep La and not at Buxa. The object of the measure was to force the Bhutanese to co-operate with the mission during its progress and could also be used in any future commercial transaction Macaulay might be able to secure. However, in June 1886, an immediate settlement with China in regard to Burma enabled the Viceroy, who had never been enthusiastic about Macaulay's far-fetched schemes, to persuade the British Government to abandon the mission.[192] Dufferin was able to show that the scheme in relation to Bhutan would never have worked, since Indian traders were not allowed to enter Bhutan and, what was more, the Bhutanese had no intention of relaxing their monopoly on foreign goods entering the country. Nor did Dufferin think that trying to hold Bhutan to Article IX of the 1865 Treaty, relating to goods transported from India into Bhutan, would have the slightest effect.

The Tibetan Government were as opposed to the Macaulay Mission as the Viceroy was and had decided to oppose it with force if necessary.[193] Their first step was to send an official to Lingtu to meet the mission and try to persuade it to turn back. The second step was the occupation of Lingtu by a garrison of Tibetan troops, at the time thought to be no more than a show of strength. On the abandonment of the Macaulay Mission, the Tibetans decided to withdraw from Lingtu, leaving only a token garrison behind. In October 1886, however, the Chinese chose to rebuke the Tibetans for their opposition to a mission which the Emperor of China had authorised; the outcome was that the Tibetans reversed their decision, closed the passes from Chumbi to Sikkim and reinforced Lingtu. Lord Dufferin was convinced that the Tibetans would withdraw from Lingtu of their own accord if only they were assured of the peaceful intentions of the British in Sikkim. He made the error, however, of referring the issue to the Chinese, in the hopes of getting them to intercede at Lhasa on the mission's behalf.[194] It had the opposite effect, and the Tibetans refused to move out of Lingtu altogether. The Viceroy believed that it would not be difficult for British troops to drive the Tibetans out of Lingtu, but feared that the move might be taken by the Chinese to signify an attempt to 'force a passage into Tibet'. Throughout the winter of 1887–88 the Chinese, both in Peking and through their Legation in London, fought hard to delay the expulsion of the Tibetans. In February 1888, the Viceroy sent an ultimatum to the Dalai Lama himself outlining his case and emphasising that, whilst he was not prepared to tolerate Tibetan troops in Sikkim, a state under British protection, he entertained no aggressive designs on Tibet itself. The letter, however, did not reach its destination since the Tibetan garrison at Lingtu

refused to transmit any communication whatsoever from the Indian Government.[195]

In March 1888, a force of 2,000 men under Brigadier-General Graham drove out the Tibetan garrison from Lingtu. In May, the Lhasa levies returned in force and re-occupied Lingtu. The occupation, however, was not for long; in September, Graham again attacked the Tibetan stronghold and, this time, the Tibetans were finally driven out of Lingtu, having suffered heavy losses.[196] The success of the operation at Lingtu produced some tangible results for the Indian Government. When the Tibetans, after the first British offensive, approached the Tongsa Penlop for assistance, he refused on the grounds that if he gave active help the British would cut off his subsidy.[197] It is more than probable that the failure of the Tibetans to help Bhutan during their troubles with the British was a further reason for refusing. In any case, the policy of non-intervention by the Indian Government during the years of civil strife in Bhutan may also have contributed to the Tongsa's neutrality. From then on a total change was to take place in Bhutan's attitude to their neighbour in the south. For the Tongsa Penlop not only assured the British Government of his friendship, but agreed to send his agents and arrived himself to help in the settlement of differences which had arisen between Tibet and British India.

Bhutan and the Younghusband Mission, 1899–1904

The arrival of Lord Curzon as Viceroy in January 1899 brought a radical change in emphasis in the Government of India's policy towards the neighbouring states of the north and most particularly in its policy towards Tibet. Up to the time of Curzon's arrival, the issues which had involved the Indian administration were local frontier policy and the development of trans-frontier trade. After his arrival, these issues became inextricably bound up with the much wider question of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. 'She conceives herself to be fitted for it by temperament, by history, and by tradition', and most particularly did Curzon see Russia extending her influence to Lhasa. The dangers inherent in the spread of this influence to the northern principalities on India's sensitive border, Curzon did not intend to ignore. 'If Russia is entitled to these ambitions, still more is Britain entitled, nay compelled, to defend that which she has won, and to resist the minor encroachments which are only a part of the larger plan'.[198]

Curzon was not the man to ignore indications that the hierarchy in Tibet was in close alliance with Russia. '. . . the Lamas there have found out the weakness of China. At the same time they are being approached by Russia. There seems little doubt that Russian agents, and possibly even someone of Russian origin, have been at Lhasa, and I believe that the Tibetan Government is coming to the conclusion that it will have to make friends with one or other of the two great Powers. That our case should not be stated in these circumstances, and that judgment should go against us by default, would be a great pity . . . as the relations that we desire to establish with them are almost exclusively those of trade, I do not think it ought to be impossible, if I could

get into communication with the Tibetan Government, to come to terms'.[199]

To Curzon it was not simply a question of an alliance, but that Russia was in the very process of establishing a protectorate over Tibet. As far as he could see, the only hope lay in establishing direct contact with the central authority in Lhasa, and thereafter in persuading them, whether under pressure or persuasion, to ally themselves with Britain rather than with Russia. The supreme authority in Tibet meant the Dalai Lama, but Curzon was in a quandary as to how direct contact with him could be achieved. It was evident that no European could get through to Lhasa without alerting the Chinese and the Russians, and attempts to transmit letters, in the past, through Tibetan frontier officials had failed totally. Curzon decided to look around for a 'native' intermediary who not only had access to Lhasa, but was not obviously known as a British agent. The Bengal Government came up with the answer and recommended the Bhutanese *vakil*[200] in Darjeeling, Kazi Ugyen Dorji, and Curzon readily accepted him.

Kazi Ugyen had already served the British in his capacity as an honorary agent in 1898. In July of that year, he had gone to Lhasa bearing gifts for the Dalai Lama from the Tongsa Penlop, and the Bengal Government had taken the opportunity to send the Tibetan ruler a present, of a horse, through him. It seems probable that the Kazi was instructed to enquire discreetly whether the Tibetans would be prepared to establish closer relations with India. At any rate, on his return to India, the Kazi reported that he had warned the Tibetans of the danger of ignoring the British Government. The Dalai Lama had been sufficiently impressed to offer him the role of unofficial agent between Lhasa and Calcutta, a request which he had refused on the grounds that he was already a servant of the Bhutan Darbar and could not serve two masters. In his view, Lhasa was favourably inclined to British overtures, particularly since 'they did not like the Chinese yoke'. He had been able to observe, whilst in Lhasa, that relations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Amban were somewhat strained. Moreover, the Tibetans were most insistent that their willingness or unwillingness to talk was not dependent on orders from China. The Bengal Government found Kazi Ugyen's account of great interest, though they were not inclined to lay too much store by his analysis of the Tibetan situation.[201]

In September 1899, the Bengal Government officially gave permission for the Kazi to make a formal approach on their behalf to Lhasa. He was instructed to write to the Dalai Lama from Phari, in his own words, and to inform the ruler of British willingness to receive a Tibetan official. If this attempt was to succeed, then they would entrust the Kazi with a letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama. When Kazi Ugyen returned to India in November 1899, he reported that the Dalai Lama was in no position to oblige the Viceroy by entering into secret correspondence with the Indian Government, particularly since it would displease the Chinese, if they ever found out. The Bengal Government accepted that it was 'useless to make any further endeavour, at present, to open direct communications through an agent, with the Tibetan authorities'.[202]

Nevertheless, India had not given up all hope of using Kazi Ugyen for another trial run to the Dalai Lama. In December 1899, they persuaded the Kazi to write once again to Lhasa and, this time, to exhort the Dalai Lama to 'make haste and settle' lest the 'Viceroy in Calcutta lose patience, it will not be well for you'.[203] In spite of the implied threat, the reply from Lhasa was no more encouraging, but the Dalai Lama did suggest that he might consult with the new Amban when he arrived in Lhasa.[204] As for Russian encroachment, the Dalai Lama had this to say: '. . . on no account will we let them in . . . They have repeatedly, with the orders of China, wished to come within our boundary . . . We will not allow them on any occasion to come, and on this we are united, both lamas and laymen'.[205]

Before the answer to Kazi Ugyen's second letter had been received, the Indian Government instructed Caption Kennion, the Kashmir Assistant Resident, to make use of the Garpons[206] of western Tibet, who occupied the outpost at Gartok, to carry a letter to the Dalai Lama. In March 1901, Kennion heard from the Garpons, when they returned the Viceroy's letter unopened, that the Tibetan Government saw no need for establishing communications with the British. In April, however, the Garpons wrote yet again to Kennion, this time denying that the letter had ever been sent to Lhasa; they explained that they had not sent it because they feared that the authorities would punish them for associating with officials from the British Government. Kennion believed that the Garpons' second letter had been written on the orders of Lhasa, so that the Tibetan Government could deny, if necessary, the responsibility for having refused to acknowledge the letter in the first place. Curzon found no reason to accept this interpretation; he had no doubt that his letter had never left Gartok, and the only channel now left open to him was Kazi Ugyen.[207]

The Dalai Lama had just purchased two elephants, two peacocks and a leopard, and Kazi Ugyen had been instructed to escort this menagerie up to Lhasa in June 1901.[208] The occasion seemed opportune and he was asked to carry with him a revised version of Curzon's letter to the Dalai Lama which had been held back since 1899 because the Bengal Government had felt unable to find a messenger trustworthy enough to take it. Kazi Ugyen was instructed to deliver the letter into the hands of the Dalai Lama himself, and to urge him to send a reply. Great secrecy was to be maintained in the transaction. In contrast to the first letter Kazi Ugyen had carried, Curzon's tone was peremptory, the language indicative of a growing impatience, and he warned the Tibetan ruler that his 'government must reserve their right to take such steps as may seem necessary and proper'.[209] He called on the Tibetan Pontiff to respond and he hoped that his friendly overture would be the start of relations between the two governments. As for Kazi Ugyen, Curzon said 'he will be rewarded according to the degree to which these instructions are observed and to the results achieved'.

When Kazi Ugyen returned in October 1901 with the Viceroy's letter unopened and its seals intact, the Viceroy was thoroughly displeased. The Kazi reported that he had handed the letter to the Dalai Lama, who had refused to

accept it on the grounds that tradition forbade him to have any dealings with foreigners. The agreement had been made by his predecessor, and 'he was sorry, but he could not receive a letter or send an answer'.[210] The Kazi went on to explain the Dalai Lama's dilemma: 'The Dalai Lama was a clever man, and was really sorry that he was unable to accept the Viceroy's letter or send a reply. Also that the Dalai Lama and the Chinese are not on good terms, but that he fears them'. The Bengal Government was satisfied that Kazi Ugyen had done his best. However, it soon became apparent that reports emanating from Darjeeling gave a very different picture of his visit to Lhasa. Sarat Chandra Das in Darjeeling thought that he had not even handed the letter to the Dalai Lama, let alone mentioned its existence to him. Lama Ugyen Gyatso of the Survey of India maintained that the Tibetan Kalons or Ministers had dissuaded him from presenting the letter to the Dalai Lama, and that this would not have happened if the Kazi had followed his instructions to maintain the utmost secrecy. These opinions appeared to influence the Government of India who, as a consequence, were not entirely convinced that Kazi Ugyen had carried out his task as he had been instructed to: 'While retaining some doubt as to whether the Viceroy's letter was actually tendered to the Dalai Lama, we are forced to the conclusion that the attempt to enter into negotiations with the central Tibetan authority by the means hitherto employed must now be regarded as impracticable'.[211] By November 1901, Curzon had come to the same conclusion. 'I do not believe that the man ever saw the Dalai Lama or handed the letter to him. On the contrary, I believe him to be a liar, and, in all probability, a paid Tibetan spy'. He blamed the Bengal Government for the discovery of so unsatisfactory a messenger as Kazi Ugyen and he had no doubt that his suspicions of the Bhutanese agent were well founded.[212] This was contrary to what the Bengal Government believed, and was repudiated by Kazi Ugyen himself. 'It has always been to me a matter of keen regret that Your Lordship may have believed the story'. Years later, as a sequel to this event, the Kazi, in an effort to vindicate himself, asked Charles Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim, '. . . to enquire of the Dalai Lama in Darjeeling whether or not my story was true'. When Bell did so, the Dalai Lama was able to confirm that Kazi Ugyen had undoubtedly told the truth, but that Curzon had chosen not to believe him.[213]

The Viceroy's official despatches on Tibet throughout 1901–02, still more his private correspondence with the Secretary of State, reveal his growing hostility in regard to the frustrating nature of his relationship with Lhasa. The failure of Kazi Ugyen's mission was a serious blow to Curzon's policy of countering Russian influence in Tibet. He was convinced that the Russians were on the brink of establishing a permanent presence at Lhasa. The Dalai Lama's refusal to respond to any overture from India was a prime indication, if any were needed, that Russia was further advanced in her plans to win over Tibet than seemed possible only a year ago. Once in Tibet, the Russian presence alone would spread disaffection amongst the various Himalayan principalities. 'In itself, this might not constitute a military danger – not at any rate for many years to come. But it would constitute a political danger; for the

effect upon Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, would be most unsettling and might be positively dangerous'.[214]

During the summer of 1900, Curzon became aware that the Czar had received at Livadia one 'Aharamba Agvan Dorjief', an official of the Tibetan Government.[215] He did not, at the time, take the presence of Dorjieff in Russia too seriously. As he wrote to Hamilton in November 1900: 'We are inclined to think that the Tibetan Mission to the Czar is a fraud, and does not come from Lhasa at all. That the Russians have for a long time been trying to penetrate that place is certain; . . . but that the Tibetan Lamas have so far overcome their incurable suspicion of all things European to send an open Mission to Europe seems to me most unlikely. Tibet is, I think, much more likely in reality to look to us for protection than to look to Russia'.[216] Between June and August 1901, Dorjieff again visited Russia and was more than once received by the Czar, to whom, it was rumoured, he had brought letters and presents from the Dalai Lama. Count Lamsdorf, the Russian Foreign Minister, when asked, denied that Dorjieff's visit had any political significance whatsoever. On the other hand, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in St Petersburg gave a different account: Dorjieff, he claimed, had come on behalf of the Dalai Lama to beg the Czar to restrain his subjects from entering Tibet. It was an interpretation calculated to fuel Curzon's susceptibilities; it was not long before he was using Dorjieff's presence in Russia as further evidence of their and Tibet's duplicity.

By the autumn of 1901, Curzon had made enquiries and discovered that Dorjieff was a Buriat Mongol of Russian nationality and held the post of Professor of Buddhist Metaphysical Philosophy at Drepung monastery in Lhasa. He confided his suspicions to Hamilton at the India Office: 'I am afraid it cannot be said that the Tibetan Mission to Russia only represents Monasteries'. The news of the Dorjieff missions and of Russian activity in Mongolia and Tibet revived in the Viceroy the need for a more forceful Tibetan policy if the Russians were to be kept out of Central Asia.

Curzon's Tibetan policy was not merely based on his suspicion of Russian intent in Tibet, but also on the British failure to establish direct relations with the Dalai Lama. After the second Dorjieff mission, both Curzon and the India Office agreed that the Russian Government should be warned that HMG would never accept an alteration in the status of Tibet.[217] The India Office approved of warning Russia but were not in agreement with Curzon's solution, which was to send a British mission to keep Russia out of Lhasa. They were not going to involve themselves in a war in Asia at such a critical period in British history. The result was that the only policy left to Curzon was to increase pressure on the Tibetan border in the hopes of getting the Tibetan authorities to respond to his overtures. He outlined his plan in February 1902; the first step was to be the demarcation of the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet and the removal of the Tibetans from the frontier town of Giaogong. The Foreign Office, when asked for their views, agreed that the exclusion of the Tibetans from their grazing grounds at Giaogong was an appropriate and justifiable measure. However, if this step did not induce the Tibetan authorities to enter into negotiations, 'the action to be taken

subsequently will be matter for further discussion', and on this point they preferred to reserve judgment.[218]

By 1902, questions of trade and the Tibetan's grazing rights at the frontier seemed unimportant when compared to the need to convince the Dalai Lama of the dangers inherent in refusing to open relations with the British in India. Curzon was by now convinced that Dorjieff was a Russian agent of some importance. He had been resident in Lhasa for many years and was reported to have much influence over the Dalai Lama; what was more, Czar Nicholas II had openly acknowledged that the Buriat Lama had an entree to the Russian court. Throughout 1902, rumours reached Curzon's ears from a variety of sources that a Russian protectorate over Tibet was imminent. By late summer, rumours of a Russian treaty with China about Tibet came to feed Curzon's already over-charged suspicions. Details of the supposed treaty appeared in the *China Times*,[219] and though Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Peking, thought it was all a 'ballon d'essai' put out by the Russo-Chinese Bank, the argument failed to convince Curzon.

In November 1902, yet another version of a Russian agreement about Tibet appeared, this time, in St Petersburg. The arrangement, it was rumoured, gave the Russian Buriats certain religious privileges and in exchange the Dalai Lama had agreed to a Russian agent in Lhasa, and the entry into Tibet of Russian Orthodox missionaries.[220] In March 1903, there emerged yet another account of a Sino-Russian treaty over Tibet. It was said to have been signed in Lhasa on 27 February 1903 by the Chinese Amban and a Russian representative. The treaty contained eight clauses, all dealing with the granting of Russian mining rights in Tibet. At all stages of the prospecting operations, the treaty testified to the fact that the Chinese were to be consulted and their permission obtained, but not that of Tibet.[221]

This was the last of the Sino-Russian treaties to be reported. Like all the other rumours it had a far greater effect on Curzon than the Dorjieff missions themselves. Although he was not entirely satisfied with Russian assurances that the second Dorjieff mission had no political significance, it was the rumours of Sino-Russian agreements, taken in conjunction with Chinese procrastination in sending officials to settle the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, as well as the Dalai Lama's refusal to deal directly with him, that confirmed Curzon of the need to march an army to Lhasa and while there 'to crush their little game'.[222] Both Lords Lansdowne and Hamilton, at the Foreign and India Offices respectively, had no doubt that there was a good deal of truth in the rumours regarding a Russo-Chinese treaty, but they were not convinced of the Viceroy's solution, which was to send an army to Lhasa. Throughout the early months of 1903, Curzon plotted and planned the despatch of a mission to Lhasa; he was determined that if it went at all it would go spearheaded by an armed escort.[223]

While the British mission was in occupation of the Chumbi valley, it had been decided that the political management of Bhutan would be transferred from the Bengal Government to Colonel Younghusband as Commissioner of the Tibet Frontier Mission. He, in turn, would act under the direct control of

the Government of India. Before the mission set out, it was thought necessary to obtain reliable information regarding Bhutan's relations with Tibet. Towards this end, two Bhutanese were sent by Rai Bahadur Ugyen Gyatso, Manager of the government estate at Kalimpong, into the Chumbi valley with instructions to go as far as possible in the direction of Lhasa and bring back news regarding Bhutan's intentions.[224] On their return, they gave out that a messenger had arrived from the Paro Penlop at Phakri, six or seven days' journey from Lhasa, and told them that a conference was being held to decide whether Bhutan should join Tibet in a war with England. Rumour had it that the Bhutanese were more than ready to help Tibet because of the resentment they felt at the lands taken from them at Buxa and Daling after the Bhutan war, and the Paro Penlop had written to the Tibetan authorities to find out details as to the plan of operation.[225]

Whether the news was fact or fiction regarding the Paro Penlop's intentions, the Indian Government thought it indicated the necessity of closer communication between themselves and the Bhutan authorities. Younghusband was instructed to approach the Tongsa and Paro Penlops to find out their intentions, and 'to detach them from the Thibetans if it is true that they have any leaning in that direction'.[226] He was also to discuss the question of exploration by Captain O'Connor of the Di Chu and the Amo Chu valley routes into the Chumbi valley, and induce the Bhutanese to follow the example of Nepal by supplying yaks and other transport for the mission.

The Tongsa Penlop had by now become the *de facto* ruler of Bhutan; it was remembered that, in 1888, after the last civil war in Bhutan, he had shown a measure of helpfulness to the British during their short-lived hostilities with Tibet.[227] Both the Commissioner and Lord Curzon were in some anxiety as to what the mission might expect from 'the incomprehensible hierarchy who preside over the hills that literally overhang the camp'.[228] These doubts were confirmed by Charles Bell in Darjeeling who reported that the Tongsa Penlop had written to the Lhasa authorities offering to close the roads through Bhutan to the Chumbi valley against British troops, and for this measure of co-operation he had, in exchange, asked for the cession of the Chumbi valley to Bhutan. He had also issued an order that all villagers in Bhutan should contribute 200 arrows each to the Tibetan cause. However, when the Lhasa authorities declined his proposal, the people were ordered to stop preparing arrows and to collect iron instead, for such time as it may be needed.[229] Bell soon had more disquieting information to relate regarding the Bhutanese readiness to fight on the Tibetan side: taxes, he claimed, were also being levied. In his opinion, the Bhutanese were naturally in favour of the Tibetans, but would remain neutral until they saw how the British troops fared. Should any disaster 'befall our troops, it is probable that the Bhutanese would join the Thibetans openly, unless some strong cause, such as a heavy bribe, prevent this'.[230]

By the time Younghusband reached Chumbi, he was able to report back that the Tibetans were hostile and 'their reliance on Russian support so complete, that I see no chance of effecting any settlement without first

breaking the power of Lhassa monks'.[231] This early declaration of intent on the Commissioner's part meant that he would require Bhutanese cooperation, rather than obstruction, if the venture was to succeed. In the circumstances, he was naturally anxious to know whether the Penlops had decided to accept the Commissioner of Rajshahi's invitation to send a representative to meet him. To urge him to do so, the Tongsa Penlop was to be reminded of the treaty of peace and friendship which Bhutan had with the British Government, and as a further inducement, Commissioner Marindin was to inform him that the subsidy would be withheld until Bhutan understood its treaty obligations. When the Tongsa Penlop had fixed a time and place for his interview with Marindin, Younghusband would have, in his keeping, half a lakh of rupees in the Darjeeling treasury ready to make over to him.[232]

Withholding the subsidy had an immediate effect; although the Tongsa did not immediately accept the invitation to attend, he did reply to Marindin's note. He explained that he wished to ascertain the true 'posture of affairs and the intentions of both the British and the Tibetan Governments, before he set out'. But a 'wicked and false report' had gone to Tibet, suggesting that Bhutan had already thrown in her lot with the British, and this had had the unfortunate effect of delaying his reply to the Commissioner. Now that he was assured that the Tibetan Government had no suspicion of him, he was able to reply. '. . . the Chinese Amban is coming from Thibet, and he is an officer from a great Empire; he will, I think surely, suffice to effect a Treaty between Thibet and the British Government'. If Younghusband felt that the Chinese Amban would only represent Tibetan interests, he considered it his duty to act as negotiator between the two governments, and most particularly 'to negotiate from your side'. In the meantime, since the goodwill of the Bhutan Government was there for all to see, the Tongsa asked that the subsidy be paid immediately, and towards this end he was deputing the 'Trimpuk Jongpen' to receive it, and to bring back an answer to his offer to act as mediator.[233] The envoy was informed that since the Tongsa Penlop had not agreed to attend in person, the subsidy could only be paid to him, and then only under the instructions of Colonel Younghusband.[234]

When the Trimpuk Dzongpon met Younghusband at Tuna he was asked to provide proof of Bhutan's friendly intentions towards the mission. As he hesitated, thinking that Younghusband meant Bhutan throwing in her lot with the British, the position was spelt out to him: 'I said that at present to get into Chumbi the mission and its escort had to cross the high, snow-covered Jelap La, but a road which could be made up the Amo-chu or Di-chu valleys would be much easier . . . if the Bhutanese Government were prepared to give permission for its construction, Government would take this as certain proof of their friendly intentions towards us, and would, of course, be prepared to give a liberal subsidy in return for the right to construct the road'. After some bargaining on the part of the envoy, the Trimpuk Dzongpon agreed that the Bhutan Darbar would be willing to make a road up the Amo Chu and Di Chu, provided the Rs 50,000 subsidy was forthcoming immediately. Younghusband was delighted with the day's work and wrote to

the Viceroy informing him of the results of the agreement, '. . . the Government of India have, without the firing of a shot, now acquired the means of access from the plains of India to the high plateau of Thibet, through the territories of two of the most secluded people in the world'.[235] He was also able to provide a map 'of that portion which is under the Bhutanese Government together with a report by Captain Ryder, of the reconnaisance made by Surveyor Dalbir Rai of the Amo-chu and Di-chu valleys'. The map itself was drawn up without the assistance of Bhutanese officials or without the acknowledgement of its acceptance by the Bhutan Darbar.

While the Trimpuk Dzongpon remained at Tuna, Younghusband conscripted him into explaining the British position to the Lhasa delegates. 'I had no hope that he would be able to effect anything, but I thought that the fact of his attempting to mediate might be the means of bringing the Bhutanese Government into close relations with us'. After several such meetings, the envoy reported that the Tibetans were insistant on the British mission first retiring to Yatung, before they would agree to negotiate. The envoy was thanked for his trouble, and was told to inform the Tibetans that the reply was totally unreasonable. 'We had left them alone for 150 years as we knew they did not like strangers, and we had no object in coming into their miserable inhospitable country which we saw around us here. But they had wantonly and without provocation invaded Sikkim territory in 1886, and now repudiated the settlement which the Amban made on their behalf . . . We communicated with the Bhutan Government, and as a result we had been on cordial terms for years'.[236] After this broadside, there only remained for the envoy to be shown the Maxims, the Commissariat stores, the workshop and the army hospital for him to be sufficiently overawed, and to realise, as the Commissioner had hoped, that the Tibetans stood very little chance of effectively opposing the powerful British mission.

Within two weeks of the Trimpuk Dzongpon's arrival, the Dharma Raja had presented the Commissioner with a Permit, officially sealed, to survey and construct a road either by the Di Chu or Amo Chu rivers, 'and the taking up of necessary land for the road and for such rest-houses as may be required along it'.[237] In exchange for these privileges, the annual subsidy of Rs 50,000 was instantly made over to the Dzongpon by Colonel Younghusband.

One result of the Amo Chu and Di Chu survey was that Charles Bell's discovery, made early in 1903, of a tract of some 70 to 80 square miles of country lying to the north-east of the Kalimpong estate, and traditionally held by Bhutan, was to be re-aligned. The object of the original survey of 1866–67, Bell maintained, had been to interpose a strip of British territory between Bhutan and Sikkim, in order to make it impossible for the Bhutanese to enter Sikkim without first passing through British or Tibetan territory. At the time the boundary had been laid down, the eastern alignment of this strip of land had been defined as the left bank of the Jaldhaka or Di Chu river from its source onwards. However, Bell discovered that the Jaldhaka had several tributaries near its source; in his opinion the best means of demarcating a tract of land which entirely cut off Bhutan from Sikkim, was to adopt, as the main stream,

the river course of the Chone Chhu. 'It includes a large area of land which is as fertile as the best land in the Darjeeling district. It would probably also provide a good route from the plains via the Bengal Dooars Railway over a pass near Gipmochi into the Chumbi valley of Thibet . . . Such a route might be useful for trade and for the transport of troops, if so required'.[238] Since this tract of land was shown, in accordance with the 1865 Treaty, to be in the possession of Bhutan, Bell was instructed to proceed to the area and ascertain who the inhabitants were, what revenue, if any, they paid and to whom, and generally to investigate their actual status.

When the Trimpuk Dzongpon returned to Bhutan, he was able to persuade the Tongsa Penlop that his best interests lay in offering his services as a mediator to Colonel Younghusband. This the Tongsa readily agreed to do; on the other hand, somewhat in line with the Commissioner's point of view, he was not prepared to sally forth without the assurance that officials with more authority than the lowly Tibetan delegates at Guru were there for him to negotiate with. He was quite prepared, he told Younghusband, to stop the tribute which Bhutan paid to Lhasa until the difficulties existing between the British and Tibetans had been resolved. The coming and going of high officials between Bhutan and the British camp, Younghusband considered, could do nothing but impress the border people, and increase British prestige. 'It has been the policy of the Government of India to enlist the sympathies of the States on their side of the Himalayas in our favour in our present negotiations'. It was the Commissioner's hope that it would increase the 'intimacy of our relations with Bhutan, and lay a solid foundation for our future intercourse'.[239]

The successful action fought at Guru on 31 March 1904 by the British troops against the Tibetan Lamas and their men, saw Younghusband confident that no further resistance would be offered, that the situation had worked entirely in favour of the mission's advance. The Chinese Amban's statement, no less, had made it clear that the Dalai Lama was at last aroused to a sense of British power, that Tibetan officers were begging the Amban to intercede on their behalf, and that 'the common people' at Lhasa were ready to welcome the appearance of British troops. 'The game is thus entirely in our hands. We must be careful not to let the Amban carry off the advantage gained . . . Our prestige is now at its height, Nepaul and Bhutan are with us; the people are not against us; the soldiers do not want to fight; the Lamas are stunned; the Dalai Lama is prepared to fly; and the Russians are engaged elsewhere'.[240] Time was to tell that neither the Amban nor Younghusband had quite got the measure of Tibetan feeling: in fact, the Tibetans were to offer resistance, step by step, all the way to Lhasa.

No sooner had the Bhutan Government heard of the British victory at Guru, than the Dharma Raja wrote to Younghusband congratulating him on the event, and rejoicing at the friendship established between Britain and Bhutan. 'Although the small officials at Guru would not hear what we had to say, I have thought that the higher officials might do so'. In the hopes that his conjecture was right, the Dharma Raja had taken it upon himself to write to

the Dalai Lama direct.[241] The Tongsa Penlop and the Trimpuk Dzongpon joined in the congratulations, and the former offered to pay his long overdue visit to the Commissioner at Gyantse. He also took the opportunity of giving him a piece of advice; on no account was the mission to 'move to any other place' until the Dharma Raja had received a reply from the Dalai Lama.[242] Younghusband's reply gave little hope that he intended to heed the Tongsa's warning. He had written from Tuna to the new Amban at Lhasa asking him to meet him at Gyantse, with properly empowered Tibetan representatives, but so far the Amban had chosen to remain silent. 'My patience cannot last much longer. Why are the Thibetans so foolish? Will they never learn to treat the British Government with respect?'[243]

By the time the Tongsa Penlop put in an appearance at Phari Dzong, he was able to inform the Commissioner that the Dalai Lama was not prepared to negotiate or to receive any communication whatever from the British Government. In the Penlop's view, the Tibetan ruler had been given foolish advice by his Kazis [Councillors], who had now been dismissed. The delay in the appointment of new Kazis, who might give advice more favourable to Younghusband, was being delayed by the Emperor of China, whose approval was being sought. Thus, if the mission intended to move forward to Lhasa, there was evidence to suggest that the Tibetans would resist the British advance. On the other hand, the Tongsa Penlop felt that he could confidently predict that the Commissioner, on arrival, would find that the Dalai Lama and his government had prudently decided to desert the capital.[244] In June 1904, when Younghusband was on the point of advancing towards Lhasa following the Tibetan's failure to comply with his ultimatum, the Tongsa Penlop restrained him with the promise that the Kalon Lama and the Ta Lama[245] were on their way to Gyantse, where he himself would join them and attempt to persuade the Tibetans to agree to British terms.[246]

The Commissioner was, at first, inclined to refuse the offer of the Tongsa Penlop's services as a mediator. He intended to negotiate with the Tibetan Government direct, at the place and in the manner indicated by him, and with no one else.[247] However, when he found that the Tibetan Councillors were unwilling to negotiate without the Tongsa Penlop, and furthermore that the Dalai Lama appeared to have confidence in his powers of persuasion, Younghusband decided to summon the Tongsa to Gyantse.[248] He arrived on 2 June 1904 with a retinue of 200 men.[249] From then on, he was to become the Commissioner's right-hand man in his negotiations with the Tibetan representatives.

On 2 July 1904 the Ta Lama and six representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries, accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop, were received by Younghusband. He found that the Tibetans displayed no eagerness for settlement, and he promptly sent them away to have matters explained to them by the Tongsa Penlop. When Younghusband met them again, the delegates still refused to discuss the terms; the Tongsa was then asked to inform them of the consequences of their refusal. They were to be told that their response would mean that the British mission would proceed to Lhasa and that 'the character

and duration of our stay there was dependent on the Thibetans themselves'. As the mission steadily advanced towards Chaksam Ferry, Younghusband had two visits from the Ta Lama and one from the Dalai Lama's Grand Chamberlain; the latter brought with him a letter from the Tibetan ruler himself asking him not to proceed to Lhasa.[250]

During the protracted negotiations that took place at Gyantse Dzong, both sides relied on the Tongsa Penlop to act as go-between. The Tibetan delegates refused to evacuate the Dzong without first getting an assurance that British troops would do the same; the Tongsa informed Younghusband of their suspicion that on their vacating the Dzong they would have no assurance of his wanting a settlement. In response, the Tibetans were told that they had no option but to vacate the Dzong, without an assurance if necessary, at 12 noon promptly on 6 July. This uncompromising reply was mitigated by the Tongsa Penlop's offer to the Tibetans, which was that if they appeared with a white flag of truce, 'they would be given asylum' in his camp. These dubious options appeared not to impress the Tibetans who decided to ignore Younghusband's warning and, as a result, military operations were carried out against them, General Macdonald capturing the Dzong on the afternoon of 6 July. Immediately following the capture of Gyantse Dzong, the Tongsa Penlop sent a message of congratulation to Younghusband; he was promptly despatched to bring the Tibetan delegates in to negotiate, but on arrival at their camp, the Tongsa found that the delegates had already fled.[251]

After the capture of Gyantse Dzong, the Dalai Lama wrote twice to the Tongsa Penlop urging him to use his influence and to request the English 'not to nibble up our country'.[252] In the meantime, having been advised by the Tongsa Penlop to be more accommodating, the Tsongdu or Tibetan National Assembly, wrote a letter 'to the All-wise Sahib' asking him not to enter the country but to negotiate with the new delegates who were on their way from Lhasa.[253] When the new delegates arrived at Chaksam Ferry, they brought a letter and some presents from the Dalai Lama, which the Tongsa Penlop insisted on handing over to the Commissioner personally. At first, Younghusband refused to accept the presents 'unless accompanied by a letter or handed to me by one of the Dalai Lama's own officials'.[254] When these conditions were fulfilled, Younghusband thought he could accept the offering 'without loss of dignity'. He informed the Dalai Lama, through his delegates, of the 'inconvenience it would be to me, now that I have left Gyantse, to negotiate at any other place than Lhassa itself', and to comfort the ruler in case he feared that his presence would, in any way be objectionable, '. . . I will disturb Your Holiness as little as possible in your religious seclusion'.[255]

By the time Younghusband reached Lhasa, he was able to point to one of the more satisfactory features of the whole venture, which was finding the 'Chief of Bhutan' himself working so zealously with him to effect a settlement with Tibet. A year ago, he mused, the British had almost no relations with Bhutan, but now the Tongsa Penlop, apart from being the first person to get him into contact with the Tibetan Government, was endeavouring to bring the Tibetans to see reason. Younghusband took pains to explain to the Viceroy

that whatever else might be the result of the mission, 'we shall, at any rate, have bound Nepaul and Bhutan more closely to us than they ever were before, for they will have felt that they have worked together with the great suzerain Power in an enterprise which, if it should fall short of complete success, will do so only on account of an excess of moderation in the hour of victory'.[256]

Throughout the mission's final advance to the Tibetan capital and during the negotiations which resulted in the Lhasa Convention of 1904,[257] Younghusband was able to rely the Tongsa Penlop's good offices to expound British terms to the waiting Tibetans, and to exhort them 'to look on England as their friend and leader . . . They could rely on their neighbour, England, to help them in time of trouble if they kept on good terms with her'.[258] When justifying his part in the denunciation of the Dalai Lama to the new Viceroy, Lord Ampthill, the Commissioner was to lay part of the blame on the Bhutanese chief. 'Fact that I endeavoured to induce the Dalai Lama to come in is well known to Buddhists here, and they are also aware that, after he had definitely fled from the country, it was on the initiative of the Amban that he was denounced. I, personally, consider the denunciation a very politic step. It also has the approval of the Tongsa Penlop'.[259]

The Tongsa Penlop's role as mediator was commented upon by Percival Landon who accompanied the Younghusband Mission as *The Times* correspondent. 'In theory, he came to act as mediator between ourselves and the Tibetans, but his unblushing and openly-admitted preference for the English was not entirely satisfactory even to us. It suggested a biased mind that was likely to interfere with the discharge of his delicate and impartial duties'.[260] Younghusband, for his part, found the Tongsa's bias most useful and, in consequence, continued, throughout the mission's advance, to underwrite his importance, despite the many embarrassments to which the predatory raids of his men exposed the mission.[261] When, on one of the few occasions the Tongsa Penlop actually disagreed with the Commissioner and said as much, Younghusband found no difficulty in disregarding his advice. The occasion arose when the Tongsa Penlop demurred about the excessive terms regarding the indemnity which Younghusband was proposing to impose on the Tibetans. 'I was always glad to hear suggestions from one who had proved himself so staunch a friend of the British Government, and if he could think of some way which would save the Indian peasants from being saddled with the cost of this war, and at the same time not weigh too heavily upon the Thibetans, he would be doing a service which would be appreciated by both the Government of India and the Thibetans'.[262] No doubt the Tibetans themselves, let alone the Dalai Lama, came to realise that their case might have been argued more persuasively by some other intermediary without an axe of his own to grind. If the extent of the influence that the Tongsa Penlop actually wielded could be gauged by his success in preventing the mission's advance to Lhasa, which was at the heart of the Dalai Lama's request to him, then his role as mediator was singularly flawed.

The weakness of the Tongsa Penlop as an independent mediator should be viewed in the context of his position as the recipient of a British subsidy. When

the Bhutanese chief gave no clear answer to Younghusband's command to present himself at Phari and assure the mission of Bhutan's willingness to assist in its progress towards Lhasa, the procrastination cost him the state's subsidy. Equally, when the Dharma Raja sanctioned a road through the Amo Chu, the subsidy was withheld until the alignment was arranged to the satisfaction of the British Frontier Commissioners. Thereafter, when the Tongsa Penlop was summoned to Younghusband's side after the victory at Gyantse Dzong, the subsidy was still outstanding since the final alignment, as a matter of policy, had still not been decided upon and was to wait upon the outcome of the Tibet mission to Lhasa. He was forced to agree, with good grace, 'that there was no hurry about it, and that the amount could be settled afterwards'.[263] He had no wish, after all, to forfeit the subsidy altogether. There is no doubt that after the Bhutan War the men who guided Bhutanese affairs, such as the Tongsa Penlop and Kazi Ugyen Dorji, saw a safer future allied to the British Government, both politically and commercially. They recognised that attempts to obstruct the powerful British had been tantamount to courting bankruptcy. In the end, it was the economic factor which proved decisive in undermining Bhutan's independence. After the Younghusband Mission, Bhutan was to move steadily into closer political alliance with the Government of India.

British suzerainty and Bhutan, 1905–07

The years following the Younghusband Mission brought Bhutan into direct relations with the Government of India. A new political charge was created provisionally, under the direct control of the Indian Government, and a Political Agent appointed to conduct relations with the Government of Bhutan.[264] The main reason which led to the transfer of political control of Bhutan away from the Bengal Government was the belief that Bhutan's relations with Tibet, which British officials, quite mistakenly, considered to be close, should be under the direct control of the Government of India. That is, until such time as relations with the Tibetans had been placed upon a more definite and satisfactory footing, and until trade, within prescribed limits, had been safely established.[265]

The change in the Tongsa Penlop's attitude to the British stemmed in large part from Younghusband's treatment of him during the Tibet Frontier Mission, and to the impression made on him by the military success of that expedition. He had decided then and there to throw in his lot with the British Government, and on his return to Bhutan had informed Lord Curzon of the fact.[266] In recognition of the friendly attitude adopted by the Bhutanese Government in connection with the scheme to construct a road up the Amo Chu, it was decided to waive the Indian Government's claim to that strip of territory, which Bell had so fortuitously discovered, at a sensitive time, to be wrongly included in Bhutan. The Tongsa Penlop's personal efforts on the British Government's behalf were to be rewarded by the signal honour of a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of the Indian Empire.

Claude White, the Political Officer in Sikkim, was deputed to visit Bhutan in order to invest the Penlop with the Insignia.

White's mission to Bhutan in 1905 was received in very different circumstances than that of the ill-fated Eden, when he had been insulted and had to fly for his life. 'From the beginning to the end of the journey I was treated almost royally, everything that was possible was done for my comfort, and Sir Ugyen's attentions were most marked'.[267] During his stay in Bhutan, White was authorised to invite the Deb Raja and Sir Ugyen Wangchuk to visit Calcutta so as to have an opportunity of 'paying their respects to the Prince of Wales during his tour of India'. On 23 December 1905, the Tongsa Penlop arrived in Calcutta as the sole representative of Bhutan, the Deb Raja having precluded himself due to his religious duties, and 'was allowed the place and honours due to a Maharaja whose salute is 15 guns'.[268] He was accorded a reception and a return visit by the Prince of Wales and the Viceroy, and was permitted to present *nazar*[269] on behalf of the Deb Raja and the Bhutan Council with expressions of loyalty to the King Emperor. The Viceroy found it most satisfactory that the advance into Tibet had marked a turning point in British relations with Bhutan. 'The Tongsa Penlop at once attached himself unswervingly to our fortunes, and has since shown himself anxious on all occasions to draw closer the bonds which unite his State to the Government of India'.[270] It was not surprising, therefore, that when the Bhutan Darbar decided to offer the Tongsa Penlop the hereditary secular chiefship of the state, the Indian Government put forward no objections. On the contrary, the fulfillment of the Tongsa's ambition to regularise his position as head of state could not have been achieved without the indirect support of the Indian Government.

The Secretary of State, John Morley, was not entirely convinced with Lord Minto's argument regarding the transfer of political control away from the Bengal Government. In his view, a greater security for maintaining friendly relations with the new Maharaja would arise if the Commissioner of the adjoining division and other officers of eastern Bengal and Assam had a hand in supervising frontier affairs. He also questioned whether, as a result of the recent events in Tibet, Bhutan had become a Native State in India under the suzerainty of HMG. 'Under ordinary circumstances it would be unnecessary to decide such a question for the purpose of determining whether the subjects of a State in the position of Bhutan would be entitled to British protection in a foreign country'. Meanwhile, Morley saw no reason to alter his opinion about allowing the local governments concerned to have direct control of Bhutan's affairs.[271]

Before his departure to attend the installation ceremony of the Tongsa Penlop as hereditary Maharaja, Claude White was anxious to take the opportunity, while he was in Bhutan, to negotiate a new treaty. One object would be to counteract China's influence in the face of her attempts to 'make a coalition of the Eastern Hill States against us'; another would be to make it worth Bhutan's while to remain on friendly terms by the offer of an increase in the subsidy, assistance in opening up roads and communications and the

encouragement of trade with British India rather than with Tibet. Permission was to be granted to develop the natural resources of Bhutan in the form of mines, tea gardens and other industries.[272] Lord Minto was averse to these measures. He thought it undesirable, at that particular moment, to open up questions regarding a revision of the treaty arrangements with Bhutan, 'or to do anything which would lead the Tongsa Penlop to believe that he had a Government guarantee for his dynasty'.[273]

The election of Ugyen Wangchuk, the Tongsa Penlop, was the first occasion in the history of Bhutan that the nobles and chiefs had decided unanimously to appoint a hereditary ruler. The process was hastened by the appearance of a new reincarnation of the Dharma Raja or the Shabdrung Rimpoché, and the death of the Deb Raja in 1907.[274] Since the seventeenth century, the Government of Bhutan had been subject to dual control, jointly exercised by the clergy and laity, in the persons of the Dharma and Deb Rajas. In the course of time these persons came to hold only nominal power, the real power passing into the hands of semi-independent Penlops, who fought continually for supreme control and nominated, in turn, their own candidates as Dharma and Deb Rajas. This state of affairs had resulted in revolutions and internecine wars, destructive to both the people and the kingdom's wealth; moreover, in the process, it had tended to destabilise the central authority of Bhutan.

White, on being informed that Sir Ugyen Wangchuk had been confirmed as the future ruler of Bhutan, pressed the Indian Government for immediate recognition of his hereditary role. 'Whereas in the past, we had to deal with the Rajas of Bhutan through their irresponsible masters, the Penlops, we will in the future deal with the responsible head of Government'. This was particularly relevant since, in White's opinion, the Tongsa Penlop had accepted high office in full reliance of the support of the Indian Government.[275] Lord Minto finally agreed, and on the occasion of the installation wrote to Sir Ugyen Wangchuk recognising him as the hereditary ruler of Bhutan.[276]

White's suggestion that a need existed to amend the 1865 Treaty with Bhutan, Lord Minto turned down. In his opinion, to alter the Treaty contemporaneously with the installation of the new Maharaja would have looked as though Ugyen Wangchuk's elevation to his hereditary position was to be guaranteed by the Government of India, and this the Viceroy had no intention of doing. Added to which, Minto had a poor opinion of White's integrity, believing that he had furthered his personal interests while serving in Sikkim and Bhutan, and a recommendation from White, therefore, was not to be seriously considered.[277] As a result, revision of the Treaty was shelved for the time being.

Chinese claims to suzerainty in Bhutan, 1908–10

The return of the Younghusband Mission from Lhasa had shown that the British Government did not covet Tibet, nor did they intend to impose a protectorate over that distant land. The direct result was to impel China to

initiate a forward policy towards Tibet as well as to the other kingdoms in the Himalayan region. As for Russia, locked in a struggle with Japan, the shadow of her malevolent interest in Tibet, which had dominated Lord Curzon's thinking, was already beginning to shorten. It was now assumed, both in Whitehall as well as in India, that Russian interests lay in Outer Mongolia and not in Tibet. In sharp contrast to these two powers were the Chinese who, alerted to their anomalous position by Younghusband's intrusion, decided to penetrate into Tibet once again in the hopes of establishing what they considered was their lost suzerainty.

The policy of the Liberal Government in England was to avoid, at all costs, complications and involvement on the Indian frontier. Two events were to take place in 1908 which highlighted Whitehall's policy, and which were to have a lasting effect on Bhutan's external relations with her neighbour, India. The first was the withdrawal in 1908 of British troops from the Chumbi valley, and the second was the replacement of Claude White by Charles Bell.[278] With the removal of the British presence from the Chumbi valley, the Chinese felt encouraged to bring Bhutan into the orbit of the Chinese Empire. Kazi Ugyen, the Bhutanese Agent, brought proof of their intent to Charles Bell. The Chinese Amban at Lhasa, as well as the Popon[279] at Chumbi, had both written to the Maharaja claiming that Bhutan was the southern gate of the Chinese Empire, and proposing that a Chinese mission would soon arrive to settle differences which had arisen due to Younghusband's interference in the affairs of Tibet.[280] On hearing of these moves, Bell decided to take no action until he had seen how the Bhutanese Darbar would receive the Chinese mission: he was well aware that the terms of the 1865 Treaty gave the British Government no rights to interfere in Bhutan's internal affairs.

When Ma Chi-fu, accompanied by twenty Chinese soldiers, arrived in Bhutan in April 1908, the Maharaja, no doubt primed by Charles Bell, first of all refused to accept Chinese claims to suzerainty over Bhutan, and thereafter made various excuses so as not to meet the Popon. The mission itself was encouraged not to proceed beyond Paro. However, the presence of Chinese officials in an area of special concern to the British Government alerted Charles Bell to the necessity of outlining the basis of a future policy towards Bhutan. The direct effect of Younghusband's mission, he declared, had been to establish Chinese influence in Tibet on a firmer basis than it had ever been before. 'The Tibetans were cowed by defeat and turned to China, the only nation that could in any way help them. By our withdrawal and our Conventions we have made over Tibet to the guardianship of China'.[281] As a result, the Chinese had sent 'one of her ablest officials', Chao Erh-feng, to Lhasa, and his brother Chao Erh-hsun to replace him in the eastern Marches, and between them to re-organise the Tibetan administration. Chinese troops had already taken possession of Chamdo and other parts of eastern Tibet, and it was unlikely that the Tibetans would effectively be able to resist China's military advance. On the other hand, China with the added advantage of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement[282] to fall back on would prove strong enough to keep other powers out of Tibet.

In Bell's opinion, it was essential to keep Chinese influence out of Bhutan and the territories of the north-eastern frontier. China claimed Bhutan as being subordinate to the Tibetan Government and, therefore, to the Emperor of China, 'partly at any rate on the ground of certain offerings made yearly by the Bhutanese Agent at Lhasa'. The Bhutanese insisted that they had made war and peace with the Indian Government in 1865 without assistance from China, and in any case China made no payment of a subsidy to Bhutan. It has never been admitted by the Bhutan Government that Chinese claims to suzerainty over Bhutan had ever existed. In fact, Bell feared that the stationing of Chinese troops in Bhutan and the interference by China in Bhutan's civil administration would develop, in time, into a serious threat to the security of India's borders.

Bell outlined his solution to the question of Bhutan coming under the control of China and the measures necessary to secure her as a neutral buffer state. It was essential for India's security that Bhutan should agree to British suzerainty, and openly acknowledge that her foreign relations were under the Government of India's control. 'Anything beyond suzerainty, by which I understand chiefly the control of foreign relations, we do not require. To control the country altogether, and thereby to push forward our frontier to the Tibetan border, would make our frontier co-terminous with that of China and would call to life those very difficulties which we are seeking to destroy'. The solution would be to get Bhutan to agree to refer her disputes with other states to the British Government, or if she was unwilling to consent to this change, then to give her assent to a clause binding her not to admit to the interference of any other state in her affairs without the consent of the British Government. If the Bhutan Government appeared willing, the 1865 Extradition Arrangement could also be amended, but this should not be pressed if Bhutan did not desire the change. Bell endorsed his predecessor's recommendation that the Bhutanese ruler should be given substantial economic and engineering assistance in building roads and developing communications between India and Bhutan. He also favoured the employment of Europeans and Indians in supervisory roles in the tea gardens, a measure which would ensure the Bhutanese being brought into contact with India; at the same time, the policy would help to produce 'a great deal of money' for the country. The remaining proposal was to increase the yearly subsidy from Rs 50,000 to one lakh of rupees per year. The subsidy would constitute an increased claim to 'our suzerainty, since Bhutan recognises the acceptance of a subsidy as in some degree a token of subordination'.[283]

The Viceroy considered Bell's proposals in the light of Chinese moves in Tibet. The transfer of Chao Erh-feng, the assignment of an increased grant from the Szechuan revenue for the reorganisation of the Tibetan administration, the occupation of Chamdo and other portions of eastern Tibet, and the establishment of a military post at Nagchuka were but some of the changes which Lord Minto considered had materially altered the *status quo* on that part of the frontier. He knew that HMG's policy with regard to Tibet limited the Indian Government's interest merely to the observance of treaties and trade

regulations. But Chinese aspirations in Bhutan could not fail to raise complications of a graver kind for the Indian Government, necessitating the location of a considerable force on the Indian border. The time had come, Minto agreed 'to frustrate the evident designs of China on Bhutan', and he endorsed Charles Bell's recommendations.

In the first instance, Bell was to go quietly to Bhutan and enter into secret negotiations with the Maharaja on the lines indicated. Should the Maharaja decline to bind himself by a fresh treaty, a further increase in the subsidy, to a limit of two lakhs, was to be offered. If it was found necessary to guarantee the Maharaja against aggression, Bell was authorised to incorporate some provision to this end in the treaty, but only if the Maharaja insisted upon it.[284]

Lord Morley at the India Office, against his natural inclination, was forced to agree that the political situation on the Bhutan section of the Indian border, due to Chinese policies in Tibet, justified a departure from the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Bhutan. The terms of the new agreement were to take the form of a revision and expansion of Article VIII of the 1865 Treaty, and its substance was to be as follows: 'The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes or causes of complaint against the Rajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred to for arbitration to the British Government which will settle them in such manner as justice may require, and insist upon the observance of its decision by the Rajas named'.[285] Bell was instructed to explain to the Maharaja that the British Government's obligation to advise and support him in the conduct of the State's foreign affairs meant that he, himself, would not enter into any agreement with other foreign states, or permit their agents to reside in Bhutan or part with land to the authorities of any foreign state. Morley did not think that the Indian Government's insistence on keeping the treaty secret was of vital necessity; nor would it weaken Britain's position with regard to China. The time and manner of it's disclosure would be determined after it had been signed.[286]

Charles Bell's Mission to Bhutan: the Treaty of 1910

Charles Bell was entrusted with the task of proceeding to Bhutan and while there persuading the Maharaja to revise the 1865 Treaty so as to place the external relations of Bhutan in the hands of the British Government. Negotiations were first initiated through the Maharaja's Agent, Kazi Ugyen, since Bell believed that not only was his influence in Bhutan considerable, but that his personal interests were bound up with those of India.[287] In Bell's opinion, it was essential to keep all knowledge of the negotiations from the Chinese and the Tibetans, and in line with these arrangements Kazi Ugyen was summoned to Darjeeling to be briefed regarding the terms of the proposed treaty.

To Kazi Ugyen, Bell explained the importance of revising Article VIII,

'which is the kernel of the new Treaty', and gave him a copy in English and Tibetan to carry to the Maharaja in Bhutan. He was to travel via Buxa Duar, since to have travelled via the Chumbi valley would have aroused Chinese and Tibetan suspicions, and to let Bell know, as secretly as possible, as soon as the Maharaja was convinced about accepting the terms of the treaty. On 15 December 1909, Bell received a summons and started for Bhutan via Siliguri and the Buxa Duar. On arrival he found that Kazi Ugyen had succeeded in persuading the members of the Bhutan Council, including the Paro Penlop whose attitude had given rise to some anxiety, to agree to discuss the provisions of a new treaty with the British Government.

Bell gave to the Maharaja and Council a complete copy of the revised Treaty in English and Bhutanese. He found the Council members initially averse to the new clause, fearing loss of independence for Bhutan, 'but their scruples were overcome, and I arranged that the Treaty should be signed on the following forenoon'. The Treaty was duly signed and affixed with the seal of the Dharma Raja, with the Maharaja's own seal, and with the seal of every member of the Council; for good measure, Bell added the seals of the 'Ta-ka Penlop, the Zhung Dro-yer and the Wang du Po-tang Jonpen, whose posts are at present vacant'. The Assembly was also persuaded by Bell to affix the seal of the Ta-tsang, or State Hierarchy of Bhutan, since 'it is as well to bind the priestly body also in such a priest-ridden country'. With some satisfaction, Bell recorded that 'by one o'clock the signing and sealing were finished, and Bhutan was incorporated in the British Empire'.[288]

Article IV and VIII of the 1865 Treaty had been amended: in Article IV, the annual allowance to the Bhutan Darbar was to be increased from Rs 50,000 to Rs 100,000; and in Article VIII, the Bhutanese Government were to agree to be guided by the advice of the British Government in their external relations.[289] Bell had not only succeeded in securing a new and revised Treaty, but the promise that the Bhutan Darbar would, if called upon, give up such pieces of land as the Indian Government might require, and remove all duty on trade between Bhutan and the Kamrup districts.[290] The Maharaja had fulfilled all his obligations in relation to the Treaty; he had also assured Bell that if the Chinese attempted to interfere in Bhutan's internal affairs, he would send word through Kazi Ugyen, and await instructions before replying.[291]

The India Office did not entirely approve of Bell's conclusions. They felt that he had gone in advance of the Treaty itself. His insistence that the Bhutanese were 'incorporated in India' and 'subjects of the British Empire' were terms which could not be justified, when an assurance had been given to the Darbar not to meddle in their internal affairs.[292] Lord Morley gave official proof of his doubts. Some of the language used by Bell, he felt, might be taken to imply a change in the fundamental relations of the British Government with Bhutan and in the status of its subjects. 'No such change is intended by the present Treaty. That Treaty marks no departure from the settled policy of HMG upon all the frontiers of India, which is to undertake no extension, direct or indirect, of the administrative responsibilities of the Government of India, and to derogate in no respect, beyond the letter of our treaty rights,

from that measure of internal independence which we have engaged to respect in the States concerned'.[293] He impressed upon the Viceroy the need to keep these views in mind and to see that they were equally understood by his officials on the frontier.

In addition to the Treaty of 1910, a further Treaty was negotiated later in the same year, which sought to simplify the antiquated extradition arrangements between India and Bhutan. The terms were: in Article I, the Government of India would agree to surrender all Bhutanese subjects accused of crimes specified in the Indian Extradition Act of 1903, and who took refuge in British territory. For their part, the Bhutan Government in Article II would agree to surrender any British subject or subjects of a foreign power whose extradition was sought, with whom the Government of India might have an agreement, and who might have taken refuge in Bhutanese territory. The Treaty was signed on 21 November 1910.[294] In it, the principle of mutual reciprocity was not observed, the Government of India undertaking to extradite only Bhutanese subjects, while the Bhutan Darbar promised to extradite not only Bhutanese and British subjects, but those of a foreign power as well. The discrepancy was justified on the grounds of inequality in civilisation and jurisprudence under British law and that operating in Princely States, the argument having been brought forward from 1865.[295]

The 1910 Treaty with Bhutan was, in fact, modelled on the British Government's treaty relations with the Indian States. Her status as a protectorate, however, differed in certain essentials: these were that Bhutan's internal independence was recognised in exchange for the Maharaja agreeing to accept British guidance on foreign policy matters. In the political management of Bhutan, Lord Morley was adamant that there was to be no change in the status of Bhutanese subjects. 'The Treaty marks no departure from the settled policy of HMG upon all the frontiers of India, which is to undertake no extension, direct or indirect, of the administrative responsibilities of the Government of India, and to derogate in no respect, beyond the letter of our treaty rights, from that measure of internal independence which we have engaged to respect in the States concerned'.[296]

Bhutan in treaty relation with the Crown, 1911–45

The Treaty of 1910 brought Bhutan into close political alliance with the British in India. To seal the friendship, the Bhutanese ruler himself was brought ever closer into the political orbit of British-India. As part of this policy the Maharaja was invited to attend the Coronation Darbar held at Delhi in 1911, for which financial assistance was granted to him out of the Indian exchequer. The Maharaja, with other Indian rulers, was required to pay homage to the King Emperor, and on this occasion, the Government of India invested him with a higher honour, that of the Insignia of Knight Commander of the Star of India. The paying of homage was in itself a political statement, the Maharaja knowing full well that none but Feudatory Chiefs participated in the ritual; nonetheless, he agreed to attend. The India Office took the broad

view that it placed Bhutan under His Majesty's suzerainty; yet they were prepared to qualify this statement since they considered it 'expedient to leave its status ambiguous as it is undesirable to extend British commitments in regard to Bhutan'.[297]

By these gestures the Government of India hoped to provide an effective antidote to Chinese attempts to influence Bhutan. The measures were not entirely successful, the Chinese continuing to interfere whenever an opportunity presented itself. An occasion occurred shortly after the signing of the 1910 Treaty which illustrates China's refusal to accept the change in Bhutan's status. There was little doubt, despite the secrecy which was supposed to surround it, that the Treaty was known to the Chinese through Bhutanese officials, who, not above temptation, had responded to the financial blandishments of their spies. Nor could Bell's appearance in unfrequented Himalayan territory saddled with extra boxes containing money, arms and ammunition have gone unnoticed.[298] In any case, it alerted the Chinese Amban at Lhasa who thought fit to send off two letters to the Maharaja, the first demanding an explanation for having allowed the Dalai Lama's men to pass through Bhutanese territory on their way to India bearing goods for the Tibetan ruler. It also ordered him to allow Chinese-Tibetan rupees to circulate in Bhutan.[299] The second letter chose to ignore the Maharaja's title and issued an order to the Deb Raja, the Paro and Tongsa Penlops. They were told that Chinese troops were to be posted at Kongbu (a district of Tibet, east of Lhasa), and that every assistance was to be given to the Popon. They were also warned '. . . not to listen to bad instructions of other people [British Government] and collect troops and make the country unsettled. If you stay peacefully as before nothing harmful will happen to you. But if you unnecessarily act unlawfully, far from you being able to save your own lives you will bring trouble to the country. As there must be some among you, the headmen who know the customs, I, the Great Minister, tell you these now with good intent; therefore explain this to all and report to this Yamen. This is important and should not be disobeyed at all'.[300]

No sooner had Minto been informed of the Chinese moves than he took prompt action on both counts. The Maharaja was to be advised not to send any reply to the Chinese, particularly since it was addressed to him in improper terms, and informed that the British Minister in Peking was in the process of making representations on the Indian Government's behalf. The British Trade Agent at Yatung was instructed to inform the Chinese Popon, in no uncertain terms, that, as Bhutan's external relations were under the control of the Government of India, it was his duty to reply on behalf of Bhutan, and in future all communications should be addressed through the Political Officer at Sikkim for transmission to the Bhutan authorities. The India Office fully agreed that it was most '. . . desirable in the first instance, in order that the Chinese may clearly understand the position, that the procedure should be followed which served for many years in the case of Russia and Afghanistan'.[301]

When Max Müller, Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, took up the matter with

Prince Ch'ing of the Wai-wu-pu,[302] the reply went much further than the Prince's note of 18 April. Then he had merely claimed that Nepal was a feudatory of China, but that Bhutan and Sikkim were both States in friendly relations with China. He was able to reassure Max Müller that 'in the event of steps being taken in the future for the reorganisation of the internal Government of Thibet . . . it should not affect those States in any way'.[303] However, having been informed of the 1910 Treaty and the change in Bhutan's status, the Prince's response was rather different. The Treaty, he said, could not affect China's long established position in Bhutan, which was '. . . that Bhutan is a vassal state of China, and from the time of Yung Cheng (AD 1723–36) has paid tribute and frequently received sealed orders from late Emperors. Moreover in the 17th year of Kuang Hsu (1891) Letters Patent under the Imperial Seal were bestowed on her'. He went on to say that the Amban in Tibet was in the habit of employing a form of manifesto when addressing the heads of the Bhutan Government, while they always replied in the form of a petition. China would continue to act in accordance with established precedent and did not intend to make any alterations in respect of the status of that country. 'Bhutan is a vassal state of China, and cannot be regarded as on the same footing with Sikkim which, in accordance with Treaty, is under the protection of Great Britain'.[304]

The terms of the note were such that they called forth an equally specific and clear statement from the Viceroy and Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office in London. Lord Minto made it clear that missions which went out from Nepal and Bhutan to China were in the nature of embassies from one court to another. Presents which they carried for the Emperor could never, in any sense, be regarded as tributes, but as a means of expressing 'our high regard and respects for the Emperor and cultivating good will of Chinese Government, especially on account of our heavy stake in Tibet'. Nor did Bhutan pay tribute to China or Tibet. Presents which she gave to the Dalai Lama were an acknowledgement of his position as head of their religion. Although in 1891, the former Deb Raja had received a seal and hat with a false coral button from the Emperor, neither had ever been used on any occasion to signify Bhutan's subservience to the Chinese Emperor.[305]

Grey was equally stern in his reply to Prince Ch'ing's note. The 1910 Treaty, he pointed out, had been concluded by Bhutan of her own free will, and the treaty put Bhutan, as far as the conduct of her foreign relations was concerned, 'on the same footing with Sikkim, whose status is recognised by the Wai-wu-pu'.[306] This view did not foreshadow any radical change in British Government attitudes to the frontier states or to China. Their assertion, however, was directly due to China's policy in Tibet which had involved the overturn of stable government in that country. Evidence of this was to be found in the despatch of Chinese troops in the direction of the frontier of India. As long as China adhered to her pledge not to prevent the Tibetan Government from fulfilling its treaty obligations to Britain, China's interests in Tibet would be recognised. 'But no attempt of the Chinese Government to exercise influence over States so remote from the sphere of

direct Chinese interests, and in such close relations with the Government of India as Nepal and Bhutan can possibly be tolerated'.[307]

The Wai-wu-pu's reply brought no assurance for the Viceroy. On the contrary, it reaffirmed their claim that Nepal and Bhutan were vassal States of China.[308] The India Office decided that it was about time that they stated their position in a manner not to invite a reply. On 8 May 1911, Sir John Jordan in Peking was instructed to inform the Chinese Government that HMG could not recognise China's claims to suzerainty over Bhutan and Nepal, and would '. . . be bound to resist any attempt by Chinese Government to impose authority on, or in any way to interfere with, either of the two States'.[309]

The end of 1911 found the Bhutan Government referring all communications received from the Chinese Amban in Lhasa to Charles Bell in Sikkim. From time to time, orders did come from 'Len Amban, the Great Minister Resident in Tibet who holds the rank of the Peacock Feathers and Pu-tu-tung by the command of the Great Emperor' to the Deb Raja urging him to submit to China. The orders chose to ignore the fact that a Maharaja now ruled in Bhutan, and by so doing the Amban made it clear that neither he nor his government had any intention of accepting the change which had taken place in Bhutan's status since the 1910 Treaty. The Bhutan Darbar was advised not to reply.[310]

On the other hand, the Bhutan Darbar was left almost entirely free from interference by the Indian Government in the internal administration of the country. When officials, tea planters and others residing in British districts bordering on Bhutan requested that Bhutanese methods of administration should be modified to promote their interests, the request was usually refused. It was considered inadvisable to accede to these wishes and '. . . press upon an unwilling Bhutan methods to which she is unaccustomed and which could not be enforced without an irritating foreign supervision'.[311] Nor was India prepared to guarantee protection or rights which the Bhutan Darbar conferred on Europeans in respect of industrial enterprises undertaken in Bhutan itself, such as mines and tea gardens. The annual subsidy of Rs 100,000 was made over to Rai Ugyen Kazi Bahadur at Kalimpong without the usual arguments which had attended each annual share-out in the past.

The internal situation in China, let alone in Tibet, after 1911 underwent a dramatic change. There can be no doubt that 1910 indicated the high-water mark of Chinese influence and prestige in Tibet. Chao Erh-feng had successfully subjugated the Marches and managed to hold Lhasa for nearly two years. Then had come the Chinese revolution, bringing with it Tibetan determination to remove the invaders from their country. The Amban was driven from Lhasa and China's armies were routed in the Marches by the forces of the Kalon Lama. The result was that by 1912 the Chinese were in no position to involve themselves in furthering their imperial designs on Bhutan. Moreover, the Tibetan Government, having expelled the Chinese from Tibet, established their *de facto* independence and adopted a policy of friendly co-operation with the Government of India.[312] As the danger of Chinese penetration into Bhutan declined, so did the British relax their control over the

external affairs of Bhutan. As a mark of their confidence, the Darbar was permitted to settle specific frontier and other disputes with Tibet, without having recourse to the Political Officer in Sikkim.[313]

The politics of Bhutan in the early years of the twentieth century was dominated by the force of character and influence of the first Maharaja. Some of that power stemmed from his close alliance with the British in India, and some from the fact that he succeeded at the start of his reign, to introduce his own relations and adherents into most of the influential positions throughout the state.[314] In internal administration some of the more powerful chiefs were allowed to enjoy a large measure of independence, but in foreign affairs the Maharaja reigned supreme so long as he consulted the Political Officer. The Tibetan influence in Bhutan had steadily declined, particularly since the priests were encouraged to devote themselves entirely to religious affairs and refrain from interfering in the internal administration of Bhutan. Difficulties which arose at the Duars between British officials and Bhutanese traders were usually referred to Raja Ugyen Dorji, as he had now become, and he, more often than not, consulted with Charles Bell as to the best method of reducing tension.

During the early years of his reign the Maharaja's main aim was to develop the natural resources of his country in the hopes of improving its financial position. Towards this end, the Maharaja invited Claude White, formerly Political Officer in Sikkim, to assist in the development of Bhutan with the help of British capital. The schemes advanced by White comprised the lease of land near the frontier of British India for the cultivation of tea, the development of the mineral resources of Bhutan and the extraction of timber and bamboo. White was to act as the Maharaja's representative and agent in the above matters and in March 1914 the Government of India recognised his appointment. However, differences arose between Raja Ugyen Dorji and White over claims put forward by the latter for his personal expenses, and the Maharaja was persuaded eventually to cancel White's appointment as his agent and representative. With his departure went schemes for European investment and European employment; it was decided, with some encouragement from Raja Dorji, not to repeat the experiment in the future.[315]

In August 1913, it was found that the full demarcation of the boundary line between British territory and the Bhutan state had still not been fully completed. The boundary referred to was the Goalpara-Bhutan border. The history of the demarcation was that in 1867 O'Donel had put down the Goalpara pillars from the west of the Manas river, but he had chosen not to visit the east side of the river. 'In the same season Butler did the Revenue Survey of Kamrup. He took pillar 79 to be the trijunction of Kamrup, Goalpara, and Bhutan, and mapped the Goalpara-Kamrup boundary from this pillar'. When the matter came to the attention of Basil Gould, the Political Officer in Sikkim in 1914, he maintained that the boundary between Goalpara and Kamrup was as that outlined in Butler's survey. The question was then referred to the Bhutan Darbar, who wanted the boundary alignment to be left as O'Donel had shown it. A year later, having received no reply to their request, the Bhutan Darbar complained that the present surveyor had

removed the boundary pillars from the trijunction and the new boundary was found to be encroaching upon Bhutanese territory. The Assam administration argued that the pillars in question had been incorrectly placed in 1877; they had now been moved correctly to places assigned in O'Donel's survey in 1867, and, indeed, as had been demanded by Bhutan itself. The Bhutan Darbar refused to accept this explanation, and insisted upon the restoration of the boundary pillars to their former position.[316]

The war years found British relations with the Bhutan Darbar continuing as cordial as ever. Charles Bell was to note that the Paro Penlop, who but a few years previously had shown open hostility to the British cause, had, since the 1910 Treaty and the removal of Chinese influence from the councils of Bhutan, come round to the British point of view. The friendliness of the Maharaja was exemplified by his willingness to turn Bhutan into a recruiting ground for Gurkha and Bhutanese troops. The scheme met with little success, due to the unwillingness of the Bhutanese to serve in a war not of their making and to the uncooperative attitude of Bhutanese officials. The Indian Government felt that the scheme had failed through no fault of the Maharaja, who had gone as far as he could by offering remission of rents and taxes for three years to all who would enlist. Apart from this commitment, the Maharaja, like any other Indian ruler, made his financial contribution to the war effort. One lakh of rupees was donated to the Imperial Indian Relief Fund, 'a considerable sum for a country where money is scarce and trade carried on by barter'.[317] The willingness of the Maharaja to contribute to the war effort found for him, in the same year, a solution to the Goalpara-Bhutan boundary which, for more than two years, had proved intractable. The Assam Government were able to furnish a set of maps which ceded to Bhutan 72½ acres more than did the old boundary. The following year also saw a settlement of the boundary between Sikkim and Bhutan near Gipmochi. Here again, evidence was found to indicate that possession of a tract of land which had been previously exercised by Bhutan, and claimed by the Bengal Government during the Younghusband Mission, was admitted to be in Bhutanese territory.[318]

In June 1916, Raja Ugyen Dorji, Prime Minister and Political Agent of Bhutan, died in Kalimpong. No history of British relations with Bhutan is complete without acknowledging the role played by Kazi Ugyen, as he was first known. At the very beginning of his association with the British, he was Curzon's channel of communication with the Tibetan ruler. Despite Curzon's suspicion of his motives, he was to serve Britain loyally and to negotiate on her behalf during the Younghusband Mission to Tibet. In later years, Raja Dorji was to use his influence with the Chiefs of Bhutan in favour of allying their country with Britain rather than with Tibet or China. He had been appointed Bhutan Agent as far back as 1888, and with the passage of time came to be used by both the British and the Bhutan Chiefs as their trusted emissary. His services were rewarded by the high rank of Deb Zimpon, bestowed on him by the Maharaja, which empowered him to settle all frontier disputes on behalf of the low-lying border areas of Bhutan. When the Maharaja was awarded his KCSI at the time of the Delhi Coronation Darbar, the Viceroy invested Rai

Ugyen Dorji with the title of Raja as a personal distinction. Throughout his long association, he voluntarily assumed a dual role, appointed and paid for out of the Indian exchequer to look after its interests in Bhutan, and on the other hand safeguarding Bhutan's interests as landlord and High Sherriff of her border territories. Raja Ugyen's death was to deprive Bhutan of one of its most trusted and experienced officials.[319]

In August 1926, Maharaja Ugyen Wangchuk, the first ruler to establish hereditary monarchy in Bhutan and to set it on the path of close political association with the British in India, also died. Hereditary monarchy was a new institution in Bhutan, and Colonel Bailey, Political Officer in Sikkim, feared that the Paro Penlop and other semi-independent Dzongpons would exploit regional differences and make a bid to remove the dynasty. To his surprise the situation was quietly accepted by all, the succession passing to the late Maharaja's son, Jigme Wangchuk, without a recurrence of the internecine warfare which was so marked a feature of the past. A factor which made for the peaceful progression was primarily the close relationship between the late Maharaja and his subordinate district officers, most of whom owed their positions to political expediency and personal relationship to him.

The new Maharaja was installed at Punakha on 4 March 1927 in the presence of Colonel Bailey, the Dharma Raja and other important officials in Bhutan. At the close of the ceremony, the insignia of the Commander of the Indian Empire, along with a *Kharita*[320] from the Viceroy, was presented to him.[321] Within three years of his accession, the Maharaja was created a Knight Commander of the Indian Empire, and this time Colonel Weir went up to the capital to invest him. Weir discovered that one of the main drawbacks facing the new ruler was the lack of old and experienced advisers. Although the Maharaja had inherited the political acumen and clear sightedness of his late father, he was still young and inexperienced, and his chief adviser was Raja Sonam Tobgye Dorji, the son of the late Raja Ugyen Dorji. In consequence. Weir expected the Maharaja, in all probability, to turn more and more towards the Political Officer in Sikkim for advice in matters regarding both the internal and external policies of Bhutan.[322]

Weir also found the Government of Bhutan to be vested, in theory, solely in the hands of the Maharaja. In actual practice, he found him to be very little more than an overlord of the province of Tongsa. His main source of income, which, in a sense, was the source of his power, came from a portion of the subsidy handed out by the British Government; one lakh being divided among the Paro Penlop, the Dzongpons of Thimpu, Punakha and Wangdiphodrang, and the lesser Dzongpons in the west. In Weir's opinion the subsidy was painfully inadequate and he said as much. 'If Bhutan is to advance on more modern lines and is not to be allowed to disintegrate, she must have increased financial support'. She also faced the danger of Chinese pressure on Tibet forcing itself southward and in turn, affecting the north-east frontier of India, particularly if Bhutan collapsed as an entity.

When Frederick Williamson visited Bhutan as part of his duties in December 1933, he too stressed the need for an increase in Bhutan's subsidy.

The Maharaja argued that the annexed Duars and Kalimpong sub-division were highly prosperous and undoubtedly brought in considerable revenue for the Government of India, a revenue out of all proportion to the subsidy which the Indian Government were prepared to give him as compensation. He accepted that the annexations were due to the 'faults of Bhutan, which was not at the time under effective rule of one central authority, but he considered that he was not unreasonable in asking as a matter of equity and not of right, that the present subsidy should be very substantially increased'. As Williamson saw it, the increase should be a matter of policy. The Maharaja's position was not entirely secure and he was, at present, little more than the 'overlord of a confederation of Chiefs who are bound to him only through personal interest and the feeling that the Government of India are more ready to help a combined Bhutan to maintain its position than they would be to help a number of petty independent chiefs'. Many of the chiefs, given sufficient outside inducement in money or promises, would be prepared to join any movement which would enable them to throw off the Maharaja's control. To forestall such an attempt, Williamson recommended that the Maharaja should be given assistance in time of peace to help consolidate his position, and not when trouble threatened, when it would be more than useless for him to try and control the situation.[323]

The schemes the Maharaja had in mind to improve both the security and the financial condition of the state, were the creation of a small body of 500 armed police, which would enable him to deal with internal unrest, but which would not be sufficiently large to attract attention in Tibet; and the improvement of communications to enable him to control the country and expand trade. The provision of medical relief, a change in the system of taxation, educational and veterinary facilities and the introduction of irrigation were some of the proposals put forward by the Bhutan Darbar to bring prosperity to the territory. In Williamson's opinion, Bhutan had a great deal to fear from the ever-present danger of China attempting to re-establish her control over Tibet; if she ever did, '. . . our position would be immeasurably helped by the presence of a loyal and friendly Bhutan firmly established under a neutral ruler, as a buffer against her'. He emphasized the urgent need for a substantial increase in the Maharaja's subsidy.

The general concensus of opinion at the India Office was that they did not approve of Political Officers who held views regarding their political charges. 'Reforming zeal is natural in the few lucky Political Officers who visit Bhutan. It is, however, dangerous and one has to be on one's guard against infection'. There was no reason to suppose that reform in Tibet, Nepal or Bhutan on modern lines would suit either them or India. As for a small body of armed police whose immediate function would be to cow the federal chiefs, the India Office was having none of it. 'This all sounds very familiar. It reminds one of the pitiful history of Kalat when the Khan, with the help of the Government of Sind, was raising mercenary troops against his federal chiefs. This led on of course to years of civil war, which only ended with the appearance of Sandeman, the reconciliation of the Khan and chiefs and the disappearance of

the armed force'.[324] The decision in London went against encouraging the sort of reforms Williamson had in mind in a state on India's borders of which little was known and which could, in time, prove both inconvenient and unprofitable. In India, the Foreign Department's primary concern was the maintenance of an autonomous Tibet against Chinese inroads. Until a decision had been reached regarding the extent of their financial commitment to Tibet, the question of an increase in subsidy to Bhutan could not be considered.[325]

The Government of India Act of 1935 did not provide Bhutan with a seat in the Council of States of the Federal Legislature of India. The argument put forward for not doing so was that the definition of Bhutan's status remained irregular. The precise legal definition of the status was described as semi-sovereign foreign State: foreign, because she was not in law an Indian State, and semi-sovereign, because her sovereignty in external affairs was limited by the Treaty of 1910.[326] This somewhat anomalous position worried the Maharaja, particularly since the 1935 Act would, in time, make over to India the rights and privileges that the British Government enjoyed in relation to Bhutan. He wrote of his anxiety to the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon.[327] He pointed out that India would be the beneficiary by having handed over to her by the British the full government of land which formerly belonged to Bhutan in the Himalayan region. The land, having been developed by the industry and efforts of British pioneers, was far more valuable than when it was annexed. The Maharaja asked that an extra Rs 200,000 of annual subsidy should be granted to him before Lord Willingdon left India for good. 'That sum represents, as Bhutan's share, an infinitesimal fraction of the past and present and future profits which have accrued and will accrue to India'. Willingdon refused to reopen the question of an increased subsidy 'during the few days that remain to me in India'.[328]

In the internal affairs of Bhutan, the Government of India Act of 1935 made no substantial change. Moreover, the Indian Government continued to expect from Bhutan its political co-operation and acceptance of control in foreign relations; at the same time they acknowledged that there was little cause to call on these rights so long as no outside force threatened Bhutan or unsettled the north-east frontier of India. The outcome of these measures was that, whenever questions of jurisdiction over British subjects or matters relating to extradition of offenders arose, the Political Officer in Sikkim could be relied upon to prevent any miscarriage of justice without raising the political temperture, or bringing into focus any awkward legal questions. Internally, the Bhutan Government enjoyed total autonomy. Any issues which troubled the Indian Government were routed through the Political Officer in Sikkim, who, in turn, submitted periodic reports with suggestions for the maintenance of good relations with Bhutan.[329]

The most persistent demand from Bhutan remained the Maharaja's request for an increase in the annual subsidy. On the whole, however, official thinking remained unchanged on this point and it was not until the Second World War threatened, when Sir Basil Gould succeeded in getting what it had not been

possible to obtain since 1924, the Government of India's consent to an increase in the annual subsidy. The subsidy was increased by half the sum demanded, that is by Rs 100,000, and even then, it carried the stipulation that it was only for the duration of the war. Gould's arguments for an increase were no different to those of Weir and Williamson in the years before the war, the poverty of the state proving to be a barrier to any development in administration. Where his reasoning differed was over Bhutan's ability to hold herself in the British interest, when Britain was having to defend herself on two fronts; he thought it open to grave doubt. Gould proposed that Bhutan should be permitted to undertake her own defence. 'Against the cost of giving financial help to Bhutan may be set the cost which would involve maintaining regular troops for the protection of the country. In so large and so mountainous an area a battalion would go nowhere, and the maintenance of a single battalion might well amount to 10 lakhs of rupees a year'. In other words, an increase in subsidy would be used to guarantee a defence force which would free the Government of India from actively having to invest in Bhutan's defence themselves. Bhutan would undertake to recruit Gurkhas, and make a contribution to the war effort of a grant of Rs 60,000 towards the Viceroy's War Fund, and another Rs 10,000 to the Vicereine's Red Cross appeal.[330]

Nearly eight years had passed since Williamson had expressed anxiety regading China's inclination to pursue an active forward policy in Tibet and beyond it to India's borders. Modern Chinese maps, Gould discovered, gave clear indication of Chinese ambitions extending far into the British sphere of influence. If there was reason to watch for Chinese interference in Bhutan in 1933, there was more cause to do so now. The Government of India's repeated rejection of the Maharaja's requests was tending to disturb the ruler's confidence in himself and it was affecting the stability of Bhutan. 'Either the power and prestige of the ruler of Bhutan must increase or it must wane. In Bhutan as elsewhere money talks. The acts of beneficence and of power by which rulers are judged cost money, which in the case of Bhutan has been lacking'. In exchange for an increase in the subsidy, the Government of India might consider asking Bhutan to agree to a modification of the 1910 Treaty; in other words to suggest that she might admit herself to be part of India on the same footing as Sikkim.[331]

The question of Dewangiri was brought forward by Gould on the insistence of the Maharaja. The district had been annexed in 1865 because it was thought to be an ideal location for a military garrison. The Maharaja wanted 30 square miles of territory in the area leased or given back to Bhutan, particularly since he personally laid great store by it and also because the present value of Dewangiri to the British Government was practically nil. The loyalty shown by Bhutan in the face of the Japanese threat, in Gould's opinion, required a *quid pro quo*. Moreover, the presence of the Maharaja at Dewangiri would bring him into closer touch with India. The suggestion was turned down by the Government of India on the basis that the procedure for altering the boundaries of a province was extremely cumbrous, nor did they think that the

Maharaja's presence in Dewangiri would influence him to favour India because of the proximity of the area to the Indian frontier.[332]

Problems arising between Tibet and Bhutan regarding the rendition of Tibetans who had settled in Bhutan and *vice versa,* or disputes over grazing rights on the eastern frontier of Bhutan, were referred by the Darbar to the Political Officer. The Maharaja was usually told that the internal affairs of Bhutan were his concern, although he was encouraged to send copies of any correspondence he might have with the Tibetan authorities to the Political Officer. In the case of mutual grazing arrangements between Bhutan and Tibet, the Maharaja was advised to write a conciliatory letter to the Tibetan Government offering to settle the question through Bhutanese and Tibetan officers on the spot. In the main the Government of India did not interest themselves or offer to undertake responsibility in small frontier matters.[333] The India Office had its reservations to this policy. 'In so far as the position of Bhutan is assimilated to that of an Indian State, this is in theory wrong'.[334] In practice, however, they were prepared to allow it to stand, and not to interfere in the Indian Government's decision.

When the Shabdrung Rimpoché, or Dharma Raja, now a purely spiritual leader, became discontented and tried to recover some of the powers of his predecessor, the matter was reported by Raja Dorji to Williamson in Sikkim. One reason for his discontent, Raja Dorji explained, was the influence of Congress activities in India, and most particularly a visit by the Shabdrung's brother to Gandhi. The Maharaja feared that the Shabdrung would escape into Tibet, especially since he knew that the Dalai Lama's sympathies lay with him.[334] Suspecting that the Shabdrung had already crossed into Tibetan territory, the Bhutan Darbar decided to despatch troops into Tibet to arrest him. The India Office viewed these developments with a measure of concern. Under Article VIII of the 1910 Treaty, Bhutan had agreed to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external affairs. Since the Shabdrung's offence was political, it could not be said to come under such informal extradition arrangements for minor offences as the British Government had with Tibet. When the matter was brought to the notice of the India Office they were insistent that the Political Officer in Sikkim should in no way be seen to exceed his brief by tendering advice to the Bhutan Government and if he had already done so, it was hoped that it was not of an authoritative nature. 'I hope the India Foreign Office will squash this sort of interference in the internal and semi-spiritual affairs of what is *not* an Indian State. Dorji and the Maharaja seem to have played Mr Williamson very skilfully with the Congress fly. As if the Rimpoché hadn't a thousand internal grounds for discontent'.[335]

A few months later, the Shabdrung Rimpoché's death was announced under what the Indian Government considered were highly suspicious circumstances.[336] An explanation of the circumstances was offered by the Maharaja, the letter being accompanied by a note from the Kashag, or Tibetan Government.[337] The Tibetans protested strongly at the despatch of Bhutanese troops into Tibetan territory, and were justifiably annoyed to find them

openly announcing that their orders were to arrest or kill the Shabdrung Rimpoché whether in Tibetan territory or outside it. The sanctity of the Shabdrung Rimpoché was acknowledged both in Tibet and in Bhutan, and it was, therefore, all the more shocking when news came shortly afterwards of his death; the Tibetan Government, not unnaturally, attributed it to foul play. Colonel Weir, although prepared to admit that the Tibetans had cause to complain, found the tone of the letter from the Kashag offensive. It was couched in terms of a suzerain to a subject country, he complained. 'Although the lamaist church of Bhutan is to some extent subordinate to the Dalai Lama . . . the country is, and has always been, independent of Tibet'. Feeling as strongly as he did, Weir took it upon himself to discuss the matter with the Dalai Lama. He informed the Tibetan ruler that any punishment inflicted on the Shabdrung Rimpoché was purely an internal matter for Bhutan, and since Bhutan's relations with foreign states was controlled by the Government of India' they would be 'prepared to support Bhutan if matters went further'.[338]

The India Office were of the view that there was no need to go further than to give 'a strong hint orally' to the Tibetan Trade Agent; for it was not Indian Government policy to extend their responsibilities in Bhutan, an extension which might ultimately lead to friction with Tibet. '. . . the case affords a typical argument *against* turning Bhutan into an Indian State; and an illustration of unwise meddling by the Political Officer in internal affairs. The action proposed seems sound. But I sympathise with Tibet'.[339] The interference of Tibet in the Shabdrung affair, and the Political Officer's role in matters affecting Bhutan, particularly in relation to her internal affairs, led the Government of India and the India Office to look once again into the status of Bhutan.

The end of the British connection: status of Bhutan, 1946–50

The status of Bhutan had been brought into question as early as 1924, when Maharaja Ugyen Wangchuk, fearing that, on his death, there might be opposition to his son's accession, asked the Political Officer in Sikkim to give an assurance that he would personally install and secure the succession of the Wangchuk dynasty. The request gave rise to Lord Reading, the Viceroy, examining the status of Bhutan. The legal position raised two separate questions. Was Bhutan under the suzerainty of HMG, and if so, was it in India? To the first, it was thought that Bhutan's agreement to Article III of the Treaty of 1910, in which she accepted control of her external relations by Britain, meant that she clearly parted with that full external sovereignty which 'is the necessary attribute of an independent Sovereign State'. Legally, therefore, there was no need to go outside the Treaty of 1910 to find authority that Bhutan was a state under the suzerainty of the British Government.

To the second question, as to whether Bhutan was a state in India, the answer depended on whether the suzerainty of HMG over Bhutan was exercised through the Governor General in India or through any Governor or officer subordinate to the Governor General. Since HMG's control over the

external relations of Bhutan was exercised through the Political Officer in Sikkim, acting under the instructions of the Government of India, Lord Reading had no doubt that the answer was in the affirmative. So far as purely legal considerations went, Bhutan was a state in India under the suzerainty of the King Emperor, or in other words, an ordinary Indian State. However, on closer inspection, Reading found that Bhutan had not been treated juridically as an Indian State; none of the rights or duties of the Paramount Power in regard to the internal administration of an Indian State had been claimed in the case of Bhutan. She had been left to enjoy and experience the function and authority of internal sovereignty, and Reading wondered if it was politically expedient to change that role. He decided that since no specific advantage would accrue to India in an extension of her commitment to Bhutan, 'apart from the sterilisation of China . . . and a general amenability to our control, to leave the status of Bhutan in convenient ambiguity, with its easy transition – should this hereafter prove advisable – to the status of an Indian State'.[340]

Independence was largely a question of recognition, was the India Office view. Degrees of dependence and independence existed in the Government of India's relations with other states. Although HMG controlled the relations of Afghanistan, it had never been suggested that the Amir had put himself under the suzerainty of the British Government by accepting the limitation. In the case of Bhutan, however, the Maharaja had voluntarily paid homage to the King Emperor, and there were grounds for saying that, as a result, Bhutan was under the suzerainty of HMG. 'If it is going too far to say that Bhutan is already in the position of an ordinary Indian State, it is certainly time to say that it is in the process of becoming one'.[341]

Bhutan's status also came under scrutiny by the Federal Structure Committee in 1932 while they examined the workability of her external relations in conjunction with the legal changes which were about to be incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1935. The ambiguity which had attached to a precise definition of her status in the past was thought unacceptable in the light of a future federal constitution for India. The best means, put forward to bring a frontier state within the orbit of federation, was to make provision in the Federal Constitution for 'potential units' like Bhutan to qualify for adherence.[342] To do so, Bhutan would have to take the initiative to secure the status of an Indian State or a federal unit.[343] 'The affairs of Bhutan appertained to the Viceroy so far as their dynastic or internal matters were concerned, but became matters for the Governor General in the Reserved Department of External Relations on frontier affairs'. In any event, Bhutan's direct relations were in the hands of the Political Agent and, therefore, came under the second category.

In 1940, Sir Olaf Caroe, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, reviewed the relations of the states and tribal areas of the North East Frontier of India; he did so in the context of one to the other, with India and with China and Tibet. The review arose out of the importance attached to the frontier as a security for India during the Second World War. Inevitably it brought into question the status of the frontier states. In Caroe's opinion, China's tradition

was to work through Tibet and to claim for Chinese suzerainty whatever Tibet could influence. One such area was Bhutan. It was only since the 1865 Treaty that the ruler of Bhutan had come more and more to rely on his connection with India. Before that, Bhutan's status showed that she had ancient links with Tibet and China. Examples of this were to be found in the right of granting a seal of office to the ruler of Bhutan by the Emperor Ch'ien Lung in 1836. Pemberton's report in 1837 showed clearly the power of China in Bhutan, and the deference shown by the Bhutanese to the wishes of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Moreover, when in 1877, the Deb Raja reported to Lhasa the wishes of the British Government for a road to be constructed through Bhutan, Chinese and Tibetan officials were despatched to Bhutan to support him in a refusal. With regard to Tibet, as early as 1774 the Panchen Lama, in his correspondence with Warren Hastings, had claimed Bhutan as a dependency of the Dalai Lama. Up to the 1940s, Bhutan had continued to maintain an agent at Lhasa. Caroe doubted whether federation was the right solution for Bhutan, particularly since the state was really a Protectorate in close treaty relations with HMG.[344]

The end of the war saw the arrival in India of the Cabinet Mission to work out a formula for the independence of India. Its arrival drew from the Maharaja of Bhutan a memorandum asking for a review of existing treaties between Bhutan and the Crown. Bhutan, the Maharaja stated, was not an Indian State, it was in fact more akin to Tibet and China than to India. Until 1860, Bhutan had acknowledged Tibetan suzerainty, and to show that this was so, had continued to pay, up to the present time, a nominal subsidy to Tibet.[345] Although he had every sympathy with the aspirations of the Princes and the peoples of India, he felt some apprehension that these political changes would affect adversely the agreements existing between Bhutan and Britain. He requested that a Bhutanese representative should be allowed to put Bhutan's case to the Cabinet Mission. The request was turned down, an assurance being given that 'Bhutan's special position will be given very careful consideration before the time comes for the British Government to transfer authority in India to Indian hands'.[346]

The Maharaja's anxiety about the future of his kingdom was shared by the Political Officer, A J Hopkinson. He wanted an assurance that Bhutan would not be confronted with a decision classifying it as an Indian State, which, in his view, it was not. 'Bhutan's treaty is with Britain. Bhutan, at present, wants to be and to remain within the British Commonwealth'. That having been acknowledged, they would then wish to enter into a new tripartite agreement with Britain and India on revised terms, including an increase in subsidy and the return of annexed Bhutanese territory. The Bhutan Darbar's argument was that since India was being given back to the Indians, it was reasonable to suppose that Bhutanese territory should be returned to Bhutan. The aim should be of a friendly and contented Bhutan within the Indian union rather than in the Chinese orbit. 'Bhutan is now friendly and anxious for continued friendship; but negligence or contempt would soon drive it – and much else besides – into the open arms of China, and bring a foreign power, perhaps

Russia, to India's doors'.[347] To eliminate this danger, one solution, Hopkinson advocated, would be for Britain to continue to give Bhutan her subsidy for a limited period, 'as a gesture symbolic of continued friendship for Bhutan'.

A solution to the Bhutan problem was discussed at the India Office. One school of thought offered the analogy of South Africa as a solution of anomalously situated territories on the borders of India. The British High Commissioner had certain responsibilities in regard to territories in South Africa which were not brought under the jurisdiction of the Union Government.[348] The reason for this omission being South Africa's policy towards the African population. Others at the India Office saw the policy as totally unworkable because, unlike the South African territories, Bhutan had been treated as 'an embryonic Indian State' since 1910. To separate it from India would involve putting Bhutan under British protection exercised by a British representative in India 'with little effective means at his disposal' to carry out the task. In any case, the British Government had never administered the state, and there were practical, as well as political, difficulties in putting the suggestion into operation. For a start, Indian nationalist opinion would not readily tolerate the excision of territory from India or 'the perpetuation in the frontier states of British influence and of the paramountcy which elsewhere is to lapse upon the transfer of power'.[349]

As the Cabinet Mission contemplated the position of Bhutan in the event of the supersession of the paramountcy of the King Emperor by the new Indian Union, two definite views emerged. One, that the British Government would be well advised, at this juncture, to avoid entering into fresh commitments with any of the Frontier States, or seeking to redefine their political status. Their importance to India was strategic, in direct relation to Tibet and China, and indirectly to Russia. Any adjustment of their relations with the Indian Government, therefore, would be governed by those political and strategic considerations, 'rather than by constitutional niceties which do not help defence policy'.[350] And two, that if India chose to go out of the Commonwealth, it would be impracticable for Bhutan to remain within it. The most that could be offered was help in negotiating a fresh treaty for Bhutan with the future Indian Government.

Prior to Indian independence, Hopkinson in Sikkim was urging the Indian Government to explain to Bhutan the effect that constitutional developments in India would have on existing relations with HMG. It was hoped that an assurance would be given that present relations would continue on the same 'standstill basis' as had been proposed for the Indian States. In the case of Bhutan it would be on the basis of existing treaties or until such time as these were mutually terminated.[351] While Hopkinson was pleading Bhutan's case, the Maharaja was submitting a memorandum of his own. Now that HMG was ceding British India back to the Indians, the Government of Bhutan felt sure that 'HMG will cede back to Bhutan, if not the whole at least a part of the territories which only eighty-two years ago rightfully belonged to Bhutan'. The areas the Maharaja had in mind were part of the Buxa Duars, the undeveloped areas around Dewangiri and the forest lands adjoining the

borders of Bhutan. Using the analogy of Pakistan, the argument he put forward was that the population of these areas was predominantly Bhutanese.[352] In Bengal, the tracts claimed by the Maharaja comprised 100 square miles approximately; whereas in Assam, the area was considerably larger, approximating to 400 square miles. The response to this request was not initially encouraging, the Government of India refusing to cede any territory whatsoever to Bhutan before the transfer of power.[353]

The official announcement of the transfer of power from Britain to India went out to the Bhutan Government on 23 July 1947. It promised HMG's continued friendly interest in the future prosperity of Bhutan, and hoped that the close and cordial relations which had existed between them, would be accorded to the successor Indian Government 'upon whom alone the rights and obligations arising from the existing Treaty provisions will heretofore devolve'.[354] At the same time, the Indian Government undertook to retain the existing posts in Sikkim and Tibet. The presence of a Political Officer at Gangtok, simultaneously responsible for relations with Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan, was felt to be the best guarantee for the northern principalities' special position to be recognised.[355]

As in India, so in Bhutan, imperial affiliations came to an end on 15 August 1947. The British Government formally handed over authority to the national Governments of India and Pakistan. For Bhutan and the other Himalayan States, it was India who assumed the role of successor government. India's agreement with Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet continued on the basis of a Standstill Agreement until a new treaty was negotiated. With regard to Bhutan, however, India did not sign a Standstill Agreement, both governments choosing to operate as if they had. The Bhutan Agent in India, Raja Dorji, continued to function in his previous capacity, and it was he who brought the Bhutan Darbar's reply to the Indian Government. In it, they agreed to abide by the arrangement subsisting between HMG and themselves and wished 'with all convenient speed after August 15th, to enter into negotiations with the Government of India in regard to fresh arrangements for the future'.[356]

It was not until 1949 that negotiations were begun for a formal Indo-Bhutan Treaty. Bhutan asked for recognition of its independence and the restoration of the Dewangiri hill strip on the frontier with India. When the Treaty came to be signed on 8 August 1949, it incorporated the essential provisions of the 1910 Treaty by which India recognised Bhutan's independence, and undertook not to interfere in her internal administration. Article VIII of the 1910 Treaty was also incorporated, whereby the Bhutan Government agreed to be 'guided by the advice of the Government of India in its external relations'. The Indian Government, in its turn, agreed to restore the Dewangiri tract to Bhutan, and the annual subsidy was increased to Rs 500,000.[357]

Bhutan was probably fortunate in securing the terms that she did from New Delhi in 1949. At the time, India did not consider that any serious threat existed to the north-east Himalayan fringe, and therefore saw no reason to redefine her political or strategic relationship with Bhutan. By the time the Chinese offensive against independent Tibet had been launched in 1950, and

Chinese forces had entered western Tibet from Sinkiang into territory claimed by India, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was forced to put a different interpretation on his frontier policy. If he had been more perspicacious in 1949 and showed some understanding of the history of China's claims to the northern frontier, India's terms would probably have been more exacting with regard to Bhutan, as indeed they were a mere few months later in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal in 1950, and the retention of Sikkim as a Protectorate in the 1951 Treaty with that State.

Whatever concern India and Bhutan showed initially over the political and strategic implications of Communist China in Tibet, it was put aside while India embarked on her policy of 'peaceful co-existence' with China. Bhutan, like India, continued to assume that the Himalayan frontier posed no active threat and therefore no fundamental change was required in their mutual foreign and defence policies. Bhutan's representative at Lhasa, the suitability of which Sir Olaf Caroe had previously questioned, continued to function as before, while trade and political relations between the two kingdoms flourished in near-normal conditions. It was not to last; when the storm broke in Tibet in 1959, India discovered that one of the most valuable links in the security of the northern frontier was indeed the kingdom of Bhutan. The 1949 Treaty had precluded any interference in Bhutan's internal administration, nor had it given India the right to assume responsibility for Bhutan's defence. It was to come later. For in 1960, India found that China's offensive against Tibet had brought Chinese border guards to patrol the passes from the Tsona district of Tibet into Bhutan. Simultaneously, Chinese cartographical claims to sections of Bhutan's northern borders coincided with statements by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai defining Bhutan as 'the southern gate' of the Manchu Empire. New Delhi was forced to recognise Bhutan as one of the more vulnerable points in India's security system, and particularly so since no treaty arrangements existed for her defence. To rectify this, several economic-aid agreements, including roads linking Central Bhutan with India, were concluded in 1960. In 1961, the Indian Army was formerly entrusted to train the Royal Bhutan Army. By implication, at least, it brought Bhutan into the defence system of India.[358]

India, somewhat belatedly, came to understand that the Communist perspective of China, in relation to the states on the Himalayan periphery, posed the same threat as the Manchu Emperor's claims to Bhutan had done in 1865. Then, at least, it had been recognised that India, for her own security, should attach to herself, in a union of interests, all those parts of the Himalayan frontier which looked to her for protection and whose disintegration would throw open her own defences.

Notes

1. *Ralph Fitch, England's pioneer to India and Burma*, T Fisher Unwin (London, 1899), p. 116.
2. *The East India Gazetteer*, Parbury and Allen (London, 1828), 2nd edition, vol 1, p. 272.
3. Clive, Robert (1725–74) created first Baron of Plassey, 1762; Governor of Bengal, 1758–60 and again in 1765–67.

4. IOR: *MSS Eur D 1073*, Letters from Major James Rennell, Rennell to Burrington, 30 Aug 1765. *See* also *H/765* Home Miscellaneous, 1758–85.
5. *A note concerning early Anglo-Bhutanese relations*, A R Field, East and West, New Series, vol 13, no iv (Rome, 1962), pp. 340–45.
6. *Sannyasi:* One who has abandoned all wordly possessions and affections, a Brahmin of the fourth order, religious mendicant.
7. *Faqirs:* poor, needy, indigent men, religious mendicants. Referred to by Rennell as 'a kind of sturdy begger'.
8. IOR: *MSS Eur D 1073*, Rennell to Burrington, 30 Aug 1765.
9. *Ibid* Rennell to Burrington, 16 Nov 1767.
10. *Ibid* Rennell to Burrington, 20 Jan 1768.
11. *Terai:* low-lying swampy land at the foothills of the Himalaya.
12. IOR: *MSS Eur E 78*, History of Sikkim, compiled by Their Highnesses the Maharaja Sir Thutob Namgyal and Maharani Yeshés Dolma of Sikkim, 1908 [typescript], pp. 87–88.
13. IOR: *H/219*, 16 Feb 1768, f. 325.
14. Warren Hastings (1732–1818), Governor General of Fort William in Bengal, 1774–85.
15. *Trade through the Himalayas: the early British attempts to open Tibet*, Schuyler Cammann (Princeton, 1951), p. 26.
16. IOR: *E/4/620*, Despatch to Bengal, 10 Apr 1771, p. 541.
17. IOR: *H/108*, 15 Jan 1773, pp. 25–40.
18. IOR: *H/117*, 17 Oct 1774, pp. 9–13. Tashilhunpo Monastery, near Shigatse, is the seat of the Panchen Lama, who in this case was the IVth Incarnation, Lobsang Tan-pai Nyi-ma (1781–1854).
19. Prithvi Narayan Shah, King of Nepal, was opposed to the growth of British power in the Himalaya; in consequence his intervention was not entirely altruistic.
20. *A collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and the neighbouring countries*, Charles Umpherston Aitchison, vol XIV, pt IV (Calcutta, 1929), no i, pp. 89–90.
21. IOR: *MSS Eur E 226/8–14*, Bogle Papers. *See* also *Narratives of mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, Clement Robert Markham (London, 1876), pp. lxviii-ix.
22. *Tassisudon*, so referred to in early British records, but more correctly Tashichho Dzong.
23. Markham, *op cit*, pp. 5–9.
24. IOR: *MSS Eur E 226/23*, Bogle to Hastings, 27 Apr 1775.
25. IOR: *MSS Eur E 226/86*, Hamilton to Bogle, 29 Dec 1775.
26. *Ibid*, Hamilton to Hastings, 30 May 1776.
27. *An account of an embassy to the court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, Capt Samuel Turner (London, 1806).
28. IOR: *H/219*, 9 Jan 1783, pp. 455–56. *Zamindar:* a landholder, one who pays revenue direct to government.
29. *Ibid*, p. 469, Hastings to Wheler, 22 Apr 1784.
30. IOR: *H/608*, 26 Jan 1786, p. 22.
31. Fn. no 21, p. 142.
32. IOR: *H/608*, 6 Jan 1789, p. 33.
33. IOR: *P/11/25*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 25, 25 Mar 1802.
34. *Hats:* market places where fairs were held on certain days.
35. IOR: *P/118/49*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 58, 26 Apr 1809.
36. IOR: *P/118/55*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 66, 19 Jan 1810.
37. IOR: *F/4/771*, no 20906, Board's Collections, Jul 1811.
38. Richard Colley Wellesley, Marquess Wellesley (1760–1842); Governor General at Fort William in Bengal, 1798–1805.
39. IOR: *F/4/162*, no 2804, Board's Collections, 30 Jun 1802.
40. Francis Rawdon-Hastings, 2nd Earl of Moira, created Marquess Hastings in 1817 (1754–1826); Governor General at Fort William in Bengal, 1813–23.
41. IOR: *V/27/230/30*, *Papers respecting the Nepaul war*, enc in Secret Letter from Lord Moira, 22 May 1815, p. 556.
42. IOR: *H/648*, 29 Nov 1814, pp. 481–83.
43. IOR: *H/650*, Scott to Monckton, 20 Jan 1815, p. 72.
44. IOR: *F/4/810*, no 21724, Board's Collections, Nov 1814-Jun 1823, pp. 22–129.

45. IOR: *P/120/65*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 30. 14 Jun 1817. *See* also F/4/594, no 14300, Board's Collections, Jun 1817.
46. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XII, pt IV, no ii, (Calcutta, 1933), pp.230–35.
47. *Duars* means 'gateway'. There were eighteen Duars in all, eleven touching on Bengal and seven on Assam. The term Duar is now used to cover the entire tract along the southern Bhutan border.
48. The Bengal Duars were: Dalimkote, Zumerkote, Chamurchi, Lucki, Buxa, Bhulka, Bara, Goomar, Keepo, Cherrung and Bagh.
49. The Assam Duars were: Booree-Goomah, Kalling, Ghurkhalla, Banska, Chappagoorie, Chappa Khamar and Bijni.
50. *Dzongpon:* governor of a dzong or fort.
51. *Sanad:* a royal ordinance or mandate.
52. *Ahoms:* a branch of the Shan race which crossed the Pitkai range in the 13th century and established its own kingdom over eastern and central Assam. The Ahom King Chakradhraj recovered all his territories from the Mughal conquerors in 1667 and pushed the imperial frontier back to the Manas river.
53. *Political mission to Bootan, comprising the reports of Ashley Eden, Cpt R B Pemberton with W Griffith's journal and the account by Baboo Kishen Kant Bose*, (Calcutta, 1885), p.10.
54. The payment was known as *posa*.
55. *History of the relations of the government with the hill tribes of the north-east frontier of Bengal*, India Home Department (Calcutta, 1884), pp.10–12.
56. Eden, *op cit*, p.11.
57. *Sepoy:* in Anglo-Indian usage, a soldier disciplined and dressed in the European manner.
58. *Report on Bootan*, in Eden, *op cit*, pp.7–9.
59. IOR: *P/127/22*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 78. 14 Aug 1834.
60. *Sebundy:* men born and bred in tracts similar to those they were recruited to serve in.
61. *Report on the eastern frontier of British India*, Robert Boileau Pemberton (Calcutta, 1835), pp.16–21.
62. IOR: *P/127/31*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 7, 29 Feb 1836.
63. *Zinkaff:* described by Pemberton as a class of official dependents in Bhutan, who collected tribute in the Assam Duars.
64. At the head of the Bhutan Government there were two supreme authorities, the Dharma Raja, the spiritual head who succeeded by incarnation, and the Deb Raja, the temporal head who, in theory, was elected by the Council. In practice he was often the nominee of whichever of the two Penlops of East and West Bhutan happened to be the most powerful. To aid the Rajas in administering the country was a Council of Ministers. In addition to the seven ordinary members of the Council, there were three extraordinary Members, who attended the Council and were liable to be called on to attend the Council in cases of emergency. They were the Paro Penlop or Governor of West Bhutan; the Tongsa Penlop or Governor of East Bhutan; and the Daga Penlop or Governor of Central Bhutan.
65. *Iqrarnama:* a deed of assent, or acknowledgement in general.
66. Eden, *op cit*, pp.14–15.
67. David Scott, 1826–31; Thomas Campbell Robertson, 1831–34; Francis Jenkins, 1834–61.
68. Pemberton, *op cit*, p.34.
69. IOR: *F/1706*, no 68908, Board's Collections, McNaughton to Pemberton, 7 Aug 1837.
70. *Report on Bhutan*, in Pemberton, *op cit*, p.38.
71. *Ibid*, pp.39–40.
72. IOR: *P/127/29*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 5, 24 Dec 1835.
73. IOR: *P/127/31*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 6, 12 Jan 1836.
74. *Papers relating to Bootan*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1865, xxxix, 47, Précis by Aitchison, 19 May 1864, pp.1–2.
75. Pemberton, *op cit*, pp.93–95.
76. *India and Bhutan*, Kapileshwar Labh (New Delhi, 1974), p.36.
77. Pemberton, *op cit*, p.98. 'When on his contending for the insertion of a clause in the proposed Treaty authorising the Booteahs to build houses in Rungpore,

I asked whether, if such a privilege were conceded, he would also insert a condition granting a similar authority to any person the British Government might wish to send into Bootan. He immediately called out "No! No! Say nothing more on the subject".'
78. Pemberton, *op cit*, p.99.
79. *The politics of Bhutan*, Leo Rose (Cornell, 1977), p.59.
80. IOR: *P/194/70*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 116, 12 Sep 1838.
81. IOR: *P/195/20*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 93, 24 Jul 1839.
82. IOR: *E/4/766*, Despatch to Bengal, no 12, 11 May 1841.
83. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, 19 May 1864, p.2.
84. George Eden, created Earl of Auckland, 1839 (1784–1849); Governor General, 1836–41.
85. IOR: *L/P&S/6/57*, Political Letter from India, 12 Oct 1841, pp.283–87.
86. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, p.3. The total sum of the net revenue for the Assam Duars came to Rs 26,104. The Bhutan Darbar was paid an annual sum of Rs 10,000 for them.
87. James Andrew Brown, Lord Dalhousie, created Marquess of Dalhousie, 1849 (1812–60); Governor General, 1847–56.
88. *Penlops:* In the eighteenth century several officers could claim the title of Penlop, though their areas of jurisdiction varied widely. By the early nineteenth century only two Penlops were of any consequence, the Tongsa Penlop, who administered Bhutan east of the Black Mountain range, and the Paro Penlop, who exercised broad authority over western Bhutan, as well as the principal trade routes to India and Tibet.
89. IOR: *L/P&S/6/75*, Political Letter from India, 11 May 1855, p.248.
90. *Ibid*, 25 May 1855, p.649.
91. IOR: *L/P&S/6/76*, Political Letter from India, 22 Nov 1855, pp.606–07.
92. *Ibid*, 22 Nov 1855, pp.608–09.
93. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, p.4.
94. IOR: *P/201/59*, Bengal Political Consultation, nos 15–16, 15 Jun 1856.
95. *Ibid*, no 17, 25 Jun 1856.
96. IOR: *P/201/61*, Bengal Political Consultation, nos 19–21, 1–16 Jul 1856.
97. IOR: *P/202/13*, Bengal Political Consultation, nos 10–13, 6 Dec 1856.
98. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, 20 Jan 1857, p.5.
99. *Soubah:* Dzongpon or Governor of a dzong or fort.
100. IOR: *P/202/19*, Bengal Political Consultation, nos 65–66, 17 Apr 1857. Both these Duars had been attached once already and ceded back to Bhutan in 1780 and 1784 respectively.
101. IOR: *P/202/38*, Bengal Political Consultation, no 15, 8 Dec 1857.
102. *British policy in India 1854–1905*, Sarvepalli Gopal (Cambridge, 1965), p.ix.
103. IOR: *P/204/11*, Bengal Political Consultation, nos 19–20, 31 Dec 1859.
104. IOR: *P/204/13*, Bengal Political Consultation, nos 7–8, 17 Feb 1860. Ambari Falakata was ceded to Bhutan in 1784 by Warren Hastings. From 1842 it was leased by the Company for an annual payment to Bhutan of Rs 2,000. In 1860 this payment was withheld by the Government of India.
105. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, Viceroy to Wood, 22 Feb 1862.
106. Charles John Canning (1812–62), Earl Canning; Governor General and first Viceroy of India, 1856–62.
107. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, Hopkinson to Bengal, 19 Nov 1861, pp.98–99. The Dalimkote Soubah declared that the outrage which the Bhutanese were accused of committing in Cooch Behar had never taken place, and he demanded the restitution of Ambari Falakata with no strings attached.
108. *Ibid*, Hopkinson to Bengal, 12 Nov 1861, p.112.
109. *Ibid*, Letter to the Deb and Dharma Rajas, 31 May 1862, p.127.
110. *Ibid*, Beadon to Deb Raja, 26 Nov 1862, p.129.
111. *Ibid*, Deb Raja to Agent North-East Frontier, enc in letter of 30 Dec 1862, p.132.
112. *Ibid*, p.10. James Bruce, 8th Earl of Elgin (1811–63); Viceroy of India, 1862–63.

113. IOR: *L/P&S/6/527*, India Political Despatch, no 492, 11 Aug 1863.
114. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, Durand to Eden, 11 Aug 1863, pp.137–39. Although the British had repeatedly confessed to knowing little or nothing of the internal administration of Bhutan, yet they found it necessary to inform Eden that '. . . from the inequality of the state of civilization and the administration of justice in the British possessions and in Bootan, there can be no system of strict reciprocity between the two Governments. There are no securities for fair and impartial trial in Bootan such as exist under British laws'.
115. IOR: *L/P&S/6/531*, Indian Political Despatch, 11 Aug 1863, draft treaty, pp.238–41.
116. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, Durand to Eden, 25 Sep 1863.
117. Eden, *op cit*, pp.53–54. The Chebu Lama was a Minister in the Sikkim Council. He put his loyalty to the British above that to the Sikkim Darbar, and for which he was amply rewarded. He was to render valuable service to the British during their operations against the Sikkim Raja in 1861.
118. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, Eden to Durand, 10 Nov 1863, pp.142–43.
119. *Ibid*, Viceroy to Wood, 8 Feb 1864.
120. *Ibid*, Eden to Durand, 21 Apr 1864, p.148.
121. IOR: *L/P&S/6/90*, Foreign Letter from India, no 28, 8 Feb 1864.
122. Eden, *op cit*, pp.74–75. 'I sent for the Zinkaffs . . . They would not come, making one excuse after another for delay. At last I threatened to have them punished, and they came'.
123. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, p.148.
124. *Ibid*, p.149. 'No notice was taken of us; we were stopped when-ever we went out, and told that we must stay in camp till further orders, and were treated with insolence when we declined to do so . . . attempts were made to make us dismount from our ponies whenever we came near the residence of the police *Darogah*, and all villagers were punished who sold us provisions or had any communications with our camp'.
125. *Ibid*, pp.139–41.
126. *Ibid*, p.153. 'The Penlow replied that they had never agreed to the draft treaty, but had only told me to have it fair-copied; that that did not hinder them; that he had never consented to it, and never would consent to that or any other treaty until the Assam Dooars were returned; that I had chosen to come there, and if I had no authority to treat on all matters I should not have come at all, but having done so, I could not be allowed to go without settling the only matter in which he had any interest'.
127. IOR: *L/P&S/6/531*, India Political Despatch, no 39, 1 June 1864, pp.175–237.
128. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, pp.153–54. 'The Penlow took up a large piece of wet dough and began rubbing my face with it; he pulled my hair and slapped me on the back, and generally conducted himself with very great insolence. On my showing signs of impatience or remonstrating, he smiled and deprecated my anger, pretending that it was the familiarity of friendship, much to the amusement of the large assemblage of bystanders'.
129. IOR: *L/P&S/6/90*, Foreign Letter from India, no 28, 8 Feb 1864.
130. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, p.159.
131. *Ibid*, Lawrence to Wood, 1 Jun 1864, p.146.
132. *Ibid*, p.147.
133. IOR: *L/P&S/6/534*, India Political Despatch, no 39, 18 Jul 1864.
134. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, p.221.
135. *Ibid*, Durand to Bengal, 9 Jun 1864, p.225.
136. *Ibid*, Viceroy to Deb Raja, 9 Jun 1864, p.226.
137. *Ibid*, Survey Report by H H Godwin Austen, Jun 1864, pp.244–60.
138. *Ibid*, Memorandum on the Dooars of Bootan, by E H J Lance, 2 Aug 1864, pp.264–76.
139. IOR: *MSS Eur F 78/89–1–2*, Sir Charles Wood Collection, translation of a letter from the Dharma Raja, 3 Aug 1864.
140. *Papers relating to Bootan, op cit*, Durand to Bengal, 12 Sep 1864, pp.281–83.
141. *Ibid*, p.84.

142. *Ibid*, Durand to Bengal, 12 Nov 1864, pp.322–23, includes Proclamation.
143. IOR: *L/MIL/17/13/16/6*, Frontier and overseas expeditions from India, vol 4 (Simla, 1907).
144. *Ibid*, p.142.
145. *Ibid*, p.143.
146. IOR: *MSS Eur F 78/89–3*, Minute by Sir Charles Wood, [nd].
147. *Bhotan and the Dooar War*, David Field Rennie (London, 1866), pp.94–97.
148. IOR: *MSS Eur F 90/26*, Sir John Lawrence Collection, Wood to Lawrence, 10 Apr 1865.
149. *Further papers relating to Bootan*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1866, lvii 13, Viceroy to Wood, 16 Jun 1865, p.3.
150. IOR: *MSS Eur F 90/26*, Wood to Lawrence, 17 Apr 1865.
151. *Further papers relating to Bootan*, *op cit*, Viceroy to Deb Raja, 6 Jun 1865, p.5.
152. IOR: *L/MIL/17/13/16/6*, *op cit*, p.152.
153. pp.320–21.
154. *Further papers relating to Bootan*, *op cit*, Kharita to Deb Raja, 23 Sep 1865, p.51.
155. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, part IV, no VI, pp.96–98.
156. *Bhutan: a kingdom in the Himalayas*, Nagendra Singh (New Delhi, 1972), p.46.
157. *Further papers relating to Bootan*, *op cit*, Viceroy to Wood, 22 Nov 1865, pp.64–65.
158. *Ibid*, Deb Raja to Bruce, 23 Nov 1865, p.111.
159. *Ibid*, Bruce to Bengal, 3 Dec 1865, p.110.
160. *Ibid*, Bruce to Tongsa Penlop, 11 Nov 1865, pp.98–99.
161. IOR: *MSS Eur F 90/49A*, Beadon to Lawrence, 25 Jan 1866.
162. IOR: *L/MIL/17/13/16/6*, *op cit*, p.153.
163. IOR: *P/437/72*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 57–59, 27 Nov 1867.
164. IOR: *P/438/1*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 104–07, 21 Jan 1868, pp.94–98.
165. IOR: *P/438/1*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, no 23, 18 Feb 1868 in Apr 1868, p.24.
166. In January 1878 and again in January 1879 further arguments arose over the payment of the subsidy. In each case, the Bhutanese sent an officer of inferior rank to that of Dzongpon, neither time was the subsidy withheld, nor was the status of the official brought into question.
167. Rose, *op cit*, p.65. '. . . the Bhutanese had on occasion attempted to use the Tibetans and Chinese as counterbalance to the British. Prior to 1865, the Tongsa Penlop had been the most ardent advocate of such a policy . . . The failure of the Tibetans and Chinese to do anything to aid the Bhutanese in the 1865 war and the obvious disparity between British and Tibetan-Chinese strength exposed this policy as obsolete. From this time on, the Tongsa Penlop accepted as an absolute necessity the need to reach terms with the British if Bhutan was to survive – and if his family was to prosper'.
168. IOR: *MSS Eur F 112/414*, Curzon Collection, Younghusband to Miller, 30 Mar 1904.
169. *Further papers relating to Bootan*, *op cit*, Wood to Lawrence, 1 Feb 1866, p.109.
170. IOR: *P/438/10*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 75–77, Aug 1870, pp.105–11.
171. IOR: *P/438/1*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, no 28, 2 Apr 1868, p.26.
172. IOR: *P/1919*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 390–409, 6 May 1882 in Aug 1882, pp.341–42.
173. IOR: *P/773*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, no 15, 18 Aug 1874 in Oct 1874, pp.11–15.
174. *Further papers relating to Bootan*, *op cit*, Deb Raja to Bruce, 21 Aug 1865, p.59.
175. *Talooka:* Has various shades of meaning in different parts of India. In the present context it applied to tracts of land in Bengal, not easily distinguishable from *zamindari*, and sometimes subordinate to or dependent on *zamindars*.
176. *Ibid*, Note on the future boundary between the territories of the British Government and Bootan, 4 Oct 1865, p.66.
177. IOR: *P/765*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 633–34, Jun 1872 in Jul 1872.
178. IOR: *P/766*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 371–73, 18 Sep 1872 in Oct 1872.

179. IOR: *P/769*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, no 129, Jun 1873.
180. *Ibid*, no 134.
181. IOR: *P/3281*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 139–40, Oct 1888.
182. IOR: *P/4183*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 170–73, 4 Feb 1892.
183. George Douglas Campbell, eighth Duke of Argyll (1823–1900); Secretary of State for India, 1868–74.
184. IOR: *P/438/9*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, no 124, 3 Oct 1869 in Jan 1870, p.104b.
185. IOR: *P/1216*, India Foreign Political Proceeding, nos 166–76, 2 Jan 1878, pp.343–50.
186. PRO: *FO 17/1014*, IO to FO, 2 Jan 1886. *See* also Aitchison, vol XIV, pt IV, *op cit*, p.85, states that a joint Tibetan and Chinese mission was sent to Paro 'which settled certain terms of agreement between the Tongsa Penlop and Alu Dorzi, the ex-Thimpu Jongpen'.
187. *History of Bhutan*, Bikrama Jit Hasrat (Bhutan, 1980), pp.119–20.
188. IOR: *MSS Eur D558/3*, Lansdowne Collection, Cross to Lansdowne, no 12, 21 Mar 1890, p.25.
189. *The gazetteer of Sikkim*, Sir Herbert Hope Risley (Calcutta, 1894), p.viii.
190. IOR: *L/P&S/7/45*, Political and Secret Letter, no 150, 28 Aug 1885, pp.338–95.
191. Chefoo Convention, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1876, lxxii, C 4735, pp.67–75.
192. IOR: *L/P&S/7/48*, Political and Secret Letter, no 163, 11 Aug 1886.
193. *The Younghusband Expedition*, Parshotam Mehra (London, 1958), pp.64–66.
194. IOR: *MSS Eur F 130/8B*, Dufferin Collection, Dufferin to Cross, 10 Oct 1887.
195. PRO: *FO 17/1108*, Foreign Letter, no 22, 7 Feb 1888.
196. *Ibid*, India Foreign Letter, no 152, 8 Sep 1888.
197. *Ibid*, India Foreign Letter, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1888.
198. IOR: *L/P&S/7/139*, no 1376, Political and Secret Letter from India, 28 Oct 1901.
199. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/158*, Curzon Collection, Curzon to Hamilton no 23, 24 May 1899.
200. *Vakil:* an attorney or authorised representative.
201. PRO: *FO 17/1407*, India Foreign Letter, no 198, 26 Oct 1899.
202. *Papers relating to Thibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1904, lxvii, Cd 1920, no 1, enc 1 in no 37, 22 Dec 1899, p.119.
203. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/6*, Hamilton Collection, Curzon to Hamilton, no 52, 18 Nov 1900.
204. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/158*, Curzon to Hamilton, no 64, 28 Dec 1899.
205. *Papers relating to Thibet, op cit*, enc 2 in no 37, 23 Apr 1900, p.120.
206. *Garpons:* Principal officers in Ngari. For details of negotiations, see Lamb, *op cit*, pp.245–49.
207. *Papers relating to Thibet, op cit*, no 29, 26 Oct 1899, pp.102–03.
208. *Ibid*, enc 4 in no 37, 8 Jun 1901, p.121.
209. *Ibid*, annexure in no 37, 8 Jun 1901, pp.121–22.
210. *Ibid*, enc 3 in no 44, 31 Oct 1901, pp.129–30.
211. *Ibid*, no 44, 13 Feb 1902, p.126.
212. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/9*, no 49, Curzon to Hamilton, 5 Nov 1901.
213. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/340B*, Tibetan letter from Ugyen Kazi, 12 Apr 1910.
214. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/8*, no 27, Curzon to Hamilton, 11 Jun 1901.
215. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/6*, Curzon to Hamilton, 18 Nov 1900.
216. *Papers relating to Thibet, op cit*, no 31, 17 Oct 1900, p.113. Dorjieff was described in the *Journal de Saint Petersburg* as 'First Tsami Hamba of the Dalai Lama of Tibet'.
217. *Papers relating to Thibet, op cit*, enc 1 in no 38, 25 Jul 1901, p.123.
218. *Ibid*, annexure 2 in no 45, 26 Mar 1902, p.131.
219. *Ibid*, enc in no 49, 18 Jul 1902, p.140.
220. *Ibid*, no 57, 2 Oct 1902, p.145.
221. IOR: *L/P&S/7/154*, no 798, Walsh to Bengal, 30 Apr 1903.
222. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/11*, no 27, Curzon to Hamilton, 11 Jun 1901.
223. IOR: *MSS Eur D 510/13*, nos 2 and 11, Curzon to Hamilton, 8 Jan and 12 Mar 1903.
224. Ugyen Gyatsho was a Tibetan who formerly resided in Sikkim, and had

long been in British government service.

225. *Correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part I, 1903, 24 Sep 1903, p. 10. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8169 (May 1904).
226. *Ibid*, enc 5 in no 7, p. 11.
227. *Sikhim and Bhutan*, John Claude White (London, 1909), pp. 281–82.
228. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/209*, no 97, Curzon to Younghusband, 4 Apr 1904.
229. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, Part II, 1904, 18 Dec 1903, p. 29. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8364 (Mar 1905).
230. *Ibid*, Bell to Bengal, 14 Dec 1903, p. 33.
231. *Ibid*, Younghusband to India, 12 Jan 1904, p. 48.
232. *Ibid*, Bengal to Marindin, 30 Dec 1903, p. 50.
233. *Ibid*, Tongsa Penlop to Marindin, 30 Dec 1903, pp. 74–76.
234. *Ibid*, Macpherson to India, 20 Jan 1904, p. 76.
235. *Ibid*, Younghusband to India, 19 Feb 1904, pp. 103–06. Younghusband took the opportunity to sound the envoy regarding the disposition of the Paro Penlop, whom he believed to be more truculent than his fellow chiefs. His reason for asking, the Commissioner explained, was that in a letter to him [ie Younghusband] 'he had addressed me disrespectfully, he had addressed me as "three times excellent" while styling himself as "five times excellent"'. As a result, Younghusband had no option but to return the letter to him.
236. *Ibid*, Younghusband to India, 22 Feb 1904, pp. 111–12. '. . . the Bhutanese Envoy in his heart of hearts is on the side of the Thibetans. But he is intelligent enough to see that we have a good case, and he is shrewd enough to see that the Thibetans are behaving like fools and children in so obstinately keeping us at arms length'.
237. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part III, 1904, 27 Feb 1904, p. 40. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8415 (May 1905).
238. *Ibid*, Bell to Garrett, 23 Sep 1903, pp. 6–8.
239. *Ibid*, Younghusband to India, 13 Mar 1904, pp. 53–54.
240. *Ibid*, India to Brodrick, 28 Apr 1904, pp. 57–58.
241. *Ibid*, Dharma Raja to Younghusband, 29 Apr 1904, pp. 58–59.
242. *Ibid*, Tongsa Penlop to Younghusband, 16 Apr 1904, pp. 106–07.
243. *Ibid*, Younghusband to Trimpuk Jongpen, p. 108.
244. *Ibid*, India to Brodrick, 6 Jun 1904, p. 118.
245 *Kalon Lama and Ta Lama*: Tibetan Council Ministers (Kalon); Mongolian title originating in 1638 for the subordinates of the Dalai Lama.
246. *Ibid*, India to Brodrick, 24 Jun 1904, p. 135.
247. *Ibid*, India to Walsh, 26 May 1904, p. 142.
248. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part IV, 1904, 2 Jul 1904, pp. 2–3. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8509 (Oct 1905).
249. *Ibid*, Walsh to Younghusband, 3 Jun 1904, p. 26. On arrival the Tongsa Penlop was thanked for granting permission to construct the road through Bhutan, and told that payment would only be made after the final alignment had been decided upon.
250. *Ibid*, India to Brodrick, 6 Aug 1904, p. 77.
251. *Ibid*, Younghusband to India, 9 Jul 1904, pp. 86–89.
252. *Ibid*, Dalai Lama to Tongsa Penlop, 9 and 11 Jul 1904, p. 124.
253. *Ibid*, Translation of a letter from the Tibetan National Assembly, 24 Jul 1904, p. 140.
254. *Ibid*, Younghusband to India, 27 Jul 1904, pp. 144–46.
255. *Ibid*, Younghusband to the Dalai Lama, 27 Jul 1904, p. 147.
256. *Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Thibet*, part V, 1904, 17 Aug 1904, pp. 10–13. Foreign Office Confidential Print 8410 (Oct 1905).
257. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, pt II no 1, pp. 22–25.
258. *Affairs of Thibet*, *op cit*, Younghusband to India, 22 Aug 1904, pp. 20–21.
259. *Further papers relating to Thibet*, Parliamentary Papers (HoC) 1905, lviii, Cd 2370, no III, no 149, 8 Sep 1904, pp. 60–61.

260. *Lhasa*, Percival Landon (London, 1906), p.202.
261. *India and Tibet*, Francis Edward Younghusband (London, 1910), p.204.
262. *Affairs of Thibet, op cit*, Younghusband to India, 28 Aug 1904, p.38.
263. *Ibid*, Walsh to Younghusband, 3 Jun 1914, p.26.
264. IOR: *L/P&S/7/178*, Political and Secret Letter, no 1094, 6 Jan 1905.
265. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, no 25, Minto to Morley, 21 Feb 1907.
266. IOR: *MSS Eur F 111/210*, no 81, Ugyen Wangchuk to Curzon, 6th day of the 12th month of the Bhutan Shing-Duk year.
267. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, White's report on relations between the British Government and Bhutan, 19 Aug 1906.
268. IOR: *L/P&S/7/183*, Political and Secret Letter, no 1869, 20 Sep 1905.
269. *Nazar:* gold coins symbolizing allegiance to a person or office.
270. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, no 25, Minto to Morley, 21 Feb 1907.
271. *Ibid*, no 49, Morley to Minto, 3 May 1907.
272. *Ibid*, no 1702, White to India, 8 Apr 1907. *See* also no 793, White to India, 24 Feb 1908.
273. *Ibid*, no 981, Minto to Morley, 8 Jun 1907.
274. *Shabdrung Rimpoché:* Properly known in Bhutan as Zhabs-drung Rin-poché. Nga-wang Namgyal assumed the title of Shabdrung Rimpoché in 1639, and became the temporal and spiritual ruler of Bhutan. He unified the kingdom and promulgated his sixteen tenets carved on a wooden seal, known as the *Nga Chu-dugma* o· *My Sixteen Accomplishments*. The Deb Raja, properly known in Bhutan as Brug Sde-srid, or Druk De-si, was the secular head of state.
275. *Ibid*, no 2065, White to India, 24 Apr 1907.
276. *Ibid*, no 522, Minto to Ugyen Wangchuk, 16 Nov 1907. *See* also no 2891, Report by Campbell of Installation ceremony, Dec 1907.
277. IOR: *MSS Eur D 575/8*, Morley Collection, Minto to Morley, 5 Jul 1906, p.108.
278. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, no 2033, Bell to India, 1 May 1908.
279. *Popon:* Chinese official known to the Tibetans as Po-pon, the Paymaster. In this case the Chinese magistrate at Pipitang in the Chumbi valley.
280. *Tibet past and present*, Sir Charles Bell (Oxford 1924), p.100.
281. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, Note regarding future policy in Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim by Charles Bell, 24 Jul 1908.
282. Anglo-Russian Convention, Parliamentary Papers (HoC), 1908, cxxv, Cd 3750, 31 Aug 1907, p.477, and Cd 3753 (ratified version of Cd 3750), p.489.
283. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, no 2033, Bell to India, 1 May 1908.
284. *Ibid*, no 174, Minto to Morley, 1 Oct 1908.
285. *Ibid*, no 13, Morley to Minto, 25 Jun 1909.
286. *Ibid*, enc 1 in no 13, IO to FO, 22 Apr 1909.
287. *Ibid*, no 825-T, Bell to India, 18 Jun 1910. 'Rai Ugyen Kazi Bahadur applied on behalf of the Bhutan Darbar for a piece of land at Kalimpong . . . and an official residence for the Bhutan Agent and for trading purposes. The Government of India sanctioned the grant of 18.14 acres rent free, to the Bhutan Darbar for the above purpose . . . the land has been formally handed over to Rai Ugyen Kazi Bahadur'.
288. *Ibid*, no 47T-C, Bell to India, 25 Jan 1910.
289. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, pt IV no ix, 8 Jan 1910, pp.100–01.
290. *Ibid*, no 102T-C, Bell to India, 20 Feb 1910.
291. *Ibid*, no 81T-C, Bell to India, 16 Feb 1910. 'He appears to intend to abide loyally by the terms of the recent Treaty and accepts whatever advice I have hitherto offered him. He is a man for whom one cannot help entertaining a strong regard. In character and intellect he stands above anybody that I have met in Bhutan, Tibet or Sikkim'.
292. *Ibid*, no 472, IO minute, 12 Apr 1910.
293. *Ibid*, no 10, Morley to Minto, 15 Apr 1910.

294. Aitchison, *op cit*, vol XIV, pt IV, no X, 21 Nov 1910, pp.102–03.
295. *Our Indian protectorate*, Charles Lewis Tupper (London, 1892), pp.365–66.
296. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2226*, no 10, Morley to Minto, 15 Apr 1910.
297. *Ibid*, P 6349, Note by IO, 8 Jan 1929.
298. IOR: *L/P&S/10/221*, no 68T-C, Bell to India, 4 Feb 1910.
299. IOR: *L/P&S/10/223*, no 837, Minto to Morley, 12 Jun 1910. The Dalai Lama had fled to India, earlier that year, as Chao Erh-feng's troops moved into Lhasa.
300. *Ibid*, no 1424, Minto to Morley, 4 Oct 1910.
301. *Ibid*, Ritchie to FO, 8 Oct 1910.
302. *Wai-wu-pu:* In 1901, the Tsungli Yamen, a central body for the conduct of China's foreign relations, became a full Ministry of the Manchu Imperial Government and came to be known as the Wai-wu-pu.
303. *Ibid*, no 3427, Prince Ch'ing to Max Müller, 18 Apr 1910.
304. *Ibid*, no 4294, Note from Wai-wu-pu, 28 Oct 1910.
305. *Ibid*, no 1752, Minto to Morley, 6 Dec 1910.
306. *Ibid*, no 2845, Grey to Jordan, 23 Dec 1910.
307. *Ibid*, no 3296, Jordan to Prince Ch'ing, 17 Jan 1911.
308. *Ibid*, Jordan to Grey, 3 Apr 1911.
309. *Ibid*, no 3488, Morley to Hardinge, 11 May 1911. Jordan sent the Viceroy translations of the Manchu patents conferring on the ruler of Nepal his subordinate status to China. The Imperial Decree of 1796 also commended King George III for his 'humble loyalty to our Celestial Dynasty' and commanded him to 'display continued energy and dutiful loyalty so as to deserve our perpetual favour'. The India Office thought it to be a 'striking example of the worthlessness of Chinese official phraseology as evidence of political rights. It would have been entertaining to hear King George's own comments on this document – if he ever saw it'.
310. *Ibid*, enc in no 2, Hardinge to Crewe, 30 Nov 1911.
311. *Ibid*, no 134 E.C, Bell to India, 30 May 1911.
312. IOR: *L/P&S/10/432*, no 43257, Alston's memorandum on Tibet, 1 Jan – 30 Aug 1913.
313. IOR: *L/P&S/11/15*, P 4347, Memo by IO, 28 Jul 1913.
314. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2223*, P 2104, Bell to India, 29 Apr 1912.
315. *Ibid*, P 2930, Gould's report for 1913–14, 11 Jun 1914.
316. *Ibid*, P 2358, Bell to India, 12 May 1915.
317. *Ibid*, P 2590, Bell to India, 18 May 1916.
318. *Ibid*, P 3427, Campbell to India, 18 May 1818.
319. *Ibid*, *Pioneer Mail*, 24 Jun 1916 in P 2590.
320. *Kharita:* official letter.
321. *Ibid*, P 3204, Bailey's report, 25 May 1927.
322. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2222*, PZ 3112, Weir's report, 2 Apr 1931.
323. *Ibid*, PZ 1321, Williamson's report, 22 Dec 1922.
324. *Ibid*, PZ 1503, Note by Bray, 16 Nov 1934.
325. *Ibid*, PZ 5360, Caroe to Gould, 27 Jul 1934 and no 2159x, Menon to Gould, 1 Jun 1936.
326. *India's constitution in the making*, Sir Benegal Rau (Madras, 1963), pp.395–401.
327. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2222*, PZ 4337, Maharaja Jigme Wangchuk to Willingdon, 20 Feb 1936.
328. *Ibid*, Willingdon to Wangchuk, 7 Apr 1936.
329. *Ibid*, PZ 6536, Gould's report, 26 Aug 1938.
330. *Ibid*, PZ 1514, Gould to India, 22 Nov 1941.
331. *Ibid*, Ext 5159, Gould to India, 30 Apr 1943.
332. *Ibid*, Ext 4459, Caroe to Gould, 18 Sep 1944.
333. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2229*, P 3118, Bailey to India, 5 Apr 1928.
334. *Ibid*, P 6066, Note to Wakely, 1 Dec 1928.
335. *Ibid*, PZ 7004, Williamson to India, 5 Oct 1931.
336. *Ibid*, Note by Bray, 17 Nov 1931.

337. *Ibid*, PZ 58, Maharaja Jigme Wangchuk to Weir, 18 Nov 1931. *See* also Kashag to Maharaja of Bhutan, 12 May 1932.
338. *Ibid*, PZ 4087, Weir to India, 29 May 1932. *See* also PZ 329, Weir to India, 11 Nov 1932.
339. *Ibid*, Note by Bray, 3 Aug 1932.
340. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2226*, P 1030, Reading to Olivier, 7 Feb 1924.
341. *Ibid*, Notes by Chamier and Hirtzel, 16 and 21 Apr 1924.
342. IOR: *L/P&S/12/4369*, PZ 7776, India to Secretary of State, 18 Dec 1934.
343. *Ibid*, PZ 2011, Memo on the future definition of India and the position of areas in India which are not qualified for Federation, 28 Jul 1931.
344. *Ibid*, PZ 2514, Note by Caroe, *The Mongolian Fringe*, 18 Jan 1940. 'We may perhaps again press into service the Persian Gulf analogy and compare Bhutan with Bahrain as an independent State in special treaty relations with HMG'.
345. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2222*, Ext 3859, Memorandum by Maharaja of Bhutan, 7 May 1946.
346. *Ibid*, Ext 4854, Cabinet Delegation to Raja Dorji, 26 May 1946.
347. *Ibid*, Hopkinson to India, 17 May 1946. No Political Officer, let alone Hopkinson, had ever before advocated ceding back annexed territory to Bhutan. On occasions, when the British India Government suggested realignment in Bhutan's favour, it was generally the Political Officers who stood out against it.
348. *Ibid*, Note by Croft, 7 Aug 1946.
349. *Ibid*, Note by Gibson, 8 Aug 1946.
350. *Ibid*, Ext 4854, Note by Patrick, 10 Aug 1946.
351. IOR: *L/P&S/12/2226*, Ext 6989, India to Secretary of State, 17 Jun 1947.
352. *Ibid*, Ext 7445, Bhutan memorandum, 18 Jul 1947.
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355. *Ibid*, Ext 7470, India to Sikkim, 23 Jul 1947.
356. *Ibid*, Ext 8175, Bhutan to Sikkim, 11 Aug 1947.
357. Singh, *op cit*, pp. 131–35.
358. Rose, *op cit*, pp. 74–92.

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Details of all sources used in this study are given in the notes to the main sections (pp. 142–62, Tibet; pp. 276–87, Sikkim: pp. 370–80, Bhutan). Here it may suffice to list the main original sources in summary fashion but to provide fuller details for published works. For a more comprehensive account of relevant sources in the India Office Library and Records and certain other centres, readers should consult the companion volume to *Himalayan Triangle* entitled *A guide to source materials in the India Office Library and Records for the history of Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765–1950*.

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Appendix: Brief notes on other archival sources in Britain, India, Sikkim, Bhutan and China

1. THE BRITISH LIBRARY: DEPARTMENT OF MANUSCRIPTS

Limited material relating to the early period of Anglo-Tibetan relations is to be found in the Additional MSS. The following have been consulted.

BL Add MSS 39871, f. 51
BL Add MSS 39892, f. 22 and f. 26

2. THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Copies of the greater part of the correspondence between the Government of India and the India Office relating to Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan and those concerned with the conduct of British relations with China, were sent by the India Office to the Foreign Office. This correspondence comprises Foreign Office minutes and despatches and Consular reports from Chungking and Nanking in China. Also included is correspondence from St Petersburg specifically relating to Tibet and Sikkim; from the Political Officer in Sikkim, the Trade Agent at Gyantse and Chumbi and the Nepalese Government. The material is to be found particularly in the Foreign Office Confidential Prints published on a yearly basis. They have proved to be an invaluable source of information for all aspects of this study. The following series have been consulted:

FO 17 China. This series, listed as Various contains correspondence from the India Office in the form of drafts, despatches, draft telegrams, telegrams.

FO 17/1108, FO 17/1109, FO 17/1745–1756 deal solely with Tibet and Sikkim.

FO 228. The series contains correspondence between the Peking Legation, its Consulates and the Government of India.

FO 65 Russia. The series contains correspondence between the Russian Foreign Ministry in St Petersburg and the Foreign Office in London. For the purpose of this study, correspondence relevant to Tibet and China has been consulted.

3. NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI

Range of materials relating to Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan closely parallel the official records in the India Office. This is particularly true with reference to the Bengal and India Proceedings for the early years of the East India Company's rule in Bengal, and later for British administration in India.

4. THE DALAI LAMA'S LIBRARY OF TIBETAN WORKS AND ARCHIVES, DHARAMSALA

Contains a large collection of rare Tibetan texts and manuscripts, the emphasis being on works of a religious nature. There is also a section on archives relating to monasterial administration in the Tibetan provinces, edicts from the Dalai Lamas, documents relating to tax and revenue systems.

5. THE NAMYGAL INSTITUTE OF TIBETOLOGY, GANGTOK, SIKKIM

No information regarding the extent of its archival holdings.

6. ROYAL BHUTAN LIBRARY, THIMPHU, BHUTAN

Large collection of Bhutanese records and religious manuscripts. Also correspondence with the British Government, the Deb Raja, the Tongsa Penlop, the Paro Penlop during the Bhutan War. Contains correspondence of the Deb Raja and the Tongsa Penlop with Colonel Younghusband during the Tibet Mission to Lhasa in 1904.

7. STATE ARCHIVES OF CHINA

The archives of the Ming and Qing period relating to foreign affairs are divided between the Palace Museum in Taiwan, the Institute of Modern History in the Academia Sinica in Taiwan, and the Ming-Qing archives, sometimes known as the Number One Archives in Beijing. The last institution contains the documents of the Zong li Yamen [referred to in this study as the Tsungli Yamen] or the Century Foreign Affairs Office. The collection numbers some 100,000 items and includes material dealing with about fifty foreign countries. Some foreign language materials, among them Tibetan, Mongol, Uighur and Manchu, are to be found among the Zong li Yamen Collections; foreign language documentation also exists in other parts of the Ming-Qing archives. Documents relating to the Republican period are housed in Nanjing and are known as the Number Two Archives.

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